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Preface
Plural logic has become awell-established subject, especially in philosophical
logic. We want to explore its broader significance for philosophy, logic, and
linguistics. What can plural logic do for us? Are the bold claims made on its
behalf correct?
Different readers may want to follow different threads running through
the book. Readers interested in the application of plural logic in philosophy
will find Chapters 1, 2, and 8 especially relevant. We argue that plural logic
has useful applications, though not all those it is commonly thought to have.
Next, questions about the correct logic of plurals are discussed in Chapters 1,
2, 4, and 9–12, where we defend an unconventional view. We reject tradi-
tional plural logic in favor of a “critical” alternative.Themost striking feature
of this alternative is that there is no universal plurality. Chapters 1–3, 5,
7, and 9 discuss the significance of plural logic to linguistics. Advocates of
plural logic often claim that linguistic semantics should avoid “singularist”
prejudices and be formulated taking plurals at face value. We contest this
claim.
A few words about the origin of the project may be appropriate. Both
authors have for a number of years been interested in questions about the
logic, meaning, and metaphysics of plurals. Many of the ideas in the book
were first conceived during long runs along the River Thames in the period
2010–12. A first glimpse of the book project arose in connection with the
course “Plurals in Semantics and Philosophical Logic” taught at ESSLLI 2012
in Opole, Poland.
There are a lot of people to thank. This book has benefited enormously
from extensive comments given by Peter Fritz, SimonHewitt, David Nicolas,
Alex Oliver, Agustín Rayo, Sam Roberts, Timothy Smiley, Eric Snyder, Hans
Robin Solberg, and Gabriel Uzquiano. For useful feedback and discussion,
we are also indebted to Colin Caret, Aistė Čelkytė, Eyjólfur Emilsson, Vera
Flocke, Olav Gjelsvik, Nicholas Jones, Jönne Kriener, Dan Marshall, Ian
Rumfitt, Stewart Shapiro, Sean Walsh, Tim Williamson, the students in our
course at ESSLLI, and the audiences of numerous talks where material from
the book has been presented. PeterMomtchiloff has provided invaluable help
as an editor.
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Introduction
English and other natural languages contain plural expressions, which allow
us to talk about many objects simultaneously, for example:
(1.1) The students cooperate.
(1.2) The natural numbers are infinite.
How should such sentences be analyzed? In recent years, there has been
a surge of interest in plural logic, a logical system that takes plurals at
face value. When analyzing language, there is thus no need to eliminate
the plural resources of English in favor of singular resources. Rather, the
plural resources can be retained as primitive, not understood in terms of
anything else.
Plural logic has emerged as a new tool of great potential significance in
logic, philosophy, linguistics, and beyond. What is this new tool, and what
is it good for? We wish to provide a more nuanced discussion than has been
given so far.
Three questions run through our discussion. First:
The legitimacy of primitive plurals
Should the plural resources of English and other natural languages be
taken at face value or be eliminated in favor of the singular?
Different considerations pull in different directions. On the one hand, there
is the tremendous success of set theory, which shows how to represent
many objects by means of a single complex object, namely their set. This
is a powerful theory, which has proven to be of great theoretical value.
Why bother with the many when we have a supremely successful theory of
complex “ones”? On the other hand, there is a strong case for taking plurals
at face value. English and many other natural languages allow us to talk
about the many, apparently without any detour via complex “ones” such as
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo,
Oxford University Press. © Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo 2021.
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sets.Why not utilize these expressive resources in our systematic theorizing?
Moreover, attempts to eliminate the plural in favor of the singular appear to
lead to paradoxes. We are all familiar with Russell’s paradox of the set of all
sets that are not elements of themselves. While this set leads to paradox, its
many elements—considered as many, not one—do not. It thus appears to
follow that talk about the many elements cannot be eliminated in favor of
talk about their set. These considerations encourage the view encapsulated
in Bertrand Russell’s trenchant remark that “the many are only many, and
are not also one” (Russell 1903, Section 74).
While we end up favoring a “pluralist” view, which takes plural resources
at face value, this book tries to give the opposing “singularist” view a fair
hearing. Our reasons for endorsing pluralism are somewhat unconventional.
We rejectmany of the usual arguments against singularism and, in particular,
argue that linguists are often entitled to their predominantly singularist
approach. We place greater weight on a less familiar argument for pluralism,
namely that primitive plurals are of great value for the explanation of sets
and set theory.
Suppose we accept primitive plurals. This gives rise to our second overar-
ching question.
How primitive plurals relate to the singular
What is the relation between the plural and the singular? We are
particularly interested in the circumstances under which many objects
correspond to a single, complex “one” andwhether any such correspon-
dence can shed light on the complex “ones”.
Consider all the students at the nearest university. Presumably, they are very
many. It is natural, however, to think that they also correspond to various
single objects, such as a single group, or set, of students. The question thus
arises what kinds of singularizing transformations there are and whether
such transformations might be used to shed light on the resulting “ones”.
FollowingGeorg Cantor and others, we find it illuminating to explain a set as
an object that is somehow “constituted” by its many elements. This suggests
a non-eliminative reduction of certain “ones” to the corresponding “many”;
that is, we retain the “ones” as objects in good standing but seek an account
of them in terms of the corresponding “many”. It is important to notice that
this non-eliminative reduction would proceed in the opposite direction of
the singularists’ proposed elimination of the plural in favor of the singular.
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Thus, our proposal is not to eliminate the many but, on the contrary, to put
them to use in explaining certain complex “ones”.
As is well known, however, singularizing transformations are fraught with
danger. If you know Cantor’s theorem, you won’t be surprised to learn that
traditional plural logic enables us to prove that there are more pluralities of
objects than single objects. (If you don’t know the theorem, don’t worry—
it will be explained in due course.) This generalization of Cantor’s theorem
appears to show that it is impossible for every “many” to correspond to a
unique “one”. For there are more “manys” than there are “ones”! This result
appears to limit severely what singularizing transformations can exist—
and thus also to threaten the explanatory value that such transformations
might have.
When examining the relation between the plural and the singular, we
face conflicting logical and metaphysical pressures. On the one hand, the
traditional and most intuitive plural logic severely restricts what singulariz-
ing transformations there can be. On the other hand, such transformations
are intuitively plausible in their own right and (more importantly) promise
to be of great theoretical value. How are we to negotiate these conflicting
pressures? Following an approach recently defended by TimothyWilliamson
(2013, 2014), we reject a “logic first” orientation according to which we first
choose a plural logic and then require every other theory to conform to this
logic. Instead, we argue that the choice of a plural logic is entangled with
commitments in metaphysics, semantics, and the philosophy of mathemat-
ics. We must therefore choose between various “package deals” that include
not only a plural logic but also commitments far beyond.
Three such package deals will be examined. One is based on generality
relativism, which rejects the possibility of quantification over absolutely
everything. This surprising rejection of absolute generality has the benefit
of reconciling traditional plural logic with the availability of singularizing
transformations. When we apply such transformations, the range of our
quantifiers expands in a way that enables us to avoid paradox. The other two
package deals hold on to absolute generality but differ on how to address
the conflicting pressures identified above. The more familiar version of
absolute generality retains traditional plural logic and therefore limits what
singularizing transformations there can be. We also explore a less familiar
version of absolute generality which is more liberal concerning singularizing
transformations and instead restores consistency by developing a more
“critical” plural logic. In the final part of the book, we argue that the first
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 9/6/2021, SPi
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two package deals suffer from analogous expressibility problems and should
therefore be rejected in favor of the third package deal.
Finally, there is our third overarching question.
The significance of primitive plurals
What are the philosophical and (more broadly) scientific consequences
of taking plurals at face value?
The very fact that primitive plural resources are available in thought and
language is itself highly significant. Many recent writers on this subject,
especially philosophers, have claimed that there are major further conse-
quences as well. For example, we encounter claims to the effect that prim-
itive plurals: (i) help us eschew problematic ontological commitments, thus
greatly aiding metaphysics and the philosophy of mathematics; (ii) ensure
the determinacy of higher-order quantification; and (iii) require us to refor-
mulate the semantics of natural language using primitive plurals not only in
the object language but also in the metalanguage. We argue that these claims
are severely exaggerated. While primitive plurals are indeed legitimate and
often very useful (especially for the explanation of sets), many other debates
are unaffected by our choice of whether or not to accept primitive plurals. In
particular, we argue that (i) the use of plural quantifiers incurs a formof com-
mitment analogous to ontological commitment as traditionally understood;
(ii) primitive plurals provide no additional assurance of the determinacy of
higher-order quantification; and (iii) linguists are, for the most part, fully
within their rights to continue in their old “singularizing” ways.
The title of our book might entice some readers who ponder the ancient
question of whether reality is fundamentally a unity or a multiplicity. Par-
menides famously views reality as a unity, asserting of it:
Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike, and there is no more of it in one
place than in another, to hinder it from holding together, nor less of it, but
everything is full of what is. Wherefore it is wholly continuous; for what is,
is in contact with what is. (Fragment 8, translated in Burnet 1920, 262)
Russell vehemently disagrees:
Academic philosophers, ever since the time of Parmenides, have believed
that the world is a unity. […] The most fundamental of my intellectual
beliefs is that this is rubbish. I think the universe is all spots and jumps,
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 9/6/2021, SPi
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without unity, without continuity, without coherence or orderliness or any
of the other properties that governesses love. (Russell 1949, 98)
We shall not take a stand on Parmenides’s question about the fundamental
nature of reality. But we fully endorse the ancient view that the relation
between the many and the one is of profound philosophical importance. As
Russell observes, there are many objects (whether fundamental or not). Our
discussion—and book title—therefore start with the many. But as we shall
see, there are some surprisingly hard puzzles and problems concerning the
relation between the many and the one. Our analysis of these puzzles and
problems leads us to propose an unconventional solution, namely to replace
the traditional plural logic with a more “critical” alternative.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 9/6/2021, SPi
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Taking Plurals at Face Value
2.1 Some prominent views of plural sentences
Many natural languages contain a grammatical distinction between singular
and plural expressions.∗ Consider these examples:
(2.1) John is hunting.
(2.2) The gnus are gathering.
When available, plural expressions can play a critical role in thought and
language. On the one hand, by grasping their meaning and deploying
them, we are able to think and speak about many as well as about one.
For instance, we are able to sort objects into collections and communicate
important information about such collections. On the other hand, plural
expressions have logical properties that generate valid patterns of reasoning
through which we organize and extend our knowledge about collections of
objects, for example:
(2.3) (a) The gnus are gathering.
(b) The gnus are the animals being hunted.
(c) The animals being hunted are gathering.
These patterns of reasoning go beyond those studied and systematized in
traditional first-order logic, forming the subject matter of a new branch of
logic known as plural logic.
Following the lead of George Boolos’s seminal work, research on plu-
ral logic has flourished in recent decades.1 It has also begun to influence
∗ Sections 2.1–2.5 draw from Florio and Linnebo 2018.
1 See, e.g., Boolos 1984b, Boolos 1985a, Yi 1999, Oliver and Smiley 2001, Rayo 2002, Linnebo
2003, Yi 2005 and Yi 2006, McKay 2006, and Oliver and Smiley 2016.
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo,
Oxford University Press. © Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo 2021.
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linguistic semantics, where plurals have received considerable attention
since the 1980s.2
Although this focus on plurals is a relatively recent phenomenon, seman-
tic questions concerning plurals were already entertained by the founders
of modern logic.3 Gottlob Frege, for instance, addressed the question of the
proper logical analysis of sentences with a plural subject, such as:
(2.4) Socrates and Plato are philosophers.
He writes:
Here we have two thoughts: Socrates is a philosopher and Plato is a
philosopher, which are only strung together linguistically for the sake of
convenience. Logically, Socrates and Plato is not to be conceived as the
subject of which being a philosopher is predicated.
(Letter to Russell of 28 July 1902, in Frege 1980, 140)
In effect, Frege proposes to eliminate plurals and analyze (2.4) as:
(2.5) Socrates is a philosopher and Plato is a philosopher.
However, he realizes that this strategy isn’t always available. Sentences such
as (2.6) and (2.7) are not amenable to the conjunctive analysis proposed
for (2.4).
(2.6) Bunsen and Kirchhoff laid the foundations of spectral analysis.
(2.7) The Romans conquered Gaul.
Frege remarks:
Here we must regard Bunsen and Kirchhoff as a whole. ‘The Romans
conquered Gaul’ must be conceived in the same way. The Romans here
are the Roman people, held together by custom, institutions, and laws.
(Frege, ibidem)
2 SeeNicolas 2008 andMoltmann 2016 for applications of plural logic to linguistic semantics.
For some research in linguistic semantics particularly relevant to our project, see Link 1983, Link
1998, Schein 1993, Schwarzschild 1996, Moltmann 1997, and Landman 2000.
3 For historical details, see Oliver and Smiley 2016, Chapter 2.
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Elsewhere he explains that, in (2.7), ‘the Romans’ must be regarded as a
proper namewhose logical function is to stand for an object (Frege 1980, 95).
While Frege understands “wholes” in broadly mereological terms—an
approach to which we will return shortly—various alternatives, such as sets
and groups, have been suggested in the subsequent literature. Let us briefly
consider the appeal to sets.
The most famous advocate of this approach is Willard Van Orman Quine.
One of the sentences he grapples with is known as the Geach-Kaplan
sentence:⁴
(2.8) Some critics admire only one another.
According toQuine, by “invoking classes andmembership, we can do justice
to [the Geach-Kaplan sentence]” (Quine 1982, 293). He proposes what
amounts to the following analysis, or, as he puts it, “regimentation”:⁵
(2.9) There is a non-empty set such that every element of the set is a critic
who admires someone and everyone she admires is an element of the
set other than herself.
(2.10) ∃s[∃x x ∈ s ∧ ∀x(x ∈ s → (x is a critic ∧
∃y x admires y ∧ ∀y(x admires y → (y ∈ s ∧ x ≠ y))))]
Quine’s use of set theory to eliminate plurals exposes him to an objection
(see Boolos 1984b, 440). Consider the following sentence, which appears to
be a set-theoretic truism:
(2.11) There are some sets such that any set is one of them if and only if
that set is not an element of itself.
⁴ As shown by Boolos, who credits David Kaplan, there is no correct paraphrase of this
sentences comprising only singular vocabulary and the predicates occurring in it (Boolos 1984b,
432–3).
⁵ We return in Sections 2.7 and 3.1 to a discussion of the important Quinean notion of
regimentation, which differs from the familiar philosophical notion of analysis.
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It is reasonable to demand that no proper regimentation of this sentence
render it obviously false.⁶ However, a strict application of Quine’s set-
theoretic paraphrase would turn (2.11) into (2.12), which is inconsistent:
(2.12) There is a non-empty set x such that, for every set y, y is an element
of x if and only if y is a not an element of y.
Can Quine’s strategy be salvaged by using a different paraphrase? Perhaps
Quine is right that plural terms should be understood as “wholes” that are
set-theoretic in character. But such “wholes” need not be sets; they can be
collections of a more general sort. This provides a response to the objection
presented above, since it licences this consistent regimentation of (2.11):
(2.13) There is a non-empty collection c such that, for every set y, y is a
member of c if and only if y is not an element of itself.
However, this approach faces an immediate “revenge problem”. How should
we analyze the following variant of (2.11)?
(2.14) There are some collections such that any collection is one of them if
and only if that collection is not a member of itself.
James Higginbotham aptly labels this style of objection the paradox of
plurality (1998, 17). We provide a detailed discussion in Section 3.4.
In linguistics, an influential analysis of plurals is that of Godehard Link,
who invokes mereological sums. Central to his analysis is a special mereo-
logical relation (≤), corresponding to the notion of individual parthood.This
notion is not to be confused with that of material parthood. For example,
in the individual sense of the mereological vocabulary, Annie is an atomic
part of the mereological sum of Annie and Bonnie. Here Annie is an atom,
namely an individual with no other individual as part. In the material sense,
by contrast, Annie is obviously not an atomic part of the sum of Annie and
Bonnie, as she has proper material parts.
Link’s proposal is to use mereology in this individual sense and analyze
a plurality in terms of the mereological sum of its members. For example,
the plurality of Annie and Bonnie would be analyzed in terms of the mere-
ological sum of the two girls. In this setting, the relation of ‘being one of ’ is
⁶ According to the view defended in Linnebo 2010, a natural reading of (2.11) is false, but
only for the non-obvious reason that every plurality must be extensionally definite, or properly
circumscribed, which contrasts with the extensional indefiniteness of the notion of a self-
identical set. This approach will be explored in Chapter 12.
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best analyzed as ‘being an atomic part of ’ (≤At). Let ‘+’ stand for the binary
operation of mereological sum in the individual sense. And let σx.φ(x) be
the mereological sum, again in the individual sense, of the objects satisfying
the formula φ(x).⁷ Then some of the plural sentences we have encountered
may be analyzed as follows:⁸
(2.15) Bunsen and Kirchhoff laid the foundations of spectral analysis.
(2.16) F(b + k)
(2.17) The Romans conquered Gaul.
(2.18) C(σx.R(x), g)
(2.19) There are some sets such that any set is one of them if and only if
that set is not an element of itself.
(2.20) ∃x [∀y(y ≤At x → Set(y)) ∧ ∀y(Set(y) → (y ≤At x ↔ y ∉ y))]
Finally, let us mention a singularist strategy based on a neo-Davidsonian
analysis of predication in terms of events (broadly understood to include
states).⁹ This strategy eliminates a plural subject by reducing it either to a
collection serving as agent of the underlying event or to the single co-agents
of that event, where a co-agent is any object that participates in the event as
a subject. Here is how the second version of the strategy may be applied to
one of Frege’s examples.
(2.15) Bunsen and Kirchhoff laid the foundations of spectral analysis.
(2.21) There is an event e of laying the foundations of spectral analysis such
that Bunsen is a co-agent of e, Kirchhoff is a co-agent of e, and there
is no other co-agent of e.
Are any of these singularist analyses of plurals successful? This question is
discussed inChapter 3, which provides a detailed assessment of the prospects
for singularism. Whether singularism is a viable option, we argue, depends
on some hard theoretical questions concerning absolute generality and the
correct plural logic. Now, we would like to consider an altogether different
approach to plurals.
⁷ If desired, the notion of sum can be defined in terms of the parthood relation by exploiting
the fact that a sum is the minimal object whose parts include the things to be summed.
⁸ Formore details and applications of themereological framework, see Link 1983, Link 1998,
Moltmann 1997, Champollion andKrifka 2016, and Champollion 2017.We explore the relation
between plurals and mereology in Chapter 5.
⁹ See, e.g., Higginbotham and Schein 1989, and, for more recent implementations, Landman
2000 (especially Lecture Six) and Champollion 2017 (Chapter 2).
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2.2 Taking plurals at face value
Boolos rejects all the singularist strategies, favoring instead an approach that
takes plurals at face value. Thus he completely rejects Quine’s attempt to
analyze plural discourse in terms of sets. He writes:
Abandon, if one ever had it, the idea that use of plural forms must always
be understood to commit one to the existence of sets [ . . . ] of those things
to which the corresponding singular forms apply.
There are, of course, quite a lot of Cheerios in that bowl, well over two
hundred of them. But is there, in addition to the Cheerios, also a set of
them all? [ . . . ]
It is haywire to think that when you have some Cheerios, you are eating a
set [ . . . ]. [I]t doesn’t follow just from the fact that there are some Cheerios
in the bowl that, as somewho theorize about the semantics of plurals would
have it, there is also a set of them all. (Boolos 1984b, 448–9)
In fact, Boolos’s rejection of singularism has a distinguished pedigree
featuring, most prominently, Russell (1903).1⁰ Russell distinguished between
a class as one and a class as many. A class as one is a single object that
may have a multiplicity of members. Objects of this kind are the subject
matter of traditional first-order set or class theory. By contrast, a class
as many is a multiplicity of objects as such: there need not be a single
entity that represents, collects, or goes proxy for the objects that make up
the multiplicity. Russell emphasized the usefulness of this second way of
thinking about multiplicities. More recently, Max Black (1971) and Peter
Simons (1982, 1997) have advocated a treatment of plurals in the spirit of
classes as many.11
What is the broader significance of Boolos’s attack on singularist analyses
and of Russell’s earlier pluralist approach based on the notion of classes as
many? At the heart of their remarks is the simple idea that plurals should
be taken at face value. That is, we should allow certain forms of plural
discourse in our regimentation. Frege, Quine, and others were simply wrong
to think that plurals should be paraphrased away. Rather, plurals deserve to
be understood in their own terms by allowing the use of plural expressions in
1⁰ See Klement 2014 for a recent discussion of Russell’s view.
11 Again, see Oliver and Smiley 2016, Chapter 2, for more historical details.
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our regimenting language.This is the key idea behind plural logic.We outline
some basic aspects of plural logic in the next two sections. First, we introduce
a formal language for plural logic.Then, we provide a basic deductive system
that characterizes correct reasoning in this language. The semantics for this
system is discussed in Part III of this book. Some of the most interesting and
philosophically significant questions concerning plural logic arise, as we will
see, in connection with its semantics.
Let us be clear about what is at stake in the debate about whether plurals
should be taken at face value. It is one thing to observe that primitive plural
resources are found in many natural languages and quite another to accept
these expressive resources as legitimate, or even indispensable, for scientific
purposes. While no one disputes the former, the latter is controversial, as
the views of Frege and Quinean on plurals illustrate. Speaking for ourselves,
we grant that there is a presumption in favor of taking resources available in
natural language to be scientifically legitimate. But there may be exceptions
to this general rule. Quine thought that metaphysical modality provided
an example. Another possible example is linguistic tense, which appears to
presuppose a standard of absolute simultaneity, in conflict with the special
theory of relativity. How, then, can we bridge this gap between availability
in natural language and scientific legitimacy or even indispensability? Some
arguments purporting to bridge the gap will be discussed in Chapter 3 and
in Part II. Although we will findmany of these arguments to be weak, we will
develop and defend one argument having to do with the role of plurals in the
explanation of set theory.
2.3 The language of plural logic
We now describe a language that may be used to regiment a wide range of
natural language uses of plurals. It captures Boolos’s and Russell’s suggestion
and enables us to represent many valid patterns of reasoning that essentially
involve plural expressions. This language is associated with what is known
in the philosophical literature as PFO+, which is short for plural first-order
logic plus plural predicates. In one variant or another, it is the most common
regimenting language for plurals in philosophical logic.12
We start with the the standard language of first-order logic and expand it
by making the following additions.
12 We adopt the notation for variables used in Rayo 2002 and Linnebo 2003. An ancestor of
this notation is found in Burgess and Rosen 1997. Other authors represent plural variables by
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A. Plural terms, comprising plural variables (vv, xx, yy, . . . , and variously
indexed variants thereof) and plural constants (aa, bb, . . . , and vari-
ants thereof), roughly corresponding to the natural language pronoun
‘they’ and to plural proper names, respectively.
B. Quantifiers that bind plural variables (∀vv, ∃xx, . . . ).
C. A binary predicate ≺ for plural membership, corresponding to the
natural language ‘is one of ’ or ‘is among’. This predicate is treated as
logical.
D. Symbols for collective plural predicates with numerical superscripts
representing the predicate’s arity (P1, P2, . . . ,Q1, . . . , and variously
indexed variants thereof). Examples of collective plural predicates are
‘ . . . cooperate’, ‘ . . . gather’, ‘ . . . surround . . . ’, ‘ . . . outnumber . . . ’. For
economy, we leave the arity unmarked.
Let ℒPFO+ be the language just introduced. The fragment of this language
containing items A-C, that is,ℒPFO+ minus plural predicates, is the language
of the subsystem of PFO+ known as PFO. The following chart summarizes
which linguistic items are added to the standard language of first-order logic
to obtain PFO+.
type of expression natural language equivalent symbolization
plural variables they1, they2, . . . vv, vv0, . . . , xx, . . .
plural constants the Hebrides, the Channel Islands13 aa, bb, . . . , aa1, . . .
plural quantifiers there are some (things) ∃vv, ∃xx, . . .
whenever there are some (things) ∀vv, ∀xx, . . .
plural membership is one of, is among ≺
collective plural cooperate, gather, C(xx), G(vv),
predicates surround, outnumber S(xx, y), O(xx, yy)
The recursive clauses defining a well-formed formula are the obvious ones.
However, some clarifications about the language are in order.
means of different typographical conventions: boldface letters (Oliver and Smiley), capitalized
letters (McKay), or singular variables pluralized with an ‘s’ (Yi).
13 These purported examples of plural terms are controversial; for an argument that they are
best treated as semantically singular, see Rumfitt 2005, 88. Additional examples can be found in
Oliver and Smiley 2016, 78–80.
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First, our language has two types of variable: singular and plural. It is also
possible to use plural variables only and regard the singular as a limiting case
of the plural. (See Section 5.3 for discussion.)
Second, onemay require a rigid distinction between the types of argument
place of predicates. An argument place that is open to a singular argument
could be reserved exclusively for such arguments. A similar restriction could
be imposed on argument places open to plural arguments. Would this rigid
distinction between singular and plural argument places reflect a feature
of natural language? Different natural language predicates suggest different
answers. Some predicates are flexible, combining felicitously with both sin-
gular and plural terms. Examples include ‘own a house’, ‘lifted a boat’, or,
as in Frege’s example, ‘laid the foundations of spectral analysis’. (Of course,
the conjugations of the verbs will have to be adjusted.) Other predicates
appear to lack this flexibility, combining felicitously only with plural terms,
as in ‘cooperate with one another’ and ‘are two in number’. There is an
interesting linguistic question as to the source of these felicity judgments:
are they of syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic origin? We don’t wish to take
a stand on these matters. For our purposes, we can leave this question
open, noting that the two kinds of argument place—apparently flexible and
apparently inflexible—suggest different regimentation strategies, namely to
admit flexible plural predicates, or not.1⁴
Third, collective plural predicates are contrasted with distributive ones,
such as ‘are students’, ‘visited Rome’, ‘are prime’. Roughly speaking, these are
predicates that apply to some things if and only if they apply to each of those
things. How best to make this precise will depend on one’s stand on the issue
of flexible plural predicates mentioned just above. A flexible plural predicate
P is distributive just in case the following equivalence holds:
P(xx) ↔ ∀x(x ≺ xx → P(x))
A slight modification is needed for inflexible plural predicates. Let Ps be the
singular analogue of P. Then an inflexible plural predicate P is distributive
just in case the following equivalence holds:
1⁴ The possibility of flexible plural predicates raises deep and interesting questions. In the
philosophical and logical tradition, it is widely assumed that if an expression can be replaced by
another expression salva congruitate in one context, then it can be so replaced in all contexts.
This assumption of “strict typing” is true of the language of first-order logic, aswell as of standard
presentations of second-order logic. However, the assumption fails if some, but not all, plural
predicates are flexible.
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P(xx) ↔ ∀x(x ≺ xx → Ps(x))
Finally, if a plural predicate has no singular analogue (as is arguably the case
for ‘cooperate with one another’ and ‘are two in number’), then it is collective
by default.1⁵
Owing to these definitions, distributive plural predicates can be obtained
by paraphrase from their corresponding singular forms. Such predicates can
therefore be omitted from PFO+ without loss of expressibility—although
admittedly with some violence to style.
Other useful notions can be obtained by paraphrase. One is the many-
many relation of plural inclusion, symbolized as ‘≼’ and defined thus:
xx ≼ yy ↔def ∀z(z ≺ xx → z ≺ yy)
This relation is expressed by ‘are among’, as used in ‘Annie and Bonnie are
among the students’. Then, according to the definition, Annie and Bonnie
are among the students just in case anything that is one of Annie and
Bonnie is one of the students. Another notion is plural identity (symbolized
as ‘≈’), which can be defined as mutual plural inclusion.1⁶ In symbols:
xx ≈ yy ↔def (xx ≼ yy ∧ yy ≼ xx)
That is, two pluralities are identical just in case they are coextensive.
To illustrate the use of PFO+, let us provide some examples of
regimentation.
(2.22) Some students cooperated.
(2.23) ∃xx (∀y(y ≺ xx → S(y)) ∧ C(xx))
(2.24) Bunsen and Kirchhoff laid the foundations of spectral analysis.
(2.25) ∃xx (∀y(y ≺ xx ↔ (y = b ∨ y = k)) ∧ L(xx))
1⁵ What is the status of these equivalences? If PFO+ is to capture entailment relations
in natural language, we must regard them as analytic (or near enough). This is because,
for example, ‘Annie and Bonnie visited Rome’ entails ‘Annie visited Rome’. Notice that our
definition of distributivity takes the form of (analytic) equivalences. Some authors (e.g. McKay
2006, 6) tie distributivity solely to the left-to-right implication. For discussion and references,
see Oliver and Smiley 2013, 114–15. For an overview of linguistic treatments of distributivity,
see among others Winter and Scha 2015 and Champollion forthcoming.
1⁶ Of course, if flexible predicates are allowed, then plural identity can arguably be expressed
by the ordinary identity predicate ‘=’.
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(2.26) Some critics admire only one another.
(2.27) ∃xx (∀x(x ≺ xx → C(x)) ∧
∀x∀y[(x ≺ xx ∧ A(x, y)) → (y ≺ xx ∧ x ≠ y)])
We now turn to the basic proof-theoretic aspects of plural logic.
2.4 The traditional theory of plural logic
The formal system PFO+ comes equipped with logical axioms and rules of
inference aimed at capturing correct reasoning in the fragment of natural
language that is being regimented. The axioms and rules associated with
the logical vocabulary of ordinary first-order logic are the usual ones. For
example, one could rely on introduction and elimination rules for each
logical expression. The plural quantifiers are governed by axioms or rules
analogous to those governing the first-order quantifiers.
Plural logic is often taken to include some further, very intuitive axioms.
First, every plurality is non-empty:
(Non-empty) ∀xx∃y y ≺ xx
Then, there is an axiom scheme of indiscernibility stating that coextensive
pluralities satisfy the same formulas:
(Indisc) ∀xx∀yy[xx ≈ yy → (φ(xx) ↔ φ(yy))]
We need to make some remarks. First, the formula φ may contain parame-
ters. So, strictly speaking, we have the universal closure of each instance of
the displayed axiom scheme. Henceforth, we assume this reading for similar
axiom schemes, including the one below, and for axioms with free variables
in general. Second, as customary, we write φ(xx) for the result of replacing
all free occurrences of some designated plural variable vv with ‘xx’ whenever
‘xx’ is substitutable for vv in φ (see for example Enderton 2001, 113).)
Third, (Indisc) is a plural analogue of Leibniz’s law of the indiscernibility of
identicals, and as such, the scheme needs to be restricted to formulas φ(xx)
that don’t set up intensional contexts.
Finally, there is the unrestricted axiom scheme of plural comprehension,
an intuitive principle that provides information about what pluralities there
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/6/2021, SPi
20 taking plurals at face value
are. For any formula φ(x) containing ‘x’ but not ‘xx’ free, we have an axiom
stating that if φ(x) is satisfied by at least one thing, then there are the things
each of which satisfies φ(x):
(P-Comp) ∃xφ(x) → ∃xx∀x(x ≺ xx ↔ φ(x))
We refer to an axiomatization of plural logic based on the principles just
described as traditional plural logic. This is to emphasize its prominence in
the literature.
Traditional plural logic can, of course, be challenged. We will be particu-
larly concerned with unrestricted plural comprehension. A challenge to this
axiom scheme will be examined in Chapters 11 and 12. To talk about some
things, we presumably need to circumscribe the things in question. Perhaps
this circumscription isn’t a trivial matter. That is, perhaps some conditions
φ(x) fail to circumscribe some things. For example, the trivial condition
‘x = x’ might fail to do so because there is no properly circumscribed lot
of “all objects whatsoever”. We will eventually take this kind of challenge
seriously and develop an alternative, and slightly weaker, “critical” plural
logic. However, for the time being we will work with traditional plural logic,
which includes the unrestricted plural comprehension scheme.
2.5 The philosophical significance of plural logic
The significance of plural logic is not only linguistic: it is not exhausted
by its helpfulness in capturing natural language reasoning involving plural
expressions. Plural logic is philosophically significant in that it has a claim
to provide a suitable framework in which various philosophical projects can
be successfully developed. This philosophical significance largely depends
on two features that plural logic has been thought to possess: first, plural
logic is in some sense “pure logic”; second, it provides greater expressive
power than first-order logic. These two alleged features are at the core of the
common picture of plural logic and explain why it has become an important
component of the philosopher’s toolkit. In this section, we flesh out this
picture and describe how it sustains the main philosophical applications of
plural logic.
Many aspects of this common picture of plural logic will be challenged
throughout the book. Although this calls into question some popular appli-
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cations of plural logic, we also develop some new applications; in particular,
we show how plural logic can be used to shed light on set theory.
The first alleged feature of plural logic concerns its status as “pure logic”.
Surveying and assessing the debate about what counts as pure logic would
take us too far afield. In the present context, we find it more fruitful to regard
logicality, not as an all-or-nothing feature of a system, but as a cluster of
conditions that are of independent philosophical interest. There are at least
three such conditions that might underwrite the philosophical significance
of plural logic: topic-neutrality, formality, and epistemic primacy. Let us
discuss each in turn.
Topic-neutrality is based on a simple, intuitive idea: logical principles
should be applicable to reasoning about any subject matter. By contrast,
other principles are only applicable to particular domains. The laws of
physics, for instance, concern the physical world and do not apply when
reasoning about natural numbers or other abstract entities. Plural logic
seems to satisfy this intuitive notion of topic-neutrality: the validity of the
principles of plural logic does not appear confined to specific domains. As
partial evidence for the topic-neutrality of plural logic, one may point out
that, when available, pluralization as a morphological transformation does
not depend in any systematic way on the kind of objects one speaks about.
For example, both concrete and abstract nouns exhibit plural forms. The
same goes for many other categorial distinctions.1⁷
Another mark of logicality is formality. Logical principles are often
thought to hold in virtue of their form, not their content. There are different
ways of articulating the notion of formality, some of which are tightly
connected to the notion of topic-neutrality just discussed (see MacFarlane
2000). We focus on two conditions that tend to be associated with formality.
One is that formal principles are ontologically innocent: they do not commit
us to the existence of any objects.1⁸ Another is that formal principles do not
discriminate between objects: they cannot single out particular objects or
classes thereof.
1⁷ On a closer look, wemust distinguish between the weaker claim that some system of plural
logic has topic-neutrality and the stronger claim that plural logic as formulated above has this
neutrality. The latter may be challenged while retaining the former, as noted in footnote 6
and further explored in Chapter 12. We have in mind the view defended by Yablo (2006) and
Linnebo (2010), according to which every plurality is extensionally definite, or circumscribed,
in a way that the entire universe is not. This means that the plural comprehension scheme must
be restricted when the domain of discourse is the entire universe (e.g. the formula ‘x = x’ does
not define a plurality).
1⁸ Of course, the choice of a non-free logic requires the existence of one object.
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Is plural logic ontologically innocent? In particular, are plural quantifiers
ontologically innocent? The usual answer to these questions is affirmative.
Plural quantifiers do not incur ontological commitments beyond those
incurred by the first-order quantifiers. Plural logic indeed originated as
an ontologically innocent alternative to second-order logic. This view is
sustained by a particular semantics for plural logic—due to Boolos (1985a)
—which differs from the set-based semantics ordinarily employed for logics
of first and second order. To see how, let us briefly sketch Boolos’s semantics.
The key feature of this semantics is that it adopts plural resources in the
metatheory and uses them to represent the semantic values of the plural
terms of the object language. On this semantics—which many philosophers
now regard as the canonical one—the difference between singular and plural
terms is explained, not on the basis of what these terms signify, but on the
basis of how they signify. A plural variable is not interpreted as a set (or
set-like entity) of objects in the first-order domain. Instead, it is interpreted
directly as many objects in this domain, without the mediation of a set (or
set-like entity). In other words, plural variables do not range over a special
domain but range in a special, plural way over the usual, first-order domain.
Since the range of plural variables is the first-order domain, the truth of
sentences involving plural quantifiers does not seem to make ontological
demands that exceed those made by sentences involving first-order quan-
tifiers. In this sense, plural logic is said to be ontologically innocent.1⁹
As noted above, there is another condition associated with formality:
formal principles must not discriminate between objects. The standard way
of making this condition precise is to claim that logical principles are those
that remain true no matter how the non-logical expressions of the language
are reinterpreted. This presupposes a distinction between logical and non-
logical expressions of the language, which is typically captured by defining
logical notions in terms of isomorphism invariance and then characterizing
as logical the expressions that are suitably related to logical notions.2⁰ Alfred
Tarski (1986) observed that isomorphism invariance captures the standard
1⁹ Boolos’s semantics has been widely used in philosophical logic. See, among others, Yi
1999, Yi 2002, Yi 2005, and Yi 2006; Hossack 2000; Oliver and Smiley 2001 and Oliver and
Smiley 2016; Rayo 2002; McKay 2006. Authors who use this semantics tend to emphasize the
ontological innocence of the resulting logic.
2⁰ See Tarski 1986, Sher 1991, andMcGee 1996.Denoting a logical notion has been claimed to
be necessary but not sufficient for an expression to be logical. An additional semantic connection
would be required (as argued, for instance, byMcCarthy 1981 andMcGee 1996; but see also Sagi
2015 for a critical evaluation of these arguments).
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logical notions expressible in higher-order logic.21 Thus higher-order logic
should count as formal according to this way of explicating the notion of
formality. It is natural to think that analogous arguments ought to apply to
plural logic, delivering the result that plural quantification and plural mem-
bership are logical notions, and that plural logic too should count as formal.
The final mark of logicality, we recall, is epistemic. The thought is that
logical notions and principles permit a special kind of epistemic primacy.22
Logical notions can be grasped without relying on non-logical notions.
Likewise, logical truths, if knowable, can be known independently of non-
logical truths. Do the principles of plural logic enjoy this kind of epistemic
primacy? Since some of these principles are counterparts of principles of
first-order logic (for example, the introduction and elimination rules for
the quantifiers), it is plausible to assume that they enjoy the same epistemic
status as their first-order counterparts. However, plural logic encompasses
distinctive principles—chiefly plural comprehension—and the question is
whether they are subject to epistemic primacy. For the moment, let us
simply record the fact that many philosophers find plural comprehension
to be obviously true. For example, Boolos writes that every instance of
comprehension “expresses a logical truth if any sentence of English does”
(Boolos 1985b, 342). Similarly, Keith Hossack finds plural comprehension to
be a “harmless a priori truth” and, together with the other axioms of plural
logic, regards it as a genuine logical truth (Hossack 2000, 422).
If logicality is the first key feature of the common picture of plural logic,
the second is expressive power. Because of its metalogical properties, first-
order logic has well-known expressive limitations. In particular, important
mathematical theories formulated in first-order terms are subject to non-
standard interpretations. For example, first-order arithmetic has uncount-
ablemodels, while first-order analysis and set theory have countable ones. So
first-order logic badly fails to express the intended models of such theories.
By contrast, plural logic is usually ascribedmetalogical properties that lead to
greater expressive power. Indeed, it is often held that, when formulated with
the help of plural quantification, arithmetic, analysis, and set theory avoid the
non-standard interpretations just mentioned.23The resulting view, which we
dispute in Chapter 8, is that plural logic does better than first-order logic in
securing a gain in expressive power.
21 See also Lindenbaum and Tarski 1935.
22 See, for example, how Frege frames his logicist project in Frege 1879, Frege 1884, and Frege
1893/1903.
23 See footnote 3 on p. 152 for references.
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To sum up: on the common picture, plural logic has two key features,
logicality and expressive power. As noted above, instead of thinking of
logicality as an all-or-nothing matter, we find it more fruitful to regard it as
a cluster of conditions. We isolated three such conditions: topic-neutrality,
formality, and epistemic primacy. Under formality, we distinguished two
further conditions: formal principles are ontologically innocent, and they
cannot single out particular objects or classes of objects.
2.6 Applications of plural logic
Thephilosophical significance of plural logic lies in its promise to provide an
essential tool for various philosophical projects. An obvious such project is to
provide an account of plurals in thought and language.There are less obvious
uses of plural logic as well. We now wish to describe some particularly
important applications to the philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, and
semantics. As will become clear, these applications rely on various aspects of
the common picture of plural logic discussed above. Some of these aspects
will be challenged in the course of the book, especially the ontological
innocence and expressive power of plural logic (see Chapter 8) and its
epistemic primacy (see Chapter 12).
There is a well-known technical result that sheds lights on many of these
applications. As first shown by Boolos (1984b), monadic second-order logic
can be interpreted in PFO. (Monadic second-order logic is the fragment of
second-order logic that allows quantification into predicate position only
when the predicate is monadic.) The converse is true as well: PFO can
be interpreted in monadic second-order logic.2⁴ From a syntactic point
of view, the two theories are therefore equivalent. However, this mutual
interpretability by no means guarantees that the two systems share certain
philosophically important features and, hence, that they are equivalent in
their potential for philosophical applications. Since second-order logic has
faced a number of criticisms that are usually thought to be avoided by plural
logic, one might hope to be able to replace at least some uses of monadic
second-order logic with corresponding uses of plural logic.2⁵
2⁴ See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of the result.
2⁵ Second-order logic has been criticized on various grounds, e.g. for involving an illegitimate
form of quantification, for being ontological committal, and for being too entangled with
mathematics to count as pure logic (see Linnebo 2011 for a survey of the standard objections to
second-order logic).
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As developed in the work of Frege and his followers, logicism is the
thesis that a significant portion of mathematics is analytic in the sense of
being derivable from general logical laws and definitions. Second-order
logic provides the standard framework for the development of logicism.
Thus the success of Fregean logicism depends crucially on the logicality
of second-order logic. Which features of logicality matter here? When
discussing the philosophical significance of logicism, Frege and more recent
logicists have tended to emphasize topic-neutrality, ontological innocence,
and epistemic primacy. Since these are features that plural logic is alleged to
have, this logic promises be of immediate relevance to the logicist project.
One concern, which we discuss in Section 12.5, is that plural logic doesn’t
actually enjoy epistemic primacy but on the contrary carries non-trivial
set-theoretic content.
There is a more clear-cut worry, however. The resources needed for the
standard implementation of the logicist project exceed those of monadic
second-order logic, and therefore those of plural logic. For instance, the
statement of one of the main stepping stones of logicism, Hume’s Principle,
requires quantification over dyadic relations. The principle asserts that, for
any two monadic second-order entities F and G, the number associated with
F is identical with the number associated with G if and only if there is dyadic
relation witnessing the equinumerosity of F and G.
Plural logicmay still have an important role to play in logicism. First, there
are alternative implementations of logicism that rely on plural logic coupled
with a thin understanding of relations (see Boccuni 2013). Second, onemight
be able to capture quantification over relations by supplementing monadic
second-order logic with ordered pairs obtained by first-order abstraction
principles (see Shapiro and Weir 2000, Tennant 2007), by embracing exten-
sions of plural logic like the one devised in Hewitt 2012a, or by regarding
equinumerosity (or some kindred notion) as primitive (Antonelli 2010).
Moreover, even if plural logic cannot sustain the full logicist project, it could
still serve a more modest form of logicism, such as Boolos’s sublogicism.
As Boolos describes it, sublogicism is “the claim that there are (many)
interesting examples of mathematical truths that can be reduced (in the
appropriate sense) to logic” (Boolos 1985b, 332). His case for sublogicism
relies on plural logic. It essentially involves a plural interpretation of Frege’s
definition of the ancestral of a relation (see Boolos 1985b).
Another important philosophical application of plural logic, underpinned
by its alleged ontological innocence, concerns various eliminative projects in
metaphysics. For example, plural logic has been used to eliminate reference
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to certain kinds of complex objects.2⁶ Instead of quantifying over tables,
say, one may quantify plurally over mereological atoms of some appropriate
kind, namely those “arranged tablewise”. A sentence involving tables, such
as ‘some table is in the room’, can thus be rendered as a sentence involv-
ing pluralities of mereological atoms, namely ‘some mereological atoms
arranged tablewise are in the room’. Since the predicate ‘arranged tablewise’
is a collective predicate, this eliminative strategy can be carried out in PFO+.
An interesting question raised by this strategy is how plural quantification
over complex objects should be treated (Uzquiano 2004b). Since we have
already “used up” ordinary plural quantification to paraphrase singular talk
of complex objects, eliminating plural talk of such objects requires additional
resources. We would need a form of quantification that stands to plural
quantification as plural quantification stands to singular quantification. The
availability of such expressive resources is discussed in Chapter 9.
Relatedly, plural logic has been used to eliminate reference to abstract
objects. In particular, quantification over sets can sometimes be replaced
by plural quantification over concrete objects. This nominalist strategy is of
interest also to non-nominalists. In set theory, for example, quantification
over proper classes might be eliminated in favor of plural quantification over
sets (see Uzquiano 2003 and Burgess 2004).
The next application of plural logic we would like to highlight has to do
with semantics. An example was already mentioned in the previous section.
While discussing ontological innocence, we outlined the semantics for plural
logic developed by Boolos. The key idea was to employ plural resources in
the metalanguage and interpret each plural variable as standing for one or
more objects rather than a set or some set-like entity. Boolos’s semantic
insight is applicable in other contexts as well. Plural resources can also be
used to formulate a semantics for first- and second-order logic (see Rayo
and Uzquiano 1999, Rayo and Williamson 2003). As we discuss at length
in Chapter 11, an important aspect of this semantics is that it enables us
to capture interpretations of the language whose domain of quantification
encompasses absolutely everything there is. Let us briefly explain.
In the usual set-theoretic semantics, domains of quantification are repre-
sented by sets. However, since there is no universal set in standard set theory,
there is no way of representing interpretations whose domain encompasses
absolutely everything. Arguably, this is problematic. For certainly it seems
that absolutely general quantification is possible; consider, for example:
2⁶ See van Inwagen 1990, Hossack 2000, Rosen and Dorr 2002, and Uzquiano 2004b.
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(2.28) The empty set has no elements.
(2.29) Everything is physical.
These are prima facie cases inwhich the quantifiers ‘no’ and ‘every’ range over
absolutely everything there is.
If we accept that quantification over absolutely everything is possible,
set-theoretic semantics appears inadequate in this respect. This apparent
inadequacy might be overcome by developing the semantics with the help
of plural logic. Rather than describing a domain as a set-like entity whose
members constitute the range of quantification, one may describe it as some
objects, without assuming that there is a single entity to which the elements
of the domain all belong as members. How does this help us with absolute
generality? Once we let a domain be a plurality of objects, it seems, we
can capture absolute generality by means of the universal plurality, that is,
the plurality of absolutely everything there is. The existence of a universal
plurality is guaranteed by the plural comprehension scheme available in
traditional plural logic, for example, by using the formula ‘x = x’.
It is noteworthy that the ability to do justice to absolute generality depends
on the ontological innocence of plural logic, at least in the narrow sense
that it introduces no new commitments to sets or other set-like objects. If
plural logic was committed in this sense, our use of it to capture absolute
generality would likely be undermined. For in that case, there could be no
universal plurality, contrary to traditional plural logic. This can be shown
under minimal assumptions by an argument analogous to that of Russell’s
paradox. Suppose that plural talk is not ontologically innocent, in the sense
that the existence of a plurality xx requires the existence of a corresponding
set (or set-like object) s(xx). The correspondence between xx and s(xx) is
understood in terms of coextensionality: anything is one of xx if and only if it
is amember of s(xx). An assumptionwe need is that themembership relation
for these sets (or set-like objects) is subject to a principle of separation.2⁷Now
let uu and s(uu) be, respectively, a universal plurality and its corresponding
set (or set-like object). By separation, there is an object r whosemembers are
all and only the things in s(uu) that are not members of themselves:
2⁷ In this context, we can state the principle as follows. Given any set (or set-like object) s
and any condition φ(x), there is a set (or set-like object) r whose members are all and only the
members of s which satisfy the condition. That is, there is a set (or set-like object) r such that,
for any x, x is a member of r if and only if x is a member of s and φ(x).
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∀x(x is a member of r ↔ (x is a member of s(uu) ∧ x is not a member of x))
Since uu is universal, so is s(uu). Thus anything is a member of s(uu) and,
therefore, the members of r are all and only the things that are not members
of themselves:
∀x(x is a member of r ↔ x is not a member of x)
By instantiating the universal quantifier with r, we reach a Russell-style
inconsistency:
r is a member of r ↔ r is not a member of r
The conclusion is that, if plural talk is not ontologically innocent in the
mentioned sense, there cannot be a universal plurality. If there were such a
plurality, there would be a corresponding set (or set-like object), leading to a
version of Russell’s paradox. But if there is no universal plurality, plural logic
cannot serve to capture interpretations whose domain contains absolutely
everything.Thus, an important application of plural logic in semanticswould
have to be renounced.
The last application we consider pertains to the philosophy of mathemat-
ics and relates to the expressive limitations of first-order languages men-
tioned in Section 2.5. Many attempts to overcome these expressive limita-
tions resort to higher-order languages. In particular, second-order resources
are often employed with an aim to provide a categorical axiomatization of
the natural number structure, the real number structure, and certain initial
segments of the hierarchy of sets. The ability to provide characterizations of
this sort plays a major role in some philosophical accounts of mathematics,
such as various forms of structuralism (see, for example, Hellman 1989 and
Shapiro 1991).
However, the view that second-order logic is more expressive than first-
order logic is not uncontroversial. It depends essentially on a particular
semantics for second-order logic, which may be rejected. Since it is com-
monly assumed that plural logic does better than first-order logic in securing
a gain in expressive power, plural logic has emerged as an appealing alterna-
tive to second-order logic in philosophy of mathematics. We critically assess
this application of plural logic in Chapter 8.
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2.7 Our methodology
This book is first and foremost a contribution to philosophical logic,
although we occasionally aim to contribute to the philosophy of language
and linguistics as well. Our primary interest is in exploring possible
language forms and their philosophical significance. Indeed, what matters
for philosophical purposes is often just the availability of certain language
forms, rather than their actual realization in some natural language or other.
For instance, the study of modalities exhibits a wide range of operators
governing modal scope, some of which can be of philosophical use despite
not having a correlate in natural language. Higher-order logic has also found
a number of important applications even though it is controversial whether
there is a genuine form of quantification into predicate position in natural
language. Moreover, formal languages include predicates with arbitrarily
high arity that do not correspond to any predicate of natural language.
(There are presumably no primitive 17-adic predicates in English.)
This approach allows us to separate the study of possible language forms
from the more straightforwardly empirical question of which of these lan-
guage forms are in fact realized in natural language. We sometimes take a
stand on the latter question. But there are also occasions when we set aside
considerations of faithfulness to natural language in favor of an exploration
of possible language forms, which is subject to fewer empirical constraints.
Even when we do consider natural language, our main focus is on reg-
imentation rather than on a perfect representation of some underlying
logical form, as this notion is understood in early analytic philosophy or
in contemporary linguistic semantics.2⁸ The notion of regimentation we
employ is Quinean in spirit.2⁹ To regiment a language is to paraphrase it
into a fragment of ordinary or semi-ordinary language so as to lay bare
structural features of relevance to the theoretical goals at hand, usually to
address questions about logical consequence (see Chapter 3 for details). For
example, our target in regimenting plural discourse into PFO or PFO+ is
not to provide a faithful representation of the logical form underlying the
discourse. The target is more modest: we aim to provide a representation
of plural discourse that captures the logical features that are important in
2⁸ See, for instance, Pietroski 2016.
2⁹ See e.g. Quine 1960, 159.
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the given context of investigation. This means that a regimentation might
not capture all the logical relations observed in the regimented language.
However, we do make the converse demand that all the logical relations
obtaining in the regimenting language be reflected in the regimented one.3⁰
In any case, departures from what might be regarded as the logical form of a
sentence will be justified on the basis of particular theoretical interests.
Our emphasis on the availability of possible language forms rather than
their realization in natural language contributes to our goal of putting some
philosophically interesting questions into sharper focus. In fact, the richness
of natural language might be a hindrance to this goal. Consider the case
of logical paradoxes. The significance of these paradoxes will of course
depend on one’s project. Paradoxes may not be of paramount importance in
linguistic investigations concerned with a faithful representation of a given
language, where the paradoxical aspects may simply be regarded as traits of
that language. But paradoxes are clearly relevant to a project in philosophical
logic that aims to explore possible language forms and identify those that can
serve certain purposes in scientific theorizing. In that context, modeling a
paradox is not enough: the paradox must somehow be resolved.
Our concern with paradoxes also explains the emphasis we place on abso-
lute generality.Many of the arguments leading to paradox depend essentially
on the assumption that quantification over absolutely everything is possible
and that an adequate model theory must do justice to this possibility. The
role played by absolute generality in the semantics of plurals is clarified in
Chapter 7, where we discuss the connection between such generality and
different approaches to model theory.
Additional questions that will benefit from an investigation of the kind
we pursue concern ontological commitment, the legitimacy of various forms
of quantification, the determinacy of plural quantifiers, and the relation
between plurals and modalities. These are some of the main themes of this
book.
3⁰ We will refer to this requirement as logical adequacy (see Section 3.1).
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The Refutation of Singularism?
In mathematics, linguistics, and science more generally, pluralities are often
eliminated in favor of sets or mereological sums. This affords unification
and theoretical economy. In the philosophical literature, by contrast, it is
easy to find arguments with sweeping conclusions to the effect that we need
primitive plurals, and that this need cannot be filled by any of the singu-
larist alternatives, such as adding sets of objects already recognized, adding
mereological sums of such objects, or using second-order logic to quantify
over all the ways for the objects already recognized to be. For example, Alex
Oliver and Timothy Smiley write that “changing the subject”—which is their
name for singularist attempts to eliminate plurals—“is simply not on” (2001,
306). Similar views have been defended by Byeong-uk Yi (1999, 2005, 2006),
Tom McKay (2006), and others. In this chapter, we clarify and evaluate these
arguments.
If successful, these arguments establish something important. Not only
are primitive plurals available in English and many other natural languages,
they are also scientifically legitimate and indeed indispensable. Since these
are strong claims, however, we will play devil’s advocate and examine
whether primitive plurals might, after all, be dispensed with for scientific
purposes.
3.1 Regimentation and singularism
It is useful to begin by asking: for what purposes are the singularist alter-
natives “not on”? Sweeping conclusions like the one just mentioned are
usually made in the context of discussions about regimentation. Let us
elaborate on our understanding of this notion, which we briefly discussed
in Section 2.7. The process of regimentation takes as input sentences of a
meaningful object language (ℒO) and yields a translation into a regimenting
language (ℒR). This may be a natural language or a formal one. Even when
ℒR is a formal language, we may follow Quine in treating it as a “special
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo,
Oxford University Press. © Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo 2021.
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part [ . . . ] of ordinary or semi-ordinary language” (Quine 1960, 145). From
this perspective, both ℒO and ℒR are interpreted languages. We take ℒO to
be a fragment of natural language containing plurals.
To say that we need primitive plurals for regimentation does not immedi-
ately answer our initial question. The adequacy of a regimentation is always
relative to some purpose. Whether a particular regimentation succeeds will
thus depend on the purpose of the regimentation. Let us recall some of the
main theoretical purposes that regimentation has served.
One of the most widespread uses of regimentation concerns “the applica-
tion of logical theory” (Quine 1960, 145) and is illustrated by the process
of translation into logical notation familiar from any logic course. Here
the translation provides a perspicuous model of the object language that
enables us to formulate a precise account of deductive reasoning and log-
ical consequence. To provide such a model, it is not necessary to capture
faithfully the meanings of the sentences translated. As emphasized by Quine
(1960), a translation might convey more or less information than the sen-
tence it translates. What matters is that, in virtue of the vocabulary being
analyzed, the translationmostly reflects what follows fromwhat in the object
language.1
Regimentation can also serve the purpose of representing ontological
commitments. The ontological commitments of statements of the object
language are not always fully transparent. The translation might help clarify
them. Following Donald Davidson, one might for instance regard certain
kinds of predication as implicitly committed to events. As a result, onemight
be interested in a regimentation that, by quantifying explicitly over events,
brings these commitments to light.
Our focus in this chapter is largely on “the application of logical theory”.
We will discuss some arguments purporting to show that singularist
regimentations mischaracterize logical relations in the object language or
mischaracterize the truth values of some sentences. There are various
requirements one could put forward in this context. A minimal requirement
is that the regimentation be logically faithful in the sense that, if an argument
in ℒO is invalid, then so should be its regimentation. Let τ be a translation.
Then logical faithfulness requires that
1 Note that this use of regimentation is consistent with different attitudes towards logical
consequence. In particular, it is consistent with logical monism as well as logical pluralism. Of
course, one’s view about logical consequencewill be reflected in one’s approach to regimentation.
So, unlike the pluralist, themonist will see regimentation as a tool to capture the “correct” notion
of logical consequence for the object language.
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if τ(φ1), . . . , τ(φn) ⊨ τ(ψ), then φ1, . . . ,φn ⊨ ψ.
The converse requirement, which we call logical adequacy, is that if an
argument in ℒO is valid, then its regimentation be valid as well:
if φ1, . . . ,φn ⊨ ψ, then τ(φ1), . . . , τ(φn) ⊨ τ(ψ).
The requirement of logical adequacy is less compelling than that of faith-
fulness, as can be seen by considering the case of sentential logic. There are
arguments in natural language whose validity depends on their quantifica-
tional structure and thus cannot be captured by the usual regimentation
in sentential logic. While this regimentation is logically faithful, it is not
logically adequate. Logical adequacy is sometimes more plausible, however,
when relativized to a theory T. That is, one may require that if an argument
inℒO is valid, its regimentation be valid when supplemented with the axioms
of T. Thus, we have:
if φ1, . . . ,φn ⊨ ψ, then τ(φ1), . . . , τ(φn),T ⊨ τ(ψ).
Some of the analyses of plurals we will examine satisfy only this weaker
adequacy condition.
There are parallel requirements concerning truth. Here it makes sense to
require both faithfulness and adequacy, that is, to demand that a regimenting
sentence be true if and only if the regimented one is true.
We turn now to some arguments to the effect that primitive plurals are
needed for regimentation. The bone of contention is whether, for logical
purposes, we can dispense with plurals in the regimentation ofℒO. This pre-
supposes that we can determine whether the regimentation contains plurals.
Since ℒR is an interpreted language, however, we can presumably establish
whether it contains plurals by relying on an antecedent understanding of the
distinction between singular and plural expressions.
A singularist regimentation attempts to paraphrase away plural expres-
sions. The alternative approach advocated by Boolos resists this elimination
by taking plurals at face value. On this alternative, which we call regimenta-
tion pluralism, ℒR does contain plural expressions. The languages ℒPFO and
ℒPFO+ are the main examples of regimentation pluralism.
Which approach is correct? As observed, the recent philosophical litera-
ture abounds with arguments against regimentation singularism.The princi-
pal aim of this chapter is to assess some of these arguments and gain a better
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 9/6/2021, SPi
34 the refutation of singularism?
understanding of the limits of regimentation singularism. While we think
that regimentation pluralism has important applications, we also think that
regimentation singularism is amore serious rival to regimentation pluralism
than thementioned literature suggests. So wewant to give it a fair hearing. In
fact, we identify some conditions under which regimentation singularism is
perfectly benign. Since these conditions tend to be satisfied in the cases that
interest linguists, their singularist proclivities are less problematic thanmany
philosophers claim.
3.2 Substitution argument
One argument against regimentation singularism, put forward by Yi (2005,
471–2), turns on a substitution of plural and singular terms. We therefore
dub it the substitution argument. This argument is meant to apply to any
singularist regimentation, no matter how it paraphrases plural expressions.2
For concreteness, we focus on a regimentation that uses sets.
Consider the plural term ‘Russell and Whitehead’ and its set-theoretic
regimentation, the set term ‘{Russell,Whitehead}’. Letting ‘Genie’ abbreviate
this set term, we now formulate the following sentences:
(3.1) Genie is one of Genie.
(3.2) Genie is one of Russell and Whitehead.
While (3.1) is arguably true (and logically so), (3.2) is false. But given the way
in which ‘Genie’ was introduced, aren’t ‘Genie’ and ‘Russell and Whitehead’
intersubstitutable salva veritate? If so, it follows that the two sentences have
the same truth value. But this appears not to be the case.
Let us examine the argument more closely. Does it concern sentences of
ℒO or ℒR? Since ℒR is supposed to be free of plurals, the argument must be
concerned with sentences of ℒO.
Thus understood, the argument assumes thatℒO contains plural resources
and is able to express claims about sets (or whatever other objects are used
2 Note that a semantic version of this argument is also present in Yi’s discussion.The semantic
version targets the view that a plural term denotes a set or a set-like entity. In this chapter, our
focus is on regimentation and thus on the view that plural expressions can be paraphrased by
means of singular constructions. We think that it is important to keep the two views separate.
See Chapter 7 for a discussion of the semantics of plurals.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 9/6/2021, SPi
3.2 substitution argument 35
in ℒR to paraphrase plurals). The problem—if there is one—stems from an
unintended interaction between these plural resources and talk about the
objects that are used to represent pluralities. SupposeℒO could not talk about
the objects used to represent pluralities. Then ‘Genie’ would not be part of
ℒO, and the argument would not get off the ground. This suggests that the
argument can be blocked by denying the assumption thatℒO can talk about
the objects used to represent pluralities. We explore this option in the next
section. In the remainder of this section, we will show that the argument can
be resisted even when this assumption is granted.
The argument relies on the reasonable requirement that a proper regimen-
tation of (3.1) and (3.2) do justice to the fact that the two sentences differ in
truth value. But it is not hard to think of a simple translation that meets this
demand. For example, we may translate (3.1) and (3.2) as respectively:
(3.3) Genie = Genie.
(3.4) Genie ∈ {Russell,Whitehead}.
This regimentation captures the truth values of (3.1) and (3.2). It maps a
(logically) true sentence to a (logically) true sentence, and it maps a false
sentence to a false sentence.
It might be objected that we didn’t translate ‘is one of ’ uniformly. How-
ever, this non-uniformity seems justified by the peculiar grammatical status
of (3.1). One might even complain that (3.1) is ungrammatical, since ‘is one
of ’ requires a plural term in its second argument place.
Yi proposes a variant of the argument intended to avoid this complication.
Consider the following two sentences:
(3.5) Genie is one of Genie and Frege.
(3.6) Genie is one of Russell and Whitehead and Frege.
Again, the two sentences appear to differ in truth value: while (3.5) is
(logically) true, (3.6) seems false. (Presumably, something is one of Russell
andWhitehead and Frege just in case it is identical to one of the three named
logicians.)
Even in this case it is not hard to think of a translation that captures the
difference in truth value. For instance, we may translate (3.5) and (3.6) as
respectively:
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(3.7) Genie ∈ {Genie, Frege}.
(3.8) Genie ∈ {Russell,Whitehead, Frege}.
The translation of ‘is one of ’ is now uniform. In addition, the translation
preserves the truth value of the two sentences.Themoral is that, even though
regimentation singularismparaphrases a plural term like ‘Russell andWhite-
head’ bymeans of a singular expression such as ‘{Russell,Whitehead}’, it need
not license in ℒO the intersubstitution salva veritate of the two terms.
We conclude that the substitution argument does not undermine reg-
imentation singularism. First, the argument relies on an assumption that
may be resisted, namely that ℒO can talk about the objects used in ℒR to
paraphrase plurals. Second, it overlooks the potential of some singularist
regimentations to capture the intuitive truth values of the relevant sen-
tences of ℒO.
We now turn to two further objections to regimentation singularism that
share with the substitution argument the assumption thatℒO can talk about
the entities used to paraphrase plurals in ℒR.
3.3 Incorrect existential consequences
A colorful formulation of the next objection is contained in Boolos’s famous
passage quoted in Chapter 2:
There are, of course, quite a lot of Cheerios in that bowl, well over two
hundred of them. But is there, in addition to the Cheerios, also a set of
them all? [ . . . ]
It is haywire to think that when you have some Cheerios, you are eating a
set [ . . . ]. [I]t doesn’t follow just from the fact that there are some Cheerios
in the bowl that, as somewho theorize about the semantics of plurals would
have it, there is also a set of them all. (Boolos 1984: 448–9)
In one reading of the passage, the objection is that a singularist regimentation
validates incorrect inferences in ℒO and, in particular, incorrect existential
generalizations.
If the purpose of regimentation is the application of logical theory, we
want the regimentation to be logically faithful. Consider the relevant infer-
ence (with ‘cc’ naming the Cheerios in the bowl):
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(3.9)
George ate cc.
George ate a set.
As emphasized by Boolos, this inference is invalid. Compare now a set-
theoretic translation of the argument:
(3.10)
George ate* {cc}.
George ate* a set.
where ‘ate*’ is the translation of ‘ate’ and ‘{cc}’ is the set-theoretic rendering
of ‘cc’ (say, ‘{x: x is a Cheerio in the bowl}’).3
Unlike (3.9), (3.10) is valid. So we have a violation of logical faithfulness:
an invalid inference has a valid translation.
The argument can be extended to other types of singularist regimentation.
The general point is that regimentation singularism seems to permit illicit
existential generalizations, allowing us to transition as a matter of logic from
some objects to a single object that comprises or somehow represents these
objects.
As in the case of the substitution argument, it is assumed thatℒO can talk
about the objects used in ℒR to paraphrase plurals. Let us call these objects
proxies. The alleged problem stems from an unintended interaction between
the plurals and the talk of proxies. Thus, if ℒO was precluded from talking
about the proxies, the argument could not get off the ground. How might
this be achieved? Since the object language is just given to us, it is not an
option to ban certain expressions from ℒO if they already occur in it. By
contrast, the regimenting language ℒR is not given but can freely be chosen
to serve our needs. So we might well be able to choose our proxies so as to
avoid problematic interactions with any resources found in ℒO. In many of
the cases studied by linguists, such a choice is indeed possible.
Philosophical analysis, on the other hand, often aims for greater gener-
ality. Suppose that ℒO already talks about sets. Then we might be able to
avoid the problematic interaction by finding some other proxies—let us call
them “supersets”—with which to regiment the plurals of ℒO. But even if an
appropriate notion of superset can be found, we are not done. We may want
to include talk of supersets inℒO.Thus, for any kind of object that extensions
3 Since ‘ate’ is used here as plural predicate, it is regimented by means of a singular coun-
terpart ‘ate*’. By contrast, the predicate ‘set’ is singular and thus remains unchanged in the
regimentation.
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of ℒO might talk about, we must be able to regiment plural talk about such
objects using proxies of a new kind.
Is this possible? The answer will depend on the generality to which our
analysis aspires. Suppose we want a fully specified regimentation strategy
that works for any given object language whatsoever. We thus specify a
certain kind of proxy that will always be used to paraphrase plurals. When
this general strategy is applied to an object language that talks about proxies
of this kind, the problem under discussion arises. We conclude that the
singularist’s only hope is that her regimentation strategy need not be fully
specified, thus allowing her to wait and see what expressive resources a given
object language contains and only then choose her proxies—in a way that
avoids the problematic interactions. This might well be doable. Thus, even
if the most ambitious form of regimentation singularism succumbs to the
objection from incorrect existential consequences, there are less extreme
forms that avoid it. These forms will likely suffice for linguists’ purposes.
To achieve the kind of generality that philosophers seek, however, any
viable form of regimentation singularism must refrain from a fixed choice
of proxies.
3.4 The paradox of plurality
What is often regarded as the most serious objection to regimentation
singularism is the paradox of plurality, first foreshadowed in Section 2.1.
Suppose that we use sets to eliminate plurals and that ℒO has the resources
to talk about sets. Then the following sentence ofℒO appears to be a truism:
(3.11) There are some objects such that any object is one of them if and
only if that object is not an element of itself.
The contention is that set-theoretic singularism is bound to regiment (3.11)
as follows:
(3.12) There is a set of which any object is an element if and only if that
object is not an element of itself.
In symbols:
(3.13) ∃x(set(x) ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x ↔ y ∉ y))
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But this is an instance of the familiar, inconsistent Russell sentence. Thus,
the true sentence (3.11) is regimented by means of the false sentence (3.12),
which is unacceptable.⁴
Let us make explicit the generality of the argument.⁵ As before, let proxies
be the entities used inℒR to paraphrase plurals. Thus, a proxy need not be a
set, but could equally well be a class, a mereological sum, or a group. Plural
quantification is regimented as singular quantification over proxies. Let η
be the translation into ℒR of the one-many relation ‘to be one of ’. So ‘xηy’
regiments the statement that x is one of the objects represented by the proxy
y. Since η is a meaningful predicate, nothing precludes its introduction into
ℒO—or so the argument goes. Thus we may suppose that the predicate is
available in ℒO as well.
We now face an awkward dilemma. Is η reflexive? Suppose not. Then
there is an object that satisfies the open formula ‘¬(xηx)’. Applying plural
comprehension to this formula, we obtain:
(3.14) There are some objects such that any object is one of them if and
only if that object does not bear η to itself.
The singularist regimentation of this sentence is:
(3.15) There is a proxy to which any object bears η if and only if that object
does not bear η to itself.
And this, in turn, is formalized as:
(3.16) ∃x[proxy(x) ∧ ∀y(yηx ↔ ¬(yηy))]
But (3.16) is inconsistent! So again, a true sentence is regimented by means
of a false one, which is unacceptable.
Alternatively, suppose that η is reflexive. Then there is no object that
satisfies the open formula ‘¬(xηx)’. This blocks the previous argument.
Instead, another problem arises: the reflexivity of η entails that different
pluralities must be represented by one and the same proxy and hence cannot
⁴ The proposed regimentation also involves a violation of logical faithfulness. For (3.11) is
not only true but intuitively valid, whereas (3.12) is not only false but logically so.
⁵ The argument, inspired by Boolos (1984b, 440–4), is also discussed in Lewis 1991, 68;
Schein 1993, Chapter 2, Section 3.3; Higginbotham 1998, 14–17; Oliver and Smiley 2001,
303–5; Rayo 2002, 439–40; and McKay 2006, 31–2.
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be distinguished in the regimentation. To prove this entailment, suppose
there are at least two objects, a and b. When η is reflexive, the singleton
plurality of a must have itself as its proxy, and likewise for b. Consider now
the plurality of a and b, and let c be its proxy. By the reflexivity of η, we
have cηc. By the definition of a proxy, we also know that only a and b bear
η to c. Hence c is identical with either a or b. But we observed that each of a
and b is already used as a proxy for a distinct plurality, namely the singleton
pluralities of a and b. Thus, as promised, different pluralities are represented
by one and the same proxy.
Just like the previous two arguments, the paradox of plurality relies on
the assumption that talk of proxies is available in ℒO. The lesson is that,
if ℒO can talk not only about pluralities but also about their proxies, then
the regimentation validates unintended interactions of the sort just seen.
To block the paradox, we would therefore have to prevent such problematic
interactions.
One possibility, suggested by our discussion in the previous section, is to
refrain from making a fixed choice of proxies to be used in the analysis of all
object languages. Instead, the singularist can let her choice of proxies depend
on the particular object language she is asked to regiment. All she needs to
do is to choose new proxies, not talked about by the given object language.
In this way, the problematic interactions are avoided.
In fact, there are other responses to the paradox of plurality that are
compatible even with a fixed choice of proxies. One such response is that
there is variation in the range of the quantifiers involved in the paradoxical
reasoning.⁶ In particular, one can avoid the paradox by assuming that in
(3.16) the quantifier ‘∃x’ has a wider range than ‘∀y’. To see why this
assumption blocks the paradox, consider the reasoning leading from (3.16)
to contradiction:
(3.16) ∃x[proxy(x) ∧ ∀y(yηx ↔ ¬(yηy))]
(3.17) ∀y(yηr ↔ ¬(yηy))
(3.18) rηr ↔ ¬(rηr)
In the step from (3.17) to (3.18), the witness to ‘∃x’ is used to instantiate ‘∀y’.
If the domain of ‘∃x’ extends that of ‘∀y’, the step becomes illicit.
⁶ See, e.g., Parsons 1974a, 1974b; Glanzberg 2004, 2006.
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This response brings to the fore the topic of absolute generality. Indeed,
the response presupposes that the range of the quantifiers of the object
language is not unrestricted and thus that a domain expansion is possible.
The question of absolute generality is explored in Chapter 11, where we
defend the permissibility of such generality. If we are right, then the response
under discussion is unavailable. Still, since linguists are typically interested
in ordinary discourse where absolute generality is not present, they can often
bypass the argument.
Yet another response to the paradox of plurality is developed in Chap-
ter 12, where we take a more critical stance towards plural comprehen-
sion. In particular, we block the paradox by developing a reason to reject
instances of plural comprehension underlying the paradoxical reasoning,
such as (3.14).
3.5 Plural Cantor: its significance
The paradox of plurality is closely related to a generalization of Cantor’s
theorem. Let us begin by reminding ourselves of the familiar set-theoretic
version of Cantor’s theorem, which can be formulated as follows.
Cantor’s theorem (informal)
For any set A, the subsets of A are strictly more numerous than the
elements of A.
Theplural version ofCantor’s theoremmakes an analogous claim concerning
pluralities.
Plural Cantor (informal)
For any plurality xx with two or more members, the subpluralities of xx
are strictly more numerous than the members of xx.
There is only one tiny disanalogy: we need to assume that xx have two or
more members, whereas no such assumption is required concerning A. The
reason for this minor discrepancy is that pluralities, unlike sets, are required
to be non-empty. If this requirement were lifted, the analogy between the
set-theoretic and plural versions of the theorem would be perfect.
Of course, the cardinality comparisons involved in these two informal
statements need to be explicated, and the resulting plural version of Cantor’s
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theorem needs to be proved. But before we do so in the next section, we
would like to explain the significance of Plural Cantor for our discussion.
The theorem can be seen as a diagnosis of the problem exploited by the
paradox of plurality. Assume, as is done in traditional plural logic, that
there is a “universal plurality” encompassing every object whatsoever. (This
assumption will be challenged in Chapter 12.) Applied to this universal
plurality, the theorem entails that there are more pluralities than objects.
This implies that it is impossible to assign to each plurality a distinct object
as its proxy. We now find ourselves in the “awkward dilemma” described
in Section 3.4. Suppose we require that each plurality be assigned a unique
proxy. Then, as we have just seen, we land in a contradiction. Alternatively,
we may relax this requirement. But this means that some statements of ℒO
will receive an incorrect regimentation. For example, if distinct pluralities
xx and yy are assigned the same proxy z, the true statement of ℒO that
these pluralities are not coextensive will be regimented as the contradictory
statement that something does and does not bear η to z.
Can this dilemma be resisted? Once again, the question of absolute gen-
erality turns out to be central. Suppose that absolute generality is possible.
Then, aswe have observed, traditional plural logic yields an instance of Plural
Cantor concernedwith the universal plurality.We therefore obtain that there
are more pluralities than objects. This means that each plural variable of the
object language can havemore possible values—namely each plurality—than
there are objects or proxies. By contrast, suppose that absolute generality is
not possible. Then the object language ranges over some plurality of objects
aawhich, when the domain is expanded, can be seen not to be universal.This
makes it unproblematic that aa has more subpluralities than members. Each
of these subpluralities can be represented by a distinct proxy—provided that
most of these proxies are not among aa but are drawn from elsewhere. And
there is no reason why such proxies should not be available when the object
language has a restricted domain.
3.6 Plural Cantor: its statement and proof
We now turn to the task of explicating the cardinality comparison involved
in Plural Cantor. As is turns out, there are various ways to do so, resulting in
different versions of the theorem.
There are several ways to define what it means for one set Y to be “strictly
more numerous than” another set X. One option is that there is no surjective
function from X to Y; another is that there is no injective function from
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Y to X.⁷ In both cases, the notion of a function can be understood in the
usual set-theoretic way.⁸
Consider now the cardinality comparison involved in Plural Cantor.What
is it for the subpluralities of xx to be strictly more numerous than xx
themselves? Let us try to imitate the answer given in the set-theoretic case.
Suppose we add to our formalism variables of a new and primitive type for
functions from pluralities to objects, that is, functions that take one or more
objects as input and then output a single object as the value.We can then state
that there is no injective function from subpluralities of xx to xx themselves
by denying the existence of a function g from pluralities to single objects
among xx such that:
(3.19) ∀yy∀zz(yy ≼ xx ∧ zz ≼ xx → (g(yy) = g(zz) → yy ≈ zz))
Alternatively, we might add variables of a new and primitive type for func-
tions from objects to pluralities, that is, functions that take a single object as
input and then output one or more objects as values. To state that there is no
surjective function from xx to subpluralities of xx, we deny the existence of
a function f from objects to pluralities such that:
(3.20) ∀yy(yy ≼ xx → ∃x(x ≺ xx ∧ f (x) ≈ yy))
For each of these formulations, it is straightforward to prove the resulting
formal version of Plural Cantor. The version using a function from objects
to pluralities provides a good example. Assume, for contradiction, that there
is a surjective function f of the relevant sort. We contend there is an x ≺ xx
such that x ⊀ f(x), as we shall prove shortly. Thus, plural comprehension
allows us to define a subplurality δδ of xx such that:⁹
⁷ Recall that a function f from X to Y is said to be surjective if and only if
(∀y ∈ Y)(∃x ∈ X)f(x) = y,
and injective if and only if f(x) = f(x′) → x = x′.
⁸ More precisely, f is a function from X to Y if and only if (i) for every x ∈ X there is a y ∈ Y
such that ⟨x, y⟩ ∈ f, and (ii) if both ⟨x, y⟩ and ⟨x, y′⟩ are in f, then y = y′.
⁹ Note that the instance of comprehension used is predicative; that is, the condition ‘x ≺
xx∧ x ⊀ f(x)’ used to define the plurality does not itself quantify over pluralities. See Uzquiano
2015b, Section 3.1. Furthermore, note that this instance of plural comprehension is a case
of what we will later (see Appendix 10.A and Section 12.5) call plural separation, namely, a
comprehension axiom where a given plurality (in this case, xx) is cut down to a subplurality
comprising the members of xx that satisfy some formula. The same applies to other instances of
comprehension used in this and similar proofs. Thus, the proofs in question go through in the
alternative system of critical plural logic that we defend in Chapter 12.
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(3.21) ∀x(x ≺ δδ ↔ x ≺ xx ∧ x ⊀ f (x))
Since f is surjective, there is δ ≺ xx such that f(δ) ≈ δδ. By instantiating the
quantifier of (3.21) with respect to δ, we easily derive
(3.22) δ ≺ δδ ↔ δ ⊀ f(δ)
which is inconsistent because f(δ) ≈ δδ.1⁰
It remains only to prove our contention that there is an x ≺ xx such that
x ⊀ f(x).11 Assume not. As already assumed in the statement of the theorem,
there are at least two distinct objects, a and b, among xx. By the former
assumption, f maps each of these objects to the corresponding singleton
plurality. By the assumed surjectivity of f, there is an object c that fmaps to the
plurality of a and b. So c must be distinct from each of a and b, since we have
established that these two objects are mapped by f to other pluralities. Since
the members of f(c) are a and b, this entails that c ⊀ f(c), which contradicts
our assumption that there is no x ≺ xx such that x ⊀ f(x). This concludes
our proof.
Of course, these formulations and proofs assume that we have variables of
a new and primitive type, either for functions from objects to pluralities or
for functions in the reverse direction. Fortunately, our proof requires no spe-
cial assumptions concerning these new functions, only that quantification
over themobeys the usual logical principles.12 Even so, it is important to real-
ize that the new type of function is not required. InAppendix 3.A, we provide
some alternative formulations of the relevant cardinality comparisons. Some
of these avoid the new type of function, thus making the theorem available
also in systems that are less expressive. Other formulations achieve greater
generality by regarding functions as just a special kind of relation. Moreover,
by considering all these formulations side by side, we obtain amore complete
picture of the assumptions that this important theorem requires.
1⁰ The version of Plural Cantor using a function frompluralities to objects is proved similarly.
Assume there is an injective g of the relevant sort. Since g is injective, there is an inverse function
g−1. We can now use plural comprehension to define a subplurality δδ of xx such that:
(3.23) ∀x(x ≺ δδ ↔ x ≺ xx ∧ x ⊀ g−1(x))
To obtain a contradiction, let δ = g(δδ) and instantiate the quantifier of (3.23) with respect to δ.
11 This proof is nearly identical with the one on p. 40.
12 It might be objected that the proof mentioned in footnote 10 assumes the existence of an
inverse function g−1. But this assumption is easily eliminated in favor of an alternative use of
(impredicative) plural comprehension. In particular, plural comprehension yields the existence
of a subplurality δδ of xx such that:
∀x(x ≺ δδ ↔ x ≺ xx ∧ ∀yy(g(yy) = x → x ⊀ yy))
Since g is injective, a contradiction follows.
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Just as we have generalized the ordinary version of Cantor’s theorem to
Plural Cantor, so Plural Cantor admits of further generalizations. Suppose
there are “superpluralities”, that is, pluralities of pluralities. Then, using
resources analogous to those used for the proof of Plural Cantor, one can
show that, given any domain with two or more objects, the superpluralities
based on that domain are strictly more numerous than the pluralities based
on the same domain. This is done by proving that, relative to the given
domain, there is no surjective function from pluralities to superpluralities
(and no injective function in the reverse direction).
3.7 Conclusion
We have considered four arguments against regimentation singularism: the
substitution argument, the argument from unintended existential conse-
quences, the paradox of plurality, and the argument based on Plural Cantor.
Although the arguments differ in important respects, we also found some
common themes.
The first three arguments turn on problematic forms of interaction
between plurals and talk of proxies. These arguments can therefore be
blunted by giving up the requirement that a fixed sort of proxies be used
in all regimentations. Suppose this requirement is lifted. Then, for any given
object language, it may well be possible to choose new proxies, that is,
proxies that are not among the objects that this language can talk about.
If new proxies can always be found, the problematic interactions can be
avoided.
A central question is therefore whether new proxies are always available.
In fact, their availability is called into doubt by the fourth argument against
singularism, which uses a generalization of Cantor’s theorem to argue that
there aremore pluralities than objects and thus a fortiori toomany pluralities
for each to be assigned a unique object as its proxy.
We found, however, that even this fourth argument relies on some
assumptions that can be challenged, namely the possibility of absolute
generality and the validity of traditional plural logic. These assumptions
are discussed at length in Chapters 11 and 12. If either assumption fails,
this will provide an additional and more definitive response to the third
argument, that is, the one based on the paradox of plurality.
Overall, we conclude that the prospects for regimentation singularism
are not nearly as bleak as many philosophers make them out to be. As we
have seen, there are promising responses to the anti-singularist arguments.
It is noteworthy that these responses are particularly strong in many of the
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cases that concern linguists. For their purposes, it is often unproblematic to
assume that the proxies are new vis-à-vis the objects that the object language
talks about. Moreover, linguists often have independent reasons to foresake
the ambition of absolute generality (see Peters and Westerst ̊ahl 2006, 47–9).
These considerations explain why linguists’ singularist tendencies are less
problematic than many philosophers and logicians claim.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there are several ways to
talk about many objects simultaneously. In addition to using the primitive
plurals available inmany natural languages, we can add sets of objects already
recognized, add mereological sums of such objects, or use second-order logic
to quantify over all the ways for the objects already recognized to be. We
therefore asked whether primitive plurals are necessary or even scientifically
legitimate. While we grant that there is a presumption in favor of taking
expressive resources available in natural language to be scientifically legit-
imate, it would be good to do better. So this chapter has discussed some
very general anti-singularist arguments that purport to establish the need
for primitive plurals. We have shown that these arguments make limited
progress.
We will now change tack and undertake a detailed comparison of plural
logic with each of the other ways to talk about many objects simultaneously.
This is our agenda for Part II of the book. We will find that, although the
four alternatives have some important structural similarities, there are also
some significant philosophical and formal differences between them. Based
on these differences, we defend the thesis that none of them should be
eliminated in favor of any other. This yields, in particular, a more robust
argument for the scientific legitimacy of primitive plurals than this chapter
has produced.
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Appendix
3.A Alternative formulations of Plural Cantor
Suppose we want to avoid primitive functions from pluralities to objects or
from objects to pluralities, both of which we invoked in Section 3.6. We now
outline two alternatives: one that uses higher-order relations, and another
that “codes” these relations in terms of pluralities of ordered pairs.This yields
several formulations of Plural Cantor.
A plural comprehension axiom
∃x φ(x) → ∃xx∀y(y ≺ xx ↔ φ(y))
is said to be impredicative if φ(y) contains plural quantifiers, and predicative
if not. In what follows, we pay close attention to the question of whether
impredicative plural comprehension is needed to prove the different for-
mulations. This question is theoretically important. Even by its defenders,
impredicative comprehension is often regarded as a strong commitment
(see Bernays 1935). While we are prepared to make this commitment, at
least in our reasoning about plurals (see Appendix 10.A), it is important
to keep track of when the commitment is needed. It should also be noted
that our discussion of Plural Cantor carries over, with minor modifications,
to a second-order version of Cantor’s theorem. This says, loosely speaking,
that there are more values of second-order variables based on any domain
than objects in the domain. As a corollary of our discussion, one thus easily
obtains results about when impredicative second-order comprehension is
required for the proof of a second-order version of Cantor’s theorem.
Suppose we wish to use relations to state that it is impossible to “tag” each
subplurality of xx with a unique member of xx. So we consider relations of
the form R(x, yy), that is, dyadic relations whose first and second argument
places are open to objects and pluralities, respectively. We can now state that
there is no relation that effects the described “tagging” by saying that there is
no R of the mentioned form such that:
• (R is functional) yy ≼ xx∧yy′ ≼ xx∧R(x, yy)∧R(x, yy′) → yy ≈ yy′
• (R is surjective) (∀yy ≼ xx)(∃x ≺ xx)R(x, yy)
This provides a useful relational statement of Plural Cantor.
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It is interesting to reformulate that statement in terms of the converse of
R, that is, the relation R̄ defined by ∀x∀yy(R̄(yy, x) ↔ R(x, yy)). It is easy to
verify that the two mentioned requirements on R are logically equivalent to
the following requirements on R̄, respectively:
• (R̄ is injective) yy ≼ xx ∧ yy′ ≼ xx ∧ R̄(yy, x) ∧ R̄(yy′, x) → yy ≈ yy′
• (R̄ is total) (∀yy ≼ xx)(∃x ≺ xx)R̄(yy, x)
Thus, the statement that there is no relation specifying a surjective function
frommembers of xx to subpluralities of xx is equivalent to the statement that
there is no relation that associates subpluralities of xx with members of xx in
a way that is injective and total.This equivalence relies only on the extremely
weak (and obviously predicative) assumption that every relation has a con-
verse. We have thus achieved a pleasing unification of the surjectivity-based
and the injectivity-based characterizations of the cardinality comparison:
the two characterizations are logically equivalent modulo an extremely weak
assumption.13
The claim that there is no relation specifying an injective and total function
from subpluralities of xx to members of xx is strictly stronger than our
pleasing unification. For the mentioned claim adds a third requirement on
R̄, namely that R̄ be functional; that is:
∀x∀x′∀yy(R̄(yy, x) ∧ R̄(yy, x′) → x = x′)
Let us now prove our relational statement of Plural Cantor. Suppose, for
contradiction, that there is a relation R satisfying the conditions laid out
above. We want to use plural comprehension to define a subplurality δδ of
xx such that:
(3.24) ∀x(x ≺ δδ ↔ x ≺ xx ∧ ∃yy(R(x, yy) ∧ x ⊀ yy))
Of course, (3.24) is the consequent of a plural comprehension axiom whose
antecedent is ∃x(x ≺ xx ∧ ∃yy(R(x, yy) ∧ x ⊀ yy)). It is easy to prove this
antecedent, on the assumption that xx comprise at least two objects, by imi-
tating our proof of an analogous claim in Section 3.6. So let us return to our
proof of the relational statement of Plural Cantor. By the assumed surjectivity
13 By contrast, Uzquiano (2019) sees a deeper difference between these two characteri-
zations.
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of R, there is thus a δ ≺ xx such that R(δ, δδ). We now ask whether δ ≺ δδ.
By standard Russellian reasoning, it is straightforward to derive that this
holds if and only if it does not.
It is important to notice that this proof relies on an impredicative plural
comprehension axiom. For the plurality δδ is defined by quantifying over all
sub-pluralities of xx, to which the defined plurality itself belongs. In fact, the
reliance on impredicative comprehension can be shown to be essential.1⁴
So far, we have made use of primitive relations involving pluralities. An
alternative is to “code” such relations bymeans of pluralities of ordered pairs.
This alternative is available in systems without quantification over primitive
functions or relations, as is the case for most systems of plural logic found
in the literature. The basic idea is to represent the fact that a is related to the
plurality xx by pairing a with each object in xx. The resulting ordered pairs
represent that a is related to the plurality of objects with which a has been
paired. A visual example will help.
c ⟨a, c⟩ ⟨b, c⟩
b ⟨a, b⟩ ⟨c, b⟩
a ⟨b, a⟩ ⟨c, a⟩
a b c
Consider the six ordered pairs displayed. This plurality codes a relation of
objects with pluralities. Specifically, an object x is related to the plurality of
objects that figure as second coordinates in pairs with x as its first coordinate.
This can be read off by attending to each column. Visually, each column
represents the fact that the object along the horizontal axis is related to the
plurality of objects that figure as second coordinates in this column. Thus,
the diagram above represents that a is related to the plurality of b and c, that
b is related to a and c, and that c is related to a and b.
1⁴ This follows from the fact that Frege’s “Basic LawV” is consistent in second-order logicwith
only predicative comprehension axioms (see Heck 1996). We begin by rewriting Basic Law V
with plural variables in place of second-order ones:
{xx} = {yy} ↔ xx ≈ yy
Now define ‘R(x, yy)’ as ‘x = {yy}’. Heck’s model can now be tweaked to produce a model
of plural logic with predicative comprehension and the statement that R is functional and
surjective.
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Equippedwith this notion of coding, we obtain a precise way of expressing
the plural version of Cantor’s theorem using only plural resources.
Plural Cantor (formal)
For any plurality xx with two or more members, there is no plurality
that codes a functional and surjective relation of members of xx with
subpluralities of xx.
The proof of this version of the theorem is based on the same idea
as before, although with a subtle but important difference. Suppose, for
contradiction, that there is a plurality rr of ordered pairs that code a relation
of the mentioned sort. We want to define a diagonal plurality δδ of each and
every object x ≺ xx such that x is not a member of the plurality with which x
is related by the relation coded by rr.This requires some unpacking.The plu-
rality of objects withwhich x is related in thementionedway are all the y such
that ⟨x, y⟩ ≺ rr. Thus, the claim that x is not a member of this plurality is just
the claim that ⟨x, x⟩ ⊀ rr. As before, it is easy to show that, if xx have two or
more members, then there is at least one x that satisfies this condition. Thus,
a plural comprehension axiom ensures the existence of our desired diagonal
plurality δδ. The advertised difference is that this comprehension axiom is
fully predicative.1⁵ From this point on, the argument proceeds precisely as
before. Since the coded relation is surjective, there is a δ that stands in this
relation to δδ. We now ask whether δ ≺ δδ. Familiar Russellian reasoning
enables us to prove that the answer is affirmative if and only it is negative.
The following table summarizes our findings concerning the need for
impredicative plural comprehension:1⁶
primitive higher-order pluralities and
functions relations pairs
no surjective predicative impredicative predicative
function
no injective — impredicative predicative
total relation
no injective impredicative impredicative predicative
function (predicative if inverse
functions are permitted)
1⁵ We owe this surprising observation to Gabriel Uzquiano (see especially Uzquiano 2015b)
and are grateful to him for discussion of its significance.
1⁶ In fact, every relevant instance of plural comprehension can be replaced by a corresponding
instance of plural separation, as indicated in footnote 9 on p. 43.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 9/6/2021, SPi
3.a alternative formulations of plural cantor 51
This provides a richer and more interesting picture than would have been
obtained had we focused solely on primitive functions. Our table raises the
question of why predicative plural comprehension suffices to prove some
formulations of the theorem, while others require impredicative comprehen-
sion. While this is not the place for a comprehensive assessment, we wish to
make two remarks.
First, the resources needed to prove a formulation of Cantor’s theorem are
highly sensitive to the language in question. A striking example concerns
the two formulations in terms of primitive functions. The “no surjective
function” version uses a primitive function f from objects to pluralities.
Assume f is surjective. Then, for any xx, there is x such that f(x) ≈ xx.
Generalizing, we establish the following equivalence:
∀xx φ(xx) ↔ ∀x φ(f(x))
Using this equivalence, all plural quantification can be eliminated in favor of
singular quantification. It is therefore unsurprising that predicative plural
comprehension suffices for the proof. Since all plural quantification can
be eliminated, it can obviously be avoided in the comprehension axioms.
By contrast, no such elimination is available in the “no injective function”
version, which uses a primitive function g from pluralities to objects.
Second, notice that all the plural versions of Cantor’s theorem are negative
existential claims to the effect that there isn’t a function or relation that would
establish that there are no more pluralities on a domain than objects in the
domain. The strength of a negative existential claim obviously depends on
the domain: the larger the pool of possible counterexamples, the stronger
the negative existential. Compare the results recorded in the middle and
right-hand columns of our table. The results in the middle column state that
there isn’t a counterexample in the large pool of all relations of the form
R(x, yy). By contrast, the results in the right-hand column state that there
isn’t a counterexample in what might prove to be a smaller pool of such
relations that can be coded by means of pluralities and ordered pairs alone.
To investigate this possibility, let us compare the two pools of relations.
Suppose that only predicative plural comprehension is accepted. Then there
is no guarantee that every functional and surjective relation of objects to
pluralities can be coded by means of a plurality of ordered pairs. To see this,
consider a relation R(x, yy) of the mentioned sort. If we had impredicative
plural comprehension, we could establish that this relation is coded bymeans
of the plurality of ordered pairs ⟨x, y⟩ defined by the impredicative condition
∃yy(R(x, yy) ∧ y≺ yy). Without impredicative plural comprehension, how-
ever, this strategy for coding relations bymeans of pluralities of ordered pairs
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is unavailable and the two pools of relations will therefore differ in size. In
fact, when only predicative comprehension is accepted, we cannot prove in
general that all relations of the relevant type can be coded by means of a
plurality of ordered pairs.1⁷
Equippedwith this observation, let us return to the difference between the
middle and right-hand columns.We can nowbetter understand the source of
the difference. We found that, without impredicative plural comprehension,
the middle column is concerned with a strictly larger pool of possible coun-
terexamples than the right-hand column, namely the pool of all relations of
the relevant type, not just those that can be coded by means of a plurality of
ordered pairs. And it stands to reason that strictly stronger assumptions are
needed to prove a negative existential claim when this claim is concerned
with a strictly larger pool of possible counterexamples.
1⁷ Themodel construction described in footnote 14 on p. 49 provides an example of a relation
that cannot be coded in this way: let R(x, yy) be defined by x = {yy}.
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Plurals and Set Theory
What is the relation between some things and their set? This is a hard ques-
tion which has confounded many brilliant minds. We recall, for example,
that Russell wrestled with the question:
Is a class which hasmany terms to be regarded as itself one ormany? Taking
the class as equivalent simply to the numerical conjunction “A and B and
C and etc.,” it seems plain that it is many; yet it is quite necessary that we
should be able to count classes as one each, and we do habitually speak of a
class. Thus classes would seem to be one in one sense and many in another.
(Russell 1903, Section 74)
We begin with a formal comparison between plural logic and set theory,
which clarifies an important technical aspect of the question. After that, we
address some philosophical issues concerning the relation between some
things and their set. Our discussion yields an argument for primitive plurals,
which we believe has more force than any of the arguments discussed in the
previous chapter. More specifically, we argue that the expressive resources of
plurals are needed to account for sets.
4.1 A simple two-sorted set theory
Assume we start with a singular first-order language whose quantifiers range
over certain objects. Let us refer to these objects as individuals. We are
interested in ways to talk simultaneously about many individuals.
The most familiar option, at least to anyone with some training in math-
ematics, is to use set theory. A set is a single object that has zero or more
elements. Talking about a single set thus provides a way to talk about all
of its elements simultaneously. For example, we can convey information
about two individuals, say Russell and Whitehead, by talking about their
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo,
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set {Russell,Whitehead}. The information that they are philosophers can be
conveyed by saying that every element of the set is a philosopher. Similarly,
we can convey information about the natural numbers by talking about
their set. The information that they are infinitely many can be conveyed by
saying that their set is infinite. Suppose, more generally, that we want to talk
about some objects. According to the present strategy, we can achieve this
by talking about an associated set.
It is not obvious, however, that such a set exists. After all, the lesson
of the set-theoretic paradoxes is that not every formula defines a set. The
most famous example is Russell’s paradox of the set of all sets that are not
elements of themselves. Consider the formula that serves as a condition for
membership in this would-be set: x ∉ x. Suppose this formula defines a
set R. Now ask: is R an element of itself? The answer is affirmative if and only
if R satisfies the membership condition. In other words: R ∈ R if and only if
R ∉ R. But this is a contradiction!
Thankfully, the problem posed by the set-theoretic paradoxes can be put
off, at least for a while. The paradoxes do not arise when we consider only
sets of individuals drawn from a fixed first-order domain. And for present
purposes, this is all we need. So let us consider a very simple set theory, which
satisfies our present needs but does not give rise to paradoxes.
We distinguish between individuals and sets of individuals. To do so, it is
convenient to use a two-sorted language. Such languages are easily explained
because they are implicit in various mathematical practices. For example,
in geometry we often use one set of variables to range over points (say,
p1, p2, . . . ) and another set of variables to range over lines (say, l1, l2, . . . ).
We adopt a similar approach in our simple set theory, letting lower-case
variables range over individuals (x, y, . . . ) and upper-case variables (X,Y, . . . )
range over sets of individuals. We refer to these as individual variables and
set variables, respectively. If desired, we can of course add constants of either
sort. There are sortal restrictions on the formation rules. For instance, the
language has a membership predicate ‘∈’ whose first argument can only be
an individual term and whose second argument can only be a set term.Thus,
‘a ∈ X’ means that the individual a is an element of the set X. In addition to
the ordinary identity predicate, which can be flanked by any two individual
terms, our extended language contains a set identity predicate, which can
be flanked only by set terms. For convenience, we use the standard identity
sign for both identity predicates. Given the restrictions just mentioned, it is
impermissible to make identity claims involving both an individual and a set
term (such as ‘a = X’).
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This two-sorted language, which we call ℒSST, will be the language of our
simple set theory, SST. Letℒ+SST be the extended language obtained by adding
predicates that take set terms as arguments.This is an optional extra to which
we will return.
We now formulate SST based on the axioms and rules of two-sorted
classical logic. First, we adopt the axiom of extensionality for sets:
(S-Ext) ∀x(x ∈ X ↔ x ∈ Y) → X = Y
Then, we adopt an axiom scheme of set comprehension:
(S-Comp) ∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ φ(x))
whereX does not occur free inφ(x).The theory SST+ is obtained by adapting
the rules and axioms of SST to the richer language ℒ+SST.
Notice how Russell’s paradox is blocked by the use of separate sorts for
individuals and their sets. In our two-sorted language, the membership
condition for the offending set, namely x ∉ x is not even well formed.
4.2 Plural logic and the simple set theory compared
Let us compare how plural logic and the simple set theory talk about
the many. Consider a domain of individuals to which both systems are
applicable. (We will later address the important question of what, exactly,
the conditions are under which each system is applicable.) Suppose we wish
to talk about many individuals simultaneously. As we will now show, these
two ways to talk about the many share a common structure.
The two languages share a common stock of variables xi that take as their
values one individual at a time. And each language has an additional stock
of variables that are used to convey information about (loosely speaking)
collections of individuals: plural variables xxi, which take as their values
many individuals simultaneously, or set variables Xi, which take as their
values a single set of individuals. In addition, each language has a predicate
for membership in a collection: xi ≺ xxj for “xi is one of xxj” or xi ∈ Xj for
“xi is an element of Xj”.
This suggests that it should be straightforward to translate back and forth
between the two languages. One can simply replace ≺ with ∈ and xxj with
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Xj, and vice versa. In fact, things are nearly that simple. There are just two
wrinkles to be ironed out:
• ℒSST has an identity predicate that can be flanked by set terms, whereas
ℒPFO has no identity predicate that can be flanked by plural terms.
• SST postulates an empty set, whereas PFO has an axiom stating that
every plurality is non-empty.
Fortunately, both problems are easily overcome. In Appendix 4.A, we show
how to define a translation from each language to the other such that each
sentence and its translation convey the same information, at least as far as the
individuals are concerned, only that one sentence does so by utilizing plural
resources, while the other uses set-theoretic resources.
As we explain in Appendices 4.A and 4.B, the translations satisfy the
following important conditions:
(i) each translation is recursive, that is, there is an effective algorithm
for carrying out the translation;
(ii) each translation commutes with the logical connectives (for exam-
ple, the translation of a negation¬φ is the negation of the translation
of φ);
(iii) every theorem of each of the two theories is translated as a theorem
of the other theory (for example, every theorem of PFO is translated
as a theorem of SST).
More generally, let τ be a translation from the language of one theory T1
to that of another theory T2 such that these three conditions are satisfied.
Then, τ is said to be an interpretation of T1 in T2. Thus, what we show in the
appendices is that each of our two theories PFO and SST can be interpreted
in the other, and likewise with PFO+ and SST+.
It is important to be absolutely clear aboutwhat themutual interpretability
of two theories does and does not establish. Interpretability is a purely formal
notion, which also allows us to recursively turn a model of one theory into
a model of another. Thus, two mutually interpretable theories are equivalent
for the purposes of formal logic. However, there is no guarantee that the
equivalence will extend beyond those purposes.
To see this, suppose the two languages are meaningful. Then, there is no
guarantee that the translation preserves the kinds of extra-logical properties
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that philosophers commonly discuss. For example, the translation need not
preserve features of sentences such as:
• truth value;
• meaning (perhaps understood as the set of possible worlds at which a
sentence is true);
• epistemic status (for example, a priori or a posteriori);
• ontological commitments.
It is often controversial whether a translation preserves these features. The
translations presented in this chapter are no exception. Consider a nom-
inalist who accepts a certain plural sentence but rejects its set-theoretic
translation. This provides a perspective from which the translation does not
preserve truth value and hence meaning.
4.3 Plural logic vs. set theory: classifying the options
What is the significance of the shared structure (or mutual interpretability)
that we just observed? Is this merely a technical result? Or does the technical
result have some broader philosophical significance?
When the structure of one theory can be recovered within that of another,
this raises the question of whether one of the theories can be eliminated in
favor of the other. In the present context, there are three options. First, one
may eliminate pluralities in favor of sets. Second, one may proceed in the
opposite direction and eliminate sets in favor of pluralities. Finally, one may
refrain from any elimination and retain both pluralities and sets. All three
options have their defenders.
First, some philosophers hold that the plural locutions found in English
and many other natural languages should be eliminated in favor of talk
about sets. We mentioned in Chapter 2 that Quine is an advocate of this
view; see also Resnik 1988. For Quine at least, this is at root a claim about
regimentation into our scientific language. It is indisputable that many
natural languages contain plural locutions. But our best scientific theory of
the world has no need for such locutions. This theory is to be formulated
in a singular language—that is, a language lacking plural resources—whose
quantifiers also range over sets.When regimenting natural language into this
scientific language, the plural locutions of the former should be analyzed by
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means of the set talk of the latter. In short, for scientific purposes, we should
eschew plural resources and instead rely on set-theoretic resources. These
resources also suffice to interpret “the vulgar” (as Quine once put it), that
is, to regiment the plural resources indisputably found in English and other
natural languages.
Second, other philosophers insist that sets should be eliminated in favor
of pluralities. That is, we can and should interpret ordinary set talk without
relying on set-theoretic resources ourselves. A classic paper by Black (1971)
can be read as advocating this view.1 More recently, Oliver and Smiley have
expressed considerable sympathy for the view, claiming to have at least
shifted the burden of proof onto its opponents (2016, 316–17).
Lastly, one may hold that neither system should be eliminated in favor
of the other, because both plural logic and set theory are legitimate and
earn their keep in our best scientific theory. Following Cantor and Gödel,
this is the view that we will defend. Suppose we are right that both systems
should be retained. Then a host of questions arise concerning their relation.
We will be particularly concerned with two such questions.
(a) Every non-empty set obviously corresponds to a plurality, namely
the elements of the set. What about the other direction? Does every
plurality correspond to a set? If not, under what conditions do some
things form a set?2
(b) Suppose that some objects form a set. Can these objects be used to
shed light on, or give an account of, the set that they form?
Before addressing these two questions, let us explain why we reject both the
elimination of pluralities in favor of sets and that of sets in favor of pluralities.
4.4 Against the elimination of pluralities in favor of sets
One reason against the elimination of pluralities in favor of sets is the
paradox of plurality, discussed in Section 3.4. The paradox arises in untyped
approaches to sets, where sets are regarded as objects alongside others. Ordi-
nary set theory is such an approach, unlike our system SST. The argument
1 Rafal Urbaniak (2013) has argued that Leśniewski can be read in the sameway.This reading
is disputed by Oliver and Smiley who take Leśniewski to be “an orthodox singularist” about
plurals (2016, 15).
2 See Hewitt 2015 for a useful overview of this issue.
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begins, we recall, by observing that the following sentence seems trivially
true:
(4.1) There are some objects such that any object is one of them if and only
if that object is not an element of itself.
Suppose that plural resources are to be eliminated in favor of set-theoretic
ones. Then it is natural to regiment (4.1) as follows:
(4.2) There is a set of which any object is an element if and only if that
object is not an element of itself.
In symbols:
(4.3) ∃x(set(x) ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x ↔ y ∉ y))
This, of course, is an instance of the familiar Russell sentence, which is
inconsistent.
While this is a powerful argument, we saw that several responses are
possible. Quine might try to dismiss the plural talk about sets in (4.1) as just
confused talk about sets in two different guises and as having no place in the
ideal language of science. This is a logically coherent view for him to take.
However, this blunt dismissal of “the vulgar” is ultimately hard to sustain.We
find it difficult to deny that English speakers do understand plural talk about
sets. A charitable interpretation of “the vulgar” should not deny this fact.
A more promising option is to deny the possibility of absolutely general
quantification. If absolute generality is unattainable, then the door is open
to claiming that (4.2) is true but that the witness to the existence claim
lies beyond the range of the embedded universal quantifier (‘∀y’ in the
formalization), with the result that paradox is averted.3
Yet another option is to deny that (4.1) is true. Of course, (4.1) is just
an instance of plural comprehension. But perhaps plural comprehension
isn’t always permissible! Any plurality must presumably be properly cir-
cumscribed. So when we are reasoning about a domain that cannot be
circumscribed—such as the domain of absolutely everything—not every
condition can be used to define a plurality.
3 See discussion in Section 3.4.
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We won’t attempt to resolve the matter here. The last two responses to
the paradox of plurality raise big questions that we discuss in the final
two chapters. Instead, we wish to lay out another—and, we believe, more
compelling—reasonwhy pluralities should not be eliminated in favor of sets.
The reason is simply that pluralities are needed to give an account of sets.⁴
So if pluralities were eliminated in favor of sets, we could not use plural
reasoning to give such an account. In sum, to retain an attractive account
of sets in terms of pluralities, we cannot eliminate plurals.
What is the promised account of sets in terms of pluralities? It is useful
to recall how Cantor, the father of modern set theory, sought to explain the
concept of set.
By a ‘manifold’ or ‘set’ I understand in general every many which can
be thought of as one, i.e. every totality of determinate elements which
can be bound together into a whole through a law [ . . . ].
(Cantor 1883, 43; our translation)⁵
That is, a set is a “many thought of as one”. Of course, it is far from clear how
this is to be understood. (An explication will be proposed shortly.) But there
can be no doubt that Cantor sought to understand a set in terms of the many
objects that are its elements and that are somehow “thought of as one”.
By a ‘set’ we understand every collection into a whole M of determinate,
well-distinguished objects m of our intuition or our thought (which will be
called the ‘elements’ of M). We write this as: M = {m}.
(Cantor 1895, 481; our translation)⁶
It is tempting to read Cantor’s variable ‘m’ as a plural variable (see also
Oliver and Smiley 2016, 4–5). So, in line with our notation, let us replace
⁴ One might attempt to deny the need for such an account by adopting a more structuralist
conception of set, where a set is characterized in terms of its structural relations to all other
sets rather than in terms of some particularly intimate relation to its elements. See Parsons
2008, Chapter 4, for useful discussion. However, we insist that there is also a more ontological
conception of set, especially in the case of hereditarily finite sets, which regards a set as
“constituted” by its elements. In fact, such a conception is suggested by a liberal view of
definitions, to be described shortly.
⁵ The original reads: ‘Unter einer Mannichfaltigkeit oder Menge verstehe ich nämlich allge-
mein jedes Viele, welches sich als Eines denken lässt, d.h. jeden Inbegriff bestimmter Elemente,
welcher durch ein Gesetz zu einem Ganzen verbunden werden kann [ . . . ].’
⁶ The original reads: ‘Unter einer Menge verstehen wir jede Zusammenfassung M von bes-
timmten wohlunterschiedenen Objekten m unsrer Anschauung oder unseres Denkens (welche
die Elemente von M genannt werden) zu einem Ganzen. In Zeichen drücken wir dies so aus:
M = {m}.’
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this variable with ‘mm’. A set M is then said to be a collection into one of
some well-distinguished objects mm, namely the elements of M. And we
write M = {mm}.
What about the empty set? Here there is a threat of a mismatch. While
standard set theory accepts an empty set, traditional plural logic does not
accept an empty plurality. But we are confident that this threat can be
addressed. One option is to break with traditional plural logic and accept
an empty plurality, perhaps on the grounds that, although this isn’t how
plurals work in English andmany other natural languages, there are coherent
languages where plurals do behave in this way (see Burgess and Rosen 1997,
154–5). Another option is to break with standard set theory and abandon the
empty set. However, we would prefer not to deviate from successful scientific
practice, in this case set theory, unless there are compelling reasons to do so.
Finally, an elegant option proposed (in a different context) by Oliver and
Smiley (2016, 88) is to allow “co-partial functions”, that is, functions that
can have a value even where the argument is undefined. Suppose the ‘set
of ’ operation xx ↦ {xx} is such a function. Then, applied to an undefined
argument, this function can have the empty set as its value.
What is it for many objects to be “thought of as one” or collected “into a
whole”? Let us attempt to shed some light on this idea. Many philosophers
and mathematicians believe that the elements of a set are somehow “prior
to” the set itself and that the set is somehow “constituted” by its elements.⁷
Assume xx form a set {xx}.Then the objects xx can be used to give an account
of {xx}. That is, properties and relations involving the set are explained in
terms of properties and relations involving the plurality of its elements. Why
is a an element of {xx}? An answer immediately suggests itself: because a is
one of xx. Why is {xx} identical with {yy}? Again, the answer seems obvious:
because xx are the very same objects as yy.⁸
Of course, in their current form, these remarks are highly programmatic.
The promised account needs to be spelled out. We do this in Section 12.3
by defending a liberal view of definitions. Here is the rough idea behind
the view: it suffices for a mathematical object to exist that an adequate
definition of it can be provided. The adequacy in question is understood
as follows. Suppose we begin with a “properly circumscribed” domain of
⁷ See, e.g., Parsons 1977a and Fine 1991.
⁸ This account contrasts with some earlier contributions to themetaphysics of sets, e.g. Lewis
1991 and Oliver and Smiley 2016 (Chapter 14). We believe our account coheres better with the
remarks by Cantor (discussed above) and by Gödel (discussed in Section 4.6).
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objects standing in certain relations.⁹ We would like to define one or more
additional objects. Suppose our definition determines the truth of any atomic
statement concerned with the desired “new” objects by means of some
statement concerned solely with the “old” objects with which we began.
Then, according to the liberal view, the definition is permissible.
To illustrate the point, let us apply the view to the case of sets. Suppose
we begin with some properly circumscribed domain of objects. For every
plurality of objects xx from this domain, we postulate their set {xx}, with the
understanding that atomic statements concerned with any new sets should
be assessed in the following way.
(i) {xx} = {yy} if and only if xx ≈ yy.
(ii) a ∈ {xx} if and only if a ≺ xx.
Notice how this account determines the truth of any atomic statement
concerned with the “new” sets solely in terms of the “old” objects with which
we began, as required by the liberal view.1⁰
We also observe that this account distinguishes a set from its singleton, as
is customary in comtemporary set theory. By (i), we have {xx} = {{xx}} just
in case xx is coextensive with {xx}. We contend that this coextensionality
claim is false. Suppose xx are two or more in number. Then cardinality
considerations alone ensure its falsity. Alternatively, suppose xx consist of
a single object a. Then the coextensionality claim is equivalent to a = {a},
which is false because a is an element of its own singleton but not, we may
suppose, of itself.
To sum up, we argue that pluralities should be retained alongside sets, so
that the former can be used to shed light on the latter. This account of sets
draws essentially on our liberal view of definitions.
4.5 Against the elimination of sets in favor of pluralities
The view discussed in the preceding section retains sets but gives an account
of them in terms of pluralities. One may wonder whether a more radical
approach is possible. Why not simply eliminate sets in favor of pluralities?
⁹ In Part IV of the book, the notion of being properly circumscribed will play an important
role and will be analyzed under the label of extensional definiteness.
1⁰ Mereological sums provide another example of this liberal view of definitions; see
Section 5.8.
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Black’s (1971) classic discussion suggests a view of this sort.11 He observes
that ordinary language often talks about sets: expressions such as ‘my set
of chessmen’ or ‘that set of books’ feel fairly natural to English speakers. By
reflecting on ordinary uses of the word ‘set’, he argues, we can come to see the
intimate connection between talk about a set and about its elements. More
specifically, we can come to realize that basic uses of the word ‘set’ are simply
substitutes for plural expressions such as plural descriptions or lists of terms.
In his example, the sentence ‘a certain set of men is running for office’ is what
he calls an “indefinite surrogate” for the statement that, say, Tom, Dick, and
Harry are running for office (Black 1971, 631).
Black recognizes that there is a gap between ordinary uses of the word
‘set’ and its uses in mathematics. For instance, ordinary speakers untrained
in abstract mathematics often havemisgivings about the empty set. If sets are
collections of things, how can there be a collection of nothing whatsoever?
Despite such misgivings, Black contends that we can rely on our ordinary
understanding of plurals to make sense of “idealized” uses of the word ‘set’
as it occurs in mathematics.
There is an obvious difficulty for Black’s contention. Talk of sets of sets
is ubiquitous in mathematics and, as we will see shortly, such “nested” sets
are essential to the now-dominant iterative conception of set. How can we
account for these uses of the word ‘set’? If talk about sets is shorthand for
talk about pluralities, then sets of sets would seem to correspond to higher-
level pluralities, that is, “pluralities of pluralities”.12
It is controversial whether such higher-level pluralities make sense, but a
putative example is given in following sentence.
(4.4) My children, your children, and her children competed against each
other.
The subject of this sentence appears to be a “nested” plural, that is, a plural
expression formed by combining three other plural expressions. Arguably,
this nesting of the subject is semantically significant. The claim is not merely
that all the children in question compete against each other but that they do
so in teams, each team comprising the children of each parent. We return to
the question of whether there are higher-level pluralities in Chapter 9.
11 We should note that this is not the only way to read Black. It is not entirely clear whether
he proposes an eliminative reduction or favors some form of non-eliminative reductionism.
An eliminative proposal is developed by Hossack (2000), who appeals to plurals and plural
properties to eliminate sets.
12 For proposals along these lines, see Simons 2016 andOliver and Smiley 2016, Section 15.1.
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While the availability of higher-level pluralities is a necessary condition
for the envisaged elimination of sets, it is not sufficient. As observed, the
language of mathematics talks extensively about sets and appears to treat
these as objects. If possible, it would be good to take this language at face
value. The account of sets in terms of pluralities outlined in the previous
section allows us to do just that. This provides a reason to retain sets even if
higher-level pluralities are available. The reason is even stronger for those
who accept other mathematical objects such as numbers. If numbers are
accepted, why not also accept sets?
4.6 The iterative conception of set
Suppose we retain both pluralities and sets, giving up on any attempt to
eliminate one in favor of the other. How, then, to account for nested sets?
This means going beyond the simple set theory discussed in Section 4.1 to
form a stronger set theory, where the threat of paradox re-emerges. The
standard response to this threat is the so-called iterative conception of set.
One of the first clear expressions of this conception is given in a famous
passage by Gödel.13
Theconcept of set, however, according to which a set is anything obtainable
from the integers (or some other well-defined objects) by iterated appli-
cation of the operation “set of ”, and not something obtained by dividing
the totality of all existing things into two categories, has never led to any
antinomy whatsoever; that is, the perfectly “naive” and uncritical working
with this concept of set has so far proved completely self-consistent.
(Gödel 1964, 180)
The passage calls for some explanation. First, Gödel distinguishes the
iterative conception of set from a problematic conception based on the idea
of “dividing the totality of all existing things into two categories.” Consider
a condition that any object may or may not satisfy. One might then attempt
to use this condition to divide the totality of all objects into two sets: the
set of objects that satisfy the condition and the set of those that don’t.
But this approach to sets is problematic: as we have seen, it gives rise to
Russell’s paradox.
13 The passage contains some footnotes, which we elide.
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By contrast, the iterative conception starts with the integers or “some other
well-defined objects”. We are then told to consider iterated applications of
the operation “set of ”. An example will help. Suppose we start, at what we
may call stage 0, with two objects, say a and b. The “set of ” operation can
be applied to any plurality of objects available at stage 0 to form their set.
Thus, at stage 1, which results from the application of this operation to the
objects available at stage 0, we have the following sets:∅, {a}, {b}, and {a, b}.
So, at stage 1, we have six objects, namely a and b together with four sets
that were not available at stage 0. Now we can apply the “set of ” operation
again, this time to the objects available at stage 1. This yields sets such as
{∅, a}, {{a}, {b}}, and many others. Note that, by this procedure, the objects
available at any given stage form a set at the next stage.
There is a more systematic way to describe what takes us from one stage
α to the next stage α+ 1. For any set S, let its powerset,℘(S), be the set of all
subsets of S, that is:
℘(S) = {x ∶ x ⊆ S}
Suppose the objects available at stage α are the elements of Vα. Then at stage
α + 1 we form all the subsets of Vα. So, at stage α + 1, we have the elements
of Vα as well as those of℘(Vα). In symbols: Vα+1 = Vα ∪℘(Vα). Again, we
have by this procedure that all the sets available at stage α, taken together,
form a set at stage α + 1.
In fact, we want to consider really long iterations of the “set of ” operation.
The first step is to define Vω as the result of continuing in this way as many
times as there are natural numbers. We do this by letting Vω be the union
of all of the collections Vn generated at a finite stage: Vω = ⋃n<ω Vn. More
generally, for any limit ordinal λ, we let Vλ be the union of all the collections
of sets we have generated: Vλ = ⋃γ<λ Vγ.
The cumulative hierarchy of sets, V, is the union of all of the Vα. As Gödel
observes (in a footnote to the passage quoted above), V isn’t a set.There is no
stage at which all sets are available to form a universal set. For any stage, there
is a later stage containing even more sets. As a result, we ban the universal
set and any other set that would lead to paradox.
Of course, this raises the question of the status of the cumulative hierarchy
itself, including the question of whether “it” even exists as an object. We will
encounter one appealing response to this question in Section 4.8: perhaps we
can invoke plurals and simply regard the cumulative hierarchy as all the sets
that are formed in the construction described above.
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4.7 Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory
The iterative conception motivates much of today’s standard set theory,
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC), which is
adequate for nearly all of ordinary mathematics. This is a theory of pure sets,
formulated in a one-sorted language with only one non-logical predicate, ‘∈’
for membership. All other set-theoretic notions are defined in terms of this
single predicate. The axioms are as follows.
Extensionality: Coextensive sets are identical. That is:
∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ y) → x = y
Empty set: There is an empty set. That is:
∃x∀y y ∉ x
Pairing: Every two objects have a pair set. That is:
∀x∀y∃z∀u(u ∈ z ↔ u = x ∨ u = y)
Union: For every set x, there is a set y whose elements are precisely those
objects that are an element of some element of x. That is:
∀x∃y∀u[u ∈ y ↔ ∃z(u ∈ z ∧ z ∈ x)]
Powerset: Every set has a powerset. That is:
∀x∃y∀u(u ∈ y ↔ u ⊆ x)
Infinity:There is an infinite set, that is, a set with∅ as an element and such
that, whenever y is an element, so too is y ∪ {y}. That is:
∃x[∅ ∈ x ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x → y ∪ {y} ∈ x)]
Separation: For any set x and any condition φ, there is a set of precisely
those elements of x that satisfy φ. That is:
∀x∃y∀u(u ∈ y ↔ u ∈ x ∧ φ)1⁴
1⁴ This is an axiom scheme, which yields an axiom for each φ.The same goes for Replacement,
stated below.
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Foundation: Every non-empty set x has an element that is disjoint from x.
That is:
∀x(x ≠ ∅ → ∃y(y ∈ x ∧ x ∩ y = ∅))
Replacement: For every set x and functional condition ψ, there is a set of
precisely those objects that are borne ψ by some element of x.1⁵ That is:
Func(ψ) → ∀x∃y∀u[u ∈ y ↔ ∃z(z ∈ x ∧ ψ(z, u))]
This axiom is based on a simple and intuitive idea. Consider any set. For
each of its elements, choose either to keep this element or to replace it
with some other object. Then the resulting collection is also a set.
Choice: Every set x of non-empty disjoint sets has a choice set, that is, a set
containing precisely one element of each element of x. An example due
to Russell might be useful to understand the Axiom of Choice. Suppose
you have infinitely many pairs of shoes. Then it is easy to define a set
containing precisely onemember of each pair, namely the set of left shoes.
What if you have infinitely many pairs of socks where the two members
of each pair are indistinguishable? Then we are unable to define a set
containing precisely one member of each pair. The Axiom of Choice tells
us that such a set exists, irrespective of our ability to define it.
As observed, ZFC is a theory of pure sets. It is easy, however, to modify the
theory tomake room for urelements, that is, objects that aren’t sets. To do so,
we first add to the language a predicate S for being a set. Using this predicate,
we then formalize the axioms so as to match precisely their informal
statements provided above. For example, the axiom of Extensionality is
rewritten as:
∀x∀y[S(x) ∧ S(y) → (∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ y) → x = y)]
The modified system is often known as ZFCU.
The iterative conception motivates many of the axioms of ZFC or ZFCU.
The Powerset axiom provides a nice example. Suppose x is available at some
stage s. Then the elements of x were available before s. Hence each subset of
x is also available at s. Thus, the set of all these subsets is available at the stage
immediately after s.We need not here take a stand on precisely which axioms
1⁵ The condition ψ is functional just in case, for every x there is a unique y such that ψ(x, y).
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of set theory aremotivated by the iterative conception. Gödel appears to have
taken the answer to be “all of them”; others disagree.1⁶
4.8 Proper classes as pluralities
Let us use the word ‘collection’ in an informal way for anything that has a
membership structure, such as a set, class, plurality, or indeed even a Fregean
concept (where the relation between instance and concept is regarded as a
membership structure). We often wish to talk about collections that are too
large to form sets, such as the entire cumulative hierarchy of sets or all the
ordinals. We will now explain the apparent need for such collections, why
these are sometimes regarded as problematic, and finally a brilliant proposal
due to Boolos, namely that plural logic provides a way tomake sense of these
collections.
Let us begin with the need for a novel type of collection, in addition to
sets. There are several reasons for this need. Boolos mentions two. First,
collections are needed to make sense of the cumulative hierarchy V, which
is the domain of set theory. For example, we would like to say that V is the
subject matter of set theory and that V is well founded.
Second, collections are needed to understand and justify two axiom
schemes that are part of ZFC, namely Replacement and Separation.1⁷ Both
of these take the form of an infinite family of axioms. Consider Separation.
ZFC contains an axiom
(Sep) ∀z∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ z ∧ φ)
for each of the infinitelymany formulas φ of its language. Behind this infinite
lot of axioms lies a single, unified idea that can be expressed by reference to
collections.1⁸ For every collectionC and every set x, there is a set y of all those
elements of x that belong to C. Suppose we can quantify over collections.
Then the infinitely many Separation axioms could be unified as the single
axiom:
(C-Sep) ∀C∀x∃y∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z ∈ x ∧ z belongs to C)
1⁶ On this topic, see e.g. Boolos 1971 and Paseau 2006.
1⁷ Analogous considerations apply to the arithmetical principle of induction.
1⁸ See also Kreisel 1967.
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In the literature, the desired collections are often known as classes, some of
which can be shown to be “too big” to be sets. These are called proper classes.
But what would these proper classes be? Just like sets, they are collections of
many objects into one. But why, then, are proper classes not sets? As Boolos
(1984b, 442) nicely observes, “[s]et theory is supposed to be a theory about
all set-like objects”.
Adding proper classes to a theory of sets is just like adding yet another
layer of sets on top of the sets already recognized. In light of this, why
shouldn’t the proper classes count as just more sets? William Reinhardt puts
the point well:
[O]ur idea of set comes from the cumulative hierarchy, so if you are going
to add a layer at the top it looks like you forgot to finish the hierarchy.1⁹
Plural logic seems to provide precisely what we need. A proper class does
not have to be a single object that somehow collects together many things
into one. Instead of referring in a singular way to a proper class, construed
as an object, why not simply refer plurally to its many members? In this way,
we eliminate singular talk about proper classes in favor of plural talk about
their members. For example, the cumulative hierarchy does not have to be
an object. It suffices to talk plurally about all the sets.
Consider now the axiom scheme of Separation. This can be turned into a
single axiom using a plural formulation. Given any objects pp and any set x,
there is a set y of precisely those elements of x that are also among pp:
(P-Sep) ∀pp∀x∃y∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z ∈ x ∧ z ≺ pp)
Let us make two final observations. To represent all of the classes that
we might be interested in, we would need an unrestricted form of plural
comprehension, namely:
(P-Comp) ∃xφ(x) → ∃xx∀x(x ≺ xx ↔ φ(x))
Moreover, we need plural logic to be ontologically innocent. If plural vari-
ables commit us to new objects, using plurals in the formulation of Separa-
tion or Replacement is not essentially different from using proper classes.
1⁹ Reinhardt 1974, 32. For a useful elaboration of the point, see Maddy 1983, 122.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/6/2021, SPi
72 plurals and set theory
4.9 Are two applications of plural logic compatible?
We have described two very attractive applications of plural logic: as a
way of giving an account of sets, and as a way of obtaining proper classes
“for free”. Regrettably, it looks like the two applications are incompatible.
The first application suggests that any plurality forms a set. Consider any
objects xx. Presumably, these are what Gödel calls “well-defined objects”.
If so, it is permissible to apply the “set of ” operation to xx, which yields
the corresponding set {xx}. The second application, however, requires that
there be pluralities corresponding to proper classes, which by definition are
collections too big to form sets. For example, there must be a plurality of
all sets whatsoever to serve as the proper class V. But, when the “set of ”
operation is applied to this plurality, we obtain a universal set, which is
unacceptable.
Is there any way to retain both of the attractive applications of plural
logic? To do so, we would have to restrict the domain of application of
the “set of ” operation so that the operation is undefined on the very large
pluralities that correspond to proper classes, while it remains defined on
smaller pluralities. The obvious concern is that this restriction would be
ad hoc. The operation does apply to vast infinite pluralities, thus forming
large sets in the cumulative hierarchy. But once we allow that these infinite
pluralities form sets, why are other infinite pluralities suddenly too large to
do so?
To respond to this challenge, we might seek inspiration from Gödel, who
points to a restriction when he requires that the “set of ” operation be applied
to “well-defined objects”. How should this restriction be understood? One
option is to understand Gödel as requiring that the objects in question be
properly circumscribed. Perhaps a collection corresponding to a proper class
fails to satisfy this requirement. We explore this idea in Chapter 12 and find
that there are indeed “collections” that fail to be properly circumscribed.
However, we also argue that every plurality is (in the appropriate sense)
properly circumscribed and can thus figure as an argument of the “set of ”
operation. Thus, if our argument succeeds, the two applications of plurals
remain incompatible, and we must choose between them. We recommend
retaining the first application of using plurals to give an account of sets, while
looking elsewhere for an interpretation of talk about proper classes that aren’t
properly circumscribed and therefore cannot figure as arguments of the “set
of ” operation. A natural option is to look to second-order logic. We discuss
this in Section 12.8.
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Appendices
4.A Defining the translations
We wish to define a translation τ from the language of our simple set theory
SST to that of plural logic.The central idea is obvious: let us replace talk about
a set with talk about the objects that are elements of the set. Thus, instead of
saying that xi is an element of the set Xj, we say that xi is one of xxj. So we
adopt:
τ(xi ∈ Xj) = xi ≺ xxj
Identity statements involving set terms are translated as the corresponding
plural coextensionality statements. For example, ‘Xi = Xj’ is translated as:
∀x0(x0 ≺ xxi ↔ x0 ≺ xxj)
Atomic predications concerning individuals are left unchanged by the trans-
lation. Next, the translation commutes with the logical connectives. For
example, the translation of a negated formula is the negation of the trans-
lation of the formula:
τ(¬φ) = ¬τ(φ)
Finally, we need to translate existentially quantified formulas. (For simplic-
ity, we may treat universal quantifiers as abbreviations in the usual way.)
The individual existential quantifier poses no problem: here too we let the
translation commute with the logical operator.
The set existential quantifier is slightly harder. Suppose we let the transla-
tion commute, setting ‘τ(∃Xj φ)’ to be ‘∃xxj τ(φ)’. This does not quite work.
For wewant to have an empty set but no empty plurality. Boolos (1984b, 444)
proposes a trick to iron out this wrinkle. Let τ translate ‘∃Xjφ’ as
(4.5) ∃xxjτ(φ) ∨ τ(φ′)
where φ′ is the result of substituting ‘xi ≠ xi’ everywhere for ‘xi ∈ Xj’. The
second disjunct simulates an expansion of the range of quantification, thus
accommodating the possibility that a set is empty. (To see how this works,
suppose Xj is empty. Then ‘xi ∈ Xj’ always has the same truth value as
‘xi ≠ xi’, namely false.) By induction on formal derivations, one can easily
prove that each theorem of SST is mapped to some theorem of PFO.
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It is easy to define a “reverse” translation that maps formulas of the
language of plural logic to formulas of our two-sorted set-theoretic language.
As expected, one can prove that this translationmaps theorems of the former
to theorems of the latter. So we can translate in both directions between PFO
and SST while preserving theoremhood. Analogous results can be obtained
for PFO+ and SST+.
4.B Defining the interpretation
Thetwo translationswe have just encountered illustrate an important general
notion, which will provide a useful conceptual tool in subsequent discus-
sions. So let us make explicit the relevant properties of the translations.
Suppose we are comparing two theories, T1 and T2, which are formulated
in two multi-sorted languages ℒ1 and ℒ2, respectively. (Note that all the
formal languages we consider in this book can be viewed as languages of this
kind.) And suppose we have specified a translation τ fromℒ1 toℒ2 such that
(i) τ is recursive, that is, there is an effective algorithm that specifies how
to translate any given formula of ℒ1;
(ii) τ commuteswith the logical connectives (for instance, τ(¬ϕ) =¬τ(ϕ));
(iii) τ maps every theorem of T1 to a theorem of T2.
We wish tomake some remarks about the translation of quantified formulas.
First, the translation should permit a change in the type of variables. In
particular, we sometimes want to map plural variables to set variables and
vice versa. Second, a quantified formula is usually translated as a restricted
quantification:
∃v ϕ τ⟼∃u(θ(u) ∧ τ(ϕ))
But this requirement is unnecessary. In fact, to accommodate Boolos’s trick,
which simulates an expansion of the range of a quantifier, we must refrain
from requiring that every quantified formula be translated in this way.
A translation that satisfies these three properties is said to provide an inter-
pretation of T1 in T2.When there are such translations in both directions—as
in the examplesmentioned in the previous section—the two theories are said
to be mutually interpretable.
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As just defined, the notion of interpretability is entirely proof-theoretic: it
is concerned with syntax, not semantics. However, by the soundness of the
proof systems we use for our logic, the notion has a semantic upshot as well.
Suppose τ is an interpretation of T1 in T2. Then any model of T2 allows us
to define, in a recursive manner, a model of T1. The basic idea is simply to
interpret each predicate of ℒ1 in accordance with its τ-translation into ℒ2
and to let the domain(s) of ℒ1 be interpreted in accordance with how its
quantifiers are translated into ℒ2.
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Plurals and Mereology
In the previous chapters, we discussed two ways of conveying information
aboutmany objects simultaneously.The first uses primitive plurals, while the
second uses sets. We now examine a third alternative based on mereology.
Mereology is the theory of part-whole relations. Instances of such rela-
tions are easy to find. Consider a hydrogen atom that is part of a water
molecule, which in turn is part of the contents of a bottle. Mereology aims
to capture the general principles governing various relations of parthood.
For instance, we may ask whether it follows that the hydrogen atom, in the
mentioned example, is part of the contents of the bottle.The intuitive answer
is affirmative. This points to a general principle that is assumed to hold of
most relations of parthood, namely transitivity.
In this chapter, we present a basic development ofmereology and compare
it with plural logic. As we will see, the formal relation between these two
systems is analogous to that between plural logic and the simple set theory
of Section 4.1. This raises questions parallel to those encountered in the
preceding chapter. Can we eliminate plurals in favor of mereology? Can we
eliminate mereology in favor of plural logic? Or are there reasons to retain
both systems?
5.1 Mereology
Let us begin by developing a basic formal framework for mereology. We
start with the usual language of first-order logic and expand it with a new
primitive predicate ‘≤’ for parthood. So we read ‘x ≤ y’ as ‘x is part of (or
equal to) y’. The resulting language is one-sorted: its only variables are the
ordinary first-order ones.
The new primitive predicate allows us to define a number of important
mereological relations. First, there is proper parthood, which we write
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo,
Oxford University Press. © Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo 2021.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198791522.003.0005
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as ‘<’ and define by letting ‘x < y’ abbreviate ‘x ≤ y ∧ y ≠ x’.1 For example,
England is a proper part of the United Kingdom. Next, let us say that x and
y overlap when they have a common part: ∃z(z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y); we symbolize
this as ‘x ∘ y’. For example, Scandinavia and the European Union overlap, as
both have Denmark as a part. Finally, let us say that x and y are disjoint when
they do not overlap; we symbolize this as ‘x ⟂ y’. For example, the United
Kingdom and Scandinavia are disjoint.
We turn now to the theory of mereology. For our purposes, the most
relevant theory is so-called Classical Extensional Mereology (sometimes also
known as General Extensional Mereology). We first adopt axioms stating that
≤ is a partial order (that is, ≤ is reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric).2
Next, we adopt the axiom of Strong Supplementation, which states that when
x is not part of y, there is a part z of x that does not overlap y:
x ≰ y → ∃z(z ≤ x ∧ z ⟂ y)
For example, since the European Union is not part of Denmark, the former
must have a part that is disjoint from the latter. Finally, we adopt an axiom
scheme asserting the existence of arbitrary mereological sums (or “fusions”,
as they are also called). Suppose some object is φ. Then there is an object y
that overlaps something z just in case z overlaps an object that is φ; y is said to
be the sum of all objects that are φ.The existence of arbitrary sums is captured
by the following axiom:
(M-Sum) ∃xφ(x) → ∃y∀z(y ∘ z ↔ ∃w(z ∘ w ∧ φ(w)))
We often denote sums by means of the familiar ‘+’ symbol; for example, the
sum of a and b is written ‘a + b’.3
5.2 Can mereology represent the plural?
It is fairly obvious why set theory is an attractive tool for conveying infor-
mation about many objects simultaneously. Instead of talking about some
objects, we can talk about the set whose elements are precisely these objects.
1 Given antisymmetry (see footnote 2), an equivalent reading of ‘x < y’ is ‘x ≤ y ∧ y ≰ x’.
2 Recall that a relationR is said to be anti-symmetric if and only if ∀x∀y(Rxy∧Ryx → x = y).
3 Formally, y is said to be the sum of a and b if and only if ∀z(y ∘ z ↔ z ∘ a ∨ z ∘ b).
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Given this set, we can always retrieve the objects in question, namely as
the elements of the set. Above, we described mereology as an alternative to
set theory (and primitive plurals) for the purpose of conveying information
about many objects simultaneously. It is less obvious how mereology can
serve this purpose.Whenwe consider themereological sum of some objects,
we cannot in general retrieve the objects with which we started.
For an example of this phenomenon, consider the following two plurali-
ties: Russell and Whitehead, and the molecules of Russell and Whitehead.
These are obviously entirely different pluralities. While the former things
are two in number, the latter things are far more numerous. Yet the two
pluralities appear to have one and the same mereological sum. Indeed, to
overlap Russell or Whitehead comes to the same thing as overlapping one of
the molecules of these two logicians.
This suggests that the mereological sum of some objects is insufficient to
represent these objects. An example by Oliver and Smiley (2001) makes the
problem vivid. Consider the following inference:
(5.1)
Russell and Whitehead were logicians
The molecules of Russell and Whitehead were logicians
Because of the distributive predicate ‘were logicians’, the conclusion is false
and hence the argument is invalid. Suppose we want to represent some
objects by means of their mereological sum. This representation of the
argument seems to yield a different logical verdict. As Oliver and Smiley
remark:
‘Whitehead and Russell’ and ‘the molecules of Whitehead and Russell’
represent different decompositions of the same sum, but giving them that
sum as their common reference forces the conclusion that the molecules of
Whitehead and Russell were logicians. (2001, 293)
So they conclude that “mereological sums or fusions are ineligible” for the
task of representing many objects simultaneously. Similar examples have
been put forward by others (see, for example, Rayo 2002, 444–5, and McKay
2006, 42).
In light of these considerations, it may be surprising that mereology is a
far more popular tool among linguists interested in plurals than set theory.
Suppose we start with some objects. Whatever the merits of set-theoretic
representations in general, the set of these objects at least enables us to
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retrieve the objects in question. By contrast, there appears to be no guarantee
that we can retrieve the objects with which we began from theirmereological
sum. As we just saw, one and the same sum can be obtained by taking the
sums of two logicians and of their many molecules.
However, this problem isn’t fatal for the project of using mereology to
represent many objects simultaneously. To see why, consider three atomic
particles, say a, b, and c (where by “atomic”wemean that they have no proper
parts). To talk about the three atoms simultaneously, wemay talk about their
sum a+ b+ c. Given this sum, we can retrieve the three particles that jointly
compose it: there is a uniqueway to break this sumdown into its three atomic
parts.⁴ By talking about this single sum, we can therefore convey information
about its three atomic parts. For example, the information that the three
particles are collinear can be conveyed by saying that there is a line on which
each atomic part of the sum lies.
Thus, provided that each of the objects in question is a mereological
atom, mereology is a perfectly good tool for talking about all these objects
simultaneously. But what if we wish to talk simultaneously about many
objects that are not atomic but have proper parts? If we could somehow
regard each object as an atom, the use of mereology to represent pluralities
would be available more generally. Might this be possible?
A solution, developed and defended by Link (1983, 1998), goes as follows.
Even if the objects with which we start have material parts, they can figure as
atoms in a different sense: each is, in Link’s phrase, an individual atom. That
is, each object is an atom with respect to a different relation of parthood,
namely individual parthood. While many complaints against mereological
representations of plurals are appropriate for the ordinary notion of part-
hood, they do not apply to Link’s notion.
Let us look at an example. In the material sense, the sum of Russell and
Whitehead is the same as the sumof themolecules of Russell andWhitehead.
This is not true, however, if themereological notions are construed according
to the relation of individual parthood. In that sense, the sum of Russell
and Whitehead is the sum of Russell and Whitehead conceived as atomic
individuals, that is, taken as atoms in the domain of quantification. This
means that, in the individual sense, Russell and Whitehead are the only
proper parts of the sum of Russell and Whitehead. It follows that, in the
individual sense, the sum of Russell and Whitehead is not identical with
⁴ Readers may find it an interesting exercise to prove this from the axioms of Classical
Extensional Mereology.
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the sum of their molecules. The former but not the latter has Russell and
Whitehead as its only proper parts.
More generally, individual mereology starts with a domain of individuals
that are treated as mereological atoms, ignoring other mereological relations
in which those individuals may stand. A mereological structure is then
defined on top of that domain. The relation of individual parthood satisfies
the axioms of Classical Extensional Mereology. In addition, it satisfies the
principle of Atomicity, which states that everything has an atom among its
parts. Formally:
(M-Atomicity) ∀x∃y(At(y) ∧ y ≤ x)
where ‘At(y)’ abbreviates ‘¬∃z z< y’. We call the resulting theory Atomistic
Classical Extensional Mereology.
In fact,mereological sumshave some advantages vis-à-vis sets, which have
motivated their use in semantics. First, mereological sums are presumably
just as concrete as their parts. While the set of Russell and Whitehead is
frequently taken to be abstract, the sumof Russell andWhitehead is plausibly
taken to be concrete. So, if we want our semantics to assign concrete entities
to certain ordinary expressions, this recommends using sums rather than
sets for that purpose.
Second, we might want to assign the same semantic value to ‘Alice’ and
‘the objects that are identical with Alice’. Mereology allows this, since the
sum of a single object is identical to this very object. By contrast, standard
set theory does not allow this kind of identification, since a singleton set
is distinct from its sole element. In fact, this problem has occasionally
motivated the adoption of a non-standard set theory that allows exactly this
kind of identification (Schwarzschild 1996, 1).
The appeal to individual mereology does raise an obvious question, how-
ever. Is it permissible to invoke mereological notions in the individual sense?
The question can be split into two. First, is it even logically coherent to speak
in this way? Second, assuming that it is coherent, is this just a manner of
speaking or do the described mereological sums really exist?
We defend the claims of logical coherence and existence in Sections 5.3
and 5.8, respectively. Suppose we are right. Then we can assume that each
of our initial objects is an individual atom. So we may consider sums of
individual atoms. This ensures that pluralities of these initial objects are
uniquely represented by the corresponding individual sum.
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5.3 One-sorted plural logic
There is no concern about the logical coherence of individual mereology.
As we will now show, plural logic can be developed in a way that realizes
precisely this structure.
Let us explain. As presented in Chapter 1, plural logic is based on a two-
sorted language, since it contains two sets of variables. A singular variable
(x, y, . . . ) ranges over a single object, while a plural variable (xx, yy, . . . )
ranges over one or more objects. It is also possible to dispense with the
singular variables and provide a one-sorted version of plural logic. Our recent
foray into mereology makes this straightforward: a one-sorted plural logic
can be obtained as a mere notational variant of mereology. Instead of the
usual singular variables, we use plural variables. And instead of the parthood
predicate ≤, we use the symbol ‘≼’ as a new primitive, though we continue
to read ‘xx ≼ yy’ as “xx are among yy”. Finally, there is an identity predicate
that takes plural arguments. Indeed, in the one-sorted plural language, this
is the only identity predicate.
What is it for some objects xx to comprise a single object (and in this sense
be an individual)? We define ‘Ixx’ as ‘∀yy(yy ≼ xx → xx ≼ yy)’. That is, xx
comprise just a single object if and only if xx are contained in each of its
“subpluralities”, which means that xx has no strictly smaller “subplurality”.
How should we axiomatize plural logic in this one-sorted presentation? A
straightforward but clumsy option is simply to translate the axiomatization
already adopted (see Section 2.4) into the new one-sorted language. For
some axioms, the result is not bad. For example, the axiom stating that every
plurality is non-empty, ∀xx∃y y ≺ xx, translates as:
∀xx∃yy(Iyy ∧ yy ≼ xx)
But the translations of other axioms are needlessly long and unintuitive.⁵
Amore elegant option is to exploit the close connection we have observed
between one-sorted plural logic and the atomistic version of Classical Exten-
sional Mereology. So let us simply adapt the axioms of the latter to the
former. First, we lay down that ≼ is a partial order and obeys the Strong
⁵ Plural comprehension provides a good illustration. This axiom scheme translates as
∃xx(Ixx ∧ φ(xx)) → ∃xx(∀yy(Iyy → (yy ≼ xx ↔ φ(yy))))
This does not enjoy the immediate plausibility of its two-sorted analogue, namely (P-Comp).
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Supplementation principle. Next, we require an analogue of atomicity, that
is, that every plurality has a subplurality comprising just a single individual:
(P-Atomicity) ∀xx∃yy(Iyy ∧ yy ≼ xx)
Finally, we require the existence of arbitrary sums. One way to implement
this requirement is by adopting a principle to the effect that, for every instan-
tiated condition φ(xx), there is a unique smallest plurality zz that includes
everything that satisfies the condition. That is, if φ(xx) is instantiated, there
are zz such that:
(i) zz include every xx that satisfy the condition φ(xx):
∀xx(φ(xx) → xx ≼ zz)
(ii) zz is the smallest plurality verifying requirement (i):
∀ww(∀xx(φ(xx) → xx ≼ ww) → zz ≼ ww)
This principle can be given a more compact formalization as follows:
(P-Sum) ∃xxφ(xx) → ∃zz∀ww(∀xx(φ(xx) → xx ≼ ww) ↔ zz ≼ ww)
An alternative way to require the existence of arbitrary sums is by adopting
a plural analogue of (M-Sum). As we prove in Appendix 5.B, the two
alternatives are in fact equivalent, given background assumptions that are
currently in place.
The possibility of a one-sorted approach to plural logic is theoretically
important. This approach is just as serious as its more familiar two-sorted
cousin about the fact that plural terms can stand formany objects simultane-
ously. But this insight is represented in two very different ways. On the one-
sorted approach, the insight is captured by means of the ‘among’-predicate
‘≼’. Its argument places belong to the same sort, a sort that is given a plural
interpretation. By contrast, on the two-sorted approach, the insight also has a
syntactic manifestation in the sortal distinction between terms representing
individual objects and terms representing many objects simultaneously. But
clearly, this syntactic manifestation of the distinction between one andmany
is not obligatory. As we show shortly, many linguists prefer to do without it.
It should be unsurprising, in light of our discussion, that we can translate
between the languages of one- and two-sorted plural logic. One direction is
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straightforward. Apart from the special logical predicate ‘≼’, the one-sorted
language is a sublanguage of the two-sorted one. So the translation from the
one-sorted to the two sorted-language leaves unchanged every formula not
containing ‘≼’. It remains to specify how this predicate can be translated.
A plural ‘among’-statement, ‘xx ≼ yy’, can be translated as a generalized
individual ‘among’-statement, namely
∀z(z ≺ xx → z ≺ yy)
So we have the translation in one direction.
Let us now describe a translation τ in the reverse direction. Consider ‘x ≺
yy’. This individual ‘among’-statement can be translated as a plural ‘among’-
statement conjoined with a statement to the effect that some things comprise
just a single object:
xx ≼ yy ∧ I(xx)
Quantification over individual objects can be translated as plural quantifica-
tion restricted to singleton pluralities. Thus, ‘∃x φ’ is translated by τ as:⁶
∃xx(Ixx ∧ τ(φ))
Again, it turns out that both translations provide an interpretation of
one theory in the other. Formal definitions and proofs are given in the
appendices.
It is also no surprise that we can translate between one-sorted plural logic
andAtomistic Classical ExtensionalMereology. After all, we have formulated
the former theory by simply adapting the axioms of the latter. It follows that
all of the three theories considered in this section—themereological one and
plural logic with one or two sorts—aremutually interpretable. Again, see the
appendices for details.
5.4 Classifying some ways to talk about the many
This chapter and the previous one have described three different ways to
talk about the many. In addition to the use of primitive plural resources,
we can use sets or (individual) mereology. We have seen that there are close
connections between these different systems. But let us be more systematic.
⁶ We assume a convention is in place to ensure that xx does not occur in τ(φ).
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The alternatives we have considered differ along two dimensions: they can be
one- or two-sorted, that is, they have one or two distinct registers of variables
and constants; and they may or may not allow an “empty entity”. Our results
are summarized by the following table:
one-sorted two-sorted
empty entity — SST+
no empty entity individual mereology, PFO+
one-sorted plural logic
In fact, the top left-handquadrant is populated aswell. It is straightforward
tomodify individualmereology so as to allow an “empty sum”,much as SST+
modifies PFO+ by allowing an empty set.
We can provide translations that interpret any one of the theories in
any other. Translations that establish the mutual interpretability of the two
entries in the right-hand column were sketched in Section 4.1. And transla-
tions that establish the mutual interpretability of the two entries in the bot-
tom rowwere outlined in Section 5.3.Thus, by composing these translations,
it follows that any system in the table can be interpreted in any other such
system.
As observed in Section 4.2, the existence of these translations and the
possibility of interpreting one system in another leave wide open various
questions of great philosophical interest. The translations do not necessarily
preserve meaning. In fact, the translations may not even preserve truth
value on the intended interpretation of the languages in question. Consider
a nominalist, who believes that everything is concrete and thus that there
are no abstract objects such as sets. This theorist would take various set-
theoretic statements to be false although their translations into the plural and
mereological idiom are true. Moreover, even philosophers without nominal-
ist scruples will reject as false certain set-theoretic statements whose plural
analogues they regard as true.The statement that there is a universal plurality
(discussed in Sections 2.6 and 3.5) provides an example. Its translation into
ordinary single-sorted set theory is the statement that there is a universal
set, which is false according to the standard contemporary conception of set.
This apparent mismatch between plural logic and set theory will be a major
theme in Chapters 11 and 12.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will consider the relation between
pluralities and mereological sums. Does one explain, or even afford an
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elimination of, the other? Or should both notions be retained? As in the
previous chapter, we end up favoring the more liberal option of retaining
both notions.
5.5 Mereological singularism in linguistic semantics
Mereology is a popular tool among linguists interested in plurals. Indeed,
the most influential analysis of plurals in linguistic semantics invokes indi-
vidual mereology.⁷ The popularity of the mereological analysis of plurals is
supported by a number of theoretical considerations.⁸
To begin with, mereology provides a framework for the analysis of both
plurals and mass terms. The key idea is that plurals are analyzed by means of
individual mereology, while mass terms are analyzed by means of material
mereology. By appealing to shared mereological structures, one can explain
the common features of these two classes of expressions with a high degree
of unification. Consider the property of cumulative reference. If some people
are students and some other people are students, then all of those people are
students. Similarly, if some stuff is water and some other stuff is water, then
all of that stuff is water. On amereological analysis, this general phenomenon
is captured by assuming that certain properties P “transmit upwards” from
the parts to the whole:
∀x∀y(P(x) ∧ P(y) → P(x + y))
Moreover,mass nouns, like plurals, can give rise to collective and distribu-
tive readings. Compare:
(5.2) This jewelry is expensive.
(5.3) These pieces of jewelry are expensive.
Both sentences can mean that the jewelry as a whole is expensive. But
they can also mean that each piece of jewelry is expensive. A mereological
semantics permits a highly unified explanation, for example by assuming
⁷ See, e.g., Link 1983, Link 1998, and Champollion 2017. For an overview, see Champollion
and Krifka 2016. Alternative approaches based on mereology can be found in Gillon 1992,
Moltmann 1997, Landman 2016, and Sutton and Filip 2016.
⁸ This section and the next draw from Florio and Nicolas 2020.
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that distibutive properties “transmit downwards” from the whole to its
salient parts.
Furthermore, there are constructions that combine with plurals and mass
nouns but exclude singular count nouns, for instance comparative construc-
tions (‘more pieces of jewelry’ and ‘more jewelry’ are grammatical but ‘more
piece of jewelry’ is not) and the proportional quantifier ‘most’ (‘most pieces
of jewelry’ and ‘most jewelry’ are grammatical but ‘most piece of jewelry’ is
not). In this case too, one can provide a highly unified analysis by assuming
a shared mereological structure of plural and mass nouns.
Another appealing feature of mereology is that it can easily be integrated
with the rest of linguistic semantics. Let us explain. In linguistic semantics,
one usually interprets natural language by first assigning semantic values
to the basic expressions of the language and then deriving the semantic
value of more complex expressions compositionally. The stock of available
semantic values belongs to a hierarchy generated in the following way. First,
one postulates semantic values of some basic types, say objects and truth
values. Then, one obtains more semantic values by means of set-theoretic
operations applied to the semantic values of the basic types. Any set of
objects, for example, is now available as a possible interpretation of a one-
place predicate. More generally, the stock of available semantic values may
include sets of truth values, and functions between any two sets already
available. So the available semantic values inhabit a cumulative hierarchy
of sets generated by the entities of the basic types. Mereological sums can
be added to the pool of semantic values without fundamentally altering the
rest of semantics. These new entities become available for the set-theoretic
operations that yield other types of semantic values. The full power of set
theory thus becomes available across the semantics. So there is no special
difficulty in capturing the fact that plurals, mass terms, and singular count
nouns combine in the same way with other grammatical expressions, such
as adjectives and verbs, several determiners (for example, ‘the’, ‘some’, ‘any’,
and ‘no’), and partitive constructions.
Things look different if we try to add pluralities to the stock of semantic
values. A plurality is not a special object and hence requires the introduction
of a new semantic type. Consider the semantic value of a plural predicate.
On the mereological approach, this might be a set of individual sums, where
each such sum represents some objects to which the predicate applies. Since
the individual sums are objects, they are eligible to figure as elements of a set.
Suppose we used primitive plurals instead of individual sums. A plurality is
not an object and is thus not eligible to figure as an element of a set, which
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precludes a set-theoretic representation of the semantic value of a plural
predicate. This raises the broader question of how to integrate the new type
of primitive plurals with the rest of semantics.
Take the case of ‘some’. As shown by the following sentences—all instances
of the scheme ‘some φ ψ’—this determiner can combine with singular count
nouns, plural count nouns, and mass nouns:
(5.4) Some wolf can be found on the North Pole.
(5.5) Some wolves can be found on the North Pole.
(5.6) Some ice can be found on the North Pole.
The mereological translations of these sentences have the same form:
∃x(φ(x) ∧ ψ(x))
Each asserts that there is an object that satisfies both φ and ψ. Thus, on
the mereological analysis, the determiner can be seen as making the same
semantic contribution in all cases, requiring a common instance of φ and ψ.
By contrast, these sentences do not have the same representation in plural
logic. While (5.4) and (5.6) have the form displayed just above, (5.5) has a
different form, namely:
∃xx(φ(xx) ∧ ψ(xx))
Therefore ‘some’ appears to have one type of meaning when it combines with
a plural count noun and another type of meaning when it combines with a
singular count noun or a mass noun.⁹
Thus, we see that linguists have multiple reasons to be attracted to mere-
ological analyses of plurals. Do these analyses have any philosophical con-
sequences? Do they reveal, say, how plural talk in natural language should
really be understood and thus suggest that plural logic should be eliminated
in favor of (individual) mereology? No doubt, the analyses open the possibil-
ity of this sort of elimination. But, by themselves, the linguistic reasons for
such analyses don’t support this philosophical conclusion. Link, however,
can be read as suggesting this further, eliminative step:
⁹ Another instance of this issue concerns the formulation of a generalized quantifier theory
and is discussed in Studd 2015. See Yi 2016 for further discussion.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 10/6/2021, SPi
88 plurals and mereology
While [Boolos] thinks that plural quantification is a self-understood notion
I want to argue that this idiom is both in need and capable of a theoretical
explanation, which I submit is mereology. (Link 1998, 331–2)
In Section 4.4, we argued that primitive plurals are needed to explain
set theory. This argument has an important consequence concerning the
possibility of eliminating plurals in favor of (individual) mereology. Plurals
provide a more natural basis for the explanation of set theory than mereo-
logical sums. For it is more illuminating to explain a set in terms of its many
elements than to explain it in terms of themereological sum of these elements.
Thus, our argument provides a reason to retain plurals and not eliminate
them in favor of mereological sums.
5.6 Assessment of singularism in linguistic semantics
The use of individual sums in linguistic semantics requires that we think
of sums as objects rather than pluralities. For sums can figure as elements
of sets, while pluralities cannot. Therefore mereological talk in linguistic
semantics is not one-sorted plural logic in disguise but a genuine form of
singularism. As such, it faces the objections already considered in Chapter 3.
Our assessment there was that the objections are not compelling, at least not
in the absence of substantive assumptions.
In this section, we do two things. First, we discuss a new objection,
which has particular force against mereological singularism in the context
of linguistic semantics. Then, we revisit one of the substantive assumptions
behind some arguments discussed in Chapter 3, namely the possibility of
absolute generality. We examine the plausibility of this assumption in the
particular context in which we now find ourselves.
The mereological analysis of plurals has raised a concern about the intelli-
gibility of plural predication.1⁰ Consider the following collective predication:
(5.7) Annie and Bonnie cooperate.
This sentence is perfectly intelligible to competent speakers. According to
the mereological analysis, its truth conditions are as follows:
(5.8) ‘Annie and Bonnie cooperate’ is true if and only if the individual sum
denoted by ‘Annie and Bonnie’ satisfies the predicate ‘cooperate’.
1⁰ See McKay 2006, 24.
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However, it may be objected that the right-hand side of (5.8) is unintelligible.
We do understandwhat it is for two people to satisfy the predicate ‘cooperate’
but—the objection goes—we do not understandwhat it is for a sum to satisfy
that predicate.
In response, one may observe that we do understand what it is for a single
entity like a group, a team, or a committee to satisfy the predicate ‘cooperate’.
For (5.9) is perfectly intelligible:
(5.9) This group/team/committee cooperates.
So one may insist that the sense in which a sum satisfies the predicate
‘cooperate’ is the same sense in which a group, a team, or a committee does.
An alternative response relies on an event-based analysis of predication
that generalizes the influential proposal of Davidson 1967. If we broaden the
notion of event to include states, we can regard all predicates as properties of
events. We can then analyze a sentence like (5.7) in one of two ways.11
(5.10) ‘Annie and Bonnie cooperate’ is true if and only if there is an event of
cooperating and the individual sum denoted by ‘Annie and Bonnie’
is the agent of that event.
(5.11) ‘Annie and Bonnie cooperate’ is true if and only if there is an event
of cooperating, each atom of the individual sum denoted by ‘Annie
and Bonnie’ is a co-agent of that event, and nothing else is a co-agent
of that event.
The sole difference concerns the relation between the sum denoted by ‘Annie
and Bonnie’ and the underlying event of cooperating. In the first analysis, the
sum is the agent of the event.That is, the sum plays the thematic role of agent
of the event. In the second, the sum simply provides the atoms that share
the role of agent and, in this sense, function as co-agents of the event. No
matter which proposal is adopted, the intelligibility problem should be less
pressing: clauses (5.10) and (5.11) appear to be intelligible. The mereological
notions involved are given to us through axioms, and we can certainly rely
on our ordinary understanding of events for a basic grasp of the event-
theoretic notions employed in the semantics. But event semantics is a well-
established and successful framework, routinely used by many linguists and
11 See Landman 2000, Chapter 3, Section 3.2–3.3. For historical details and references, see
Oliver and Smiley 2016, 44–5.
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philosophers. We see no reason to doubt the coherence of their research and
the intelligibility of the event-based analysis of predication.
A theme that emerged in Chapter 3 is that a singularist analysis, such as
the mereological one, might not be available in the presence of absolute gen-
erality, provided that traditional plural logic is assumed. Let the domain of
quantification of our plural object language comprise absolutely everything.
We observed in Section 5.2 that mereology can represent the plural only if
the objects in the range of the first-order quantifiers are mereological atoms
in the individual sense. Since the first-order domain contains absolutely
everything, it follows that every object whatsoever is an individual atom.
To apply the mereological analysis, however, we would need further objects,
namely sums of atoms. Because absolutely every object is now regarded as
an atom, no such sums are available. We have, as it were, run out of objects
to serve as sums.
How strong is this objection?Wewill ultimately respond to it by restricting
traditional plural logic. But a more immediately appealing response is to
deny the possibility of absolute generality. If there is no such thing as absolute
generality, then the objection under discussion gets no foothold.
Even if there is some sense to be made of absolute generality—as we argue
in Chapter 11—a closely related response nonetheless remains available,
namely to observe that, for the vast majority of their purposes, linguists can
set aside the problem of absolute generality. They are anyway assuming that
the domain is given as a set, for instance when they do generalized quantifier
theory. And as we have seen, there is no set of absolutely all objects.Thus, the
objection poses no additional problem for linguists. Given their purposes,
linguists are entitled to proceed precisely as they do.
5.7 The elimination of mereology in favor of plural logic
The thesis that mereology should be eliminated in favor of plural logic has
found a number of supporters in metaphysics.12 A systematic development
is given by Keith Hossack (2000), who advocates an atomistic metaphysics.
According to this view, there really are no complexes such as masses,
composite objects, or sets; only metaphysical atoms exist. The view relies
essentially on plural logic.
12 An influential use of this idea is found in van Inwagen 1990; see also Rosen andDorr 2002.
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Hossack points out that none of the usual axioms of mereology, including
the ones stated above, seems to hold in general. For example, we can find uses
of the word ‘part’ for which transitivity fails. A page is part of a book, which is
part of a library, although the page is not part of the library. And it is highly
controversial whether the axiom (M-Sum), which asserts the existence of
arbitrary sums, is correct.
According to Hossack, “[a]bout the only interpretation on which the
mereological axioms are indisputable logical truths is a plural one” (Hossack
2000, 423).The formal translation frommereology to one-sorted plural logic
can be seen as vindicating this point. Indeed, he gestures at the result and
concludes that:
it seems plausible thatwe can use the are-some-of relation to give an analysis
of our ordinary talk of parts andwholes that is superior to the account given
by extensional mereology. (Hossack 2000, 424)
Finally, he shows how the analysis can be carried out for various complexes.
Simplifying a bit, the proposed strategy is illustrated by the following
examples of elimination concerning masses and complex objects.
(5.12) There is some water.
(5.13) Some atoms are φ.
(5.14) There is a chair.
(5.15) Some atoms are ψ.
Here φ and ψ are collective predicates true of atoms that constitute water
and atoms that constitute a chair, respectively. In the literature, the latter is
usually rendered as “are arranged chairwise”.
There are three main issues with this approach. First, what guarantee
do we have that all composite objects decompose into atoms? Aristotle
famously held that matter is indefinitely divisible. Any bit of matter contains
an even smaller bit of matter. Whether or not he was right about that, it
certainly seems possible that there could be atomless gunk, that is, some stuff
without atomic parts.13 Thus, the proposed analysis depends on a risky and
controversial metaphysical assumption.
13 More formally, x consists of atomless gunk if and only if any part y of x has a proper part z.
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Second, how should we analyze plural talk about composite objects?1⁴
Consider the following collective predication about a plurality of composite
objects:
(5.16) The chairs are arranged in a circle.
The problem is that talk about a single chair already uses plurals, in the form
of plural talk about some atoms arranged “chairwise”. So we have already
“used up” the plural resources of the language in which we give our analysis.
Pluralities of composite objects would therefore require superplurals. (We
discuss the legitimacy of superplurals in Chapter 9.)
Finally, there appears to be a mismatch between the modal profiles of a
plurality and that of a composite object. Plural membership is modally rigid.
If a is one of bb, then necessarily so (at least on the assumption that all of
the objects in question continue to exist). And likewise for not being one of
some things. In short, a plurality doesn’t vary with respect to whichmembers
it has in different circumstances or possible worlds. (This view is defended
in Chapter 10.) By contrast, there are composite objects for which parthood
appears non-rigid. Consider one of your cells. It seems possible for you to
exist even though this cell is no longer to be part of you.And a good thing too,
since the life expectancy of most cells is far shorter than that of the organism
to which they belong!1⁵
5.8 Keeping both plural logic and mereology
Where does this leave us? We argued in Chapter 4 that both pluralities and
sets should be retained. Should mereological sums too be retained alongside
pluralities and sets?
Our previous discussion suggests an “algebraic conception” of mereology.
The axioms of mereology describe a certain kind of abstract structure,
which can be realized in many different—indeed non-isomorphic—ways.1⁶
1⁴ For a discussion of this objection, see Uzquiano 2004a.
1⁵ Even if our claims about a mismatch of modal profiles is right, this isn’t the end of the
story—as so often in philosophy. The mismatch is analogous to that of the modal properties of
the statue and the clay in the famous problemofmaterial constitution. In both cases, a proponent
of the relevant reduction can attempt to address themismatch by invoking a counterpart relation
(see Lewis 1971 and Gibbard 1975).
1⁶ See Fine 2010, Section II, for a similar view based on a “pluralist” conception of parthood.
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We have seen various examples of such realizations: the material interpre-
tation, where x is part of y just in case the matter of x is contained in
that of y; and the plural interpretation in the one-sorted formulation of
plural logic. This suggests that mereology, unlike set theory, does not have
a single canonical interpretation. Mereology is the abstract theory of part-
whole structures, which are realized in many different ways. In this respect,
mereology is rather like the theory of partial orders. It makes no sense to
ask what is the true partial order of reality. A plethora of different partial
orders are realized throughout reality. Likewise, we submit, itmakes no sense
to ask what is the true part-whole structure of reality. There are many such
structures.
The question, then, is: what part-whole (or mereological) structures are
there? We have already mentioned two examples: material parthood and the
among-relation defined on pluralities. For our purposes, themost important
aspect of the question concerns individual mereology, which as we have
seen plays a key role in many linguistic approaches to plurals. Are there
individual sums?
This metaphysical question has no easy answer. A comprehensive dis-
cussion would take us too far afield. Instead, we will briefly present two
reasons to accept the existence of individual sums. First, individual sums are
very useful in semantics in order to account for various natural language
phenomena. This provides a broadly naturalistic reason to accept them,
namely that individual sums figure in respectable scientific practice.
Second, as explained in Section 4.4, we are attracted to a liberal view of
definitions. According to this view, it suffices for a mathematical object to
exist that an adequate definition of it can be provided, where the adequacy in
question is understood as follows. Suppose we start with a domain of objects
standing in certain relations and would like to define one or more additional
objects. Suppose our definition determines the truth of any atomic statement
concerned with the desired “new” objects by means of some statement con-
cerned solely with the “old” objects with which we began. Then, according
to our liberal view, the definition is permissible.
Let us apply this approach to our question about the existence of indi-
vidual sums. Suppose we start with some domain of objects. For every
plurality of objects xx from this domain, we postulate their individual sum
Σ(xx), which contains each member of xx as an individual atom. Atomic
predications concerned with these objects are to be assessed as follows.
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(a) If xx consist of just a single object y, then the sum Σ(xx) is identical
with y.
(b) Σ(xx) ≤ Σ(yy) if and only if xx ≼ yy.
Clearly, (b) entails:
(c) Σ(xx) = Σ(yy) if and only if xx ≈ yy.
This yields an account of the desired individual sums and their relations in
terms of pluralities of the objects with which we started and their relations.
The account of individual sums clashes with certain metaphysicians’
attempts to eliminatemereology in favor of pluralities.The result of adopting
the liberal view of definitions yields mereological sums as objects, much
as the application of Gödel’s “set of ” operation to pluralities yields sets as
objects. These objects live alongside the pluralities from which they are
formed. By contrast, the eliminative project surveyed in Section 5.7 rejects
the existence of all mereological non-atoms. Overall, our view is that we
should retain two kinds of derived objects—sets and individualmereological
sums—both of which can be accounted for in terms of pluralities. Because
of this account, our view is a form of non-eliminative reductionism.
Wehave advocated retaining pluralities, sets, andmereological sums.How
do these three kinds of object interact? This question raises a number of
interesting and difficult issues. We shall content ourselves with commenting
on one particularly important point. How does the individual sum Σ(xx)
differ from the set {xx}? Part of the answer has to do with clause (a): while the
sumof a singleton plurality is identical with the solemember of this plurality,
the set formed by a singleton plurality is distinct from its sole member.
Another part of the answer emerges when sum formation is iterated. Clause
(b) must then be replaced by a more general criterion of identity. Let ‘z ∘ xx’
abbreviate ∃x(z ∘ x ∧ x ≺ xx). Then this more general criterion can be
formulated as:
(b+) Σ(xx) ≤ Σ(yy) ↔ ∀z(z ∘ xx → z ∘ yy)
which, unlike (b), is valid even when xx and yy are not all individual atoms.
Clearly, (b+) entails:
(c+) Σ(xx) = Σ(yy) ↔ ∀z(z ∘ xx ↔ z ∘ yy)
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These clauses show that sum formation is “flat” in a way that set formation is
not.1⁷ That is, taking the sum of some objects and some other objects is the
same as taking the sumof the former objects and the sum of the latter objects.
The analogous set-theoretic claim is false: taking the set of some objects and
some other objects is not the same as taking the set of the former objects
and the set of the latter objects. To be precise, let us formalize these obser-
vations. Let t1 and t2 be two terms, either singular or plural, and let tt be the
plural term referring to all of the objects referred to by either t1 or t2. Using
Σ(t1, t2) as a shorthand for Σ(tt), we then have that Σ(xx, Σ(yy)) = Σ(xx, yy),
while the analogous set-theoretic claim, {xx, {yy}} = {xx, yy}, is false. Thus,
as advertised, sums and sets behave in importantly different ways.
1⁷ Kit Fine develops a similar but more general view. His “sums” (2010, 574) correspond to
our individual sums.
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Appendices
5.A Partial orders and principles of decomposition
The appendices to this chapter have two main aims. First, we want to
provide a useful introduction to mereology. We begin with the axioms
of the atomistic version of Classical Extensional Mereology, mentioned in
Section 5.1. We present the axioms in natural groups, where each group cap-
tures one fairly unified idea. Second, based on the resulting understanding
of mereology, we prove the mutual interpretability of our official two-sorted
plural logic PFO+ and the appealing one-sorted alternative based on the
described mereological theory.
We begin by rehearsing some definitions. Let ‘≤’ be an atomic pred-
icate representing ‘is part of (or equal to)’. Then we make the following
definitions.
Definition 5.1 (Basic notions)
(a) x < y (x is a proper part of y) iff x ≤ y ∧ x ≠ y.
(b) x ∘ y (x overlaps y) iff ∃z(z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y).
(c) x ⟂ y (x is disjoint from y) iff ¬x ∘ y.
(d) At(x) (x is an atom) iff ¬∃y(y < x).
The first group of axioms, which is already familiar, consists of those of a
partial order.
Definition 5.2 (Partial order) ≤ is a partial order iff:
x ≤ x(PO1)
x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x → x = y(PO2)
x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z → x ≤ z(PO3)
Let PO be the first-order theory whose axioms are (PO1)–(PO3).1⁸
The second group of axioms are principles of decomposition. They sanc-
tion that the mereological relations that obtain between two objects are a
matter of these objects’ parts. First, there are the supplementation axioms:
1⁸ In the statement of these axioms, we rely on our convention from Section 2.4 of omitting
initial universal quantifiers, as is often done in mathematical prose.
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x < y → ∃z(z ≤ y ∧ z ⟂ x) (Weak Supplementation)(WS)
x ≰ y → ∃z(z ≤ x ∧ z ⟂ y) (Strong Supplementation)(SS)
Next, there is the principle of complementation:
(C) x ≰ y → ∃z∀w(w ≤ z ↔ w ≤ x ∧ w ⟂ y) (Complementation)
If x ≰ y, the object z said to exist by (C) is easily seen to be unique; this object
is often written ‘x ⧵ y’ (pronounced “x minus y”).1⁹
Our first result orders the principles of decomposition by their logical
strength. Let us say that φ is strictly stronger than ψ relative to a theory T
iff T,φ ⊢ ψ but T,ψ ⊬ φ. Then:
Lemma 5.1 Relative to the theory PO of partial orders, we have: (C) is
strictly stronger than (SS), which is strictly stronger than (WS), which
is strictly stronger than just PO.
Proof. The implications are straightforward. First, x ⧵ y can serve as the
object z said to exist by (SS). Second, we use the fact that the definition of
x < y assures y ≰ x. The three non-implications are established by means of
counterexamples. See Varzi 2019, Section 3, for details. ⊣
Strong Supplementation is particularly important because it ensures that
parthood admits of a very useful characterization in terms of overlap,
namely:
(∗) ∀z(z ∘ x → z ∘ y) ↔ x ≤ y
Let us call ∀z(z∘x → z∘y) the overlap criterion for the parthood claim x ≤ y.
Thus, (∗) asserts the validity of the overlap criterion for parthood. Our next
result reveals the tight connection between Strong Supplementation and the
validity of the overlap criterion.
Lemma 5.2 (SS) is equivalent to (∗) relative to the theory PO.
Proof. First, observe that some simple first-order logic allows us to rewrite
(SS) as:
(SS′) ∀z(z ≤ x → z ∘ y) → x ≤ y
1⁹ To prove uniqueness, assume there were two such objects, z1 and z2. Then we would have
z1 ≤ z2 and z2 ≤ z1, whence z1 = z2 after all.
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Next, PO proves the equivalence of ∀z(z ≤ x → z ∘ y) and ∀z(z ∘ x → z ∘ y).
It follows that (SS) is equivalent, relative to PO, to the left-to-right direction
of (∗). Our claim therefore follows because the other direction of (∗) is a
theorem of PO. ⊣
Strong Supplementation has another attractive consequence as well, which
is recorded in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3 The following statements are equivalent relative to POplus (SS):
(i) x = y
(ii) ∀z(z ≤ x ↔ z ≤ y)
(iii) ∀z(z ∘ x ↔ z ∘ y)
(iv) ∀z(z ⟂ x ↔ z ⟂ y)
Proof. Relative to PO, (i) implies (ii), which in turn implies (iii). We now use
Lemma 5.2 to establish that (iii) implies (i) relative to PO + (SS). Thus, the
first three conditions are equivalent. Finally, we observe that (iii) is equivalent
to (iv) because z ⟂ x ↔ z ⟂ y can be rewritten as ¬z ∘ x ↔ ¬z ∘ y. ⊣
5.B Some notions of sum
Wenow describe two conceptually different notions of sum that are available
in the context of any partial order ≤.
The first notion is that of a least upper bound. Let us say that z is an upper
bound of x and y iff x ≤ z and y ≤ z. A least upper bound of x and y is an
upper bound z of x and y such that, for any other upper bound w, we have
z≤w. The statement that z is a least upper bound of x and y can be
formalized as:
(5.17) ∀w(z ≤ w ↔ x ≤ w ∧ y ≤ w)
Clearly, when a least upper bound of two objects exists, it is unique.2⁰
A second notion of sum is defined in terms of the notion of overlap,
namely that z is a fusion of x and y iff:
(5.18) ∀w(w ∘ z ↔ w ∘ x ∨ w ∘ y)
2⁰ Suppose both z1 and z2 were least upper bounds of x and y. Then we would have z1 ≤ z2
and z2 ≤ z1, which entails z1 = z2.
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That is, a fusion of x and y is an object z such that, to overlap z is equivalent
to overlapping either x or y. Assume Strong Supplementation. Then, if there
is a fusion of x and y, this fusion is unique. To see this, suppose that z1 and z2
are fusions of x and y. By our definition of a fusion, an object w overlaps z1
iff w overlaps z2 (namely, iff w overlaps either x or y). By the overlap criterion
of identity—which by Lemma 5.2 is available on the assumption of PO and
Strong Supplementation—it follows that z1 = z2.
What is the relation between the two notions of sum? The next result
provides the answer.
Lemma 5.4
(a) Assume Strong Supplementation. Then any fusion of x and y is also a
least upper bound of x and y.
(b) Assume Complementation. Then any least upper bound of x and y is
also a fusion of x and y.
Proof. (a) Assume z is a fusion of x and y, that is, (5.18). The overlap criterion
for parthood immediately yields x, y ≤ z. It remains to show that z is the least
upper bound of x and y. So assume x, y ≤ z′. This assumption, combined
with (5.18), yields ∀w(w ∘ z → w ∘ z′), whence by the overlap criterion again,
we have z ≤ z′, as desired.
(b) Assume z is a least upper bound of x and y, that is, (5.17). Because
x, y ≤ z, we have that w ∘ x ∨ w ∘ y implies w ∘ z. It remains to establish the
converse implication. Assume, for contradiction, thatw∘z butw ⟂ x∧w ⟂ y.
This means that z ≰ w, whence by Complementation, we can let u be z ⧵ w,
that is:
(5.19) ∀v(v ≤ u ↔ v ≤ z ∧ v ⟂ w)
Instantiating ‘∀v’ with respect to x and y, it follows that x, y ≤ u. But w ∘ z, so
u < z. This result contradicts our assumption that z is the least upper bound
of x and y. That establishes the implication we set out to prove. ⊣
We now formulate axioms stating that any two objects have a sum in each
of our two senses:
∃z(∀w(z ≤ w ↔ x ≤ w ∧ y ≤ w))(LUB)
∃z(∀w(w ∘ z ↔ w ∘ x ∨ w ∘ y))(Fus)
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What about larger collections of objects: do these too have sums? Let us start
with sums understood as least upper bounds. A partial order ≤ is said to be
complete iff, for any instantiated condition φ(x), there is a least upper bound
of all the objects that satisfy the condition; that is, iff:
(LUB+) ∃x φ(x) → ∃z∀w(z ≤ w ↔ ∀x(φ(x) → x ≤ w))
Next, the partial order is said to permit unrestricted fusion iff the following
axiom scheme holds:
(Fus+) ∃x φ(x) → ∃z∀w(w ∘ z ↔ ∃x(φ(x) ∧ w ∘ x))
This is meant to capture the idea that any non-empty collection of objects
has a fusion.
As before, and under the same assumptions as before, we can prove that a
least upper bound (or fusion), if there is one, is unique. Also as before, and
under the same assumptions as before, we can prove that these unrestricted
notions of least upper bound and fusion are equivalent.
Equipped with this understanding of unrestricted sums, we are now ready
to define Classical Extensional Mereology.
Definition 5.3 The theory of Classical Extensional Mereology consists of:
(i) the theory PO of partial orders
(ii) the axiom of Strong Supplementation
(iii) the axiom scheme (Fus+)
Various alternative (but equivalent) axiomatizations exist as well. Here is
one important example: we may replace (ii) and (iii) with the axiom of
Complementation and the axiom scheme (LUB+), respectively.21
21 To see that this alternative yields an equivalent axiomatization, we first invoke the men-
tioned generalization of Lemma 5.4. It then remains only to show that Classical Extensional
Mereology, as defined above, entails Complementation. (Hint: Show that x ⧵ y can be defined
as the fusion of w such that w ≤ x ∧ w ⟂ y.) See Varzi 2019, Section 4.4, for a useful overview
of further alternatives, including more minimalistic ones. The articulation of the axioms of
Classical Extensional Mereology into the three groups (i) through (iii) is nevertheless histor-
ically important and, we think, conceptually more illuminating than the more minimalistic
alternatives.
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5.C Atomicity
Definition 5.4 A partial order ≤ is said to be atomistic iff every object has
an atomic part:
(At) ∀x(∃u(u ≤ x ∧ At(u))
Let Atomistic Classical Extensional Mereology be the result of adding (At) to
Classical Extensional Mereology.
Lemma 5.5 Let ≤ be an atomistic partial order with Strong Supplemen-
tation.
(a) Then parthood can be tested on atoms, in the following sense:
x ≤ y ↔ ∀u(At(u) → (u ≤ x → u ≤ y))
(b) Assume ≤ is also complete; that is, (LUB+) holds. Then every object
is is identical to the fusion of its atoms.
Proof sketch. The proof of (a) is routine and is therefore omitted. For (b),
consider any object x, and let y the fusion of the atoms in x. By Atomicity,
anything that overlaps x is easily shown also to overlap y. Moreover, anything
that overlaps y overlaps an atom in x and thus also x itself. By the overlap
criterion of identity, it follows that x = y. ⊣
Our main reason for being interested in atomistic mereology is that the
among-relation≼ is atomistic. Recall that this relation is defined in the two-
sorted system, but primitive in the one-sorted system. Consider the plural
comprehension scheme:
(P-Comp) ∃x φ(x) → ∃xx∀x(x ≺ xx ↔ φ(x))
Theanalogue of this principle in the atomisticmereology of≼ is the principle
stating that, provided φ is instantiated by an atom, there is a sum whose
atomic parts are all and only the atomic φs:
(At-Sum) ∃x(At(x) ∧ φ(x)) → ∃z∀w(At(w) → (w ≤ z ↔ φ(w)))
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Let us now compare this atomistic principle with our unrestricted fusion
principle (Fus+).
Theorem 5.1 (Fus+) is strictly stronger than (At-Sum) relative to the theory
of partial orders with Strong Supplementation. However, if we add the
assumption that the partial order is atomistic, the two principles become
equivalent.
Proof. Assume ∃x(At(x) ∧ φ(x)). Consider the fusion of all atomic φs.
This fusion is easily shown to be a witness for the existential claim in the
consequent of (At-Sum). The converse implication is easily seen to fail when
≤ is non-atomic. Finally, assume that≤ is atomistic. Suppose there is a φ. We
want to show that there is a fusion of allφs. Let z be the sumof all atomic parts
of φs, which is ensured by (At-Sum) to exist. That is, we instantiate (At-Sum)
with the formula ‘∃y(φ(y) ∧ x ≤ y)’. Then, since ≤ is atomistic, to overlap z
is equivalent to overlapping some atomic part of some φ. And to overlap
some atomic part of some φ is (again, since ≤ is atomistic) equivalent to
overlapping some φ. By transitivity, to overlap z is equivalent to overlapping
some φ. Thus, z is our desired fusion of all φs. ⊣
5.D One- and two-sorted plural logic compared
Let us compare the one- and two-sorted formulations of plural logic. The
former, we recall from Section 5.3, states that the among relation ≼ satisfies
the axioms of Atomistic Classical Extensional Mereology. More precisely,
this theory is just like Atomistic Classical Extensional Mereology, as formu-
lated above, except that it uses the predicate ‘≼’ rather than ‘≤’ and that all
of its variables are doubled (for example, ‘xx’ instead of ‘x’). The latter is the
familiar system PFO+. We also provided translations from each language
into the other. Let us now prove the promised result that these translations
are interpretations of each formulation of plural logic in the other.
Consider first the result of translating the system PFO+ into one-sorted
plural logic. The axioms and inference rules of PFO+ are easily seen to be
mapped to theorems and derived rules of one-sorted plural logic. First, the
axioms and rules of sentential logic and the quantifiers rules are straightfor-
ward. Next, consider the indiscernibility principle:
(Indisc) xx ≈ yy → (φ(xx) ↔ φ(yy))
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 10/6/2021, SPi
5.d one- and two-sorted plural logic compared 103
The antecedent is translated as the statement that xx and yy have the same
atomic parts. By Lemma 5.5(a) and the assumption that ≼ is a partial order,
we derive the identity statement xx= yy, whence the translation of the
consequent of (Indisc) follows by Leibniz’s Law.
Then, there is the axiom which says that every plurality is non-empty:
(Non-Empty) ∀xx∃y(y ≺ xx)
This is mapped to the axiom that states that the order ≼ is atomistic.
Finally, each instance of the plural comprehension scheme (P-Comp)
is mapped to an instance of the atomistic principle (At-Sum), which is a
theorem of our one-sorted plural logic by the first half of Theorem 5.1.
We turn now to the reverse direction, namely the interpretation of one-
sorted plural logic in PFO+. As mentioned in Section 5.3, the primitive
among-relation ≼ of one-sorted plural logic is translated as its defined
counterpart in PFO+:
(5.20) xx ≼ yy ↔def ∀u(u ≺ xx → u ≺ yy)
So we must verify that this defined relation satisfies the required properties.
Theorem 5.2 The defined relation ≼ in PFO+ satisfies the axioms of Atom-
istic Classical Extensional Mereology.
Proof. It is immediate from its definition that the relation ≼ is a partial
ordering. Using (P-Comp) we can easily derive Strong Supplementation and,
via (Non-Empty), Atomicity. The completeness axiom (Fus+) also follows
from an appropriate use of (P-Comp). That is, an application of (P-Comp) to
the formula ‘∃xx(φ(xx) ∧ u ≺ xx)’ delivers the fusion of all pluralities which
satisfy φ. (This is, essentially, the second half of Theorem 5.1.) ⊣
Putting everything together, we obtain our main result.
Theorem 5.3 The two-sorted system PFO+ and the one-sorted plural logic
are mutually interpretable.
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Plurals and Second-Order Logic
We have encountered three ways to talk about the many, using primitive
plurals, set theory, or mereology. Let us now examine a fourth and final
way, namely using second-order logic. We begin with a brief introduction
to second-order logic. We will then examine whether this system can be
eliminated in favor of plural logic or vice versa.
6.1 Second-order logic
Consider the statement that Socrates thinks, which we formalize as:
(6.1) T(s)
Classical first-order logic allows us to generalize into the noun position
occupied by ‘Socrates’ to conclude that there is an object x that thinks:
(6.2) ∃x T(x)
By allowing additional forms of generalization, we can obtain more expres-
sive logics. Second-order logic (SOL) studies another form of generalization:
it allows us to generalize into the predicate position occupied by T in (6.2)
to conclude:
(6.3) ∃F F(s)
Following Frege,we describe the values ofmonadic second-order variables as
concepts. So we gloss (6.3) as follows: there is a concept, F, such that Socrates
falls under F.1
1 Different glosses are found in literature, e.g. that a concept “applies to” an individual, that
an individual is “in the extension of ” a concept, or that an individual “instantiates” a concept.
We will make use of these glosses when stylistically convenient.
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo,
Oxford University Press. © Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo 2021.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198791522.003.0006
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Variables taking predicate position—called second-order variables—
belong to special sorts and are written as upper-case letters. There is one
sort for each type of predicate. First, we have a sort for variables taking the
position of monadic predicates. Variables of this sort are marked by the
superscript ‘1’ (X1,Y1, . . . ). Then, we have another sort for variables taking
the position of binary predicates. Variables of this sort are marked by the
superscript ‘2’ (X2,Y2, . . . ). And so on. When no confusion arises, we omit
the superscripts.
Second-order logic is thus amulti-sorted system,with a sort for individual
variables and multiple sorts for second-order variables. As mentioned in
Section 2.6,monadic second-order logic (MSOL) is the subsystemof second-
order logic that adds to first-order logic only monadic variables. We can
expand MSOL with predicates taking monadic variables as argument. We
refer to the resulting system as MSOL+.
The key observation in this context is that a monadic second-order term
allows us to talk about many things simultaneously. For a concept can be
used to represent all the things that fall under it. For example, the concept F
represents precisely the φs if and only if ∀x(Fx ↔ φ(x)).
Monadic second-order logic must nevertheless be carefully distinguished
from plural logic. While the former allows us to generalize into predicate
position, the latter allows us to generalize plurally into noun position. Plural
logic thus allows us to infer from (6.1) that there are one or more objects xx
that think:
(6.4) ∃xx∀y (y ≺ xx → T(y))
As is apparent, plural andmonadic second-order logic permit different kinds
of generalization.
This difference distinguishes MSOL from the three other approaches
to representing many objects simultaneously that we considered above.
While all four approaches enable us to talk about “collections” of some
given objects, MSOL is unique among these approaches in representing
the “collections” by means of the semantic values of predicates. So, on the
second-order approach, there will be interactions between ordinary first-
order predication and the representation of “collections” that are not found
in any of the other approaches.
Let us describe the second-order logic that we will adopt. The rules asso-
ciated with the singular vocabulary—logical connectives and quantifiers—
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are the usual ones, for example introduction and elimination rules for each
logical expression. Second-order quantifiers (that is, the quantifiers binding
second-order variables) have introduction and elimination rules analogous
to those of the singular quantifiers. In addition, there is the second-order
comprehension scheme:
(SO-Comp) ∃F∀x(Fx ↔ φ(x))
where F does not occur free in φ, as well as the polyadic analogues of this
scheme.2
Is there a natural language counterpart of second-order quantification?
In other words, does quantification into predicate position occur in natural
language? Some authors have defended an affirmative answer. For example,
Higginbotham (1998, 3) points to the following sentence.3
(6.5) John is everything we wanted him to be.
A natural regimentation of (6.5) involves bound variables in predicate posi-
tions. If this analysis is correct, MSOL is not only an available language but
it is actually in use.⁴
Even if there isn’t always a good natural language counterpart, we need not
give up on second-order languages. For the lack of correspondence might be
due to an expressive limitation of natural language. Still, if we are to use a
second-order language in theorizing, we need to learn it. Is it possible for us
to do that? Williamson suggests that we use “the direct method”:
We may have to learn second-order languages by the direct method, not
by translating them into a language with which we are already familiar.
After all, that may well be how we come to understand other symbols in
contemporary logic, such as⊃ and3: we can approximate them by ‘if ’ and
‘possibly’, but for familiar reasons they may fall short of perfect synonymy
[ . . . ]. At some point we learn to understand the symbols directly; why not
2 For ease of readability, we will often omit parentheses around argument positions that
immediately follow second-order variables.
3 See also Rayo and Yablo 2001.
⁴ A fan of plurals might attempt a further generalization as well, namely to pluralize not
only first-order variables but also higher-order ones. For example, one might try to regiment
“You are several things that I am not”, using a plural version of second-order logic, as
∃FF ∀G(G ≺ FF → G(you) ∧ ¬G(I)). See Fine 1977 for a system with a very general form
of pluralization.
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use the same method for ∀F? We must learn to use second-order languages
as our home language. (Williamson 2003, 459)
If successful, this method establishes the legitimacy of second-order
resources.
6.2 Plural logic and second-order logic compared
What is the relation between second-order and plural logic? Let us compare
the languages of MSOL+ and PFO+. We can suppose that the singular
first-order fragments of these languages coincide. Each language adds to
this shared base a new stock of variables, as well as new predicates whose
argument places admit such variables. Although the new variables of each
language function in very different ways, there is (as we will now explain) a
natural correspondence between their values.
The new variables of MSOL+ are supposed to range over monadic con-
cepts, which (as Frege pointed out) we may think of as functions from
individuals to truth values.⁵ For example, one of these variables can replace
the predicative expression ‘ . . . is a boy’ and have as its value the function β
defined as follows:
β(x) = {the true, if x is a boy;the false, if not.
By contrast, each of the new variables of PFO+ is allowed to have one ormore
individuals as its values. For example, one of these variables can replace the
plural noun phrase ‘the boys’ and have as its many values all and only the
boys in the domain, say bb.
We can now explain the promised natural correspondence between the
values of the new kinds of variable. The correspondence is nicely illustrated
by the function β and the plurality bb. Suppose we start with β. Then bb can
be defined as all and only the objects that βmaps to the true. Suppose instead
we start with the plurality bb.Then β can be defined as the function thatmaps
these objects, and only these, to the true. As mathematicians like to put it, β
is the characteristic function of bb. This allows us to define either β or bb in
terms of the other.
⁵ Although our target is a syntactic translation between MSOL+ and PFO+, it is convenient
to refer to semantic concepts such as values and ranges of variables. This is done for ease of
exposition. We turn to semantic matters in Chapter 7.
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Although this single example captures the essence of the comparison we
want tomake betweenMSOL+ andPFO+, it is useful to state things in proper
generality. This requires some notation for talking about the various types of
expression. As customary, let e be the type of ordinary singular terms and
t be the type of truth values. Moreover, for any two types θ1 and θ2, we let
⟨θ1, θ2⟩ be the type of functions from entities of type θ1 to entities of type
θ2. Thus, ⟨e, t⟩ is the type of one-place predicates, which (as we have seen)
stand for functions from individuals to truth values. But we make a single
important addition to this customary setup: we add another basic type, ee,
as the type of plural terms.
Using this notation, we can rehearse the above explanation—only now
stated in proper generality.WhileMSOL+ adds variables of type ⟨e, t⟩, PFO+
adds variables of type ee. But there is a natural correspondence between the
two types ee and ⟨e, t⟩. Given any objects aa, there is an associated function
α that sends an object x to the true just in case x ≺ aa. We may think of α as
the semantic value of the predicative expression ‘ . . . is one of aa’. Conversely,
given any function α of type ⟨e, t⟩, there is—at least according to traditional
plural logic—a plurality aa of all and only those objects that α sends to the
true. Finally, each of MSOL+ and PFO+ adds predicates applying to any
number of arguments of type e and of the one additional type available in
that language, namely ⟨e, t⟩ or ee.
With these explanations on board, it is easy to describe translations
between the two languages. The basic idea is simply to map each variable
xxi to Xi and vice versa, and to map a predicate with an argument place of
type ee to a predicate with a corresponding argument place of type ⟨e, t⟩ and
vice versa. For example, ‘cooperate(xx)’ is mapped to ‘cooperate(X)’.
There is only one small bump in the road. While a monadic concept may
apply to no individuals at all, a plurality is ordinarily taken to consist of
at least one individual. This bump is easily handled by incorporating into
the translations a trick due to Boolos, which we described in Appendix 4.A.
The trick is nicely illustrated by considering the behavior of the resulting
translations on existentially quantified statements. Let σ be the translation
from the plural to the second-order language. Then a plural existential
generalization is translated as the corresponding conceptual existential gen-
eralization restricted to non-empty concepts, that is:
∃xx φ σ⟼∃X(∃yXy ∧ σ(φ))
Let τ be the translation in the opposite direction. Then a conceptual existen-
tial generalization is translated as a disjunction:
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∃Xφ τ⟼ ∃xx τ(φ) ∨ τ(φ′)
where φ′, defined as the result of substituting ‘xi ≠ xi’ everywhere for ‘Xjxi’,
is a way of simulating existential generalizations involving empty concepts.
Equipped with these translations, let us now consider the axioms of the
two theories. It can be shown that the comprehension axioms of the two
theories match via the translations. A second-order comprehension axiom
∃X∀x(Xx ↔ φ(x))
translates as a formula equivalent to the corresponding plural comprehen-
sion axiom:
∃xφ(x) → ∃xx∀x(x ≺ xx ↔ φ(x))
And clearly, a plural comprehension axiom translates as a formula equivalent
to a second-order comprehension axiom.
It remains only to consider some additional axioms of plural logic. The
axiom stating that every plurality is non-empty translates as the trivial
claim that every non-empty concept is non-empty. More interestingly, a
plural indiscernibility axiom is translated as a corresponding indiscernibility
principle in the second-order language:
∀x(Xx ↔ Yx) → (φ(X) ↔ φ(Y))
Indiscernibility principles of this kind are implausible on a conceptual inter-
pretation of the second-order language, and for that reason are not part of
MSOL+, as defined above. Two coextensive concepts might be discerned by
modal properties. Assume, for example, that being a creature with a heart and
being a creature with a kidney are coextensive. Even so, these two concepts
can be discerned by a modal property such as possibly being instantiated
by something that lacks a heart. We return shortly to the philosophical
significance of this observation.
6.3 The elimination of pluralities in favor of concepts
The formal results just presented open up the possibility of two eliminative
strategies. We might try to eliminate pluralities in favor of concepts, or we
might try to effect the opposite elimination.Michael Dummett advocates the
former option:
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[A] plural noun-phrase, even when preceded by the definite article, cannot
be functioning analogously to a singular term. [ . . . ] [I]t is only as referring
to a concept that a plural phrase can be understood [ . . . ]. To say that it
refers to a concept is to say that, under a correct analysis, the phrase is seen
to figure predicatively. (Dummett 1991, 93)
As an illustration of his eliminative strategy, he proposes to analyze (6.6) as
(6.7) and (6.8) as (6.9).⁶
(6.6) All whales are mammals.
(6.7) If anything is a whale, it is a mammal.
(6.8) The Kaiser’s carriage is drawn by four horses.
(6.9) There are four objects each of which is a horse that draws the Kaiser’s
carriage.
Here, plurals nouns (‘whales’, ‘mammals’, ‘horses’) are replaced by cor-
responding singular predicates (‘is a whale’, ‘is a mammal’, ‘is a horse’);
moreover, the plural ‘four objects’ is eliminated in the usual way in favor
of first-order quantifiers and identity statements.
To see how Dummett’s proposal could be generalized, it is useful to start
from a basic example of collective predication:
(6.10) Russell and Whitehead wrote Principia Mathematica.
How should this use of plurals be eliminated?One option is to useDummett’s
analysis of (6.8) as a model and to regiment (6.10) as (6.11):
(6.11) Russell is a co-writer of PrincipiaMathematica,Whitehead is as well,
and no one else is.
However, the formal translation given in Section 6.2 suggests a more sys-
tematic approach. First, we regiment (6.10) in PFO+. Then, we apply the
formal translation to eliminate pluralities in favor of concepts. The steps are
as follows.
⁶ For discussion, see for example Rumfitt 2005 and Oliver and Smiley 2016, Chapter 4.
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(6.10) Russell and Whitehead wrote Principia Mathematica.
(6.12) ∃xx(∀y(y ≺ xx ↔ (y = r ∨ y = w)) ∧ wrote(xx, p))
(6.13) ∃X(∀y(Xy ↔ (y = r ∨ y = w)) ∧ wrote(X, p))
We refer to this eliminative approach as the predicative analysis.
This analysis has received much criticism.⁷ Before going into details, a
general observation is in order. A precondition for eliminating plurals in
favor of second-order resources is that plural logic can be interpreted in
second-order logic.⁸ The objections we will now consider purport to show
that the former theory cannot even be interpreted in the latter.
One objection concerns flexible predicates, which can combine felicitously
with both singular and plural terms. We observed in Section 2.3 that ‘own
a house’ and ‘lifted a boat’ appear to be flexible. However, the translation
defined in Section 6.2 implicitly assumes that there are no flexible predicates.
Thus, if such predicates are added to the language, the interpretability result
from that section is no longer available.⁹
Oliver and Smiley (2016, 59) discuss the problem, calling attention to the
following sentence:
(6.14) Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus, not Russell and Whitehead.
The predicate ‘wrote’ appears to be flexible, and a natural formalization of
this sentence in plural logic would employ a single predicate applying to both
Wittgenstein and the duo Russell and Whitehead:
(6.15) wrote(w1, t) ∧ ∃xx(∀y(y≺ xx ↔ (y= r ∨ y=w2)) ∧ ¬wrote(xx, t))
Applying the predicative analysis to (6.15) yields:
(6.16) wrote(w1, t) ∧ ∃X(∀y(Xy ↔ (y = r ∨ y = w2)) ∧ ¬wrote(X, t))
⁷ See especially Yi 1999, Yi 2005, and Oliver and Smiley 2016, Chapter 4.
⁸ At least, all theoretically useful parts of our plural logic must be so interpretable. If some
aspects of this theory were found to be of no scientific use, they might perhaps be abandoned
and therefore ignored for the purposes of the elimination.
⁹ The need for flexible predicates disappears if one adopts a one-sorted plural logic. In this
system, individuals become singleton pluralities. By raising the type of individuals to that of
pluralities, one restores uniformity among the argument places of predicates.
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However, this sentence is not even well-formed in MSOL+. According to
the standard formulation of second-order logic, predicates are strictly typed:
each of their argument places can be occupied by expressions belonging to a
unique sort. So the first argument of ‘wrote’ cannot be an individual variable
in one conjunct and a second-order variable in the other.
In response, the proponent of the predicative analysis could relax the
requirement that predicates be strictly typed and allow certain predicates
to apply to objects and concepts alike. In the context of higher-order logic,
this flexibility is known as cumulativity. It is not assumed in standard
presentations of second-order logic but there is no formal obstacle to adopt-
ing it. A cumulative version of higher-order logic is perfectly consistent.
Indeed, Gödel once referred to strict typing as a “superfluous restriction” of
higher-order logic (Gödel 1933, 46). In sum, if we allow flexible predicates
in plural logic, we can allow flexible predicates in second-order logic too. If
second-order logic is modified in this way, we can at least simulate predicates
of the former kind using predicates of the latter kind.
In linguistics, a variant of the predicative analysis has been proposed by
Higginbotham and Schein (1989). It centers around an event-based account
of predication and resembles closely the combination of events and mere-
ology discussed in Section 5.6. There we mentioned two ways of analyzing
plural predications in terms of events. According to the first, a mereological
sum can serve as the agent of the event described by the predicate. According
to the second, a mereological sum can serve to represent the atoms that
function as co-agents of the event, that is, participate in the event as agents.
It is easy to see that the role played by mereological sums in each account
could be played by concepts. A concept can serve as the agent of an event or,
perhaps more plausibly, it can serve to represent the individuals (namely its
instances) that function as co-agents of the event.
Higginbotham and Schein (1989) develop the second approach and ana-
lyze (6.17) as (6.18):
(6.17) Some apostles lifted the piano.
(6.18) ∃X(∃yXy ∧ ∀y(Xy → apostle(y)) ∧ ∃e(lift-the-piano(e) ∧
∀y(Xy ↔ y is a co-agent of e)))
This approach avoids the objection from flexible predicates. To see why, let
us return to the example that illustrated the need for such predicates:
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(6.14) Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus, not Russell and Whitehead.
On Higginbotham and Schein’s analysis, the predicate ‘wrote’ applies to
events, not to objects or concepts. This means that the predicate’s arguments
are uniform. Applying their analysis to (6.14) yields someting along the
following lines:
(6.19) ∃e(writing-the-Tractatus(e) ∧ w1 is an agent of e) ∧
¬∃e∃X(writing-the-Tractatus(e) ∧ ∀y(Xy ↔ (y = r ∨ y = w2)) ∧
∀y(Xy ↔ y is a co-agent of e))
So the objection from flexible predicates does not get off the ground.
A second objection to the predicative analysis concerns extensionality.
The thought is that, because pluralities and concepts differ with respect to
extensionality, the former cannot be eliminated in favor of the latter. A clear
manifestation of this problem has already emerged. At the end of Section
6.2, we remarked that the main difficulty for interpreting PFO+ in MSOL+
has to do with the indiscernibility principle, which states that coextensive
pluralities satisfy the same formulas. The principle strikes most logicians
and philosophers as highly plausible and is included in our axiomatization
of plural logic. Its second-order translation states that coextensive concepts
satisfy the same formulas:
∀x(Xx ↔ Yx) → (φ(X) ↔ φ(Y))
However, this second-order indiscernibility principle is not plausible (see the
example on p. 109), let alone a good candidate for a logical truth. Still, the
principle is required if our translation is to yield an interpretation of PFO+
in MSOL+.
Let us illustrate this objection with an example discussed by Yi (1999,
2005). Consider the following inference, which is intuitively valid:
(6.20)
Russell and Whitehead cooperate.
Russell and Whitehead are philosophers who wrote Principia
Mathematica.
Some philosophers who wrote Principia Mathematica
cooperate.
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The inference can be formalized in PFO+ as:
(6.21)
∃xx(∀y(y ≺ xx ↔ (y = r ∨ y = w)) ∧ cooperate(xx))
∃xx(∀y(y ≺ xx ↔ (y = r ∨ y = w)) ∧
∀y(y ≺ xx → philosopher(y)) ∧ wrote(xx, p))
∃xx(∀y(y ≺ xx → philosopher(y)) ∧ wrote(xx, p) ∧ cooperate(xx))
We obtain a formalization of the inference in MSOL+ by applying to (6.21)
the translation procedure described in Section 6.2. The result is as follows:
(6.22)
∃X(∀y(Xy ↔ (y = r ∨ y = w)) ∧ cooperate(X))
∃X(∀y(Xy ↔ (y = r ∨ y = w)) ∧
∀y(Xy → philosopher(y)) ∧ wrote(X, p))
∃X(∀y(Xy → philosopher(y)) ∧ wrote(X, p) ∧ cooperate(X))
As is easy to verify, the conclusion of each formal argument can be derived
from its premises with the help of instances of the appropriate indiscernibil-
ity principle. Without them, the validity of the initial inference would be left
unexplained.
Since (6.20) is logically valid and does not appear to be enthymematic,
the indiscernibility principles must be assumed to be logical. In particular,
it must be assumed that as a matter of logic a predicate like ‘cooperate’ is
extensional in the sense that it does not distinguish between coextensive
concepts. Yi concludes:
it is one thing to hold the extensional conception, quite another to hold,
more implausibly, that the truth of the conception rests on logic alone.
[ . . . ] One cannot meet the objections [ . . . ] under the assumption that the
property indicated by “COOPERATE” is one that Russell calls extensional
(that is, a second-order property instantiated by any first-order property
coextensive with one that instantiates it). This does not help unless the
assumption holds by logic [ . . . ]. (Yi 2005, 475; see also Yi 1999, 173)
Is this objection fatal to the eliminative project under consideration? We
think not. Let a first-level concept be a concept of objects, and a second-level
concept be a concept of first-level concepts.1⁰Then the key observation is that
1⁰ Thus, a first-level concept can be the value of a second-order variable, and more generally,
a concept of level n can be the value of a variable of order n+ 1.
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the following fact is provable in a basic extension of MSOL+: every second-
level concept has a counterpart that doesn’t discern between coextensive
first-level concepts.That is, for every second-level conceptP, there is another
second-level concept P∗ applying to all and only the first-level concepts
coextensive with those to which P applies:
P∗(X) ↔ ∃Y(P(Y) ∧ ∀x(Xx ↔ Yx))
Let us call P∗ the undiscerning counterpart of P. The proponent of the
eliminative strategy can use these undiscerning counterparts to capture the
extensional behavior of plural predicates.11 This move does not require that
the second-order indiscernibility principle be logical and is indeed consis-
tent with some failures of the principle. In sum, we can admit undiscerning
second-level concepts alongside “discerning” ones. We just need to ensure
that all plural predicates are translated by means of undiscerning second-
level concepts. This shows that plural logic can be simulated using concepts.
In fact, there is another reason to think that the objection from extension-
ality is not fatal. We have seen that the problem posed by flexible predicates
can be avoided if we combine plurals and events along the lines indicated
by Higginbotham and Schein. Remarkably, their framework also manages
to avoid the objection from extensionality. Consider again the potentially
problematic inference (6.20):
(6.20)
Russell and Whitehead cooperate.
Russell and Whitehead are philosophers who wrote Principia
Mathematica.
Some philosophers who wrote Principia Mathematica
cooperate.
Its validity can easily be explained in Higginbotham and Schein’s frame-
work. Roughly put, the premises are understood as stating that Russell
and Whitehead are co-agents of events of three kinds: cooperating, being
a philosopher, and writing Principia Mathematica. It follows from second-
order comprehension that there is a conceptXwhose instances are co-agents
of events of those three kinds. But, on Higginbotham and Schein’s analysis,
this is precisely what the conclusion states.
11 See Florio 2014a, 12.
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A third and final objection is a modal analogue of the objection from
extensionality. Membership in a plurality is typically taken to be modally
rigid. That is, if a is one of bb, then necessarily so, at least on the assumption
that the objects in question exist; and likewise with non-membership. (See
Chapter 10 for a defense of this view.) By contrast, falling under a concept is
almost universally taken to be modally non-rigid. Although Socrates in fact
falls under the concept philosopher, he might not have done so. Thus, when
modalities are added, we obtain an extension of PFO+ that may no longer
be interpreted in the corresponding extension of MSOL+.
Onemight try to counter this objection by imitating the response given to
the extensionality problem. We saw that it is possible to model the behavior
of plural predicates using undiscerning second-level concepts, even though
many such concepts are discerning. Something similar might work here. It
might be possible to model the rigid behavior of pluralities using rigid con-
cepts, even though many such concepts are non-rigid. The crucial question,
though, is what assurance we have that the requisite rigid concepts exist.
In the presence of plural logic, a compelling argument for their existence
is available. For every plurality aa, we can use second-order comprehension
to define a corresponding concept:
∃F2∀x(Fx ↔ x ≺ aa)
The rigidity of the plurality ensures the rigidity of the concept defined in
terms of it. In the absence of plural logic, however, it is unclear that the
existence of rigid concepts can be motivated without invoking highly con-
troversial forms ofmodalized second-order comprehension (seeWilliamson
2013, Chapter 6). We conclude that the most compelling reason against the
elimination of pluralities in favor of concepts has to do with their modal
behavior. The modal rigidity of pluralities isn’t easily secured in second-
order logic without relying on plurals.
6.4 The elimination of concepts in favor of pluralities
Let us now consider the attempt to eliminate in the opposite direction, that
is, to eliminate concepts in favor of pluralities. As we will see, this project is
more challenging and therefore more likely to fail.12
12 See Williamson 2003, Section IX, with whom we are in broad agreement.
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Some difficulties have to do with the fact that there are some natural
ways to generalize MSOL+ that have no obvious analogues in the case of
plurals. One example is third-order quantification, that is, quantification
over second-level concepts. This raises the question of whether there is any
plural analogue of quantification of third and higher orders. A monadic
second-level concept would correspond to a plurality of pluralities. We are
thus led to the question of superplurals, which has surfaced in our discussion
from time to time. We defer a proper discussion of the matter to Chapter 9.
Another example concerns polyadic concepts.There are not onlymonadic
concepts but also polyadic ones. If it is permissible to quantify over monadic
concepts, it should be equally permissible to quantify over polyadic ones.
By contrast, there is no obvious polyadic analogue of plural quantification.13
So it is unclear whether polyadic second-order logic can be interpreted in
some form of plural logic.
One might respond that the desired polyadic analogues can be defined
provided that ordered pairs are available. Suppose that for all individuals a
and b, there is an ordered pair ⟨a, b⟩ such that:
⟨a, b⟩ = ⟨a′, b′⟩ ↔ a = a′ ∧ b = b′
Using ordered pairs, it is easy to define a plural analogue of any relation. For
example, a plurality of ordered pairs can be used to represent the extension
of a dyadic relation, provided that the relation is non-empty. This plural
analogue of a relation might perhaps be criticized for being too indirect and
unnatural. Just as a monadic concept of ordered pairs can represent a dyadic
relation but isn’t really one, a plurality of ordered pairs too can represent a
dyadic relation but isn’t really one.
Although we find talk about what relations “really are” somewhat neb-
ulous, a clear objection can be extracted from the fog. Consider again the
mismatch between the modal profile of pluralities and that of concepts. We
observed in the previous section that it is possible to model the behavior of
pluralities using rigid concepts, even though concepts are in general non-
rigid. But the reverse direction is problematic. With only modally rigid
material at our disposal we are unable to model any non-rigid phenomenon.
For example, while a plurality of ordered pairs can model the extension of a
dyadic relation, it cannot in general represent all of its intensional features.
13 See Hewitt 2012a for an attempt to develop a non-obvious analogue.
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Yet another reason against the elimination of concepts in favor of plural-
ities emerges in the final chapter, where we argue that the comprehension
scheme found in traditional plural logic must be restricted. In particular, we
deny that there is a plurality of absolutely every object, which renders our
system unable to represent the universal concept.
6.5 Conclusion
We have compared plural and second-order logic. As part of this under-
taking, we have investigated to what extent one of these systems can be
interpreted in the other.
We found that second-order logic in its entirety cannot be interpreted
in plural logic. It is unclear how to handle polyadic concepts or concepts
of higher levels, and, most seriously, there is no way to handle the inten-
sionality of second-order logic, using only modally rigid pluralities. Since
interpretability is a precondition for elimination, we conclude that second-
order logic cannot be eliminated in favor of plural logic.
What about the other direction? We found that plural logic can be inter-
preted in terms of second-order logic, at least in the absence of modality.
This raises the question of whether plural logic should be eliminated in favor
of a subsystem of second-order logic. We regard the proposed elimination as
problematic, for several reasons.The identification is prima facie implausible
because of the deep and pervasive differences in how plurals and predication
are represented in English and other natural languages. Being a member of
a plurality and falling under a concept are, it seems, simply different things.
Our detailed analysis identifies a further, more robust, reason against the
proposed elimination. As already stressed, a precondition for this elimina-
tion is the interpretability of plural logic in second-order logic. We have
isolated various assumptions that are needed for this interpretability result to
obtain. First, we found that plural predicates are extensional, while predicates
of concepts are not.We showed how to circumvent this problem by invoking
undiscerning second-level concepts. Second, we observed that plural mem-
bership and predication have different modal profiles. While the former is
a matter of necessity (at least conditional on the continued existence of all
the objects in question), the latter is not. This difference was neutralized, in
our interpretability result, only by the assumptions that plural terms stand
for rigid concepts. But the most natural and compelling argument for the
existence of such concepts seems to rely on plurals.
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The conclusion of this chapter echoes those of the preceding ones. There
are several ways to represent many objects simultaneously, at least in
ordinary circumstances where our domain is a set. In addition to taking
plurals at face value, we may use sets, mereological sums in the individual
sense, ormonadic concepts. Although these systems share a common formal
structure, at least in ordinary circumstances, the notions that they represent
are different and must be kept apart.
What if ordinary circumstances do not obtain? In Chapter 12, we provide
an account of domains that do not forma set and argue that, in such domains,
another deep difference between plurals and predicates emerges: while the
former are subject to a form of limitation of size, the latter are not. If correct,
this account provides yet another reason not to attempt to eliminate second-
order logic in favor of plural logic.
Let us briefly summarize all of Part II. We have examined four different
ways to talk about many objects simultaneously. By identifying various
philosophical and formal differences, we have argued that none of these
ways should be eliminated in favor of any other. Thus, the detailed, pairwise
comparisons of Part II yield an argument for primitive plurals that Chapter 3
failed to produce.
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The Semantics of Plurals
Plural logic has emerged as an appealing framework for the regimentation
of natural language plurals and for the development of various philosophical
projects. As we will now see, however, the choice of a regimenting language
leaves wide open the semantic question of how such a language should be
interpreted. Since plural logic is characterized by a precise axiomatic theory,
one may wonder why we should be interested in its semantics.
The semantic question is important, for at least two reasons. First, a
semantics is needed for a complete account of plural logic. It is by means
of a semantics that we define a relation of logical consequence, which can be
used to identify valid as well as invalid arguments. The axioms of plural logic
help us reason correctly but, by themselves, do not tell us which arguments
are invalid. This limitation can be overcome by studying not only which
meanings the expressions of the language have but also which meanings
such expressions might have. The part of semantics concerned with possible
meanings ismodel theory. Inmodel theory, logical consequence is defined as
truth preservation under every interpretation (model) of the language,where
an interpretation is simply an assignment of possible meanings. Starting
from the notion of interpretation, we thus obtain a fully general way of
characterizing whether or not a conclusion is a logical consequence of
some premises. Second, the alleged features of plural logic that underlie the
philosophical applications discussed in Section 2.6—ontological innocence,
expressive power, and absolute generality—are really semantic features and
hence can only be assessed in light of a worked-out semantics.
In this chapter, we are primarily concerned with traditional plural logic.
In particular, the various semantic accounts we consider validate the unre-
stricted axiom scheme of plural comprehension. These accounts have to be
adjusted if, as we suggest in Chapter 12, an alternative logic is adopted.
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo,
Oxford University Press. © Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo 2021.
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7.1 Regimentation vs. semantics
The regimentation of plurals was discussed in Chapter 3, where we focused
on the following two views.
Regimentation Singularism
A singular language suffices to regiment a fragment of natural language
containing plurals, where a language is said to be “singular” if it has no
plural resources, unlike, say, ℒPFO+.
Regimentation Pluralism
Plural terms, variables, and predicates are required to regiment the
relevant fragment of natural language.
We asked whether singularism can provide a satisfactory regimentation
of plurals and found that, though often benign, this approach has some
shortcomings as a general strategy. Especially if we assume that absolute
generality is possible and that traditional plural logic is valid, there are good
reasons to favor regimentation pluralism. In light of this, we examined the
relation between plural logic and other systems.
While regimentation is relevant to semantics, it does not determine how
semantic interpretations should be specified, at least not in any obvious way.
So it is important to distinguish two questions that are often conflated:
(Q1) How should a given fragment of natural language be regimented?
(Q2) Once a regimenting language has been chosen, how should we
specify the semantic interpretations of that language?
While the first question is entirely about the object language, the second is
also about the metalanguage.
The importance of the distinction between regimentation and semantics
becomes clear whenwe look at other cases of semantic analysis. Consider, for
example, modalities. The first question concerns the proper regimentation
of modal notions. Should they be regimented as predicates of sentences?
Or should they rather be regimented as operators? As is well known,
considerations related to paradox strongly recommend the second approach.
Once a particular regimentation has been chosen, a second question arises
as to how semantic interpretations for the regimented language should be
specified. The most popular option, embodied in standard possible world
semantics, is simply to characterize models as set-theoretic constructions.
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Modalities are therefore absent from the semantics. An alternative approach
would take modal notions as primitive in the metalanguage and use them
to define the interpretations of the regimented language. But, as the set-
theoretic approach shows, the metalanguage need not embrace the notions
being analyzed. This means that the semantics cannot be directly read off
the regimented language. The transition from regimentation to semantics is
a delicate one.
The case of plurals is no different: here too we have options. In perfect
analogy with the case of modalities, we could provide a set-theoretic speci-
fication of the interpretations of the language, or we could take plural talk as
primitive in the metalanguage and use it to formulate the semantics. For our
purposes, it is useful to characterize two broad methodological approaches
to the semantic question.
Semantic Singularism
Once the regimenting language has been chosen, semantic interpreta-
tions can be specified within a theory formulated in a singular metalan-
guage.
Semantic Pluralism
Once the regimenting language has been chosen, semantic interpreta-
tions must be specified within a theory formulated in a plural metalan-
guage.
The second approach was Boolos’s great innovation and marks a clean break
with broadlyQuinean approaches, whichmight acknowledge the availability
of plural resources but would not permit their use in rigorous theorizing.
Combining the two semantic approaches with the approaches to regimen-
tation discussed earlier, we end up with four alternatives, shown in the table
below together with some of their supporters.
regimantation singularism regimentation pluralism
semantic singularism Quine (some linguists)
semantic pluralism — McKay, Oliver & Smiley,
Simons, Rayo, Yi
The bottom left-hand quadrant is empty because regimentation singularism
makes semantic singularism almost inevitable. If plurals are just singular
expressions in disguise, why should we appeal to plurals in the semantics?
But as emphasized above, regimentation pluralism does not make semantic
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pluralism inevitable. If plurals are not just singular expressions in disguise,
however, why avoid plurals in the semantics? Possible reasons have to do
not onlywith simplicity and ideological economy, but alsowith expressibility
problems that arise when one embraces type-theoretic hierarchies, as we will
see in Chapter 11.
7.2 Set-based model theory
Model theory provides the standard setting for the characterization of logical
properties. Given an object languageℒ, one first defines the notions of inter-
pretation (ormodel) ofℒ and truth in an interpretation (or satisfaction).Then
one uses these notions to characterize the key relation of logical consequence
for sentences of ℒ. A sentence ψ is said to be a logical consequence of a set
of sentences Σ just in case ψ is true in every interpretation in which every
member φ of Σ is true. When this holds, we write:
Σ ⊨ ψ
Other logical properties (such as logical truth and consistency) can easily be
defined in terms of consequence.
The possible interpretations of ℒ are obtained by varying two features:
the domain of quantification and the interpretation of the non-logical
terminology of ℒ (that is, its constants and predicates). Thus, an
interpretation is fixed by specifying these two features. The second feature is
specified by means of an interpretation function (or interpretation, for short).
The ordinary implementation of model theory is based on sets. Working
within set theory, an interpretation of ℒ is taken to be a pair ⟨d, f ⟩, where d
is a set representing the domain and f is an interpretation function from the
non-logical terminology of ℒ to set-theoretic constructions generated by d.
When ℒ is the language of first-order logic, the situation is familiar. For
example, f assigns an element of the domain to singular constant of ℒ, and
it assigns a subset of the domain to each monadic predicate.1
The next step is to define what it is for a sentence to be true in an
interpretation. Again, the situation is familiar when ℒ is the language of
first-order logic. We obtain the definition of truth in an interpretation
from the more general relation of truth in an interpretation relative to a
1 Our semantics treats all terms as denoting, as is usually done. The semantics could, if
desired, be generalized to allow non-denoting terms. For discussion of non-denoting terms in
the context of plurals, see Oliver and Smiley 2016, Chapter 5.
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variable assignment. Let i= ⟨d, f ⟩ be an interpretation, and let s be a variable
assignment relative to d, namely a function assigning an element of d to each
variable of ℒ. We use the notation JEKi,s as follows:
JEKi,s = { f (E), if E is a constant or a predicate;s(E), if E is a variable.
(We may omit one or both subscripts when the intended notation is clear
from context.) So JEKi,s stands for the semantic value of E (that is, its
“denotation”) according to i or s.
To define when a formula φ is true in i relative to s, written i ⊨ φ [s], we
proceed by induction on the complexity of φ via satisfaction clauses. If φ is
an atomic formula, say St, then:
(Sat-A) i ⊨ St [s] if and only if JtKi,s ∈ JSKi,s
Since we treat the identity predicate as logical, it is always interpreted
homophonically (namely by means of the analogous predicate in the meta-
language). That is:
(Sat-=) i ⊨ t1 = t2 [s] if and only if Jt1Ki,s = Jt2Ki,s
If φ is a negation (¬ψ) or a conjunction (ψ1 ∧ ψ2), then we have the obvious
clauses:
i ⊨ ¬ψ [s] if and only if it is not the case that i ⊨ ψ [s](Sat-¬)
i ⊨ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 [s] if and only if i ⊨ ψ1 [s] and i ⊨ ψ2 [s](Sat-∧)
If φ is an existential generalization (∃v ψ), then
(Sat-∃) i ⊨ ∃v ψ [s] if and only if i ⊨ ψ [s(v/x)] for some x ∈ d
where s(v/x) is an assignment just like s, with the possible exception that
s(v/x) assigns x to v.
We are now ready to define our target notion, namely truth in an interpre-
tation. The definitions just given ensure that if φ is a sentence (that is, it has
no free variable), we can ignore variable assignments. More precisely, φ is
true in i relative to a variable assignment if and only if φ is true in i relative to
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any other variable assignment. Thus, we can define φ to be true in i, written
i ⊨ φ, if φ is true in i for some (equivalently, every) variable assignment.
So far, we have only recapitulated the standard, set-based definition of
truth in an interpretation for the language of first-order logic. But there is
a straightforward extension of this definition to the richer language ℒPFO+.
An interpretation of this language is a pair ⟨d, f ⟩, just as before, only that
f now also assigns set-theoretic semantic values to plural constants and
predicates. For example, f assigns a non-empty subset of d to every plural
constant, and it assigns a (possibly empty) set of non-empty subsets of d to
every monadic plural predicate. Likewise, a variable assignment s relative
to d is extended by assigning a non-empty subset of d to each plural
variable.
The extended definition of truth in an interpretation relative to an assign-
ment is achieved by adding the following satisfaction clauses to the previous
ones. If φ is an atomic plural predication, say Ptt, then
(Sat-PA) i ⊨ Ptt [s] if and only if JttKi,s ∈ JPKi,s
For the special case of plural membership, we have:
(Sat-≺) i ⊨ t ≺ tt [s] if and only if JtKi,s ∈ JttKi,s
This means that the interpretation of plural membership does not vary: it
always corresponds to set-theoretic membership. Finally, if φ is a plural
existential (∃vv ψ), then
i ⊨ ∃vv ψ [s] if and only if i ⊨ ψ [s(vv/x)] for some non-empty(Sat-P∃)
x ⊆ d
where s(vv/x) is an assignment just like s, with the possible exception that
s(vv/x) assigns x to vv.
It is worth highlighting an important implication of the last clause: plural
quantifiers are taken to range over the full powerset of the first-order domain
d, minus the empty set.2 This semantic treatment of plural quantifiers cor-
responds to a standard interpretation of second-order logic, that is, an
2 Since the range of plural quantifiers is always determined by the first-order domain, there
is no need to specify it separately.
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interpretation in which the second-order quantifiers range over all subsets
of the first-order domain. In the next chapter, we develop an analogue
of Henkin semantics, which permits plural quantifiers to have a narrower
range.
To explain the standard semantics with whichwe are currently concerned,
it might help to consider a particular interpretation of ℒPFO. This example
will also be useful later in our discussion. To keep things simple, let us assume
that ℒPFO contains only the following items:
A. singular terms: two constants t and r, plus the usual variables
(v, v1, v2, . . . );
B. plural terms: two constants tt and rr, plus the usual variables
(vv, vv1, vv2, . . . );
C. singular predicates: a monadic predicate S;
D. parentheses and the usual logical symbols (¬, ∧, ∃, ≺, etc.).
The interpretation we want to consider is i = ⟨d, f ⟩, with d = {a, b, c} and f
defined by the following identities:
f (t) = a f (r) = b
f (tt) = {a, b} f (rr) = {b, c}
f (S) = {a, b}
Then, for example, the next two sentences are true in i:
(7.1) r ≺ tt
(7.2) ∃v(v ≺ rr ∧ ¬Sv)
That is easy to verify using the clauses given above. For (7.1), we reason like
this:
i ⊨ r ≺ tt if and only if
i ⊨ r ≺ tt [s], for some s if and only ifJrKi,s ∈ JttKi,s, for some s if and only if
f(r) ∈ f(tt) if and only if
b ∈ {a, b}
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For (7.2), an analogous series of steps yields:
i ⊨ ∃v(v ≺ rr ∧ ¬Sv) if and only if
x ∈ {b, c} and x ∉ {a, b}, for some x ∈ d
Similarly, we could verify that these two sentences are false in i:
(7.3) t ≺ rr
(7.4) ¬∃v(v ≺ rr ∧ Sv)
It might also help to consider a particular interpretation of ℒPFO+.
This example too will be useful later in our discussion. For simplicity, we
assume thatℒPFO+ augmentsℒPFO with just one (monadic) plural predicate
P. Our interpretation of PFO+ is an extension of i = ⟨d, f ⟩, the interpretation
of ℒPFO presented just above. We only need to specify a semantic value for
P. Let f+ be an extension of f such that f+(P) = {{a, b}}. Then i+ = ⟨d, f+⟩ is
an interpretation of ℒPFO+. It follows by construction that any sentence of
ℒPFO that is true in i remains true in i+. Here are some sentences available
in ℒPFO+ but not in ℒPFO:
(7.5) Ptt
(7.6) ∃vv¬Pvv
(7.7) ∃v∃vv((Sv ∧ v ≺ vv) ∧ Pvv)
Using the appropriate clauses, it would be easy to verify that, in i+, the first
two sentences are true while the last one is false.
On the semantics just given, PFO and PFO+ have metalogical properties
that distinguish them from first-order logic. Neither system is complete
or compact, and both lack the Löwenheim-Skolem property. Indeed, both
systems are able to provide categorical characterizations of arithmetic and
analysis, and a quasi-categorical characterization of set theory. In this sense,
the expressive power of both systems goes beyond that of first-order logic.
7.3 Plurality-based model theory
We have seen that the familiar set-based model theory is easily extended
to PFO and PFO+. However, there is nothing inherent in the idea of a
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model theory that requires it to be set-theoretic. So why not adopt plural
resources in themetalanguage and exploit these richer resources to represent
the semantic values of plural expressions? This alternative approach, which
we call plurality-based model theory, was initiated by Boolos (1985a). On
Boolos’s new semantic paradigm, the semantic value of a plural variable is
not a set (or any kind of set-like object) whose members are drawn from
the ordinary, first-order domain. Rather, a plural variable has many values
from this ordinary domain and thus ranges plurally over it. This semantic
approach to plurals has become very popular among philosophers.3
To develop a plurality-based model theory, we proceed much as before.
Working within plural logic, we first define a notion of interpretation. Then,
we use this notion to characterize, via satisfaction clauses, that of truth
in an interpretation. And as before, we rely on variable assignments as an
intermediate step.
Let us spell out these steps. In set-basedmodel theory, we defined domains
and interpretations functions as special kinds of set-theoretic objects. This
allowed us to define an interpretation as a pair ⟨d, f⟩. These definitions were
possible because the semantic values of terms andpredicateswere themselves
objects. But now we want the semantic value of a plural term to be one or
more objects. So an interpretation function can no longer be a function in
the usual set-theoretic sense. We need a different strategy.
The model-theoretic characterization of logical consequence requires
that we can quantify over interpretations: an argument is valid just in
case it is truth-preserving under every interpretation of the language. Since
our metalanguage has just two sorts of quantifiers—singular and plural—
interpretations must be either objects or pluralities. Given the semantic
shift sanctioned by Boolos’s approach, it is natural to consider the idea that
interpretations themselves might be pluralities rather than objects. As it
turns out, this idea leads to a nice formulation of the plurality-based model
theory.
If we postulate a pairing operation on objects, there is a relatively simple
way to proceed. Recall that an interpretation is fixed by specifying a domain
of quantification and the interpretation of the non-logical terminology of
the language. We can represent a domain of quantification by pairing a
conventional symbol, say the symbol ‘∃’, with each element of the domain.
If we want the domain to consist of the objects a and b, for example, we
3 See, e.g., Oliver and Smiley 2005; Yi 2005; Yi 2006; McKay 2006, Chapter 3; Rayo 2006; and
Oliver and Smiley 2016, Sections 11.5, 12.5, and 13.2.
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will represent that by means of the pairs ⟨‘∃’, a⟩ and ⟨‘∃’, b⟩. (For simplic-
ity, we omit the quotation marks in this type of ordered pairs and write:
⟨∃, a⟩ and ⟨∃, b⟩.) Similarly, we can represent an interpretation function
by pairing the relevant expressions with their semantic value or values.
For example, if we want to assign the plurality a and b to the term tt,
we will do that by means of the pairs ⟨tt, a⟩ and ⟨tt, b⟩. An interpreta-
tion will just be a plurality ii of pairs representing the relevant semantic
information. Among ii there will be pairs representing information about
the domain and pairs representing an interpretation function. Quantifying
over interpretations amounts to quantifying over the appropriate pluralities
of pairs.
Let us illustrate the new definition of interpretation by showing how to
convert the set-based interpretation i = ⟨d, f ⟩ from the previous section
into a plurality-based interpretation. This way of coding a plurality-based
interpretation goes back to Boolos 1985a. First, the domain d = {a, b, c} is
represented by these three pairs:
⟨∃, a⟩ ⟨∃, b⟩ ⟨∃, c⟩
Call these pairs dd. Next, there is the interpretation function f, which was
defined by the following identities:
f (t) = a f (r) = b
f (tt) = {a, b} f (rr) = {b, c}
f (S) = {a, b}
We can represent f by means of eight pairs:
⟨t, a⟩ ⟨r, b⟩
⟨tt, a⟩ ⟨tt, b⟩ ⟨rr, b⟩ ⟨rr, c⟩
⟨S, a⟩ ⟨S, b⟩
Call these pairs ff. The plurality-based interpretation corresponding to i is
the plurality ii combining dd and ff.Thus ii consists of the eleven pairs shown
above.
Our next goal is to provide the satisfaction clauses defining the relation of
truth in a plurality-based interpretation relative to a variable assignment. In
this context, a variable assignment is a plurality of pairs ss representing the
assignment of an object to each singular variable and of one or more objects
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to each plural variable. For instance, an assignment ss containing precisely
the pairs ⟨v, a⟩, ⟨vv, b⟩ ⟨vv, c⟩ is one that assigns a to v and the plurality b and
c to vv. The notation for semantic values will follow our earlier convention.
That is, we let the symbol JEKii,ss indicate the interpretation of E according
to ii if E is a term or a predicate, and we let it indicate the assignment to E
according to ss if E is a variable. In both cases, the result can be one or more
things. For instance, if we consider the interpretation ii and the assignment
ss just introduced, we have that JttKii,ss indicates a and b, whereas JvvKii,ss
indicates b and c.
We are finally ready to state the clauses that define when a formula φ is
true in ii relative to ss, written ii ⊨ φ [ss]. If φ is an atomic formula, say St,
then:
(Sat-A∗) ii ⊨ St [ss] if and only if JtKii,ss ≺ JSKii,ss
A small wrinkle needs to be ironed out. A predicate may obviously have an
empty extension, but there is no empty plurality. This mismatch is easily
handled, for example by always adding an arbitrary triple to the interpre-
tation of any predicate. This convention will henceforth be implicit in model
theories where predicates are given a plural interpretation.
For plural membership, we have:
(Sat-≺∗) ii ⊨ t ≺ tt [ss] if and only if JtKii,ss ≺ JttKii,ss
Notice that plural membership is always interpreted homophonically, in
accordance with our decision to treat it as logical. If φ is a negation (¬ψ)
or a conjunction (ψ1 ∧ ψ2), then we have:
ii ⊨ ¬ψ [ss] if and only if it is not the case that ii ⊨ ψ [ss](Sat-¬∗)
ii ⊨ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 [ss] if and only if ii ⊨ ψ1 [ss] and ii ⊨ ψ2 [ss](Sat-∧∗)
Let dd be the domain of ii. If φ is a singular existential (∃v ψ), then
(Sat-∃∗) ii ⊨ ∃v ψ [ss] if and only if ii ⊨ ψ [ss(v/x)] for some x ≺ dd
where ss(v/x) is an assignment just like ss, with the possible exception that
ss(v/x) assigns x to v. If φ is a plural existential (∃vv ψ), then
(Sat-P∃∗) ii ⊨ ∃vv ψ [ss] if and only if ii ⊨ ψ [ss(vv/xx)] for some xx ≼ dd
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where ss(vv/xx) is an assignment just like ss, with the possible exception that
ss(vv/x) assigns xx to vv.
Plural quantification receives, again, a standard interpretation. Plural
quantifiers are taken to range over every subplurality of the first-order
domain. Interestingly, it is possible to formulate an alternative, Henkin-
style semantics even within a plurality-based model theory. We develop this
idea in the next chapter, where we also explore its significant philosophical
implications.
We have obtained a definition of the relation of truth in an interpreta-
tion relative to a variable assignment for formulas of ℒPFO. However, our
definition is carried out in a richer metalanguage, namely ℒPFO+. This is
because the relation being defined (“φ is true in ii relative to ss”) has a singu-
lar argument for formulas and two plural arguments, one for interpretations
and one for assignments. So, in this setting, ‘ . . . is true in . . . relative to . . . ’ is
a plural predicate, which takes us beyond PFO into PFO+.This is not an acci-
dent but a manifestation of Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth.
We examine this phenomenon more closely in Chapter 11. A consequence
of immediate concern is that we should expect the model theory for PFO+
to require an even richer metalanguage (see Section 7.5).
As in the case of set-based model theory, the satisfaction of a sentence is
independent of the choice of variable assignment. So we can define truth in
an interpretation as follows. For any sentence φ, φ is true in ii, written ii ⊨ φ,
if φ is true in ii for some (equivalently, every) variable assignment.
Going back to the interpretation ii we used as an example, it is easy to
verify that ii makes true the same sentences that were made true by its set-
based counterpart i. Recall that
(7.1) r ≺ tt
was shown to be true in i (p. 129). We can verify that this sentence is true in
ii by means the following reasoning:
ii ⊨ r ≺ tt if and only if
ii ⊨ r ≺ tt [ss], for some ss if and only ifJrKii,ss ≺ JttKii,ss, for some ss if and only if
b ≺ a and b
For another example, apply the above clauses to (7.2), which is easily seen to
yield:
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ii ⊨ ∃v(v ≺ rr ∧ ¬Sv) if and only if
x ≺ b and c, and x ⊀ a and b, for some x ≺ dd
where dd is the domain of ii. These truth conditions now have a pleasing
homophonic feel.
We mentioned above some of the key metalogical properties of PFO on
the set-based model theory. PFO turns out to have the same metalogical
properties on the plurality-based model theory just outlined. In particular,
PFO is neither complete nor compact, and it lacks the Löwenheim-Skolem
property. So PFO continues to have more expressive power than first-order
logic.
While the twomodel theories are on a par with regard to suchmetalogical
properties, it has nevertheless been argued that there are reasons to prefer the
plurality-based model theory over its set-based analogue. Let us turn to this
issue.
7.4 Criticisms of the set-based model theory
There is an apparent element of artificiality in the set-based model theory.
Plural terms are taken to denote sets. So plural quantification is interpreted as
quantification over sets. By contrast, the plurality-based model theory does
justice to the intuitive idea that a plural termdoes not stand for a set of things,
but it stands for the things themselves. Intuitively, the term ‘Paris and Rome’
does not stand for the set of the two cities; it stands for the cities themselves.
The plurality-based approach captures this intuitive idea. It assumes that a
plural term refers plurally to some things, without the mediation of a set that
stands proxy for them.
The issue becomes especially pressing when the things intuitively denoted
by a plural term are too many to form a set. Consider a plural constant
intended to refer to all the sets. Assuming traditional plural logic, we can
construct a plurality-based interpretation in which this term refers plurally,
as intended, to all sets.⁴ There is no corresponding interpretation in the set-
basedmodel theory.Wemust interpret a plural term bymeans of a single set.
⁴ If the correct plural logic is the “critical” one we propose in the final chapter, then
this interpretation is unavailable. We discuss the semantic significance of this approach in
Section 12.8.
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But there is no set of all sets in standard set theory. So the semantic value of
our constant cannot encompass all sets.
Anothermanifestation of this issue concerns the domain of quantification.
By requiring that the domain of quantification be a set, the set-based model
theory rules out any interpretation whose domain is too big to form a set.
In particular, there is no set-based interpretation whose domain includes all
sets.Thismeans that there is no interpretation corresponding to the intended
model of set theory. The set-based model theory is thus unable to capture all
the intuitive interpretations of the language.
Theplurality-basedmodel theory avoids these limitations, again assuming
traditional plural logic. Since the domain of quantification is given by a
plurality, it is possible to represent a domain encompassing all sets. Consider
all and only the pairs such that their first coordinate is the symbol ‘∃’ and
the second coordinate is a set. Plural comprehension and the existence
of a pairing operation on objects jointly entail that there is a plurality of
exactly those pairs. This plurality represents a domain encompassing all sets.
Likewise, there is a plurality that represents a domain encompassing every
object whatsoever. Therefore, the plurality-based model theory can be said
to capture not only the intended interpretation of set theory but also absolute
generality.
As stated, these considerations pertain to intuitive limitations of the set-
based model theory, namely its inability to represent intuitive semantic
values or intended interpretations. But are such considerations relevant to
logic? We can move beyond the intuitive level by focusing on a key fact that
has been implicit in our discussion. While every set-based interpretation
can be converted into a plurality-based one, it is a consequence of the
plural version of Cantor’s theorem that the reverse claim isn’t true.⁵ This
fact is relevant to logic. For logical consequence is defined by quantifying
over every interpretation and hence depends on which interpretations are
admitted. Let us elaborate on this claim.
Imagine two parties A and B wishing to characterize the relation of
logical consequence for sentences of a given language ℒ. Suppose B has
a richer conception of interpretation than A. That is, every interpretation
⁵ The theorem states that the subpluralities of xx are strictly more numerous than the
members of xx, provided that xx has two or more members (see Section 3.5). Using traditional
plural logic, we let xx be the universal plurality—that is, the plurality of absolutely all objects.
It follows that the pluralities are more numerous than the objects. Since any plurality can
be the domain of a plurality-based interpretation, it follows in turn that the plurality-based
interpretations are more numerous than the set-based interpretations, which are objects.
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countenanced by A is also countenanced by B, but not the other way around.
So, letting ⊨A and ⊨B be the two parties’ consequence relations, we have:
Δ ⊨B φ ⇒ Δ ⊨A φ
for any set of sentences Δ and any sentence φ. But there is no guarantee
that the opposite implication holds and hence no guarantee that the two
relations of consequence are coextensive. The proponent of the set-based
model theory and the proponent of the plurality based model theory are in
the same situation as A and B.
When the language is first-order, Georg Kreisel’s famous “squeezing
argument” can be used to establish that the two model theories yield an
equivalent relation of consequence (Kreisel 1967). Let ⊨P and ⊨S be the
relation of consequence sanctioned, respectively, by the plurality-based
model theory and by the set-based model theory. But let us restrict attention
to first-order sentences. The argument goes as follows. In the preceding
paragraph, we established that:
Δ ⊨P φ ⇒ Δ ⊨S φ
By the completeness theorem for first-order logic, we have
Δ ⊨S φ ⇒ Δ ⊢ φ
where ⊢ is the usual provability relation for first-order logic. Finally, we
observe that the plurality-based account of consequence is sound with
respect to this relation:
Δ ⊢ φ ⇒ Δ ⊨P φ
This closes the circle of implications. It follows that:
Δ ⊨S φ ⇔ Δ ⊨P φ
In sum, despite the fact that the the proponent of the plurality-based model
theory has a richer conception of interpretation than its set-based competi-
tor, their definitions of logical consequence yield exactly the same verdict for
arguments involving first-order sentences.
An essential premise of Kreisel’s argument is that the set-based relation of
consequence satisfies the completeness theorem. But this premise might not
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hold whenwemove beyond first-order logic. In fact, it fails for PFO, which is
not complete according to the plurality-basedmodel theory presented above.
So Kreisel’s argument is not available for PFO. We can, however, get the
same effect by appealing to set-theoretic reflection principles. For a simple
example, consider the principle which asserts that any sentence of PFO that
is true in the universe of sets is also true in some set-based model:
(PR) φ → ∃α (φVα)
where φVα is the result of restricting the quantifiers of φ to the set Vα,
whose elements are all the sets of rank less than α (see Section 4.6). The
principle (PR) turns out to be equivalent to the claim that any sentence that
has a plurality-based model also has a set-based model (Shapiro 1987). This
ensures the extensional equivalence of two definitions of logical truth: one
in terms of truth in every set-based model, the other in terms of truth in
every plurality-based model. An analogous result is available for the notion
of logical consequence, although the required reflection principle is stronger
than the one just mentioned (again, see Shapiro 1987).
These results may assuage the worries with which the section started. The
inability of a model theory to represent some intuitive semantic values or
intended interpretations need not have an effect on the logic. In particular,
the apparent artificiality of the set-based model theory need not manifest
itself at the level of logical consequence. For example, the model theory
does not validate incorrect existential consequences of the kind discussed
in Section 3.3. In other words, although plural terms have sets as semantic
values, a sentences like Ptt does not logically entail that sets exist. A parallel
case is that of predication in the usual set-based model theory for first-order
logic. Predicates have sets as semantic values. Yet a predication like St does
not logically entail that sets exists. Boolos (1984b, 448–9) insisted that “it
doesn’t follow just from the fact that there are some Cheerios in the bowl
that, as somewho theorize about the semantics of plurals would have it, there
is also a set of them all.” A set-based model theory does not sanction that it
follows logically from the fact that there are some Cheerios in the bowl that
there is also a set of them.
As far as logic is concerned, and assuming the appropriate reflection
principle, we have found no reason to think that adopting a set-based model
theory for PFO is any more problematic than adopting a set-based
model theory for first-order logic. As we will see shortly, however, other
considerations may help us decide which is the more appropriate type of
model theory.
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7.5 The semantics of plural predication
The interpretation of plural predicates raises a number of interesting ques-
tions. We presented a plurality-based model theory for PFO in Section 7.3.
Let us now examine how this model-theoretic approach can be extended to
PFO+. There are two main ways to proceed, depending on whether we want
to give plural predicates an extensional or an intensional interpretation.
As formulated above, the plurality-based model theory for PFO incorpo-
rates an extensional treatment of singular predication. For the semantic value
of amonadic singular predicate S is the plurality of objects to which S applies,
that is, its extension. This choice of semantic value aligns with the choice of
semantic value in the set-based model theory, where S is assigned the set of
objects in the domain to which S applies.
One might instead take an intensional approach to predication and
interpret predicates not as pluralities, but as properties. Suppose—if only
temporarily—that properties are objects, and let us interpret S by means
of the property σ. Then we could simply include the pair ⟨∃, σ⟩ in our
interpretation function. Recall the plurality-based interpretation function ff
for ℒPFO described in Section 7.3 (p. 132):
⟨t, a⟩ ⟨r, b⟩
⟨tt, a⟩ ⟨tt, b⟩ ⟨rr, c⟩ ⟨rr, d⟩
⟨S, a⟩ ⟨S, b⟩
On an intensional approach, ff would be replaced by the following plurality
of pairs:
⟨t, a⟩ ⟨r, b⟩
⟨tt, a⟩ ⟨tt, b⟩ ⟨rr, c⟩ ⟨rr, d⟩
⟨S, σ⟩
The clause for singular predication would be revised accordingly:
ii ⊨ St [ss] if and only if JtKii,ss has JSKii,ss
That is, the truth of a singular predication St amounts to the fact that
the semantic value of the term t (an object) has the semantic value of S
(a property).
We thus have two approaches to singular predication, one extensional
and one intensional. How do these approaches extend to plural predication?
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Let us start with the extensional approach. Suppose the semantic value of a
singular predicate S is a plurality of objects. Then the most natural choice of
semantic value for a plural predicate P would be a “plurality of pluralities”,
or a “superplurality” as we have called it. The intuitive reason is this. The
predicate S applies to objects and hence its semantic value is the plurality
of the objects to which it applies. Since P applies to pluralities, its semantic
value must be the plurality of pluralities to which it applies.
But what is a “plurality of pluralities”? Throughout the book, we use
‘plurality’ as a shorthand for a plural construction. Thus, to talk about “a
plurality of dogs” is just a shorthand for talking about one or more dogs.
It is controversial whether it makes sense to talk about “a plurality of plu-
ralities” and hence whether the expressive resources needed to formulate an
extensional version of plurality-basedmodel theory for PFO+ are legitimate.
We address the question of superplurals in Chapter 9. For the time being,
we would like to make two remarks. First, it is relatively straightforward to
develop a formal system of superplural quantification suitable to develop our
model theory (Rayo 2006). Moreover, natural language offers at least some
help.We can think of a superplurality as some things articulated into distinct
subpluralities, such as: Russell and Whitehead, and Hilbert and Bernays, or:
these things, those things, and these other things.⁶
Assuming the legitimacy of the expressive resources needed, we must
find a way to incorporate the proposed interpretation of plural predicates
into the model theory. We would like to proceed much as in the case of
singular predicates, where a singular predicate S was interpreted by means
of a plurality of ordered pairs, ⟨S, a⟩, ⟨S, b⟩, et cetera. Each of these ordered
pairs, say ⟨S, x⟩, represents that S applies to x. Now consider a plural predicate
P. We would like to interpret P by means of a bunch of ordered pairs, which
we may think of as ⟨P, aa⟩, ⟨P, bb⟩, et cetera. Each of these ordered pairs, say
⟨P, xx⟩, represents that P applies to xx. The problem, however, is that no
sense has yet been assigned to expressions such as ‘⟨P, aa⟩’. After all,
an ordered pair is an ordered pair of objects. Thus, the second coordinate
of an ordered pair must be an object; it cannot be a plurality of two or
more objects.
Fortunately, there is a natural way to assign sense to the mentioned
expressions.⁷ Suppose we want to talk about the ordered pair of P and aa.
⁶ For more examples from natural language, see Section 9.4.
⁷ For details and a more general treatment, see Appendix 11.A.
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Consider all ordered pairs of the form ⟨P, a⟩, where a ≺ aa. The plurality pp
of such ordered pairs can be used to represent the desired but problematic
pair ⟨P, aa⟩. To see that this representation works, observe first that the
representing plurality pp is well defined, and second, that the representation
uniquely determinesP and aa and thus does all thework that the problematic
ordered pair was meant to do. To wit: given the mentioned plurality pp
of ordered pairs, P can be retrieved as the unique object that figures as
the first coordinate of all the ordered pairs pp, and aa can be retrieved
as the plurality of objects each of which figures as the second coordinate
of one of these ordered pairs. In light of this, it is unproblematic to use
the familiar notation ‘⟨P, aa⟩’ as a suggestive shorthand for the mentioned
plurality pp.
With this convention in place, we can proceed to state the interpretation
of a plural predicate P as a bunch of ordered pairs, ⟨P, aa⟩, ⟨P, bb⟩, et cetera—
keeping in mind that this bunch will be a superplurality, as it is a bunch of
pluralities. We can then say, informally, that an atomic plural predication,
such as Ptt, is true if and only if tt stands for a plurality that appears as second
coordinate in one of the pairs ⟨P, aa⟩, ⟨P, bb⟩, et cetera.
To provide a formal clause capturing these truth conditions, we need to
define a notion of interpretation capable of representing the target interpre-
tation of plural predicates as well as other non-logical expressions. As it turns
out, this can be done by letting an interpretation be a superplurality iii.⁸ Its
components will be a domain dd and an interpretation function fff, which
now consists of a superplurality. A variable assignment remains a plurality
ss. Let us use ‘are among’ to indicate the membership relation between a
plurality xx and a superplurality xxx. So, loosely speaking, xx are among xxx
just in case xx are one of the pluralities comprising xxx. We are finally in a
position to state the satisfaction clause for an atomic plural predication:
iii ⊨ Ptt [ss] if and only if JttKiii,ss are among JPKiii,ss
where JttKiii,ss is a plurality and JPKiii,ss a superplurality.
Let us now turn to the intensional approach to predication, which takes
properties rather than pluralities (or superpluralities) as semantic values
of predicates. To interpret plural predicates, we need plural properties, that
is, properties that (if instantiated) are instantiated by many things jointly. By
⁸ Again, see Appendix 11.A for technical details.
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contrast, singular properties (if instantiated) are instantiated by many things
separately. For example, the property of cooperating is plural while that of
being human is singular.
Suppose that plural properties are objects.⁹ Then, given any plural prop-
erty π, we could obtain an interpretation function ff+ for ℒPFO+ by simply
adding the pair ⟨P, π⟩ to the interpretation function ff considered above. For
an atomic predication, we would therefore have:
ii ⊨ Ptt [ss] if and only if JttKii,ss have JPKii,ss
which is perfectly analogous to the satisfaction clause for singular
predication on the intensional approach.
However, there is significant pressure to reject the supposition that plural
properties are objects. For this supposition is subject to a variant of a Russell-
style argument put forth by Williamson (2003), and it clashes with a plural
version of Cantor’s theorem.1⁰ Let us briefly comment on the last claim.
As discussed in Section 3.5, the instance of Plural Cantor concerned with
the universal plurality entails that there are more pluralities than objects.
If properties are objects, it follows that there cannot be a plural property
corresponding to every plurality. But this may seem implausible. If there are
some things, why shouldn’t there also be a plural property had by them and
only them?
The natural reaction is to postulate a type distinction between objects and
properties.11Thus, wemay think of properties as higher-level entities, which,
following Frege, we call concepts.This view leads us to combine the resources
of plural logic with those of second-order logic. The resulting system is an
extension of PFO+ where quantification into predicate position is allowed




(7.10) ∀vv∃F(Fvv ∧ ∀uu(Fuu→∀v(v ≺ uu↔ v ≺ vv))
⁹ In the context of plural logic and its semantics, this assumption is endorsed by Hossack
2000 and McKay 2006.
1⁰ See Florio 2014c for a detailed exposition of these arguments.
11 This approach is endorsed, for example, by Oliver and Smiley and by Yi (see footnote 3 on
p. 131).
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In fact, they are also provable with the help of the appropriate instances of
this scheme of comprehension for plural concepts:
(PSO-Comp) ∃F∀xx(Fxx ↔ φ(xx))
where F does not occur free in φ. We assume this scheme as well as its
polyadic analogues.
Postulating a type distinction between objects and properties avoids the
two problems mentioned above. The Russell-style argument is blocked for
essentially the same reason Russell’s paradox was blocked in the simple
set theory discussed in Chapter 4. That is, owing to the sortal distinctions
between individuals, pluralities, and properties (now concepts), the key
condition driving the paradoxical argument cannot even be formulated (see
Williamson 2003, Section IX). Moreover, if properties are no longer objects,
it is consistent to hold both that there are more pluralities than objects and
that there is a plural property corresponding to every plurality. So there is
no clash with the plural version Cantor’s theorem.
How can we accommodate the view that predicates stand for concepts in
the plurality-based model theory? As in the case of superplurals, we cannot
supply the interpretation of predicates by simply adding some ordered pairs
to the interpretation function. Concepts are not objects. So we cannot
represent the fact that the semantic value of S is the singular concept X, and
the semantic value of the predicate P is the plural concept Y, by means of
⟨S,X⟩ and ⟨P,Y⟩. For these are not proper pairs.
In fact, there is a way to represent not only single such “pairs” but also
many of them simultaneously. We resort to concepts of an even higher level
than X and Y. To represent a bunch of pairs of the form ⟨S,X⟩, we use a
second-level concept R with two argument places, one open to objects and
the other open to first-level concepts, such that R(S,X) just in case ⟨S,X⟩
is one of the target bunch of pairs.12 By quantifying over the appropriate
sort of higher-level concepts, we can then define a notion of interpretation
capturing the informal idea that an atomic plural predication Ptt is true if
and only if Fxx, where xx is the plurality for which tt stands and F is the
plural concept interpreting P.
12 This approach, in its current version, assumes that concepts are individuated extensionally.
That assumption can be dispensed with, if desired. One option is to adopt suitable modalized
comprehension principles of the form ∃F2∀x(Fx ↔ φ(x)).
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7.6 The problem of choice
We have surveyed a number of ways in which the model theory for plural
logic may be developed. On the one hand, we could opt for a set-based
model theory. We argued in Section 7.4 that this model theory is no more
problematic than the usual set-based model theory for first-order logic, at
least from a purely logical point of view and assuming the relevant reflection
principle. On the other hand, we could opt for an extensional or intensional
version of a plurality-based model theory. The formulation of this style of
model theory has led us to introduce richer expressive resources. The model
theory for PFO was carried out in PFO+, as it construed interpretations as
pluralities and thus relied on a plural predicate to characterize the notion of
truth in an interpretation. The model theory for PFO+ was carried out in a
metalanguage including either superplural quantification or quantification
over concepts. As noted, the ascent to more expressive metalanguages is
not an accident but a robust Tarskian phenomenon, which we explore
systematically in Chapter 11.
The existence of multiple model theories presents us with a problem: how
are we to choose between the available options? This problem of choice, as
we will call it, is connected with large and difficult philosophical questions.
So we will not attempt to reach a final verdict. We do, however, aim to paint
as complete a picture as possible of the considerations that are relevant to
solving the problem.
It is useful to classify the available options on the basis of whether or
not they use certain resources. Does a given option use plural resources?
And does it use conceptual resources? The table below summarizes the
alternatives and indicates some of the authors who have adopted them.
no plural resources plural resources
no conceptual
resources
Link and other linguists,
Quine, Resnik





Oliver & Smiley, Yi, Rayo &
Yablo, Williamson, Linnebo
Three of the four alternatives are exemplified by model theories discussed
above: the set-based model theory uses neither plural not conceptual
resources; the extensional version of the plurality-based model theory
uses plural but not conceptual resources; the intensional version of
plurality-based model theory uses both plural and conceptual resources.
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However, we have not presented any option that uses only conceptual
resources. Let us briefly mention two such options.13
The first imitates the eliminative strategy of Higginbotham and Schein
discussed in Chapter 6. They analyze predication in terms of events and
eliminate pluralities in favor of concepts. The same resources (events
and concepts) could be put to use in developing a model theory for PFO+.
The second way to construct a model theory that uses only conceptual
resources imitates another eliminative strategy discussed in Chapter 6. We
have seen that there is a translation of PFO+ into MSOL+. Similar results
can be obtained for extensions of these theories. In particular, the systems
needed to formulate the extensional or intensional version of plurality-based
model theories for PFO+ can be interpreted in a fragment of higher-order
logic containing a few layers of concepts. These conceptual resources can be
used to develop a model theory for PFO+. What’s more, it can be shown that
the resulting model theory delivers the same relation of consequence as the
plurality-based model theory (see Florio 2014a).
Recall that the set-based model theory can deliver the same relation of
consequence as the plurality-based model theory for PFO, assuming the
appropriate reflection principle (Section 7.4). This continues to hold when
we add plural predicates to the object language. It follows that all the options
considered are on a par, as far as logic is concerned. If we are to solve the
problem of choice, we must look beyond the logic.
In light of this, someone with a purely instrumental view of the semantics
may deny that there is a problem of choice after all. If model theory is
a mathematical tool whose sole purpose is to characterize a relation of
consequence for a given language, then any option is just as good as any
other option—at least in the case at hand. And if an option must be selected,
one might well select the simplest and most economical one. However, if we
want model theory to be not just a mathematical study of logical relations
but a study of possible meanings of natural and formal languages, then
there might be further constraints capable of discriminating between the
options.
13 The existence of all these alternatives may be unsurprising: owing to the interpretability
results presented in Part II, we know that it is possible in principle to imitate any of the relevant
systems in any other of those systems.
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7.7 Absolute generality as a constraint
One such constraint is absolute generality. Since this issue will receive a
detailed discussion in Chapter 11, we limit ourselves to some brief remarks.
Absolutely general quantification seems possible; for example, it seems
possible to assert that the empty set has no elements, none whatsoever.What
would be the domain of an absolutely general quantifier? It cannot be a
set, since standard set theory recognizes no universal set. Perhaps it can
be a plurality (though see Chapter 12). For example, plural comprehension
implies that there are some objects uu such that:
∀x(x ≺ uu ↔ x = x)
This plurality includes absolutely everything there is and hence every set.
Using uu as a domain, the plurality-based model theory is able to repre-
sent an absolutely general interpretation of the quantifiers. Thus, absolute
generality—if there is such a thing—can serve as a constraint that narrows
down the options, ruling out the set-based model theory.
Could this conclusion be resisted by using some non-standard set theory
that does accept a universal set?1⁴ We might for example use New Foun-
dations (see Forster 2019) or some “logical” notion of set (or property) of
the kind developed in Fine 2005c and Linnebo 2006. Any such maneuver
would only shift the bump in the carpet. Recall the plural version of Cantor’s
theorem. In the context of traditional plural logic, this implies that there are
more pluralities than objects. Since any plurality can be used to interpret
a one-place predicate—namely by letting the predicate be true of precisely
these objects—the theorem means that there are more interpretations of the
predicate than can be represented by objects—no matter what kind of sin-
gular representation one chooses, including any non-standard conception of
set. If we want our model theory to capture every possible interpretation of a
predicate, then the plural version of Cantor’s theorem serves to rule out any
form of semantic singularism cashed out in first-order terms.
While absolute generality promises to be a powerful weapon against any
such form of semantic singularism, it is perfectly consistent with a model
theory formulated within higher-order logic. If we accept higher-order logic,
1⁴ Class theories such as von Neumann-Bernays-Gödel and Morse-Kelley take a major step
in this direction by accepting a class of all sets. But there can be no class of all objects, since a
class is prohibited from being an element of a set or class.
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there is good reason to accept a universal concept. This corresponds to the
following instance of second-order comprehension:
∃F∀x(Fx ↔ x = x)
Theuniversal concepts can then serve to represent a domain of quantification
containing absolutely all objects. As indicated in Section 7.6, it can be shown
more generally that every plurality-based model has an isomorphic model
described with purely conceptual resources (Florio 2014a).
So absolute generality does not single out the plurality-based model
theory as the only viable option. Put in terms of our diagram on p. 144,
absolute generality takes out the upper left-hand quadrant, but is neutral with
respect to the three remaining options.
7.8 Parity constraints
There are additional constraints onemight impose on themodel theory. One
might require that certain theoretical and empirical desiderata be satisfied.
For example, one might want the metatheory to be ontologically parsi-
monious or the representation of possible meanings to be psychologically
plausible. Moreover, one might want to be able to integrate the model theory
for PFO+ with the model theory for a language including a broader class of
expressions (such as generalized quantifiers, adverbs, and modalities). As
we have seen in Chapter 5, a similar thought is an important motivation
behind the analysis of plurals in terms of individual mereology favored by
some linguists.
In this section, we want to examine some constraints that demand some
form of parity between the language being analyzed and the language used
to analyze it. We therefore call them parity contraints. We consider four such
constraints.
First, we remarked above that the truth conditions of the plurality-based
model theory have a pleasing homophonic feel. This contrasts with the set-
based model theory whose truth conditions appear more artificial: they
equate truth in an interpretation to facts about sets. Could we rule out
semantic singularism, and any model theory based on purely conceptual
resources, by assuming homophonicity as a constraint?We need to be careful.
Since we are dealing with model theory, not truth theory, it is not really an
option to require homophonicity across the board. This would conflict with
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the aim of letting non-logical expressions be reinterpreted from model to
model.
Note that this also applies to more restricted requirements of homo-
phonicity, such as the following deflationist constraint on predication:
(7.11) ∀y(‘F’ is true of y ↔ Fy)
It states that a predicate can be said to be true of whatever it can be truly
predicated of. Friederike Moltmann cites this constraint in support of plural
reference and notes that it reflects “what is generally considered an important
condition on a semantic theory, namely that the object language be included
in the metalanguage” (2016, 108). A plural predicate can be truly predicated
of pluralities and hence these must be the semantic values of the terms with
which the predicate combines. Is this a reasonable constraint? Again, we
need to be careful. Since we are dealing with model theory, our ability to
enforce the constraint is limited. While the constraint may be plausible for
truth theory, it is not an option for model theory.
Our question, then, is whether one might capture the spirit of homo-
phonicity and of the deflationist constraint on predication through a require-
ment that is applicable to model theory. A second constraint does just that—
by requiring that the semantic value of an expression of the object language
be given by an expression of the same type in the metalanguage. Let us call
this the principle of type preservation. This constraint is less demanding than
the previous two, requiring only that the type of an expression be preserved
by its semantic value. On the plausible assumption that the relevant types
are determined by the logico-linguistic categories of PFO+, type preser-
vation solves the problem of choice in favor of the intensional version of
the plurality-based semantics. Type preservation rules out the extensional
version of plurality-basedmodel theory because thismodel theory interprets
predicates as superpluralities rather than concepts. Moreover, it rules out
the remaining model theories because they fail to preserve the type of plural
terms, interpreting them as objects or concepts rather than pluralities.
However, the power of type preservation comes with far-reaching, revi-
sionary consequences. It can often be illuminating to analyze expressions of
one type using resources from other types. An example is the analysis of
tense in terms of explicit reference to, and quantification over, moments
of time. Another example is the usual set-based model theory for ordinary
first-order languages, which interprets predicates by means of sets rather
than concepts and therefore violates the principle of type preservation.
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Indeed, much of the set-based model theory employed in linguistics and
mathematics would have to be rewritten. Especially in the case of linguistics,
it is unclear whether this can be done successfully while holding on to the
principle of type preservation. We have no guarantee that the array of types
needed to regiment natural languages can be systematically incorporated
in a unified and adequate model theory. A case in point is that of modals:
these expressions are usually interpreted using possible worlds, not primitive
modalities in the metalanguage.
A final parity constraint concerns the modal profile of plural terms.
These are generally thought to be rigid.1⁵ That is, the following principles
are supposed to hold. Let E be an existence predicate (paraphrasable as
∃zz zz ≈ . . . ), and let 2 stand for metaphysical necessity. Then:
2∀x ∀yy (x ≺ yy → 2(Eyy → x ≺ yy))(Rgd+)
2∀x ∀yy (x ⊀ yy → 2(x ⊀ yy))(Rgd−)
Informally, the principles state that if this object is one of those objects, then
necessarily, whenever those objects exist, this object is one of them. Similarly,
if this object is not one of those objects, then necessarily this object is not one
of them. But unlike plural terms, predication is not rigid, as illustrated by the
next example.
(7.12) John is tall but might not have been.
Now consider this constraint concerning modal profile: semantic values
should have the same modal profile as the expressions of which they are
semantic values. It would follow that predicates cannot have superpluralities
as semantic values, as the latter but not the former are rigid. Similarly, plural
terms could not have concepts as semantic values, as the former but not
the latter are rigid. Thus, the constraint helps with the problem of choice
by eliminating the off-diagonal options in our diagram (p. 144).
Once again, the constraint can be challenged. For example, Kripke
semantics for modal logic is widely regarded as illuminating, despite using
semantic values with the “wrong” modal profile. Although sets possess their
members necessarily, in Kripke semantics they are successfully used as
semantic values of predicates. The key is to allow these semantic values to
vary from world to world.
1⁵ See Chapter 10 for details and a defense.
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7.9 Conclusion
We have discussed various constraints that may help us choose among the
available model theories for plural logic. First, we have absolute generality,
which rules out the options in the upper left-hand quadrant of our diagram.
Then, we have two parity constraints applicable to model theory: type
preservation—which selects an option in the bottom right-hand quadrant—
and modal profile—which rules out the off-diagonal options. Putting every-
thing together, only the bottom right-hand quadrant remains.
However, neither of these parity constraints was found to be absolutely
compelling. So there seems to be no simple solution to the problem of
choice. What is required to make progress, it seems to us, is greater clarity
on what model theory is supposed to do. On a minimal conception of the
role of model theory, such as the one espoused by an instrumentalist about
semantics, the existence of several, equally good options is perfectly accept-
able. This is less so if model theory is supposed to capture certain features of
the “true nature” of our expressive resources. In that case, onemight insist on
a model theory that is not only extensionally but also intensionally correct.
This is especially importantwhenwe lack independentmeans of determining
the correct extension. If so, we can establish an extensionally correct theory
by relying on an intensionally correct one. These considerations lend further
support to the option in the bottom right-hand quadrant. This option will
play a role in Chapter 11, where we again discuss semantic matters in the
presence of absolute generality.
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On the Innocence and Determinacy
of Plural Quantification
8.1 Introduction
Plural logic has undoubtedly become an important component of the
philosopher’s toolkit.∗ Many of its applications depend on two alleged
virtues: ontological innocence and expressive power. In this chapter, we
want to assess whether plural logic has these virtues and thus whether those
applications are ultimately justified.
It is commonly assumed that plural logic is ontologically innocent in the
sense that plural quantifiers do not incur ontological commitments beyond
those incurred by the ordinary first-order quantifiers. This alleged virtue
of plural logic is supported by the plurality-based model theory pioneered
by Boolos (1985a) and further developed by Agustín Rayo and Gabriel
Uzquiano (1999). (For an overview and discussion of this form of model
theory, see Chapter 7.) On this model theory, the value of a plural variable is
not a set (or any kind of set-like object) whose members are drawn from the
ordinary, first-order domain. Rather, a plural variable has many values from
this ordinary domain and thus ranges plurally over this domain. Of course,
in ascribing to a plural variable many values, the plurality-based model
theory makes essential use of the plural resources of the metalanguage. In a
nutshell, on the traditional set-based model theory, a plural variable ranges
in an ordinary way over a special domain reserved for variables of its type,
whereas on the new kind of plurality-based model theory, a plural variable
ranges in a special, plural way over the ordinary domain.1
The second alleged virtue of plural logic is expressive power. To see this
point, consider first the case of second-order logic with its two kinds of
∗ Most of this chapter derives from Florio and Linnebo 2016.
1 Defenses of the innocence of plural logic in the sense just defined are put forth, among
others, by Boolos 1984b, and Boolos 1985a, Yi 1999, Yi 2002, Yi 2005, Yi 2006; Hossack 2000,
Oliver and Smiley 2001 and 2016; Rayo 2002; McKay 2006.
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo,
Oxford University Press. © Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo 2021.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198791522.003.0008
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traditional set-based model theory. In standard semantics, the second-order
quantifiers range over the full powerset of the first-order domain, whereas
in Henkin semantics the second-order quantifiers may range over a subset
of this powerset. This gives rise to an interesting debate about semantic
determinacy. That is, does our linguistic practice single out, relative to a
given domain, the interpretation given by the standard semantics as the
correct one?2 An important aspect of this question is that it is only on
the standard semantics that second-order logic can truly be said to offer
more expressive power than first-order logic. For second-order logic on
the Henkin semantics may be regarded as a version of first-order logic,
namely a first-order system with two sorts of quantifiers. As such, it has all
the main metalogical features of first-order logic: it is complete, compact,
and has the Löwenheim-Skolem property. But, for the same reason, it fails
with respect to the main accomplishments of second-order logic with the
standard semantics. Chiefly, it does not discriminate between importantly
different classes of structures, such as countable and uncountable ones, and
it fails to ensure the categoricity of arithmetic and analysis, and the quasi-
categoricity of set theory.
In this respect, plural logic on the plurality-based model theory, as well
as higher-order logic on a parallel higher-order model theory, is thought to
provide a significant improvement over second-order logic on the set-based
model theory. Indeed, one findsmany claims to the effect that plural logic, on
the plurality-based model theory, is immune to the threat of non-standard
(Henkin) interpretations that confronts higher-order logics on their more
traditional, set-based model theory. Nearly all writers who have embraced
plural logic on the plurality-based model theory ascribe to this system
metalogical properties which presuppose that the semantics is standard
rather thanHenkin, but without flagging this as a substantive presupposition
as one would do as a matter of routine in the case of systems with a set-based
model theory.3 The failure to make this presupposition explicit strongly
suggests that the only plurality-based interpretation is the standard one.
So it is naturally interpreted as a commitment to the standard semantics
rather than the Henkin alternative. Why else claim that plural logic—not
plural logic with standard semantics—lacks a complete axiomatization and
2 See Shapiro 1991, Chapter 8. A notable consequence of the view that second-order quan-
tification is determinate is the thesis famously held by Kreisel and others that the Continuum
Hypothesis is either true or false (for discussion, see Weston 1976).
3 See, for instance, Rayo andUzquiano 1999, 315–18; Yi 1999, 180–1; Hossack 2000, 439–41;
Yi 2006, 256–7; McKay 2006, 139–43; Rayo 2007, 215; Oliver and Smiley 2016, 246–9.
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compactness, yielding the categoricity of arithmetic and analysis, and the
quasi-categoricity of set theory?
In any case, a striking feature of the literature on this novel kind of model
theory for plural logic is the near-absence of debate about the semantic deter-
minacy of plural quantification thus interpreted.⁴ Indeed, on the plurality-
based approach, the only interpretation of the plural quantifiers that has been
articulated is the standard one. No analogue of Henkin semantics has been
developed. The following diagram sums up the kinds of semantics currently
available:
standard semantics Henkin semantics
set-based semantics A. Tarski L. Henkin
plurality-based semantics G. Boolos —
The apparent absence of a plurality-based Henkin semantics has no doubt
influenced the ensuing debate. It has encouraged the thought that plural
logic on the plurality-based model theory is immune from non-standard
interpretation, and thus the thought that plural logic does better than higher-
order logic on the set-based model theory in securing a gain in expressive
power.
As appealing as this commonpicture of plural logicmay be,we believe that
it is far too optimistic. Our aim in this chapter is to develop an alternative
picture, one in which both alleged virtues of plural logic—ontological inno-
cence and expressive power—are much less significant than they are made
out to be. We argue that set-based and plurality-based model theory are on
a par with respect to worries about indeterminacy. So no progress is made
by switching from the former to the latter. We do not take a stand on which
side of the debate prevails; though in the absence of a compelling argument,
we urge caution about the determinacy claims. Moreover, we articulate a
generalized notion of ontological commitment according to which plural
logic is not, after all, innocent. This provides, for the first time, a precise
development of some ideas by Parsons 1990 (section 6), Hazen 1993, Shapiro
1993, and Linnebo 2003. Our focus is on plural logic, though much of what
we say would apply, mutatis mutandis, to second- and higher-order logics
that quantify into predicate position.
⁴ The same is true for a higher-order model theory for higher-order logic, though Rayo and
Yablo 2001 provides a rare exception.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 10/6/2021, SPi
154 innocence and determinacy of plural quantification
Our pursuit of the mentioned aims uses as its main tool a semantics for
plural logic that fills the gap in the above diagram. Accordingly, the first
part of the chapter is devoted to the development and defense of a plurality-
based Henkin semantics. (Technical details can be found in this chapter’s
appendices.) In the second part of the chapter, we reconsider the alleged
virtues of plural logic in light of the new semantics. The resulting picture
is one in which the role of plural logic as a philosophical tool is substantially
diminished.
8.2 A plurality-based Henkin semantics
As announced, our first step is to construct a plurality-based Henkin seman-
tics for plural logic and thus populate the empty quadrant in the above
diagram. Although from a technical standpoint this is largely a straightfor-
ward adaptation of the familiar set-based Henkin semantics, arguing for its
philosophical legitimacy is not straightforward. Once the resources needed
to develop a plurality-based Henkin semantics are identified, they must be
shown to be in good standing vis-à-vis the resources used to develop the
plurality-based standard semantics.
Our object language will be ℒPFO. As with the set-based model theory,
the plurality-based Henkin models consist of a domain for the first-order
quantifiers, a representation of the range of the plural quantifiers, and an
interpretation function that specifies the semantic values of the non-logical
terminology of the language. The crucial difference is that, in our case, the
first-order domain, the range of the plural quantifiers, and the interpretation
functions will not be set-theoretic objects.
A domain dd for the first-order quantifierswill consist of some things—any
things in the domain of the metatheory. Next, to represent the range of the
plural quantifiers, we need a “collection”D of pluralities.Wewill think ofD as
a plural concept, but an alternative interpretation is available:Dmay be taken
to be a superplurality. We remain neutral between these interpretations.
The pluralities ‘in’ D will be exactly those that instantiate D. We require
that the two domains be connected in the following way: for every xx such
that D(xx) (that is, xx instantiate D), xx are among dd. In symbols:
∀xx(D(xx) → xx ≼ dd)
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Finally, we continue to assume the model-theoretic framework presented
in Section 7.3. In particular, we assume that the metatheory is equipped
with a pairing operation so that an interpretation function can be defined
as some ordered pairs ii specifying the semantic value or values of each
non-logical item in the vocabulary of the object language. (A more precise
formulation of the semantics is provided inAppendix 8.A.) As is well known,
the standard deductive system for second-order logic is sound and complete
with respect to set-based Henkin semantics. As one would expect, this result
carries over to the case of plurality-based Henkin semantics for plural logic.
A completeness proof is given in Appendix 8.B.
Two aspects of our semantics deserve to be highlighted. First, as in the
plurality-based standard semantics, plural quantifiers in our plurality-based
Henkin semantics do not range over any special kind of set-like objects.
Rather, they range plurally over things in the domain of the first-order
quantifiers. Second, the formulation of the semantics requires expressive
resources that go beyond those of plural logic. The variable D, used to repre-
sent the non-standard interpretations for the plural quantifiers, introduces
a form of third-order quantification. As interpreted above, D stands for a
plural concept. The alternative is to give D a superplural interpretation. (See
Chapter 9 for a discussion of superplurals.) Either interpretation of D might
raise worries about the legitimacy of the additional expressive resources
required by our semantics. So let us address this issue next.
8.3 The legitimacy of ascending one order
As shown in Chapter 7, a standard version of the plurality-based model
theory for PFO does not require expressive resources beyond those of PFO+.
So, when describing standard interpretations of ℒPFO, there is no need to
invoke a variable D. This is only needed if we wish to “select” a non-standard
range for the plural quantifiers. In the plurality-based standard semantics, a
sentence of the form ∃vv φ is true in a model of the language just in case
some things among those in the first-order domain satisfy the formula φ.
The formulation of this clause relies only on plural quantification. In our
Henkin semantics, we want to impose the additional requirement that the
things satisfying the formula also be among the pluralities represented by D.
The expressive economy of the plurality-based standard semantics may
be thought to constitute an important advantage of that semantics over our
Henkin alternative, especially when coupled with some skepticism about
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the legitimacy of expressive resources going beyond PFO+. However, we
believe that this advantage of the plurality-based standard semantics over our
Henkin alternative is not significant. For, as wewill now argue, the additional
expressive resources required by our semantics are available, and they are
needed anyway for independent semantic reasons.
As observed in Section 7.5, it is relatively straightforward to develop a
formal system of third-order quantification suitable to develop the plurality-
based Henkin semantics (see Rayo 2006). Thus the expressive resources
under discussion are available at least in the sense of belonging to the
inventory of possible semantic mechanisms. Moreover, there is evidence
from natural language that such resources are available also in the stronger
sense of being actually in use. On the one hand, familiar arguments for
the presence in natural language of quantification into predicate position
extend from singular to plural predicates. In Section 6.1, we observed that
examples such as ‘John is everything we wanted him to be’ are naturally
regimented using bound variables in predicate position (Higginbotham
1998, 251, but see also Rayo and Yablo 2001). The same conclusion vis-à-
vis plural predicates is suggested by analogous examples involving plural
predication, such as ‘John and Mary are everything we wanted them to be’.
This vindicates the interpretation of D in terms of plural concepts. On the
other hand, it has been argued that natural languages such as English contain
superplural expressions (seeOliver and Smiley 2004,Oliver and Smiley 2005,
and Oliver and Smiley 2016, Section 8.4; Linnebo and Nicolas 2008), which
provides at least prima facie support for the superplural interpretation of D.
(Again, see Chapter 9 for details.)
An important reasonwhy the expressive resources required by our seman-
tics are needed anyway has to do with absolute generality. This emerged
in Chapter 7, where a plurality-based standard semantics for PFO was
carried out in PFO+ and the same kind of semantics for PFO+ was carried
out in a richer metalanguage including either superplural quantification or
quantification over concepts. Let us recapitulate the main idea.⁵
An attractive feature of the plurality-based standard semantics is that
it allows us to capture models whose first-order domain of quantification
contains absolutely everything. By means of the plural resources available in
the metalanguage, one can definemodels in which the first-order quantifiers
range over all objects. But, if quantification over absolutely everything is
⁵ Aswe noted inChapter 7, the appeal to resources going beyond PFO+ can also bemotivated
by parity constraints other than absolute generality.
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possible, developing amodel theory for plural logic requires the introduction
of a new non-logical predicate. Specifically, it requires the introduction
of a plural predicate functioning as a satisfaction predicate (see Rayo and
Uzquiano 1999). However, once the original language of plural logic has
been expanded to include plural predicates, ascending one order higher
becomes unavoidable. For it is now known that a model theory for the
language expanded to include plural predicates will require a language that
is one order higher than plural logic (see Chapter 11). So, if one wants to do
justice to the possibility of quantifying over absolutely everything, semantic
considerations push the expressive resources up one order.
Whether one interprets this higher-order quantification as quantification
over plural concepts or as superplural quantification, semantic reflection
will eventually lead the proponent of the plurality-based standard semantics
to embrace the expressive resources needed to formulate the plurality-
based Henkin semantics. Since the additional resources needed to formulate
our Henkin semantics are available and needed anyway for independent
semantic reasons, we conclude that the expressive economy of plurality-
based standard semantics does not constitute a significant advantage over
our plurality-based Henkin semantics.
8.4 Does ontological innocence ensure determinacy?
The previous two sections establish that there exist plurality-based yet non-
standard interpretations of a plural language.This is significant. For it is com-
monplace to maintain that plural logic on the plurality-based model theory
is determinate. The view goes back at least to Boolos’s famous argument
that plural logic is non-firstorderizable. The argument is based on plural
logic’s alleged ability to distinguish standard from non-standard models of
arithmetic (Boolos 1984a, Boolos 1984b, and Boolos 1985a). But of course,
if our plurality-based non-standard interpretations are admitted, then plural
logic is no better equipped to make such distinctions than, say, a first-order
set theory. This contrasts with the widespread view that, when formulated
with the help of plural quantification, arithmetic and analysis are categorical,
and set theory is quasi-categorical; and relatedly, that plural logic is not
axiomatizable (see footnote 3). To be perfectly clear: we are not claiming
that all proponents of this view deny or fail to recognize the existence of
plurality-based non-standard interpretations.Our claim is that their remarks
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are potentially misleading because they suggest that the only plurality-based
interpretation is the standard one.
Itmight be responded that, while we have shown that plurality-based non-
standard interpretations exist, they can safely be set aside as unintended
or illegitimate. Doing so would restore the determinacy of plural logic,
which the views just referenced all presuppose. The key question, it seems
to us, is whether this response is any better than the analogous response for
traditional set-based interpretations. That is, does plural logic on a plurality-
basedmodel theory have a better claim to determinacy than plural logic on a
set-based model theory? Let Plural Robustness be the view that the plurality-
basedmodel theory is superior in this regard. A defense of Plural Robustness
would have to show that the plurality-based standard interpretations are in
better standing vis-à-vis their (plurality-based) Henkin rivals than the set-
based standard interpretations are vis-à-vis their (set-based) Henkin rivals.
Our aim in this section is to articulate and reject a natural defense of Plural
Robustness. In the next section, we argue that the two forms of standard
semantics are equally well (or poorly) placed against their respective Henkin
rivals and that Plural Robustness should therefore be rejected.
Plural Robustness has considerable initial plausibility. An explicit defense
is due to Hossack, who nicely lays out the argument as follows:
The singularist [a proponent of a set-based model theory] cannot solve the
problem of indeterminacy, but the pluralist [a proponent of a plurality-
based model theory] can. [ . . . ] Plural set theory has no non-standard
models, so the indeterminacy problem does not arise for pluralism. [ . . . ]
[P]lural variables range plurally over the very same particulars that the
singular variables range over individually. Therefore the pluralist does not
confront an independent problem of identifying what the plural variables
range over. [ . . . ] Plural sentences therefore provide the missing additional
constraint we were seeking on admissible interpretations. This is why the
pluralist [a proponent of a plurality-based model theory] is able to solve
the indeterminacy problem, though the singularist cannot do so.
(Hossack 2000, 440–1, our emphasis)
As we understand it, the argument has as its point of departure the other
virtue that plural logic is widely believed to enjoy, namely ontological
innocence. According to this view—which we call Plural Innocence—plural
quantification does not incur ontological commitments to entities beyond
those in the first-order domain. In particular, plural quantification is not
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reducible to singular quantification over sets or mereological sums, nor does
it involve reference to such entities. Rather, plural variables range plurally
over objects in the ordinary, singular domain. And the use of such variables
incurs ontological commitments only to objects in this ordinary domain, not
to any sets or sums of such objects.
Of course, Plural Innocence is not uncontroversial (see Resnik 1988,
Parsons 1990, Hazen 1993, and Linnebo 2003); we too take issue with it
below. But if the thesis is false, so is an essential premise of the argument we
wish to reject, and we are done. In the remainder of this section we therefore
proceed on the assumption that the thesis is true.
It would be very natural to think that Plural Innocence supports Plural
Robustness. Since the plural quantifiers do not range over any kind of
“plural objects”, such as the subsets of the first-order domain, we do not—
as Hossack observes—“confront an independent problem of identifying
what the plural variables range over.” Plural quantifiers just range plurally
over the very same domain that the singular quantifiers range over. This
contrasts with the set-based model theory for second-order logic, where the
standard interpretation requires one to single out a range for the second-
order quantifiers that contains all the subsets of the first-order domain. The
possibility of failing to single out such a range gives rise to the possibility
of non-standard interpretations in the set-based model theory. Since Plural
Innocence ensures that no new range of entities needs to be singled out
for the plural quantifiers, this thesis renders plural logic on the plurality-
based model theory immune to non-standard interpretations, or at least
more immune than plural logic on the set-based model theory.
However, we contend that our plurality-based Henkin semantics is just as
innocent as the plurality-based standard semantics. On both semantics, plu-
ral variables range plurally over objects in the ordinary, first-order domain.
The only difference is that, on our semantics, the range of the plural variables
can be so restricted as to make room for general interpretations in addition
to the standard one.
In fact, this notion of ontological innocence can be understood in a
less and in a more demanding way. The less demanding way requires the
ontological innocence of the plural quantifiers. Then our claim that plural
quantification is innocent on the plurality-based Henkin semantics is incon-
trovertible. Since the semantics is plurality-based, the plural quantifiers do
not range over special kinds of objects.They range plurally over the objects in
the first-order domain.This is the sense of ontological innocence operative in
the argument from Plural Innocence to Plural Robustness spelled out above.
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One might also want innocence in a more demanding form that
includes the resources employed by the model theory itself. (For instance,
the plurality-based model theory uses a pairing operation which is not
ontologically innocent.) Our semantics may possess a high degree of
innocence even in this more demanding sense. For there are arguments,
akin to the one developed by Boolos himself, for the ontological innocence
of the third-order quantification that binds the variable D. This is fairly
straightforward in the case of the “superplural” interpretation of D. As for
the official interpretation of D as a plural concept, one may argue for its
innocence along the lines of Rayo and Yablo 2001 (see also Wright 2007).
Moreover, in the more demanding sense of innocence the two semantics
appear to be on equal footing. As argued above, an appeal to higher-order
resources is unavoidable when the defender of the plurality-based standard
semantics attempts to articulate a model theory for a language containing
plural predicates (as she will have to do when formulating the model
theory for her own metalanguage). So, when seen from this perspective,
the semantic machinery of the plurality-based standard semantics is no
more innocent than that of its Henkin competitor.
We conclude that, no matter which understanding of Plural Innocence
is assumed, the plurality-based Henkin semantics has as good a claim to
innocence as the standard semantics. This shows that Plural Innocence does
not support Plural Robustness. For there is an innocent semantic option,
namely the plurality-based Henkin semantics, for which Plural Robustness
fails. This poses a challenge for defenders of Plural Robustness. If their claim
is not supported by Plural Innocence, thenwhat, if anything, does support it?
8.5 The semantic determinacy of plural quantification
The question of semantic determinacy, we recall, is whether the unique
correct interpretation of our quantificational practice is the one associated
with the standard interpretations. We contend that plural logic with the
traditional set-based model theory and plural logic with plurality-based
model theory are on a par with regard to semantic determinacy.
Two remarks about this parity thesis—as we shall call it—are in order.
First, our contention is that the determinacy claims concerning plurality-
basedmodel theory stand or fall with the corresponding determinacy claims
concerning set-based model theory. We remain agnostic about whether
they stand together or fall together; though as mentioned, in the absence
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of compelling arguments, we urge caution about the determinacy claim.
Second, the parity thesis includes, but goes beyond, the claim that Plural
Robustness is false. If Plural Robustness is false, then no additional assurance
of determinacy is gained by switching from a set-based to a plurality-based
model theory. Our parity thesis consists of this claim and its converse.
We submit that the parity thesis has a great deal of plausibility whenever
the domain of quantification is set-sized, as is the case of higher-order
quantification over the natural numbers or the reals. Assume that the domain
is a set d, and let dd be its elements. (We indicate this relationship by writing
d = {dd}.) In the case of the set-based model theory, we need to single
out a special object—the standard interpretation—from a large pool of other
objects—theHenkin interpretations. In the case of the plurality-basedmodel
theory, we need to single out a special way of ranging over the domain dd—
the standard way—from a large pool of other ways of ranging over dd—the
Henkin ways. Why should it be any easier—or harder—to single out an object
from a pool of objects than to single out a way from an isomorphic pool of ways?
Since the two tasks are isomorphic, whatever can be said in one case carries
over to the other.
While these considerations capture the gist of our argument, some work
remains to be done to establish the parity thesis in full generality, that is,
independently of the assumption that the domains of the plurality-based
model theory are set-sized.⁶ Consider first the possibility that plural logic is
determinate on the plurality-based model theory and indeterminate on the
set-based model theory. If plural logic is determinate on the plurality-based
model theory, thismeans that the only plurality-basedHenkin interpretation
is the standard one. A fortiori, no non-standard plurality-based Henkin
interpretation can be countenanced in which the elements dd of the domain
form a set d. But this is incompatible with the idea that non-standard set-
based Henkin interpretations are legitimate, since the legitimacy of an inter-
pretation would then depend entirely on the way in which the interpretation
is described. Non-standard Henkin interpretations with set-sized domains
would be legitimate when described set-theoretically but illegitimate when
described with the help of higher-order resources. So we must conclude that
plural logic on the set-basedmodel theory is determinate too, and thus Plural
Robustness is false.
⁶ On the critical plural logic we develop in Chapter 12, every plurality defines a set and
the mentioned assumption is always satisfied. Thus, if we are right, the considerations of this
paragraph and the next become redundant.
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We now consider the converse. Might plural logic be determinate on the
set-based model theory but not on the plurality-based model theory? We
believe the answer is negative. The determinacy of plural logic on the set-
based model theory rules out non-standard interpretations whenever the
domain is set-sized. So, if plural logic admits non-standard interpretations
on the plurality-based model theory, such interpretations could only arise
when the domain is too large to form a set. As a result, the type of interpre-
tation legitimate for the plural quantifiers would vary depending on the size
of the domain. That is, the interpretation of the plural quantifiers would be
standard whenever the domain forms a set but may be non-standard when
the domain is too big to form a set. Why should that be so? Since plural
quantifiers are treated as logical, this asymmetry would be implausible.Thus,
it appears that if plural logic is determinate on the set-based model theory,
it must also be determinate on the plurality-based model theory.
8.6 The metaphysical determinacy of plural quantification
We now briefly examine a different determinacy question pertaining to
plural and other forms of higher-order quantification. This question is
metaphysical and challenges a presupposition of the semantic determinacy
question discussed above. Consider a domain d = {dd}. Is there a determi-
nate maximal set of subsets of d or a determinate maximal concept of being
a subplurality of dd? Where the semantic question asks whether our practice
uniquely singles out as correct a maximal interpretation of the plural and
higher-order quantifiers, the metaphysical question asks whether the sort of
thing we are attempting to uniquely single out even exists.
Many philosophers and mathematicians have defended a negative answer
in cases where the domain is infinite.Their skepticism is fueled in part by our
inability to answer some fairly immediate questions about the set of subsets
(or its analogue in the case of plurals). A well-known example is Cantor’s
Continuum Hypothesis, which provably resists an answer by ZFC and has
so far resisted an answer from widely accepted further axioms.
The metaphysical question is interesting in part because it might provide
a reason to prefer the plurality-basedmodel theory over the set-basedmodel
theory. For metaphysical determinacy might hold in the case of pluralities
but fail in the case of sets. However, we don’t think that this is so. More
generally, we believe there is a determinate totality of subpluralities of the
things dd that serve as our domain if and only if there is a determinate totality
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of subsets of d = {dd}. To see this, consider the conditions that would define
these two totalities, namely ‘xx ≼ dd’ and ‘x ⊆ d’. We contend that the
pluralities satisfying the former condition are in one-to-one correspondence
with the sets satisfying the latter. Provided that this contention is right, it
is hard to see how one of the conditions could define a determinate totality
while the other fails to do so.⁷
It remains only to defend our contention. For every set satisfying the
condition ‘x ⊆ d’, the plurality of its elements satisfies the condition ‘xx ≼ dd’.
Next, we observe that every plurality satisfying the latter condition forms a
set, by the axiom of Separation and the fact that d = {dd}. Moreover, this set
satisfies the former condition. Thus, we can go back and forth between sets
and pluralities satisfying the two conditions. Indeed, we obtain the promised
one-to-one correspondence by observing that a set is sent to the plurality of
its elements, which are sent back to the original set.
What about the case where dd do not form a set? Our considerations leave
open whether in this case there is a determinate totality of subplutalities
of dd. But any trouble here would only serve to limit the advantage of the
plurality-based model theory over its set-based rival.
8.7 A generalized notion of ontological commitment
Let us finally consider the debate about the ontological commitments of
plural logic. According to Boolos and his followers, plural languages are
ontologically innocent. For instance, when you say that you had a bowl of
Cheerios for breakfast, you are talking exclusively about the Cheerios, not
about a set of them, their sum, or any kind of “plural entity”. Call this the
narrow notion of ontological commitment. It will be made precise below. We
have seen how to develop a model theory for a plural object language in a
plural metalanguage in which the semantic values of a plural variable is one
or more objects from the ordinary first-order domain. This model theory
upholds the view that the use of plural quantifiers incurs no new commit-
ments to sets, sums, or any other kind of plural entities (Boolos 1985a).
The opposite side responds by disputing the prima facie case for the
ontological innocence of plural quantification. For instance, commenting on
⁷ Here we rely on an analogue of Replacement for our intuitive notion of determinate
totality. In Chapter 12 we develop a notion of extensional definiteness that obeys the mentioned
principle.
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Boolos’s example ‘there are some sets which are all and only the non-self-
membered sets’, Parsons writes:
in a context of this kind a quantifier like ‘there are some sets’ is saying
that there is a plurality of some kind. Cantor’s notion of ‘multiplicity’ and
Russell’s of ‘class as many’ were more explicit versions of this intuitive
notion, both attempting to allow that pluralitiesmight fail to constitute sets.
(Parsons 1990, 326)
(See alsoHazen 1993, Shapiro 1993 and Linnebo 2003, as well as Resnik 1988
for a more “singularizing” version of the view.) The model theory developed
in a plural metalanguage cuts both ways. Both parties to the debate can agree
that if the use of the plural quantifiers in the metalanguage is innocent, then
so is their use in the object language. One party will assert the antecedent,
while the other will deny the consequent. Thus there are two internally
coherent views on the matter, and we appear to have reached a standoff.
The best way to make progress, we believe, is by considering two compet-
ing construals of the notion of ontological commitment. If one understands
this notion in the narrow sense (as concerned exclusively with the existence
of objects) and takes an object to be the value of a singular first-order
variable, then the plurality-basedmodel theory does indeed show that plural
logic is ontologically innocent. For this model theory does not use singular
first-order variables to ascribe values to the plural variables of the object
language; rather, this ascription is made by means of plural variables of the
metalanguage.
There is, however, a broad notion of ontological commitment. According
to this notion, ontological commitment is tied to the presence of existential
quantifiers of any logical category in a sentence’s truth conditions. If this
notion is operative, then even the plurality-based model theory shows that
plural locutions incur additional ontological commitments. The resulting
view is an analogue of that espoused by Frege when he held that quantifica-
tion into predicate position incurs its own distinctive kind of commitment,
not to objects but to concepts.
Before a meaningful debate can take place about which notion of com-
mitment is more interesting and appropriate, both notions need to be clearly
articulated. We will now show that our plurality-based Henkin semantics is
precisely the tool we need in order to articulate the more inclusive notion.
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Let us begin with the narrow notion, which ties ontological commitment
to the values of singular first-order variables. Here is one of Quine’s more
helpful statements of his view.
The ontology to which an (interpreted) theory is committed comprises all
and only the objects over which the bound variables of the theory have to
be construed as ranging in order that the statements affirmed in the theory
be true. (Quine 1951, 11)
This suggests the following precise definition. A theory T is committed to κ
objects that are φ if and only if every model of T contains at least κ objects
satisfying the formula φ.
In light of our work in earlier sections, it is straightforward to extend this
criterion of commitment to plural variables. In both cases, the formulation
of the criterion relies on the use of quantifiers that are assumed to be
antecedently understood in the metatheory. A theory T is committed to κ
pluralities that areφ if and only if every plurality-basedHenkinmodel ofT has
a range D of the plural quantifiers containing at least κ pluralities satisfying
the formula φ. (Of course, the proper way to talk about many pluralities
is by means of plural concepts or super-pluralities, as discussed above.)⁸ It
is important to note that the appeal to plurality-based Henkin models is
essential. If we had instead appealed to Boolos-style plurality-based standard
models, then the ontological commitment of any theory involving plural
quantifiers would be trivially determined by the ontological commitments
of the first-order quantifiers of the theory. For any theory would incur
commitments to all and only the pluralities based on the objects to which the
theory is committed. By contrast, the definition of commitment to pluralities
that we have proposed has the desirable feature that a theory’s commitment
to pluralities can add information over and above its commitment to objects.
The value of this information is most easily appreciated when it is denied
that there is a single maximal interpretation of the plural quantifiers, that is,
when themetaphysical determinacy of these quantifiers is denied.When this
is denied, there can be no hope of determining the theory’s commitments
to pluralities directly on the basis of its commitments to objects. Instead,
one must assess the commitments to pluralities independently, using the
⁸ In a perfectly analogous way, we can define a notion of ontological commitment incurred
by quantification into predicate position.
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generalized Quinean criterion set out above. To illustrate this point and,
more generally, the value of our notion of commitment to pluralities, let us
consider a puzzle due to Hazen (1993, 135). Consider the scheme of plural
comprehension:
∃x φ(x) → ∃xx ∀x (x ≺ xx ↔ φ(x))
Which instances of the scheme should we accept? The traditionalist (whose
position is enshrined in the standard semantics for plural logic) accepts
all instances—with the obvious and uncontroversial proviso that φ(x) not
contain xx free. This traditional view faces various challenges. According
to predicativists, for example, we should only accept plural comprehension
axioms that are predicative in the sense that φ(x) does not contain any
bound plural variable. And according to the critical plural logic we develop
and defend in Chapter 12, plural comprehension needs to be restricted so
as to avoid commitment to a universal plurality or other pluralities that
are not properly circumscribed. As Hazen observes, there is a clear and
intuitive sense in which these non-traditional views are committed to fewer
pluralities than the traditionalist. Thus, if a notion of commitment is to
be worth its salt, it must capture this sense. And this is exactly what our
broad notion of ontological commitment enables us to do. Using this notion,
we can maintain that the traditionalist, unlike the predicativist, takes on
commitments to impredicatively defined pluralities. By contrast, had we
assumed the plurality-based standard semantics, this conclusion would not
have been available.
Our notion of commitment to pluralities is also useful in cases where
the metaphysical determinacy of plural quantification is granted. When
this is granted, there is a notion of commitment to pluralities—namely the
one associated with the maximal interpretation of the plural quantifiers—
according to which these commitments supervene on the commitments to
objects. Once the commitments to objects of a theory have been deter-
mined, so have the commitments to pluralities associated with the maxi-
mal interpretation. It must therefore be conceded that there is no further
question concerning the theory’s commitments to pluralities. However, the
supervenience of one parameter on certain others does not mean that
there is no genuine and theoretically interesting question as to the value
of this parameter! In our case, even if metaphysical determinacy ensures
that the commitments to pluralities of a theory are uniquely determined
by its commitments to objects, we still want to know how many, and what
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kind of, pluralities the theory is committed to. Even if one believes in
the metaphysical determinacy of plural quantification, one may have views
about how strong, ormathematically rich, one’s notion of subplurality is (e.g.
Shapiro 1993 and Parsons 2013). The notion of commitment to pluralities
that we have articulated allows such views to be expressed.
An example might be helpful. Assume that the commitments to objects
of a theory involve an omega-sequence, which we may think of as the
natural numbers. If metaphysical determinacy holds, then there is a sense in
which the commitments to pluralities are determined by the commitments
to objects. Even so, we can ask which pluralities the theory is committed
to. Different answers are possible. For instance, a theorist who believes the
axiom of constructibility, V = L, may answer that the only subpluralities of
the “natural numbers” to which the theory is committed are the ones that are
constructible (in the sense that they correspond to sets in the constructible
hierarchy L). Another theorist—who rejects the axiom of constructibility—
may disagree and insist that the commitments to pluralities go beyond the
constructible ones.
It may be objected to the broad notion of commitment that the com-
mitments associated with plural and higher-order quantifiers is not a form
of ontological commitment but perhaps, following Quine, of ideological
commitment. We see little point in quarreling over terminology. A more
interesting question is whether ideological commitments in this sense give
rise to fewer philosophical problems, or whether they are philosophically
less substantive, than ontological commitments narrowly understood. It is
far from obvious why this should be so. Indeed, it seems to us that questions
involving the broad notion of commitment can be just as interesting and
problematic as those involving the narrow ones. How are we to understand
the values of different sorts of variables—in extensional or intensional terms?
Which such values are there and which comprehension axioms should we
therefore accept? How do we trace a value from one context (e.g. time or
possible world) to another?
In light of these considerations, we are inclined to agree with Parsons
when he writes that, on the narrow notion,
ontological commitment may just not have the significance that both
nominalists and many of their opponents attribute to it, or that Boolos
seems to attribute to it in the case of proper classes. That might be a victory
for the Innocence Thesis, but it would be a Pyrrhic victory.
(Parsons 2013, 173)
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Thus, if Parsons is right, then either Plural Innocence is false, or else it is true
but not nearly as interesting as one might have thought.
Our primary goal in this section has been not so much to adjudicate this
debate as to prepare the ground for a precise and well-informed debate. We
have done so by using our plurality-based Henkin semantics to provide a
clear articulation of a generalized notion of commitment. Still, on the picture
emerging from our discussion, the role of plural logic as a philosophical
tool appears substantially diminished. As we have shown, plural logic is not
immune from the threat of non-standard interpretations, and the promised
gain in expressive power has not been established. Although we do not take
a stand on which side of the debate prevails, we have, in the absence of a
compelling argument, urged caution about the determinacy claims.
Further, there is a precise and interesting sense in which plural logic
may be said to be committing. Whether this commitment is ontological or
ideological, it is a full-fledged form of commitment nonetheless.
8.8 Applications reconsidered
The conclusion we have just reached is in stark contrast to the common
picture of plural logic canvassed in Section 2.5. According to that picture,
plural logic is “pure logic” and hence also ontologically innocent, and it
provides greater expressive power than first-order logic. In Section 2.6, we
explained how this common picture has sustained some important appli-
cations of plural logic, thereby contributing to the view that plural logic
has great philosophical significance. We focused on four such applications,
which concern logicism, nominalism, semantics, and categoricity arguments
in philosophy of mathematics. Let us briefly reconsider these applications in
light of the preceding discussion.
By itself, our rejection of Plural Innocence and Plural Robustness does not
force any logical revision.Our arguments can be acceptedwhile retaining the
traditional version of plural logic that we have used so far. This means that
our arguments do not affect technical applications of plural logic, including
to logicism. Logicists can employ plural logic in developing their views,
provided that such views are compatible with the failure of Plural Innocence.
The case of nominalism is different. The use of plural logic in some nom-
inalistic projects relies essentially on the alleged ontological innocence of
plural quantification. Eliminating certain kinds of complex objects in favor
of pluralities will be less significant if one accepts that plural quantification
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incurs commitments that go beyond those of first-order quantification.
Nominalists can trade some commitments to objects for new commitments
to pluralities. But they will still face some substantive metaphysical and epis-
temological questions about the nature and extent of the new commitments.
In semantics, the main application of plural logic was to develop a
plurality-based model theory. This application is unaffected by our conclu-
sions concerning the innocence and determinacy of plural quantification.
Indeed, our argument for the existence of non-standard interpretations of
plural logic used precisely the framework of plurality-based model theory.
What about absolute generality? Since the Henkin semantics subsumes
all the standard interpretations, the new semantics is just as congenial to
absolute generality as the standard one.⁹ (As mentioned, however, the use
of plural logic to represent absolute generality faces an entirely different
challenge; see Chapters 11 and 12.)
Finally, plural logic has been held up as an appealing alternative to second-
order logic in order to overcome the expressive limitation of first-order logic
and hence make available categorical characterizations of important mathe-
matical structures. Given our rejection of Plural Robustness, this application
of plural logic becomes highly problematic. Because Plural Robustness fails,
plural logic is not immune to the threat of non-standard interpretations, and
the desired gain in expressive power remains in doubt.
In sum, we have found that plural logic lacks some key features that pure
logic has been thought to have, in particular ontologically innocence; nor is
the logic immune to worries about indeterminacy.1⁰ This calls into question
somepopular applications of the system.Aswe have stressed, however, plural
logic has other important applications, particularly in accounting for sets,
which do not require those features. Plural logic is thus of great interest and
theoretical value, just not in the way that many of its earlier proponents have
argued.
⁹ In Section 2.6, we claimed that if plural talk is not ontologically innocent, then the use
of plural logic to capture absolute generality would appear to be undermined. The claim was
made in the context of what we now call the narrow notion of ontological commitment and
was explicitly linked to the existence of set-like objects (see p. 27).
1⁰ A more comprehensive summary of our view on the extent to which plural logic counts as
pure logic can be found in the final section of the book.
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Appendices
8.A Henkin semantics
Let us provide a more precise formulation of the plurality-based Henkin
semantics for PFO. This semantics is a variant of the standard semantics
illustrated in Section 7.3. The difference is that some key definitions are
relativized to a plural concept D functioning, in effect, as a domain for the
plural quantifiers.
We want to characterize a Henkin interpretation. We start with a plurality
dd serving as the first-order domain. Then we relativize to D the previ-
ous definition of an interpretation function ff (Section 7.3) by adding this
requirement: for every plural constant tt, there is at least one x such that
⟨tt, x⟩ ≺ ff, and for all xx such that
∀y(y ≺ xx ↔ ⟨tt, y⟩ ≺ ff)
it holds that D(xx). The requirement captures the idea that, in any inter-
pretation function, a plural constant tt denotes some things that instantiate
D, specifically those appearing as second coordinates of pairs whose first
coordinate is tt.
An interpretation of the object language is obtained by combining the
domains dd and D with an interpretation function ff relative to dd and
D. Given how these three components have been characterized, an inter-
pretation is not an object or the value of a single higher-order variable.
But such components can be ‘merged’ so as to be represented by a single
variable I, whose value is a plural concept (or, alternatively, a superplu-
rality) that codes the three components. Quantifying over interpretations
then amounts to quantifying over plural concepts (or superpluralities). For
convenience, however, we speak of an interpretation as a triple and represent
it as ⟨dd,D, ff ⟩.11
11 Here is oneway of doing the coding. In keepingwith the notation introduced in Section 7.5,
we let ‘⟨y, xx⟩’ stand for the ordered pairs obtained by pairing y with each x in xx. Then, given
dd, D, and ff, there is I such that for all yy, I(yy) if and only if one of the following holds:
(1) yy ≈ ⟨a, dd⟩;
(2) there are zz such D(zz) and yy ≈ zz;
(3) yy ≈ ⟨b, ff⟩;
where a and b are any two distinct objects. The plural concept (or superplurality) so character-
ized can be used as a surrogate for the triple ⟨dd,D, ff ⟩.
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We also relativize to D the previous definition of a variable assignment ss:
we require that for every plural variable vv, there is at least one x such that
⟨vv, x⟩ ≺ ss, and for all xx such that
∀y(y ≺ xx ↔ ⟨cc, y⟩ ≺ ss)
it holds that D(xx). This means that a plural variable vv is assigned some
things that instantiate D, specifically those appearing in the assignment as
second coordinates of pairs whose first coordinate is vv.
Before defining the notion of truth in an interpretation, let us introduce
some additional notation, following our convention in Section 7.2. For any
model ⟨dd,D, ff ⟩, variable assinglment ss, and non-logical expression E, letJEK⟨dd,D,ff ⟩,ss—but, in fact, wewill write JEKff,ss leaving the domains implicit—
indicate the semantic value or values of the expression E relative to themodel
⟨dd,D, ff ⟩ and the variable assignment ss.
We are ready to give the inductive characterization of truth in an interpre-
tation via satisfaction clauses. In the Henkin semantics, a formula φ is true
in an interpretation ⟨dd,D, ff ⟩ relative to a variable assignment ss based on
D, written ⟨dd,D, ff ⟩ ⊨H φ [ss], just in case:
(i) if φ is t1 = t2, then Jt1Kff,ss = Jt2Kff,ss;
(ii) if φ is Sn(t1, . . . , tn), then ⟨Jt1Kff,ss, . . . ,JtnKff,ss⟩ ≺ JSnKff,ss;
(iii) if φ is ∃v ψ, then ⟨dd,D, ff ⟩ ⊨H ψ [ss(v/x)] for some x ≺ dd;
(iv) if φ is ∃vv ψ, then ⟨dd,D, ff ⟩ ⊨H ψ [ss(vv/xx)] for some xx ≼ dd
such that D(xx);
(v) the clauses for the logical connectives are the obvious ones.
As usual, the satisfaction clauses ensure that if φ is a sentence, we can ignore
variable assignments.
We say that an interpretation ⟨dd,D, ff ⟩ is faithful if it satisfies every
instance of the plural comprehension scheme:
∃v φ(v) → ∃vv∀v(v ≺ vv ↔ φ(v))
Logical consequence is defined with respect to faithful models only.
(Of course, when we are interested in systems with restricted plural
comprehension, we modify the definition so as to consider all models that
satisfy the relevant comprehension scheme.) A sentence φ is a consequence
of a set of sentences Δ in the Henkin semantics (written ‘Δ⊨H φ’) if,
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for every faithful interpretation ⟨dd,D, ff ⟩ satisfying every member of Δ,
⟨dd,D, ff ⟩ ⊨H φ.
8.B Completeness of the Henkin semantics
Let us now prove that traditional plural logic defined in Section 2.4 is
sound and complete with respect to the plurality-based Henkin semantics
formulated above. We use the symbol ⊢ to denote the relation of provability
is this system. We want to show that, for any sentence φ and set of sentences
Δ, Δ ⊨H φ (if and) only if Δ ⊢ φ. The shortest and most elegant way of
proving this is through a squeezing argument.
First, it is a routine exercise to verify that traditional plural logic is sound
with respect to the plurality-based Henkin semantics, which means that
(8.1) if Δ ⊢ φ, then Δ ⊨H φ.
Now consider the familiar set-based Henkin semantics for second-order
logic. (See, for instance, Shapiro 1991, Section 4.3.) It is relatively straight-
forward to adapt this semantics to PFO. An interpretation is given by a triple
⟨d1, d2, f ⟩, where d1 is a non-empty set, d2 (the range of the plural quantifiers)
is a set of non-empty subsets of d1, and f is interpretation function from
the non-logical vocabulary of the language to elements of d1 (for singular
terms), elements of d2 (for plural terms), and possibly empty sets of n-tuples
from d1 (for singular n-ary predicates). Plural membership (‘is one of ’)
is systematically interpreted as set-theoretic membership. Let us use the
symbol ⊨h for the resulting relation of logical consequence when confined
to faithful interpretations, namely those satisfying every instance of plural
comprehension. So Δ ⊨h φ means that φ is a logical consequence of
Δ in the set-based Henkin semantics. In other words, for every faithful
interpretation ⟨d1, d2, f ⟩, if ⟨d1, d2, f ⟩ ⊨h ψ for every member ψ of Δ,
then ⟨d1, d2, f ⟩ ⊨h φ.
It is evident that every set-theoretic model just described corresponds
to a plurality-based Henkin model. Take any model ⟨d1, d2, f ⟩. Then its
corresponding plurality-based model ⟨dd,D, ff ⟩ is one in which dd are the
elements of d1, D is the concept of being a plurality that forms a set in d2,
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and ff is an interpretation function that matches f.12 This correspondence
establishes the following:
(8.2) If Δ ⊨H φ, then Δ ⊨h φ.
Finally, we can easily adapt the standard proof that second-order logic is
complete with respect to the set-based Henkin semantics (Henkin 1950) to
show that traditional plural logic is complete with respect to the set-based
Henkin semantics outlined in the paragraph just above.
This gives us that
(8.3) if Δ ⊨h φ, then Δ ⊢ φ.
Putting together the last three numbered claims, we obtain the result we
wanted to prove:
(8.4) Δ ⊨H φ (if and) only if Δ ⊢ φ.
So traditional plural logic is complete with respect to the plurality-based
Henkin semantics. Therefore, it is also compact and axiomatizable.
12 Specifically, if f(t) = x, then ⟨t, x⟩ ≺ ff. If f(aa) = {xx}, then ∀y(⟨aa, y⟩ ≺ ff ↔ y ≺ xx).
And, for any n-tuple ⟨x1, . . . , xn⟩, ⟨Sn, ⟨x1, . . . , xn⟩⟩ ≺ ii if and only if ⟨x1, . . . , xn⟩ ∈ f(Sn).




Superplurals have come up time and again in the preceding chapters. We
have observed on several occasions that the expressive resources afforded
by superplurals would have useful applications. Superplurals would permit
the formulation of a higher-order version of Cantor’s theorem; they would
help with the elimination of mereology and second-order logic in favor of
plural logic; and they could be extensively used in semantics, for example by
serving as values of plural predicates, codingmodels of PFO+, and restricting
the range of plural quantifiers in Henkin interpretations.
However, the legitimacy of superplural resources cannot be taken for
granted.This iswhy our appeals to superplurals have always been conditional
so far. It is time to examine the matter more closely.
Can the step from the singular to the plural be iterated? Is there such a
thing as the superplural that stands to the plural the way the plural stands to
the singular? Some examples from natural language suggest an affirmative
answer. We have already mentioned expressions that denote things articu-
lated into distinct subpluralities, namely ‘Russell andWhitehead, andHilbert
and Bernays’ and ‘these things, those things, and these other things’. These
and other examples will be discussed shortly. First we need to clarify and
sharpen the questions about superplurals that we seek to answer.
9.2 What superplural reference would be
The morphological operation of pluralization cannot be iterated—at least
not in English or any other natural language with which we are familiar.
For example, while ‘cat’ and ‘cats’ are permissible, ‘catses’ is not. So, as
far as common nouns are concerned, the singular and the plural exhaust
the options in English. This means that the quest for English superplurals
cannot be based on morphology alone. Rather, it must be based on some
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo,
Oxford University Press. © Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo 2021.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198791522.003.0009
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semantic feature. The most natural candidate is reference. Focusing on
terms, we may thus attempt to single out superplural terms on the basis of
what kind of reference they effect.
Terms may be semantically classified according to the number of things
they are capable of referring to. Singular terms can refer to at most one thing,
while plural terms are capable of referring to a plurality of things, that is,
many things at once. What is semantically distinctive of superplural terms?
In earlier chapters, we often described the reference of a superplural term
as a “plurality of pluralities”. But we noted that this expression does not have a
clearmeaning, given our stipulation that ‘plurality’ be used as a shorthand for
a plural construction. In this sense, a plurality of things just is many things.
So a plurality of pluralities would have to be, in Russell’s terms, many many’s
(1903, 516). However, one may reasonably doubt that this gloss is meaning-
ful. As a result, one may worry that the very the notion of a superplural term
is semantically unintelligible (see, for example, Ben-Yami 2013).
On a set-based formulation of the semantics, there is a perfectly acceptable
way to characterize superplural reference. Let our domain of discourse be a
set d. Then a set-based interpretation assigns an individual in d to a singular
termand anon-empty set of individuals in d to a plural term. So a superplural
term would be one to which the interpretation assigns a higher-level set,
namely a set of sets of individuals in d (subject to the conditions that all the
relevant sets be non-empty). This characterization makes precise both the
idea of iteration and the analogy used above, namely that the superplural
stands to the plural the way the plural stands to the singular.
Linguistic semantics bears witness to the fact that the notion of super-
plural reference thus characterized is of substantial theoretical interest. For
there is a rich and subtle debate over whether certain expressions of natural
language should be interpreted by means of higher-level sets.1 The debate
concerns, in particular, the interpretation of plural noun phrases obtained
by conjoining other plural noun phrases. Let α be a noun phrase of the form
β1 and . . . and βn
where β1, . . . , βn are themselves plural nounphrases.Thequestion iswhether
α should be interpreted as the union of the semantic values of β1, . . . , βn or
as the higher-level set whose elements are those semantic values. So we must
1 See, for example, Gillon 1987, Lasersohn 1989, Gillon 1990, Lasersohn 1995, Schwarzschild
1996, and Winter 2001.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 10/6/2021, SPi
176 superplurals
choose between a rule of semantic composition that makes α a plural term,
namely
JαK = Jβ1K ∪ . . . ∪ JβnK
and an alternative rule that makes α a superplural term, namely
JαK = {Jβ1K, . . . , JβnK}
We will return to this debate below. For the moment, we simply want to
emphasize that the notion of superplural reference has a clear and the-
oretically fruitful characterization within a set-based semantics. In this
framework, there is no intelligibility problem.
A new problem arises, however, when we adopt a plurality-based
semantics. If a plural term refers to many things, how are we to understand
the reference of a superplural term? This question differs from the one
discussed by linguists working within a set-theoretic framework (though
the data they consider and many of their analyses remain relevant). The
desired superplural reference would be a form of articulated reference:
a superplural term refers not just to many objects but to many objects
articulated in a certain way. The set-based semantics provides one way
to make this articulation explicit. But the following visual analogy suggests










a b c d . . .
xxx
{{a, b}, {c, d}, . . . }
xxx
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Our aim, then, is to “articulate” some objects, just like a higher-level set
“articulates” these objects through its members. If higher-level sets are
required for a successful set-based semantics, something with the same
functional role is required to carry out the semantics in a plurality-based
setting.
If natural language contains no devices with this functional role, we may
have to develop the needed devices ourselves. From a methodological point
of view, the situation is not unusual. Sometimes theorizing requires the
introduction of new expressive resources. Think of the huge expressive gains
in the history of science afforded by the introduction of new mathematical
resources. The justification for these resources derives from their theoretical
fruits, not from their antecedent availability in natural language. The propo-
nent of a plurality-based semantics may find herself in a similar situation.
She might need to develop superplural resources to account for semantic
phenomena that in the set-based semantics require higher-level sets. These
new resources too are justified in part by their theoretical fruits.
An additional way to address the intelligibility problem is by adapting a
lesson from plurals. It is customary to assume that denotation is a functional
relation between a term and its semantic value. So, for any plural term tt,
there are some things such that tt refers to them and to no other things. This
requires the use of plurals in the specification of the semantic value of tt.
But if we relax the functionality requirement and construe reference as a
one-many relation, the use of plurals can be avoided. To characterize the
reference of tt, we can say that tt refers to at least one thing, leaving open
the possibility that it refer to some other thing. To express that tt achieves
plural reference to a and b, we then say that t refers to a and t refers to b.
The semantic characterization of a plural term is now given using only
singular vocabulary. By making the right semantic adjustments, this notion
of reference is entirely adequate, as shown by the model theory presented in
Sections 7.3 and 7.5.Of course, aswe learned there, plurals are not eliminated
from the semantics.They are still needed, for example to state the satisfaction
clause for plural predication. But it is possible to reduce the complexity of the
definition of plural reference so that it only relies on singular resources.
An analogous strategy can be employed for superplural terms. We can say
that a superplural term ttt refers to at least one plurality, leaving open the
possibility that it refer to some other plurality. To express that ttt achieves
superplural reference to aa and bb, we then say that ttt refers to aa and
ttt refers to bb. This definition does not presuppose superplural notions.
Relying only on our understanding of plurals, we now have access to a
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semantic characterization of superplural reference. Of course, this does not
mean that we can fully carry out the semantics without invoking superplural
notions. But the strategy suffices at least tomake intelligible what superplural
reference would be in the context of a plurality-based semantics. So we
submit that the notion of superplural reference is in good standing.
9.3 Grades of superplural involvement
Questions about superplural reference are part of a broader range of interest-
ing questions concerning different ways in which superpluralsmay be said to
be “available”. Affirmative answers to such questions correspond to different
“grades of superplural involvement”, as we shall now explain.
The first question has to do with the availability of a certain logical system.
(Q1) Can we formulate a superplural logic?
This question receives a definitive answer in Rayo 2006. It is relatively
straightforward to formulate an extension of plural logic that, in addition
to singular and plural vocabulary, includes a third category of superplural
expressions. These new expressions (terms, predicates, and quantifiers) are
governed by logical rules similar to those governing singular and plural
expressions. In the resulting systemwe can express, for instance, the plausible
axiom that every superplurality is non-empty:
(9.1) ∀xxx∃yy yy ≺ xxx
Once a superplural logic has been formulated, an obvious semantic ques-
tion arises:
(Q2) Can we provide a semantics, especially a model theory, for a
superplural language?
A set-based model theory for such a language can easily be formulated as
an extension of the set-based model theory for PFO+. If we are willing to
countenance metalanguages with superplural resources, a plurality-based
model theory is available as well (see Rayo 2006, Linnebo and Rayo 2012,
and Section 11.A below).
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The next two questions ask whether superplurals are available in a more
demanding sense.
(Q3) Is superplural reference a legitimate expressive resource for beings
like us?
This is a question in philosophical logic, unlike the fourth question, which is
empirical and requires input from linguists.
(Q4) Is superplural reference realized in some (human) natural lan-
guage?
Our primary target is the grade of superplural involvement associated
with (Q3). This question involves the notion of “legitimate expressive
resource”. How should this notion be understood? Some indications are
provided in Lewis 1991, Hazen 1997, Linnebo 2003, and Rayo 2006. As
Hazen and Lewis point out, we can show the legitimacy of certain expressive
resources by showing that they can be taught and employed. Indeed, as
discussed in Section 6.1, this process of training can include learning by
what Williamson calls “the direct method”.
We will also be concerned with the last—and highest—grade of super-
plural involvement. While this is of obvious relevance to natural language
semantics, our primary interest in the fourth question has to do with the
fact that actuality entails possibility, or legitimacy, as we put it above. If some
natural language truly realizes superplural reference, then such reference is
certainly possible, which answers our primary question, (Q3).
9.4 Possible examples from natural language
Before reviewing a number of purported examples of superplurals in English,
let us briefly consider two phenomena from other languages.2 The first
involves number words in Icelandic. Such words have plural forms which
count not individual objects, but pluralities of objects that form natural
groups. For instance,
2 These examples are mentioned in Linnebo 2017. Grimau forthcoming offers an interesting
discussion of a wider range of examples.
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einn skór means one shoe
einir skó means one pair of shoes
tveir skór means two shoes
tvennir skó means two pairs of shoes
So we can talk about a “pluralities of pluralities” of shoes without the
mediation of any singularizing device. This feature is lost in the translation,
since ‘two pairs of shoes’ involves a singularization (via ‘pair of ’) and thus
amounts to regular plural talk of objects (the pairs of shoes).
For another example, consider these quantificational expressions in
Lithuanian:
vienas batas means one shoe
vieneri batai means one group of shoes
du batai means two shoes
dveji batai means two groups of shoes
abu batai means both shoes
abieji batai means both groups of shoes
keleri batai means several groups of shoes
keli batai means both shoes
Here too we can talk about “pluralities of pluralities” of shoes, again without
the mediation of any singularizing device.
Turning to English, there are many purported examples of superplural
terms. Most of these examples involve lists of plural terms. Let us first reflect
on the case of lists of singular terms. Some predicates applying to such lists
appear to take a variable number of arguments, that is, they appear to be
multigrade:
(9.2) (a) Annie and Bonnie met/cooperated/helped each other.
(b) Annie, Bonnie, and Connie met/cooperated/helped each other.
(c) Annie, Bonnie, Connie, andDannymet/cooperated/helped each
other.
These predicates are plausibly analyzed as plural predicates with a single
argument filled by a plural term. So, on this analysis, the predicates have
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 10/6/2021, SPi
9.4 possible examples from natural language 181
fixed adicity after all, and each list of singular terms is in fact a plural term.
By analogy, one might expect that predicates applying to lists of plural terms
also have fixed adicity and should be analyzed as superplural predicates. If
so, each list of plural terms would be a superplural term.
Here are some promising example involving lists.
(9.3) The cards below seven and the cards from seven up have been
separated. (Landman 1989a, 574)
(9.4) The Beatles and the Rolling Stones gave a joint concert. (Inspired by
Rosen and Dorr 2002, footnote 21, 172–3)
(9.5) The joint authors of multivolume classics on logic areWhitehead and
Russell, and Hilbert and Bernays. (Oliver and Smiley 2005, 1065)
(9.6) These people, those people, and these other people played against
each other. (Linnebo and Nicolas 2008, 193)
(9.7) The square things, the blue things, and the wooden things overlap.
(Linnebo and Nicolas 2008, 193)
It is worth noting that (9.5) also gives us a purported example of a superplural
term other than a list, at least if one assumes that the sentence expresses a
form of identity. On this assumption, the plural description has the same
semantic status as the list.
Oliver and Smiley maintain that this is not an isolated case: there is a
class of plural descriptionswhosemembers are in fact uniformly superplural.
These are descriptions of the form ‘the F’ that purport “to denote all the joint
satisfiers of F” rather than “the unique joint satisfiers of F” (Oliver and Smiley
2016, 132). In addition to the description in (9.5), they mention various
other descriptions as belonging to this class, including ‘the twin primes’ and
‘the creators of a great comic opera’. Let us therefore add another of their
examples to our stock:
(9.8) 3 and 5 are among the twin primes. (Oliver and Smiley 2016, 139)
On the superplural reading they propose, ‘are among’ is a higher-order
counterpart of the relation of plural membership. It holds between a plural
term (‘3 and 5’) and superplural one (‘the twin primes’) when, so to speak,
the plurality denoted by the former is one of the pluralities denoted by the
latter.
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9.5 The possible examples scrutinized
To present a convincing case for a superplural interpretation of the examples
just considered, we must rule out alternative analyses. The harder it is to
find an alternative analysis, the stronger the case for superplurals. We will
therefore examine a range of attempts to find an alternative analysis, without
necessarily endorsing these attempts.
For some of the examples, alternative analyses are clearly available (see
Linnebo andNicolas 2008 for discussion). For instance, (9.3) can be analyzed
as follows:
(9.9) The cards below seven have been separated from the cards from seven
up.
This sentence contains no prima facie superplurals. It features just ordinary
plural descriptions. However, the possibility of this analysis depends on the
fact that the original list is composed of two terms. So the analysis does not
directly apply when a list has more terms:
(9.10) The cards below four, the cards between four and six, and the cards
from seven up have been separated.
To analyze (9.10), we can integrate the idea behind (9.9) with a conjunctive
analysis:
(9.11) The cards below four have been separated from the cards between six
and four, the cards between four and six have been separated from
the cards from seven up, and the cards from seven up have been
separated from the cards below four.
The success of this conjunctive analysis requires the logical equivalence of
(9.10) and (9.11). As is easy to see, this equivalence obtains, although one
might question whether meaning is fully preserved.
However, the conjunctive analysis does not provide a general method for
eliminating purported examples of superplural terms. Its limitations become
apparent when we examine another example given above:
(9.4) The Beatles and the Rolling Stones gave a joint concert.
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As before, there is a simple analysis that avoids the list:
(9.12) The Beatles gave a concert with the Rolling Stones.
Still, the following variant of (9.4) is not amenable to a conjunctive analysis:
(9.13) The Beatles, the Rolling Stones, and Led Zeppelin gave a joint
concert.
For it is clear that (9.13) is not equivalent to this conjunction:
(9.14) TheBeatles gave a concertwith theRolling Stones, theRolling Stones
gave a concert with Led Zeppelin, and Led Zeppelin gave a concert
with the Beatles.
While (9.13) implies that there is a single concert featuring all three bands,
(9.14) does not.
Although it resists a conjunctive analysis, (9.13) does not yet provide
a compelling example of superplurals. That is because it can plausibly be
analyzed in a different way. Indeed, it has been suggested that terms like ‘the
Beatles’ and ‘the Rolling Stones’, though syntactically plural, denote groups
and are therefore semantically singular (see, e.g., Landman 1989a, Landman
1989b, and Landman 2000, Lectures Four, Five and Six). It is possible that
the Beatles and the Rolling Stones gave a joint concert, though Ringo Starr
was ill and was replaced by someone else. Assuming that pluralities have
their members necessarily (see Chapter 10), this possibility shows that ‘the
Beatles’ and ‘the Rolling Stones’ do not refer plurally and thus lends support
to the group-based analysis. On this analysis, lists such as ‘the Beatles and
the Rolling Stones’ amount to ordinary plural terms.
Is the conjunctive analysis applicable to the sentences suggested by Oliver
and Smiley? It is not applicable directly to (9.5). For, clearly, these two
sentences are not equivalent:
(9.5) The joint authors ofmultivolume classics on logic areWhitehead and
Russell, and Hilbert and Bernays.
(9.15) Whitehead and Russell are joint authors of multivolume classics on
logic, and Hilbert and Bernays joint authors of multivolume classics
on logic.
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To bridge the gap, one may apply the conjunctive analysis indirectly through
a Russellian elimination of the plural description:
(9.16) Whitehead and Russell are joint authors of multivolume classics on
logic, Hilbert and Bernays are joint authors of multivolume classics
on logic, and any joint authors of multivolume classics on logic are
either Whitehead and Russell or Hilbert and Bernays.
So the force of (9.5) as an example of superplurals depends on the extent to
which this elimination is objectionable.3
The sentence concerning twin primes is somewhat difficult to assess. In
mathematics, it is common to treat ‘twin primes’ distributively, taking a twin
prime to be a prime that differs by two from another prime. This makes ‘the
twin primes’ an ordinary plural description. So a conjunctive paraphrase
would be perfectly in order:
(9.8) 3 and 5 are among the twin primes.
(9.17) 3 is a twin prime and 5 is a twin prime.
It is also common to use ‘twin prime’ as synonymous with ‘twin prime pair’.
Then the semantic value of ‘the twin primes’ would be the collection of pairs
of the form ⟨p, p+2⟩, where p and p+ 2 are prime.While this understanding
is closer to the superplural interpretation, it will not persuade the skeptic
who takes a pair to be an object and hence sees a collection of pairs as an
ordinary plurality. This kind of skeptic may regard a true utterance of (9.8)
as tantamount to:
(9.18) The pair ⟨3, 5⟩ is among the twin primes.
Linnebo andNicolas (2008) argue that examples (9.6) and (9.7) strengthen
the case for superplurals in English in that they are not amenable to either a
conjunctive analysis or a group-based interpretation.
(9.6) These people, those people, and these other people played against
each other.
(9.7) The square things, the blue things, and the wooden things overlap.
3 For objections, see Oliver and Smiley 2016, 135–6.
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The group-based analysis is not available because, in each example, all the
terms in the lists are paradigmatic instances of semantically plural terms.
What about a conjunctive analysis? In its intended reading, (9.6) conveys
that there is a three-way competition between these people, those people,
and these other people. So a conjunctive analysis is not applicable (compare
with ‘TheBeatles, the Rolling Stones, and Led Zeppelin gave a joint concert’).
Something similar may be said of (9.7). As noted by Linnebo and Nicolas
(2008, 198), however, this sentence can be given an indirect conjunctive
paraphrase:
(9.19) There is a thing such that it is one of the square things, it is one of
the blue things, and it is one of the wooden things.
So the force of (9.6) as example of superplurals depends on whether this
paraphrase is objectionable.⁴
Let us summarize our discussion so far. Some alleged examples of super-
plurals in English have limited force, since they can be given a conjunctive
analysis or a group-based one. Other examples cannot easily be analyzed in
those ways and are therefore more persuasive.
How persuasive? Again, the answer turns on the availability of alternative
analyses. In the next section, we discuss an analysis according to which lists
cannot give rise to superplural terms because they are not terms at all. If
correct, this analysis undermines any example that essentially relies on lists.
In Section 9.7, we consider an analysis purporting to undermine all alleged
examples of superplural terms. It holds that lists, aswell as plural descriptions
of any kind, are ordinary plurals.
9.6 The multigrade analysis
If some lists are to count as superplural terms, they must be terms in the
first place. The assumption that lists are terms is prima facie plausible and,
as remarked in Section 9.4, it enables us to interpret seemingly multigrade
predicates applying to lists of singular terms as plural predicates. By parity
of reasoning, we can regard at least some seemingly multigrade predicates
applying to lists of plural terms as superplural predicates.
⁴ Linnebo and Nicolas suggest that the paraphrase could be resisted on grounds that ‘overlap’
is, plausibly, lexically primitive.
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The assumption that lists are terms may, however, be disputed. One may
instead interpret lists as strings of separate terms, taking predicates to be
genuinelymultigrade.There are several advocates of this multigrade analysis
of predication, and Oliver and Smiley have concluded that the view that lists
are string is just as plausible as the view that lists are terms (see Oliver and
Smiley 2016, Chapter 10, for discussion and references).
To see how the multigrade analysis works, let us start with some basic
examples.
(9.20) (a) Annie and Bonnie met.
(b) Annie, Bonnie, and Connie met.
(c) Annie, Bonnie, Connie, and Danny met.
If we treat the predicate ‘met’ as having variable adicity, these sentences can
be regimented as follows.
(9.21) (a) M(a, b)
(b) M(a, b, c)
(c) M(a, b, c, d)
Note that a general implementation of the multigrade analysis requires
a distinction between argument places and argument positions.⁵ Consider
these sentences:
(9.22) (a) Annie and Bonnie rescued Connie.
(b) Annie rescued Bonnie and Connie.
To avoid ambiguities, the regimentation must clearly separate the agents
from the patients of the relation. So we must first have argument places,
roughly corresponding to relevant thematic roles, such as agent and patient.
Then, within each argument place, we must have argument positions. Using
semicolons to separate argument places and commas to separate argument
positions, we can regiment (9.22a) and (9.22b) as (9.23a) and (9.23b),
respectively.
(9.23) (a) R(a, b; c)
(b) R(a; b, c)
⁵ For an elaboration of the distinction, see Oliver and Smiley 2016, 172–4.
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The key point is that, on the multigrade analysis, ‘Annie’, ‘Bonnie’, and
‘Connie’ do not combine to form new terms. Rather, they occupy different
argument positions, sometimes sharing the same argument place.
If we adopt this analysis, lists are strings of separate terms. As a result, we
forsake all examples of superplurals based on lists. For instance, (9.6) has the
form of (9.24), a formula containing only ordinary plural variables.
(9.6) These people, those people, and these other people played against
each other.
(9.24) φ(xx, yy, zz)
However, the multigrade analysis faces some difficulties. To begin with,
there is the question of how to develop the approach systematically so that
it can account for inferential relations involving sentences with lists. As
observed in Florio and Nicolas 2015 (454–5), one would have to rely heavily
on meaning postulates in order to account for the validity of inferences such
as the following:
(9.25) (a) Annie and Bonnie are students and best friends.
(b) Therefore, some students are best friends.
(9.26) (a) Bonnie and Connie are students.
(b) Annie, Bonnie, and Connie met.
(c) Therefore, Annie and some students met.
(9.27) (a) Annie, Bonnie, and Connie visited Paris.
(b) Therefore, Annie and Bonnie visited Paris.
(9.28) (a) Annie and Bonnie met.
(b) Therefore, Bonnie and Annie met.
According to the multigrade analysis, these inferences have the following
regimentations:
(9.29) (a) S(a, b) ∧ B(a, b)
(b) ∴ ∃xx(S(xx) ∧ B(xx))
(9.30) (a) S(b, c)
(b) M(a, c, b)
(c) ∴ ∃xx(S(xx) ∧M(a, xx))
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(9.31) (a) V(a, b, c; p)
(b) ∴ V(a, b; p)
(9.32) (a) M(a, b)
(b) ∴M(b, a)
To capture the validity of these inferences, we must introduce special rules
governing the relevant classes of expressions. While there is no obvious
obstacle, one may regard the need for special rules as a disadvantage over
alternative accounts that can explain the validity of the inferences from
simpler and more basic semantic principles.
Another difficulty has to do with the implementation of the analysis in
a plurality-based setting. If the multigrade analysis is to serve as a genuine
strategy for avoiding superplurals, it cannot rely on them in its implemen-
tation. Yet it is not clear that a plurality-based model theory for multigrade
expressions can avoid superplurals. For example, to describe the interpre-
tation of argument positions, one must refer to arbitrary long sequences of
pluralities, which naturally calls for superplurals.
9.7 Covers
If successful, the multigrade analysis would undermine alleged examples of
superplurals based on lists. However, there is an alternative analysis that
is more far-reaching in its potential to weaken the case for superplurals.
According to this analysis, lists as well as plural descriptions of any kind are
ordinary plurals.
This idea might seem a non-starter. Aren’t there obvious counterexamples
to any ordinary plural analysis of alleged superplural terms? As we have
seen above, there are clear cases in which the syntactic articulation of a
plural term matters to the truth conditions. Other cases are not hard to
produce. Consider these two sentences in a context where the participants
in a competition are either students or teachers at a local school:
(9.33) The participants played against each other.
(9.34) The students and the teachers played against each other.
Given the context, these two sentences can differ in truth value.This suggests
that the semantic values of their respective subjects are not the same,
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contrary to the thesis that lists and plural descriptions are always ordinary
plurals. If ‘the students and the teachers’ was an ordinary plural term,
its semantic value would be same as that of ‘the participants’. So the two
sentences would have to be equivalent, which they are not. By assuming,
instead, that ‘the students and the teachers’ is not an ordinary plural term but
a superplural one, we easily explain why the sentences are not equivalent.
Recall the dispute over the interpretation of a complex plural noun phrase
α of the form
β1 and . . . and βn
where β1, . . . , βn are themselves plural noun phrases (Section 9.2). We can
choose between a rule of composition that renders α a plural term and one
that renders it a superplural term. That is, we have two options:
JαK = Jβ1K ∪ . . . ∪ JβnK
and
JαK = {Jβ1K, . . . , JβnK}
Examples such as (9.33) and (9.34) put pressure on the plural interpreta-
tion. However, linguists such as Brendan Gillon (1987, 1990) and Roger
Schwarzschild (1996) have argued that this interpretation can in fact be
defended.
According to Gillon and Schwarzschild, articulated plural noun phrases
(‘the students and the teachers’) have the same type of denotation as unar-
ticulated ones (‘the participants’). The role of the articulation in the truth
conditions is explained by appeal to covers.
To see how the analysis works, let us examine a sentence with multiple
readings:
(9.35) Annie and her dogs weigh 50 kg.
There is, of course, a collective reading and a distributive one: Annie and
her dogs may be said to weigh 50 kg collectively or individually. But another
reading is easily available. This is an intermediate reading on which Annie
is said to weigh 50 kg individually, and her dogs are said to weigh 50 kg
collectively.
The three readings correspond to three partitions of the set containing
Annie and each of her dogs. For concreteness, assume that the dogs are two,
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d1 and d2, and hence the set can be represented asD = {Annie, d1, d2}. So the
three readings correspond to partitions of D with one, three, and two cells,
respectively:
P1 = {{Annie, d1, d2}}
P2 = {{Annie}, {d1}, {d2}}
P3 = {{Annie}, {d1, d2}}
By appealing to these partitions, we can capture the multiple readings of
(9.35) while retaining the assumption that
JAnnie and her dogsK = JAnnieK ∪ Jher dogsK
This can be done by stating the truth conditions as follows:
‘Annie and her dogs weigh 50 kg’ is true in some context Q if and only
if there is a partition P of JAnnie and her dogsK that is salient in Q, and
every element of P is in Jweigh 50 kgK.
Thus, the three readings described above (and potentially more) can be
seen to arise from contextually salient partitions. For instance, if the salient
partition is P3, the sentence is true if and only if {Annie} ∈ Jweigh 50 kgK
and {d1, d2} ∈ Jweigh 50 kgK.That is, the sentence is true if and only if Annie
weighs 50 kg individually and her dogs weigh 50 kg collectively.⁶
However, if this analysis is to succeed, we need something more general
than partitions. This is shown by the next example. Suppose that Annie,
Bonnie, and Connie variously cooperated to build sand castles; specifically,
Annie cooperated with Bonnie, Bonnie with Connie, and Connie with
Annie. None of them built any other sand castle. Then it seems that we can
truly say:
(9.36) Annie, Bonnie, and Connie cooperated.
A moment’s reflection reveals that no partition of the denotation of ‘Annie,
Bonnie, and Connie’ will capture the intended truth conditions. Indeed, the
relevant articulation is represented by a set whose cells overlap:
⁶ For convenience, here we follow Schwarzschild in assuming that a singleton set may be
identified with its sole element. Since the sentence ‘Annie weighs 50 kg individually’ is true
if and only if Annie ∈ Jweigh 50 kgK, it follows that the same sentence is true if and only if
{Annie} ∈ Jweigh 50 kgK.
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{{a, b}, {b, c}, {c, a}}
Thenotion of cover provides what is needed. A cover is just like a partition
except that the cells are allowed to overlap. In the set-theoretic framework,
the formal definition is as follows. A set C is a cover of a set D if and only if:
(i) C is a set of non-empty subsets of D
(in symbols: ∀x (x ∈ C → x ≠ ∅ ∧ x ⊆ D);
(ii) every element in D is in at least one set in C
(in symbols: ∀x (x ∈ D → ∃y (y ∈ C ∧ x ∈ y)).
Using covers, we can generalize the analysis of ‘Annie and her dogs weigh
50 kg’ presented above (see Schwarzschild 1996, 67):
[S NPplural VP] is true is some context Q if and only if there is a cover C
of the denotation of the NP that is salient in Q, and every element in C
is in the extension of the VP.⁷
Let us call this the cover analysis.
It is now straightforward to account for the multiple readings of the
sentences encountered in this section. The different truth conditions arise
from contextual variations that select different covers. If a plural subject is
syntactically structured, this structure might obviously influence the context
and render salient a cover with the corresponding articulation. So the
syntactic structure of a plural subject can affect the truth conditions even
if one rejects the assumption that the subject’s semantic value is articulated.
The cover analysis is fully general and applies evenwhen the plural subject
is a definite description or a demonstrative noun phrase:
(9.37) The children cooperated.
(9.38) These children cooperated.
If the children in question are Annie, Bonnie, and Connie, these sentences
are predicted to exhibit the same range of readings as:
⁷ Gillon (1987) requires the additional condition that the cover be minimal, namely that
no cell be properly contained in any other cell. For our purposes, we can safely leave out this
complication. In so doing, however, we do not mean to rule out its correctness.
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(9.36) Annie, Bonnie, and Connie cooperated.
This is because the noun phrases in the three sentences co-refer and are
therefore associatedwith the same range of possible covers. Nevertheless, the
difference in syntactic structuremeans that the sentencesmaymake different
covers salient.
We now wish to consider an objection to the cover analysis. Let us return
to one of the sentences that we used to motivate superplurals in Section 9.4:
(9.7) The square things, the blue things, and the wooden things overlap.
Suppose that the denotations of the three definite descriptions are as follows:
Jthe square thingsK = {a, b}Jthe blue thingsK = {a, c}Jthe wooden thingsK = {a, d}
Then, according to the cover analysis, we have:
Jthe square things, the blue things, and the wooden thingsK = {a, b, c, d}
where, in the absence of further contextual cues, the salient cover is given by
the syntactic structure of the plural subject:
C = {{a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}}
It follows from the analysis that (9.7) is true if and only if every element in C
is in the extension of ‘overlap’. This means that the truth of (9.7) requires:
JoverlapK = { . . . , {a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}, . . . }
But that seems incorrect. For this extension would also sanction the truth of:
(9.39) The square things overlap.
which is clearly false in the given context. Intuitively, the correct extension
of ‘overlap’ is as follows:
JoverlapK = {{{a, b}, {a, b}}, . . . , {{a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}}, . . . }
That is, X is an element of the extension of ‘overlap’ just in case X is a set of
non-empty sets that have some element in common. To make use of this
extension, however, we would have to revise the cover analysis so that a
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sentence is true if and only the cover itself is in the extension of the verb
phrase. But this revision would not fit with the analysis of our previous
examples where the extension of the verb phrase must contain the elements
of the cover, not the cover itself.
Let us take a step back. The cover analysis is supported by evidence con-
cerning intermediate readings. Still, at least as formulated above, it cannot
handle some of the alleged examples of superplurals, as shown in the previ-
ous paragraph. Perhaps some alternative version of the analysis, coupledwith
a closer linguistic examination of the examples, can overcome this apparent
difficulty. Even so, implementing the proposal in the plurality-based setting
would have significant consequences for the debate over superplurals.
Indeed, superplurals seem required to formulate the cover analysis in the
plurality-based setting. Consider the following examples:
(9.40) The ordinals and the cardinals overlap.
(9.41) The sets and the classes overlap.
If we assign to the descriptions their intended interpretations (the pluralities
of ordinals, cardinals, and so on), we would have to rely on superplural terms
to describe the salient covers. So appealing to covers in this setting concedes
that some sentences express “superplural thoughts”.This suffices for the third
grade of superplural involvement described in Section 9.3. It does notmatter
whether natural language is linked to superplural thoughts in a somewhat
roundabout way.
The third grade of superplural involvement is secured even on a more
instrumental conception of the semantic machinery associated with covers.
The need to invoke superplurals to develop a semantics of natural language
would still show that these resources are legitimate for theorizing and hence
legitimate in the sense of the third grade.
9.8 Mixed-level predications
We now turn to an important challenge for the superplural analysis.⁸ The
challenge is based on a simple idea. Consider a purported example of a
sentence with a superplural subject:
⁸ See, e.g., Landman 1989a, 598–601; Schwarzschild 1996, 45–8; Ben-Yami 2013, 87.
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(9.42) My children, your children, and her children played against each
other.
Now extend the sentence as follows:
(9.43) My children, your children, and her children played against each
other and then ate ice cream.
Notice that the added predicate, unlike the original one, does not call for an
argument with a superplural articulation. Thus, the two predicates seem to
belong to different levels, yet they are applied to the very same subject. How,
then, can this subject involve superplural reference?⁹
One might try to handle such mixed-level predications by claiming that,
when the semantic value of a noun phrase involves more articulation than
is required by a predicate, the redundant articulation is simply “thrown
away”, resulting in a less articulated semantic value that is appropriate for
the predicate in question. To this end, one may postulate a type-shifting
operation thatmaps a superplurality to the underlying plurality; for example:
a1, a2; b1, b2; c1, c2, c3 ↦ a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, c2, c3
However, type-shifting should not be postulated beyond necessity. And
in fact, it may be unnecessary to invoke this kind of mechanism in the
present case. There is no need to shift the semantic value of a noun phrase by
“throwing away” its redundant articulation. A predicate that does not require
this extra articulation might nevertheless be tolerant of it—in the sense that
the predicate simply ignores the articulation.1⁰ To ensure that the semantic
values are tolerant of extra articulation in this way, we require that they be
upwards closed: if X is an element of the semantic value, then so is any Y that
is based on the same individuals but has a strictly richer articulation than X.
As an example, consider the distributive plural predicate ‘ate ice cream’. For
convenience, we represent its semantic value set-theoretically. Suppose we
have:
{a, b, c, d} ⊆ Jate ice creamK
⁹ These examples also pose a challenge for the multigrade analysis. For this analysis has no
obvious explanation of why (9.42) follows from (9.43). See the discussion in Section 9.6.
1⁰ This strategy is critically discussed in Schwarzschild 1996, Chapter 4. Schwarzschild favors
a cover-based approach, as noted in Section 9.7.
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Assuming that the semantic value of the predicate is upwards closed, it will
contain all other sets based on the same individuals but ‘articulated’ in more
complex ways. For example, we have:
{{a, b}, {c, d}} ⊆ Jate ice creamK,
which corresponds to a superplural articulation of the four individuals. We
give this idea a precise mathematical definition in Appendix 9.A.
To sum up, provided that the semantic values of predicates are required to
be upwards closed, the challenge under discussion can be answered. Recall
our guiding example, (9.43). Suppose the predication of ‘played against each
other’ is analyzed as having a superplural subject, namely my children, your
children, and her children. The upwards closure of Jate ice creamK ensures
that the associated predication is true of thementioned superplurality just in
case each of the children ate ice cream, precisely as desired. More generally,
a highly articulated semantic value of some noun phrase is never a problem
so long as predicates that do not require this degree of articulation simply
ignore it.
9.9 Mixed-level terms, order, and repetition
The superplural analysis assumes that the semantic value of some plural
noun phrases is articulated, namely structured into multiple sets or plu-
ralities. Additional evidence for semantic articulation may come from the
linguistic phenomena illustrated by the following sentences:
(9.44) Annie, Annie’s sisters, and Bonnie competed.
(9.45) ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, and ‘d’ are consecutive letters.
(9.46) 1, 1, and 4 have mean 2.
The first example involves a mixed-level list, where singular terms are com-
bined with a plural description.The other examples show sensitivity to order
and to repetition. In (9.45), changing the order of the terms affects the truth
conditions. So does removing the repetition in (9.46).
Those who accept the superplural analysis can simply take these examples
to show the need for yet other forms of articulation. In particular, they can
account for the data by countenancing these additional forms of articulated
reference:
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(a) reference to mixed-level pluralities, including combinations of single
objects and pluralities;
(b) reference to ordered pluralities, respecting order;
(c) reference to multipluralities, allowing for repetition.
Suggestions of this kind have been put forward byHewitt (2012a), Ben-Yami
(2013), and Hossack (2020).11 Hewitt and Hossack claim that plural terms
can refer to things in an order (serial reference). According to Ben-Yami,
the reference of plural terms can be articulated in various ways (articulated
reference): when the articulation represents information about order or
repetition, this information can play a role in the truth conditions.
This appeal to additional forms of articulated reference can be challenged,
however. Building on earlier work by Kay (1989), Oliver and Smiley (2004;
2016, Chapter 10), and Chaves (2012), Florio and Nicolas (2015) argue that
order and repetition should be explained in a different way. They point out
that assuming additional forms of articulated reference has limited scope
and is unnecessary to give a unified account of the broad range of cases
in which order and repetition are semantically relevant. On the account
they propose, order and repetition enter the truth conditions through salient
indexings introduced by context and by the meaning of special expressions
(for example, ‘consecutive’, ‘in that order’, and ‘respectively’).
To see how their proposal works, consider this sentence:
(9.47) Annie, Bonnie, and Connie arrived in the order they were called.
(Florio and Nicolas 2015, 449)
Here the order of mention is irrelevant. There are two relevant orders: first,
the one in which Annie, Bonnie, and Connie arrived; then, the one in which
they were called. The sentence conveys that these two orders are, in some
sense, the same. This can be explicated as follows: the sentence is true if and
only if the indexing of the plurality of Annie, Bonnie, and Connie according
to their time of arrival is isomorphic to the indexing of the same plurality
according to the order of calling.There is noneed to assume that the semantic
11 Fine (2010) develops a more comprehensive approach, which can serve as a framework
for these suggestions. At the heart of the approach is a general composition operation that
can be specialized to obtain any form of articulated reference discussed here. In particular, this
operation can be set to respect or ignore each of the following features: order, repetition, and
articulation into higher-level pluralities. For a precise statement of these choices, see Fine 2010,
573.
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contribution of ‘Annie, Bonnie, and Connie’ goes beyond that of supplying
the mere plurality of objects on which the salient indexings operate.12 So the
proposal can be developed without postulating that the semantic value of a
plural term is articulated.
Might the multigrade analysis provide an alternative way to account for
the examples that seem to motivate the postulation of additional forms
of articulated reference? This analysis, we recall, promises an alternative
to superplurals. It is naturally extended to treat mixed-level terms, order,
and repetition. Using multigrade predicates, one can provide the following
regimentation of the examples discussed at the beginning of this section:
(9.44) Annie, Annie’s sisters, and Bonnie competed.
(9.48) C(a, tt, b)
(9.45) ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, and ‘d’ are consecutive letters.
(9.49) C(a, b, c, d)
(9.46) 1, 1, and 4 have mean 2.
(9.50) M(1, 1, 4; 2)
Thus, apparent mixed-level terms are simply cases in which the positions of
an argument place are occupied by terms of different levels. Moreover, the
semantic relevance of order and repetition is explained by an obvious fact
about predication: changing the order of the arguments, as well as adding or
removing an argument, does not in general preserve truth.
This extended use of the multigrade analysis has serious limitations,
however. The problem is that order and repetition can matter even in the
presence of a single, non-conjunctive argument:13
(9.51) There are some consecutive letters.
(9.52) These letters are consecutive.
(9.53) Some numbers have mean 2.
(9.54) These numbers have mean 2.
12 For details, see Florio and Nicolas 2015, Section 5.
13 See also Ben-Yami 2013, 96–7, and Florio and Nicolas 2015, 455.
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The multigrade account of order and repetition just sketched does not
apply to these cases, and it is unclear how it could explain them without
borrowing from the other approaches discussed earlier in this section. In
particular, articulated pluralities might still have to be invoked as covers or
as possible values of plural variables. But if so, it becomes harder to justify
the introduction of the multigrade apparatus.
It remains an open problem, then, how best to deal with the examples of
mixed-level terms, order, and repetition. The case for additional forms of
articulated reference is not as strong as that for superplural reference.
9.10 Conclusion
Wehave examined four questions concerning the availability of superplurals,
corresponding to increasingly higher “grades of superplural involvement”.
The first two grades are unproblematic: there is no obstacle to formulating
a superplural logic and a model-theoretic semantics for a superplural lan-
guage. It is not immediately obvious, however, whether superplural reference
is a legitimate expressive resource for beings like us. Nor is it immediately
obvious whether superplural reference is realized in natural language. So
the third and fourth grades are less straightforward and require careful
investigation.
Our investigation showed that a strong case can be made for the highest
grade. Some sentences of natural language can plausibly be analyzed in
superplural terms, and this analysis fares well compared to alternatives such
as the multigrade analysis and the cover analysis. Let us review the pros and
cons of each analysis.
The superplural analysis is supported by prima facie evidence from artic-
ulated noun phrases. However, it may require the assumption that the
semantic values of predicates be upwards closed, which some might find
problematic. Moreover, by avoiding superplural reference, the alternative
analyses can claim better ideological economy.
The multigrade analysis offers a simple way to handle some cases of order
and repetition, but it faces difficulties in accounting for all cases in which
order and repetitions are semantically relevant.Moreover, itmust rely heavily
on meaning postulates to capture data about logical consequence.
The cover analysis is supported by evidence from intermediate readings.
But it seems to falter on promising examples of superplurals, where the cover
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itself, rather than its members, has to be included in the extension of the
predicate.
What about the third grade of superplural involvement? If there is a good
case for the highest grade, there is also a good case for the third grade. That
is, if some natural language realizes superplural reference, it is hard to deny
that this form of reference is a legitimate expressive resource for beings like
us. In fact, the case for the third grade is probably even stronger than that for
the highest grade. In particular, since we have accepted the plurality-based
model theory as a new and valuable alternative to the traditional set-based
model theory, it becomes difficult to avoid superplurals. Furthermore, in that
style of model theory, superplurals are likely to be involved even in the cover
analysis and in themultigrade one.The theoretical need to adopt superplural
resources thus shows that these resources are legitimate for theorizing, which
would also establish our third grade of superplural involvement.
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Appendix
9.A The notion of upwards closure
In this appendix, we make formally precise some of the ideas outlined in
Section 9.8. Our first task is to define an analogue of the sets of finite rank
based on a domain of individuals D, though modified so as to consider
only sets of cardinality greater than or equal to 2. This modification is
natural when modeling superplural phenomena. Sets are used to represent
pluralities. But since a singleton plurality is identical with its single member,
there is no need for a singleton set to represent this singleton plurality,
since this plurality is already represented by whatever represents its single
member. We therefore proceed as follows. First, we define our modified
powerset operation by letting℘≥2(X) be the set of subsets of X of cardinality
greater than or equal to 2. Next, we define the analogue of the sets of finite
rank based on D:
• V≥20 (D) = D
• V≥2i+1(D) = ℘≥2(V
≥2
i (D))
• V≥2ω (D) = ⋃i<ω V
≥2
i (D)
Finally, let D⋆ = V≥2ω (D).
We are now ready to define the desired operation of upwards closure.
Consider some X ∈ D⋆. What is it for some Y ∈ D⋆ to be the result of
imposing a richer articulation on X? Let us proceed in steps. First, let us say
that Y is a simple articulation of X just in case Y is the result of replacing zero
or more members of X with subsets of X, ensuring that all of the members of
X are “used” in the construction, that is, that all members of X are either in
Y or in some member of Y. For example, let X be {a, b, c}. Then two simple
articulations of X are {a, {b, c}} and {a, {a, b, c}}. Next, let us say that Y is an
articulation of X just in case Y can be obtained by a finite chain of simple
articulations starting with X.
Notice that this definition works for the representation of higher-
order pluralities as well. For example, let X be {{a, a′}, {b, b′}, {c, c′}}. Then
{{a, a′}, {{b, b′}, {c, c′}}} is a simple articulation of X.
These definitions can be made precise as follows.
Definition 9.1 Let X ∈ D⋆. Then Y is a simple articulation of X if and only
if there are U,V ∈ D⋆ such that
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(i) Y = (X ⧵ U) ∪ V
(ii) x ∈ V → x ⊆ X
(iii) U ⊆ ⋃V
Next, Y is an articulation of X if and only if there is a finite chain
X0,X1, . . . ,Xn such that
(i) X = X0
(ii) Y = Xn
(iii) Xi+1 is a simple articulation of Xi for each i < n.
Finally, let A ∈ D⋆ be the semantic value of some predicate. Its upwards
closure is defined as:
UC(A) = {B ∈ D⋆ ∶ B is an articulation of A}
Suppose we require that semantic values of predicates be upwards closed.
Then there is no problem about predications of the sort discussed in Sec-
tion 9.8. Consider our main example:
(9.43) My children, your children, and her children played against each
other and then ate ice cream.
Provided that the semantic value of ‘ate ice cream’ is upwards closed, it
will apply to the articulated semantic value of ‘my children, your children,
and her children’ just in case it applies to the individuals which are thus
articulated.
In fact, the machinery just developed enables us to define what it is for a
predicate to be plural (= plural of order 1), superplural (= plural of order 2),
or plural of order n.
Definition 9.2 Assume the semantic value of a predicate P is Y. Then P is
plural of order n if and only if there is a X ⊆ V≥2n (D) such that Y = UC(X).
That is, a predicate P on a domain D is plural of order n just in case its
semantic value Y can be generated as the upwards closure of a set X whose
members are of rank n.
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Just as the interaction between first-order quantification and modalities
raises a number of interesting and difficult questions, so does the interaction
between plural quantification and modalities.∗ In this chapter, we discuss
the central aspects of the problem of how plurals and modalities should be
combined. We have two main goals. The first is to provide a useful map of
the current literature. The second is to argue for the metaphysical claim that
pluralities are modally rigid. What does this claim mean?
Consider some things, and choose any one of them. Is the chosen thing
necessarily one of the things from which it was chosen? It is usually assumed
that the answer is positive—so long as the things in question still exist.1
If some things did not include our chosen thing, then these things would
simply not be the things with which we started, that is, the things from
which we made a choice. If the things from which we chose exist at all, then
necessarily, whenever they exist, they include the chosen thing. Likewise, if
someother thing isnot one of the things fromwhichwe chose, then this too is
a matter of (conditional) necessity. With the help of an existence predicate E,
these two modal constraints on plural membership can be formalized as
follows:2
2∀x∀yy(x ≺ yy → 2(Eyy → x ≺ yy))(Rgd+)
2∀x∀yy(x ⊀ yy → 2(x ⊀ yy))(Rgd−)
The claim that pluralities are rigid is the conjunction of these constraints,
which we abbreviate as (Rgd).
∗ This chapter is a revised and expanded version of Linnebo 2016.
1 See Williamson 2003, 456–7; Rumfitt 2005, section VIII; Williamson 2010, 699–700;
Uzquiano 2011; Williamson 2013, 246–8. The view is challenged in Hewitt 2012a.
2 One might have thought that more existential presuppositions were needed. We will later
see that that isn’t so.
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo,
Oxford University Press. © Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo 2021.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198791522.003.0010
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The rigidity principles can be regarded as a form of extensionality, stating
that pluralities are tracked extensionally across possible worlds.The ordinary
principle of extensionality states that if every one of these things is one of
those things and vice versa, then these things and those things are the very
same things. (We will return to the question of how best to formalize this
principle.) This is widely assumed to provide a criterion of identity for plu-
ralities; and like criteria of identity in general, the principle is widely thought
to hold of necessity. Even so, the principle provides no information about
how pluralities are tracked across possible worlds. The rigidity principles fill
this gap. They tell us that necessarily any given things have their members
by necessity. A plurality is therefore not allowed to vary in its membership
across possible worlds. Any variation in membership would result in our
talking about some other things, not the things in question.
To appreciate how the rigidity claims for pluralities have real bite, it is
useful to contrast pluralities with groups, such as teams, clubs, committees,
and the like.3These entities do not have their members necessarily. Consider
the Department of Philosophy of the University of Athens. It might have had
other members than it in fact has: Sophus might have been hired instead of
Sophia. Someone who is a member of this department might not have been
so; and someone who is not a member might nevertheless have been one.
Thus, a group such as a philosophy department does not have its members
necessarily. The same is true of other typical groups.
If pluralities are rigid but groups are not, what explains the difference?One
might try to appeal to the distinction between many and one. A plurality is
many, while a group is one. But this distinction cannot explain the relevant
modal difference between pluralities and groups. For a set is one and yet has
its members necessarily. So rigidity is compatible with being one.
A far more promising response arises from the following basic thought:
a plurality is nothing over and above its members and is thus fully specified
when we have circumscribed its members. Tracking a plurality across possi-
ble worlds is therefore trivial: it is simply a matter of tracking its members.
Unlike a plurality, a group is something over and above its members: it is
not fully specified when we have circumscribed its members. For example,
we additionally need to specify its membership criterion. A group such as
a department of philosophy will be associated with a membership criterion
that is sanctioned by the statutes of the university. So tracking a group across
3 For useful discussions of groups, see, e.g., Landman 1989a, Landman 1989b, and Uzquiano
2004b.
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possible worlds is not trivial; it goes beyond tracking each of its members.⁴
By contrast, since a plurality is nothing over and above its members, there
is no material available that might underwrite a non-trivial tracking across
possible worlds. All we have to go on are the members. So the only way to
track a plurality is the trivial one, which ensures plural rigidity.⁵
Sets—understood according to the iterative conception—resemble plu-
ralities in this respect, with the additional and complicating factor that their
members are “bound together” into a single object (see Section 4.4).
In what follows, we attempt to clarify and develop the basic thought that
a plurality is fully specified when we have circumscribed its members. The
result will be a disentangling and clarification of several aspects of the basic
thought. We will find that plural rigidity figures at the heart of a network
of ideas having to do with what we will call the extensional definiteness of
pluralities.
10.2 Why plural rigidity matters
The question whether pluralities are rigid has emerged as the central ques-
tion about the interaction between plural quantification and modalities. The
reason for this has to do with the important ramifications of the question in
philosophical logic, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mathematics.
One example is the debate about the relation between plural logic and
second-order logic discussed in Chapter 6. Can plural logic be replaced by
monadic second-order logic or even reduced to it? Or is some reduction in
the opposite direction possible? If pluralities are rigid, then the two forms of
logic have different modal profiles. For the modal behavior of predication is
clearly non-rigid, as the following sentences illustrate.
(10.1) Timothy Williamson is a philosopher, but he might not have been
one.
(10.2) Hillary Clinton is not a philosopher, but she might have been one.
⁴ Uzquiano 2018 provides a systematic development of the idea that, since tracking them is
trivial, pluralities can be seen as a limiting case of generally non-rigid groups.
⁵ Roberts (forthcoming) provides a systematic investigation of this basic thought, resulting
in a defense not only of (Rgd) (which is ourmain concern in this chapter) but also some further
modal principles.
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As we have seen, however, the difference between the modal profile of
predication and that of plural membership makes at least one kind of
reduction problematic (see Section 6.4).
A related example concerns the semantics of predication. In Section 7.5,
we showed that if we have ordered pairs at our disposal, it is technically
possible to use plurals to give a semantic analysis of predication. Specifically,
we can take the semantic value of a predicate to be the plurality of tuples
of which the predicate is true. In addition to the lack of homophonicity
even on the intended interpretation and the need for ad hoc tricks to handle
predicates that are true of nothing, there is a violation of the constraint
that semantic values should have the same modal profile as the expressions
of which they are semantic values. So considerations pertaining to modal
rigidity can help us decide among competing semantics.
Next, the rigidity of pluralities plays a central role in one of Williamson’s
main arguments for necessitism, the metaphysical view that, necessarily,
everything necessarily exists.⁶The denial of this view is contingentism. When
we go on to consider arguments for the rigidity of plurals, it will be important
to keep inmind whether the argument is intended to be given in a necessitist
setting (which is always easier) or in a contingentist setting (which requires
greater care).
Finally, the question of the rigidity of pluralities plays an essential role
in an approach to mathematics and to the phenomenon of indefinite exten-
sibility developed in recent work by one of us (Linnebo 2010 and Linnebo
2013).⁷
10.3 Challenges to plural rigidity
We aim to survey a number of arguments for the claim that pluralities are
rigid. Before doing that, however, we should address some alleged counter-
examples to plural rigidity.
The first one involves plural descriptions. Assume that Sophia is one of
the philosophers. Does it follow that she is necessarily one of the philoso-
phers? (For simplicity, we leave implicit the assumption that the entities in
⁶ See Williamson 2010, 2013.
⁷ While this approach to mathematics and indefinite extensibility draws inspiration from
Parsons 1983b and to some extent also Putnam 1967 and Hellman 1989, these earlier views do
not rely in the same way on the rigidity of pluralities.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/6/2021, SPi
10.3 challenges to plural rigidity 209
question still exist.) If so, we would have to accept the implausible claim
that, necessarily, Sophia is a philosopher. Thus, we must deny that Sophia
is necessarily one of the philosophers. Does the case of Sophia provide us
with a counterexample to plural rigidity?
Long ago Kripke taught us how to respond. Let pp be the things such
that anything is one of them if and only it is in fact a philosopher. What is
necessarily the case is that Sophia is one of pp. But it is not necessary that pp
are all and only the philosophers. Sophia might have become a psychologist,
not a philosopher.Then she would not have been included in the ranks of the
philosophers, although she would still have been one of pp. It is important
not to misunderstand the rigidity claim.
Other apparent counterexamples involve pronouns rather than plural
descriptions. A nice example is the following ad we once saw for a gym:
(10.3) Join, and become one of us!
The plural pronoun ‘us’ is naturally taken to stand for a plurality. But when so
interpreted, the message presupposes that it is possible to become a member
of a plurality of which one is not already a member.⁸ If there were such a
possibility, we would have a failure of rigidity.
How are we to respond to these apparent counterexamples to the rigidity
of pluralities? Interesting though they are, these examples are inconclusive.
Consider, for instance, a bohemian parent who upon seeing some particu-
larly smug business school students tells her daughter:
(10.4) I’m glad you’re not one of them.
It is natural to understand the parent as expressing joy that her offspring is
not (in some salient respect) like the students in question rather than pleasure
with a fact about plural non-membership. Thus, (10.4) poses no more of a
challenge to the rigidity of pluralities than the following sentence poses to
the necessity of identity:
(10.5) I’m glad you’re not him.
In particular, the apparent counterexamples can be explained away if we
allow that a plural pronoun can sometimes function as a covert description
⁸ A similar example is attributed to Dorothy Edgington in Rumfitt 2005. Further examples
are found in Hewitt 2012b.
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or refer to a group.⁹ Either way, the behavior of the pronoun would be
consistent with plural rigidity: as observed above, plural descriptions can
function non-rigidly, and groups need not be rigid. Of course, more work
would be needed to dispel an apparent counterexample such as (10.3) and
establish an alternative explanation consistent with plural rigidity. What our
discussion does show, however, is that it is advantageous to base our assess-
ment of plural rigidity on more systematic and theoretical considerations.
As mentioned, we will see that plural rigidity figures at the heart of a
network of ideas having to do with the extensionality of pluralities. Since
the ideas in this network are true of a core use of our plural resources in
ordinary language and thought, we commend them as an explication of
these resources. We do, however, accept the existence of non-rigid groups.
So we have no trouble admitting that there may be uses of plural resources
(including plural variables) to stand for groups. Nor do we have any trouble
admitting that there are plural expressions (e.g. some plural descriptions)
that fail to satisfy rigidity.
10.4 An argument for the rigidity of sets
It will be useful to begin our investigation of the rigidity of pluralities
by reminding ourselves of an argument for the necessity of identity and
distinctness made famous by Saul Kripke (1980, Lecture III) and often
attributed to Ruth Barcan Marcus (1947).1⁰ As we will see, this argument has
striking consequences for the metaphysics of sets. Throughout this chapter,
we assume the modal system T as our background modal logic. When
stronger modal axioms are used, this will be noted explicitly.
The argument turns on Leibniz’s law:
(Leibniz) 2∀x∀y(x = y → (φ(x) ↔ φ(y)))
where, as usual, the relevant argument place of φ occurs in a transparent
context, namely outside the scope of quotations and propositional attitudes.
⁹ For arguments in support of the first strategy, see e.g. Heim 1990 and Neale 1990,
Chapter 5. The possibility of the kind of reference assumed in the second strategy is shown
by examples such as ‘Yesterday, the committee/club/team met. They decided to issue a press
release.’ Sentences such as these are natural and contain a plural pronoun, ‘they’, that appears to
be anaphoric on a group.
1⁰ See Burgess 2014 for a recent discussion of the origin of the argument.
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Given the assumption2(x= x), Leibniz’s law entails2∀x∀y(x= y→2x= y).
Moreover, given the Brouwerian axiom (or just B for short)
φ → 23φ
we can also derive the necessity of distinctness:2∀x∀y(x ≠ y → 2 x ≠ y).11
(Proof sketches of these arguments are provided in Appendix 10.B.)
A contingentist may object to the assumption of 2(x= x). After all,
in a negative free logic, ‘x= x’ can be used as an existence predicate, in
which case what is assumed is the necessary existence of x. The problem
is easily circumvented. The contingentist will have no problem with the
assumption that x satisfies the following open formula whose sole argument
is represented by ‘. . .’:
2(x = x → x = . . .)
Applying (Leibniz), this enables us to derive formulations of the necessity of
identity and distinctness that are acceptable to the contingentist:12
2∀x∀y(x = y → 2(x = x → x = y))(2 =)
2∀x∀y(x ≠ y → 2 x ≠ y)(2 ≠)
The derivation of the latter from the former relies, as before, on B.
As Kripke realized, Leibniz’s law has important metaphysical conse-
quences. The case of sets provides a nice illustration. Consider the set-
theoretic principle of extensionality:
(Set-Ext) ∀x∀y(∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ y) ↔ x = y)
Leibniz’s law reveals a respect in which this is quite a strong principle. Let x
and y be coextensive sets. By (Set-Ext), x and y are identical. Observe now
that x satisfies the open formula
2∀u(u ∈ . . . ↔ u ∈ x)
11 In fact, as Williamson (1996) has pointed out, (2 ≠) can also be derived without use of
the Brouwerian axiom by invoking suitable principles of actuality.
12 Since the necessitation of (Leibniz) ensures 2(x= y→ x= x), the existential presupposi-
tion ‘x = x’, present in (2=), would be redundant in (2 ≠). Forwere x ≠ y to fail, thementioned
presupposition would anyway be satisfied. (Thanks to Tim Williamson for this observation.)
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So by Leibniz’s law, y too satisfies this formula. We conclude that two
coextensive sets are subject to necessary covariation:
(Set-Cov) ∀x∀y(∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ y) → 2∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ y))
Thus, the set-theoretic principle of extensionality logically entails, via
(Leibniz), that two coextensive sets are necessarily coextensive.13 In fact,
since (Set-Ext) holds of necessity, (Set-Cov) does too.
This consequence of Leibniz’s law is important. It brings out a fun-
damental difference between sets and other kinds of collections, such as
groups, which are tracked across possible worlds in some intensional way.
Consider the covariation claim concerning groups: “If two groups in fact
have the same members, they are identical and thus necessarily have the
same members.” This claim is wildly implausible. Membership in a group
is contingent and thus subject to “drift”, in the sense that the group may
have different members at different possible worlds. But once membership
drift is permitted, there is no guarantee that two groups that in fact coincide
will necessarily coincide. In the case of sets, by contrast, the principle of
extensionality and Leibniz’s law entail that there can be no such drifting
apart.
Theobserved difference between sets and groups derives from the fact that
sets, unlike groups, are subject to the principle of extensionality. Having the
same members suffices for two sets to be identical, but not for two groups.
Let us dig deeper. Why does having the same members suffice for two sets
to be identical, but not for two groups? The only explanation, we contend,
is that sets, unlike groups, are constituted by their members. A set is fully
characterized by specifying its members. So when two sets have the same
members, they are identical. By contrast, a group has additional features that
go beyond its members, which means that having the same members need
not suffice for identity.
It is these additional features of groups that allow them to be tracked
from possible world to possible world in non-trivial ways, permitting, for
example, a philosophy department to have different members at different
possible worlds. Sets are fundamentally different. Since a set is constituted by
its members, there is nothing other than its members to go on when tracking
it from world to world. Sets are therefore tracked rigidly. Just as in the case
13 Here and in the remainder of this section, we leave implicit the proviso that the sets still
exist.
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of pluralities, the claim that sets are rigid, abbreviated as (Set-Rgd), can be
formalized as the conjunction of two statements:1⁴
2∀x∀y(x ∈ y → 2(Ey → x ∈ y))(Set-Rgd+)
2∀x∀y(x ∉ y → 2(x ∉ y))(Set-Rgd−)
Let us take stock. Although our argument for (Set-Rgd) does not rest on
purely logical premises, it is hard to resist. The principle of extensionality
holds for sets, unlike groups, because sets, unlike groups, are constituted by
their members. Thus, when tracking a set across possible worlds, there is
nothing other than its members to go on. This ensures that the tracking is
rigid. Not so for groups, which have additional features that go beyond their
members and thus permit non-trivial tracking.
These considerations give rise to a dilemma that applies not only to sets
but to any other notion of collection (including groups). Either we have to
give up the principle of extensionality (as in the case of groups), or else we
have to accept rigidity as well (as in the case of sets).1⁵ There is no stable
middle ground. The only explanation for the principle of extensionality also
supports rigidity.1⁶
We will now consider two objections to our argument for the dilemma.
The first objection is based on a mereological analogue of the argument for
the rigidity of sets. Let ≤ indicate the relation of parthood. Assume that
x and y share all their parts; that is, ∀z(z ≤ x ↔ z ≤ y). Provided that
parthood is reflexive and anti-symmetric, it follows that x and y are identical.
Furthermore, since necessarily x shares all of its parts with itself, it follows by
(Leibniz) that necessarily x and y share all of their parts. Yet these conclusions
seem compatible with parthood being non-rigid!This calls into question our
claim that analogous conclusions concerning sets support the rigidity of set
membership.1⁷
1⁴ Even for a contingentist, no further existential presuppositions are required, for reasons
analogous to those that apply in the case of plurals (see Section 10.6).
1⁵ For sets, the former option is unattractive. As Boolos (1971, 229–30) reminds us, if ever
there was an example of an analytic truth, then the extensionality of sets is one.
1⁶ These considerations pose a challenge to Fregean and neo-Fregean approaches to collec-
tions (or extensions, or Wertverläufe). On the one hand, such approaches adopt the principle of
extensionality as a criterion of identity. On the other hand, they view a collection as somehow
“derived from” its defining (Fregean) concept, which is plausibly regarded as non-rigid. So they
are potentially on a collision course with the rigidity thesis. See Parsons 1977b for a discussion
of Frege’s concept of extension.
1⁷ Thanks to Jeremy Goodman for articulating this objection.
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Our response is to deny that the two cases are analogous. The crux of our
argument is the claim that any reason to accept the set-theoretic principle
of extensionality is also a reason to accept the rigidity of set membership.
By contrast, there is a reason to accept that sameness of parts suffices for
identity that is not also a reason to accept the rigidity of parthood. Here is
the intuitive idea. To make sense of contingent parthood, it is useful to think
of objects as involving both matter and form.1⁸ For instance, a molecule that
is part of you might not have been so because tracking you across possible
worlds involvesmore thanmerely tracking yourmatter. On this hylomorphic
conception, it is natural to take parthood to be sensitive to both matter and
form. Mutual parthood would then ensures identity not only of matter but
also of form—and hence also ensures the identity of the objects in question.
But this explanation is perfectly compatible with objects involving form,
not only matter, and thus being tracked non-trivially from world to world.
In short, the principle that sameness of parts ensures identity admits of an
explanation that does not support the rigidity of parthood.1⁹
The second objection takes its departure from the well-known fact that
Leibniz’s law needs to be restricted. Assume that Nikita is the shortest spy. Of
course, necessarily the shortest spy is the shortest spy. But it does not follow
that necessarily Nikita is the shortest spy. It is often proposed that Leibniz’s
law be restricted to rigid designators—defined as terms that refer to the same
object at every world at which they refer at all—thus excluding terms like
‘the shortest spy’. Ordinarily, this restriction works well. But when reasoning
about sets or other kinds of collection, the restriction threatens to undermine
our dilemma between denying the principle of extensionality and accepting
the rigidity principles.
To understand this threat, we need to distinguish between two completely
different notions of rigidity. Until the previous paragraph, we have been
concerned exclusively with a metaphysical notion of rigidity. Sets and other
kinds of collection are said to be rigid if their membership is a matter of
necessity, in the precise sense laid down by the kind of rigidity claims stated
above. But as we have just seen, there is also the semantic notion of a rigid
designator.
1⁸ Abstract objects would be a limiting case where the material contribution is nil.
1⁹ A better analogue of the set-theoretic principle of extensionality is the principle that
sameness of material parts ensures identity. Now the analogy with our argument is restored.
Any reason to accept thementionedmereological principle is also a reason to accept the rigidity
of material parthood. Of course, anyone attracted to non-rigid parts should respond to this
observation by denying that sameness of material parts ensures identity.
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The problem is that it can be hard to disentangle the two kinds of rigidity.
Assume that a term t refers at w1 to a collection comprising a and b, where
a and b are all and only the Fs atw1. Assume that t refers atw2 to the singleton
collection of a, where a is the one and only F at w2. Is t a rigid designator?
The question cannot be answered until we have been told how to track the
relevant kind of collection fromworld to world. If the collections are tracked
extensionally, we are considering different collections, with the result that
t is not a rigid designator. But if the collections are tracked intensionally in
terms of theirmembership criterion, wemaywell be considering one and the
same object, namely the collection of Fs, in which case t is a rigid designator
after all.
The threat to our dilemma is now apparent. To show that our use of
Leibniz’s law is permissible, we must first show that the terms in question are
rigid designators.This involves showing that they refer to the same set across
possible worlds. But this presupposes that we already know how to track sets
across possible worlds! As we have seen, this is a matter of answering the
question ofmetaphysical rigidity. Our argument therefore appears powerless
to answer the question of metaphysical rigidity. The permissibility of its
appeal to Leibniz’s law presupposes that the question has already received
an affirmative answer.
Fortunately, the threat can be avoided by reformulating the restriction on
Leibniz’s law. Say that a term is purely referential if its semantic contribution
to linguistic contexts in which it occurs is exhausted by its referent, or, as
Quine put it, if the term “is used purely to specify its object, for the rest
of the sentence to say something about” (1960, 177). Instead of restricting
Leibniz’s law to rigid designators, we can restrict the law to purely referential
terms. After all, the semantic contribution of such terms is exhausted by
supplying their referents. Assume that t1 = t2 is a true identity involving two
purely referential terms, and that the relevant argument place of a formula
φ occurs in an transparent context. Then of course φ(t1)↔φ(t2) is true as
well, as this merely says of the common referent of t1 and t2 that it is φ if and
only if it is φ. By restricting Leibniz’s law to purely referential terms rather
than to rigid designators, our problem dissipates. The only terms involved
in our argument are variables. And a variable is purely referential because
its semantic contribution is nothing but its value. Thus, our argument for
metaphysical rigidity goes through.
There is a more general lesson here as well. The problem of disentan-
gling metaphysical rigidity from semantic rigidity points to an unfortunate
feature of the notion of a rigid designator: it runs together two kinds of
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considerations that are best kept apart. First, there is the semantic question of
whether a term is purely referential.Then, there is themetaphysical question
of how its referent is to be tracked from one possible world to another.
It is true that every purely referential term is a rigid designator. But our
discussion shows that we get a cleaner separation of the metaphysical and
semantic questions by focusing on the notion of pure reference rather than
rigid designation.2⁰ Thus, in what follows, the default notion of rigidity will
once again be the metaphysical one.
Let us sum up. As observed, Leibniz’s law entails the necessity of identity.
We have examined whether an analogous argument can be given for the
rigidity of sets. Given (Set-Ext), we found that Leibniz’s law entails (Set-Cov),
which states that two coextensive sets are necessarily coextensive. This falls
short of the rigidity of sets, though it is a step in that direction. To establish
the desired rigidity claim, we argued as follows. Any reason to accept (Set-
Ext), we argued, is also a reason to accept the rigidity of sets. For (Set-Ext)
holds because sets are constituted by their members, and this insight about
the nature of sets also ensures that there is nothing other than the members
in terms of which a set can be tracked.
10.5 An argument for plural rigidity
We will now extend the argument from the previous section to the case of
pluralities. Previously, we started with Leibniz’s law. Now, we propose to
start with the principle that any coextensive pluralities are indiscernible. As
before, we use xx ≈ yy to abbreviate the claim that xx and yy are coextensive
(see Section 2.3). Thus, our proposed starting point is the principle:21
(Indisc) 2∀xx∀yy(xx ≈ yy → (φ(xx) ↔ φ(yy)))
2⁰ See Stalnaker 1997 and essays 1–3 of Fine 2005b for some closely related considerations.
21 This starting point allows us to remain neutral on the question of whether there is a notion
of identity between pluralities. Clearly, (Indisc) requires no such notion. If such a notion is
nevertheless available—denote it with the ordinary identity sign—then (Indisc) is merely the
result of contracting into a single principle the law of extensionality for pluralities
(Ext) 2∀xx∀yy(∀u(u ≺ xx ↔ u ≺ yy) ↔ xx = yy)
and the plural analogue of Leibniz’s law:
(Leibniz∗) 2∀xx∀yy(xx = yy → (φ(xx) ↔ φ(yy)))
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Two concerns arise. First, as we have seen, the ordinary singular version
of Leibniz’s law needs to be restricted. Analogous considerations apply in the
plural case. Fortunately, it is easy to see that (Indisc) is suitably restricted.
Since plural variables are purely referential just as much as singular ones
are (only in a plural way), (Indisc) is entirely legitimate. In particular, it
presupposes no prior answer to the question of the rigidity of pluralities and
can thus safely be employed in an argument for this rigidity thesis.
Second, is (Indisc) acceptable from a contingentist point of view? To
assess this issue, we need to be more explicit about what semantics we adopt.
It is natural to use an extension of the plurality-based semantics on which
‘x ≺ xx’ is true at a world w relative to an assignment ss if and only if the
objects assigned to ‘xx’ by ss exist at w and the object assigned to ‘x’ is one
of them. This semantics makes it natural to adopt a negative free logic.22
The inference rules for the quantifiers must then be formulated so as to
make existential assumptions explicit; for instance, from∀x φ(x)we can infer
Et → φ(t), and likewise for the plural universal quantifier. (We will shortly
havemore to say about the plural existence predicate.) Given these choices, it
is easy to verify that (Indisc) remains a valid principle even in a contingentist
setting.
We are ready to develop our argument for the rigidity of pluralities. The
next step is to derive from (Indisc), an analogue of the necessity of identity.
As in the set-theoretic case, we call this analogue covariation:
(Cov) 2∀xx∀yy(xx ≈ yy → 2(xx ≈ yy))
It asserts that, as matter of necessity, two coextensive pluralities are necessar-
ily coextensive. Given the Brouwerian axiom B, we can derive the necessity
of non-coextensiveness as well.
We now come to the heart of the argument. Recall the case of sets, where
Leibniz’s law and (Set-Ext) entail (Set-Cov). While (Set-Cov) is formally
compatible with the non-rigidity of sets, it is far more plausible with rigidity.
In particular, any reason to accept (Set-Ext) is also a reason to accept the
rigidity of sets. Precisely the same goes for pluralities. That is, (Indisc)
entails (Cov). While (Cov) is formally compatible with the non-rigidity of
pluralities, it is far more plausible with rigidity.23 In particular, any reason to
22 Notice that this enables us to drop the existential assumptions Ex and Eyy from (Rgd−) on
p. 205.
23 If a notion of plural identity is available (see footnote 21), the case of pluralities is perfectly
parallel to that of sets. For the plural analogue of Leibniz’s law and (Ext) entail (Cov).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/6/2021, SPi
218 plurals and modals
accept (Cov) is also a reason to accept the rigidity of plural membership. For
(Cov) holds because a plurality is nothing over and above its members, and
this insight about the nature of pluralities also ensures that there is nothing
other than the members in terms of which a plurality can be tracked.
We therefore face a dilemma, as in the case of sets. Either we have to
give up (Indisc), which implies (Cov), or else we have to accept plural
rigidity. In other words, either we need to give up the ordinary principle
of extensionality encapsulated in (Indisc), or else we have to accept the full
transworld extensionality associated with plural rigidity. Just as in the case of
sets, the former horn is deeply unattractive, as it comes close to just changing
the subject. So we conclude that plural rigidity holds.
It is worth noting that (Cov) is logically weaker than (Indisc). The
covariation principle gives us precisely what its name suggests, namely that
two overlapping pluralities necessarily covary. By contrast, (Indisc) states
that all properties of pluralities supervene on membership. To see that
the latter principle goes beyond the former, consider a department whose
statutes decree that all and only tenured faculty are to be members of the
Hiring Committee and of the Graduate Admissions Committee.2⁴ Then the
two committees necessarily covary in membership. Nevertheless, the two
committees have different powers, namely to hire new faculty and to admit
graduate students, respectively.
To be even more specific about the relation between (Indisc) and (Cov),
one can observe that the former “factorizes” into the latter and the claim
that the properties of a plurality supervene on what we may call its modal
membership profile:
(Sup) 2∀xx∀yy(2(xx ≈ yy) → (φ(xx) ↔ φ(yy)))
We see this as follows. Clearly, (Cov) and (Sup) entail (Indisc), which in
turn entails each of the former two principles.Moreover, (Cov) and (Sup) are
logically independent and encapsulate different philosophical ideas, namely
covariation inmembership and supervenience of properties onmodalmem-
bership profile, respectively. Amore comprehensive factorization of a cluster
of ideas associated with the extensionality of pluralities will be offered in
Section 10.10.
2⁴ We assume that the statutes are partially constitutive of the committees, in the sense that,
were one to change the statutes, the original committees would cease to exist and be replaced
by new ones. If necessary, this persistence condition for the committees can be written into the
statutes.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/6/2021, SPi
10.6 towards formal arguments for plural rigidity 219
We wish to end this section by briefly commenting on another argument
for plural rigidity based on the covariation principle (Cov). This argument,
due to Williamson (2013, 245–51), begins by unpacking the two bicondi-
tionals in (Cov) to obtain:
2∀xx∀yy(xx ≼ yy ∧ yy ≼ xx → 2xx ≼ yy ∧2yy ≼ xx)
Williamson then makes the following, interesting observation: xx ≼ yy gives
no support to yy ≼ xx, and yy ≼ xx gives no support to 2xx ≼ yy. Thus,
he contends, yy ≼ xx should imply 2yy ≼ xx, and xx ≼ yy should imply
2xx ≼ yy. Williamson therefore concludes that (Cov) “stands or falls” with
the following, inferentially stronger principle:
2∀xx∀yy(xx ≼ yy → 2xx ≼ yy)
It is hard not to agree.
We are now only a small step away from (Rgd+). All it takes to make this
step is a principle asserting the existence of singleton pluralities, namely:
(Single≺) 2∀x∃xx2∀y(y ≺ xx ↔ x = y)
As Williamson shows, this natural principle, combined with (10.5), entails
(Rgd+).
We find this argument rather convincing. However, we believe the argu-
ment developed above is more explanatory. This argument, we recall, is an
explication of the basic thought that a plurality is nothing over and above
its members. Since a plurality is nothing over and above its members, the
only basis for tracking it across different possible worlds is in terms of
these members. We thus obtain an explanation of why pluralities are tracked
rigidly, with the result that the rigidity principles are true.
10.6 Towards formal arguments for plural rigidity
We have developed an argument for plural rigidity. But, as it stands, the
argument is not formally valid. Starting from (Indisc), our best formal
result so far is (Cov), which states that coextensive pluralities are necessarily
coextensive. Rigidity, our target, states that a plurality has the samemembers
at any world at which it exists. We now investigate some ways to formally
bridge this gap.
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Since we are now aiming for formal rigor, the time has come to be entirely
precise about the existential assumptions involved in our arguments. This
requires a plural existence predicate that we can use to say of some things
xx that they exist. As we have seen, the existence of a single object x can be
expressed simply as x = x (sometimes written Ex). But what about the plural
existence predicate?
One may try to define plural existence distributively in terms of singular
existence; that is, to define Exx as ∀x(x ≺ xx → x = x). But this is unsuc-
cessful. For a contingentist, the initial quantifier ranges only over objects that
exist at the relevant world, which renders the quantified claim trivially true
for any plurality xx whatsoever. Another natural but unsuccessful idea is to
define Exx as xx ≈ xx in an attempt to imitate the definition of its singular
analogue Ex as x = x. This too is easily seen to trivialize, for exactly the same
reason as the previous attempt.
One safe option is simply to adopt a primitive collective plural existence
predicateExx, whichwe stipulate to be satisfied by some things at aworld just
in case all these things exist at the world. Another option is available as well,
given the axiom that every plurality is non-empty: ∀xx∃y(y ≺ xx). We can
then define Exx as ∃y(y ≺ xx). To confirm that this works, suppose that xx
don’t exist at some world w. The semantics we are assuming (p. 217) ensures
that Exx is false at w. Suppose instead that xx do exist at w. Then the axiom
ensures that Exx is true at w. We adopt this option, rather than the first, as it
is more economical.
Recall that we have assumed a negative free logic as our background for
contingentist reasoning. As we already noted, this requires some restrictions
on the axioms for the quantifiers.2⁵
Next, we adopt the following “being constraint”:
(BC) 2∀x∀yy2(x ≺ yy → Ex)
That is, necessarily, if x is one of yy, then x exists. Clearly, this is valid on our
semantics. Notice also that, given our definitions of the singular and plural
existence predicates, (BC) entails:
(10.6) 2(x ≺ yy → Ex ∧ Eyy)
2⁵ See Hughes and Cresswell 1996, Chapter 16, for a system of free logic in the context of
modal logic.
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Finally, we adopt an axiom stating that any plurality is ontologically
dependent on each of its members:
(Dep) 2∀x∀yy(x ≺ yy → 2(Eyy → Ex))
We contend that this axiom is plausible and observe that it is compatible
with x being one of yy at some worlds but not at others.2⁶ The axiom is
useful because it enables us to formulate (Rgd+) as we have done, rather
than adopt the following, more cautious formulation with an additional
existential presupposition Ex:
2∀x∀yy(x ≺ yy → 2(Ex ∧ Eyy → x ≺ yy))
Moreover, by means of (Dep) and (BC), we are able to formulate (Rgd−) as
we have done, rather than adopt the following, more guarded formulation:2⁷
2∀x∀yy(x ⊀ yy → 2(Ex ∧ Eyy → x ⊀ yy))
In the necessitist setting, of course, no existential presuppositions are needed.
With these preliminary questions clarified, we will now consider some
formal arguments for plural rigidity. Each argument will first be developed
from a necessitist point of view, as this is simpler. We will then use our
plural existence predicate to reformulate the argument so as to work in a
contingentist setting.
10.7 The argument from uniform adjunction
The first formal argument relies on an operation + of adjoining one object
to a plurality. It is reasonable to assume that, necessarily, to be one of these
things and that thing is to be one of these things or to be identical with that
thing. We call this principle uniform adjunction:
2⁶ As observed by Roberts (forthcoming), (Dep) does not entail the principle that a plurality
is ontologically dependent on each of its subpluralities:
2∀xx∀yy(xx ≼ yy → 2(Eyy → Exx))
While this principle is not needed in the present context, Roberts points out that it is useful
elsewhere.
2⁷ To verify this claim, observe first that2ψ and2(φ → ψ) are equivalent schemes of modal
propositional logic when 2(¬ψ → φ). Now let φ and ψ be Ex ∧ Eyy and x ⊀ yy, respectively.
Then 2(¬ψ → φ) is just (10.6), which was established above.
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(UniAdj) 2∀xx∀y2∀x(x ≺ xx + y ↔ x ≺ xx ∨ x = y)
where ‘xx + y’ figures as a complex plural term. We now argue as follows.
Assume y ≺ xx. Then, by (UniAdj), we have xx ≈ xx + y. So by applying
(Cov) to xx and xx + y, we obtain:
(10.7) 2(xx ≈ xx + y)
Next, we observe that (UniAdj) also entails
(10.8) 2(y ≺ xx + y)
From (10.7) and (10.8), some simple modal logic ensures our desired con-
clusion that 2(y ≺ xx).
Gabriel Uzquiano has raised a legitimate concern about the argument.2⁸
Recall that (10.7) is a consequence of Leibniz’s law and must be restricted
to purely referential terms. Is it permissible to assume that ‘xx + y’ is purely
referential? This can be disputed. Fortunately, we can sidestep the problem-
atic assumption by reformulating (UniAdj). The above argument proceeds
from the assumption that uniform adjunctions exist. We can express this
assumption as the closure of the following plural comprehension principle:
(UniAdj∗) 2∀xx∀y∃zz2∀u(u ≺ zz ↔ u ≺ xx ∨ u = y)
This principle is very weak. Indeed, it is something that even an opponent of
plural rigidity should assent to, as the principle retains its plausibility even
when the plural variables are allowed to range over groups.2⁹
We now give our improved and official version of the argument from
uniform adjunction. As before, assume y≺ xx. By (UniAdj∗), let zz be
the uniform adjunction of y to xx. From this point onward the argument
proceeds exactly as before, onlywith zz in the role previously played by xx+y.
(The argument is spelled out in detail in Appendix 10.B.) Notice that this
argument makes no appeal to (Indisc) other than its single instance, (Cov).
In this respect, the argument from uniform adjunction is like the argument
from Section 10.5. This establishes (Rgd+).
2⁸ For a mereological analogue of this concern, see Uzquiano 2014, 42.
2⁹ Here, as elsewhere, it is interesting to inquire whether an analogous argument can be given
in mereology, to the effect that parthood is rigid. We believe the answer is negative, but this isn’t
the place for a proper investigation.
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What does it take to obtain (Rgd−)? It turns out that, in the system S5, a
necessitated version of (Rgd+) entails (Rgd−). We prove this useful fact in
Appendix 10.B and invoke it repeatedly in what follows.
Finally, let us adapt the argument to a contingentist setting.Then, uniform
adjunction requires the following, more guarded formulation:
(UniAdj-c) 2∀xx∀y2(Exx ∧ Ey → ∀x(x ≺ xx + y ↔ x ≺ xx ∨ x = y))
Asbefore, this principle can be formulated in away that sidestepsworries one
may have about the complex term ‘xx+ y’, namely by means of the following
comprehension principle:
(UniAdj∗-c) 2∀xx∀y∃zz2(Exx ∧ Ey → ∀u(u ≺ yy ↔ u ≺ xx ∨ u = y))
Thankfully, it can be verified that (Rgd+) follows and that, using axiom B,
so does (Rgd−). In sum, we find the argument from uniform adjunction
convincing, both in a necessitist and in a contingentist setting. None of the
arguments we will proceed to consider does any better, or so we will argue.
10.8 The argument from partial rigidification
Another formal argument is proposed in Williamson 2010 (699–700). The
argument requires that, for any objects xx, there be some objects yy that are
a partial rigidification of xx in the sense that xx ≈ yy but it is impossible
for yy to lose any of their members. To be precise, we assume the following
plural comprehension axiom:
(PartRig) 2∀xx∃yy(xx ≈ yy ∧ ∀x(x ≺ yy → 2x ≺ yy))
We can now argue as follows. Assume y≺ xx. Let yy be the partial rigidifi-
cation of xx. Thus, we have 2(y≺ yy). By (Cov), we also have 2(xx ≈ yy).
The latter two claims entail 2(y ≺ xx), as desired. Using (Rgd+), we can, as
before, obtain (Rgd−).
Let us now try to develop the argument from a contingentist point of
view. As usual, the comprehension axiom needs to be formulated with
greater care:
(PartRig-c) 2∀xx∃yy(xx ≈ yy ∧ ∀x(x ≺ yy → 2(Eyy → x ≺ yy)))
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Assume y ≺ xx, and let yy be the partial rigidification of xx. Applying the
same strategy as in the case of necessitism, we derive 2(Eyy → z ≺ yy). By
(Cov), we also have 2(xx ≈ yy). This establishes 2(Eyy → z ≺ xx). The
final step to our desired target, namely 2(Exx → z ≺ xx), follows by using
(Cov) to show that the existence of xx necessitates the existence of yy. (The
argument is spelled out in detail in Appendix 10.B.)
How does Williamson’s argument compare with the argument from uni-
form adjunction? Let us begin by addressing the question in the necessitist
setting. Both arguments rely on a single instance of (Indisc), namely (Cov).
The arguments differ only with respect to the plural comprehension axioms
that they invoke. We are thus left with the task of comparing the two
comprehension axioms, namely (UniAdj∗) and (PartRig). A careful formal
investigation reveals that, against the background of (Cov) and S5, the two
axioms are equivalent with each other and also with the rigidity claim. An
analogous claim holds in the contingentist setting.3⁰ Thus, at least in the
context of S5, the choice between the argument from partial rigidification
and uniform adjunction is merely a matter of taste and which heuristics one
prefers.31
10.9 The argument from uniform traversability
The last formal argument for plural rigidity that we will consider is inspired
by an observation made by Ian Rumfitt (2005, 117–18). Like above, we first
give a simple version of the argument that is acceptable from a necessitist
point of view, and then consider how the argument can be adapted to suit
the contingentist.
A finite plurality can be traversed, in the sense that its members can
be exhaustively listed. Assume for instance that aa is the plurality whose
members are a, b, and c, and that these members have names ̄a, ̄b and ̄c,
respectively. Then aa can be traversed:
3⁰ Does this three-way equivalence mean that the arguments for rigidity are begging the
question? To think so would be to conflate deductive validity with begging the question. It is
particularly important to notice that any one member of the pairs of assumptions sufficient to
prove rigidity (i.e. (Cov) plus a comprehension axiom) is compatible with the failure of rigidity.
31 Linnebo 2016 claims that, in the contingentist setting, (PartRig-c) is less plausible than
(UniAdj∗-c). While this may be true when the axioms are considered in isolation, our present
point is that the axioms are equivalent modulo the mentioned assumptions. In the context of
weaker modal logics, the argument from uniform adjunction can be shown to require weaker
modal assumptions than the argument from partial rigidification.
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∀x(x ≺ aa ↔ x = ̄a ∨ x = ̄b ∨ x = ̄c)
In fact, this traversability is uniform, in the sense that it holds by necessity:32
2∀x(x ≺ aa ↔ x = ̄a ∨ x = ̄b ∨ x = ̄c)
What about infinite pluralities? A straightforward generalization is available
if we allow infinitary disjunctions and assume that every object a has a name
̄a:33
(UniTrav) 2∀x(x ≺ aa ↔ ⋁
a≺aa
x = ̄a)
Wenow argue as follows. Assume y ≺ aa.Thenwe can find a such that y = ̄a.
By the necessity of identity, we have 2(y = ̄a). This entails the necessitation
of⋁a≺aa y = ̄a. Some simple modal logic ensures our target 2(y ≺ aa). See
Appendix 10.B for details.
Let us now consider matters from a contingentist point of view. Equation
(UniTrav) must be reformulated so as to make all existential presupposi-
tions explicit. Given any objects aa, we can name all of its members and use
this to state that, provided aa still exist, to be one of aa is just to be identical
with one of the aforementioned members. In symbols:
(UniTrav-c) 2(Eaa → ∀x(x ≺ aa ↔ ⋁
a≺aa
x = ̄a))
As far as we can see, this modified principle is just as plausible, given
contingentism, as the original principle is, given necessitism. It is therefore
satisfying to be able to verify that the original argument for rigidity goes
through much as before.
We find the argument from uniform traversability less explanatory than
the previous two formal arguments for plural rigidity. One problem is the
lack of “conceptual distance” between the premise and the conclusion.
Uniform traversability is little more than an infinitary restatement of our
32 In fact, as Jeremy Goodman observed, if a singleton plurality is uniformly traversed by its
sole member, then Uniform Adjunction allows us to prove that any finite plurality is uniformly
traversed by its members.
33 Of course, the choice of names depends on the particular plurality aa. This means that
‘aa’, in the subscript to the disjunction sign, can only be understood as a plural constant, not a
variable.
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target claim that a plurality is fixed in its membership as we shift attention
from one possible world to another (see Hewitt 2012b, 860–2, for a similar
objection).3⁴ Moreover, this premise is needlessly strong—concerning both
what it says and how it says it.
The clearest way to appreciate the strength of uniform traversability is
by observing that it entails all the premises of the previous two arguments.
One of these premises is (Cov). This is entailed by uniform traversability,
as can be seen by a simple transitivity argument available in S5. Indeed,
uniform traversability entails plural rigidity, which in turn entails (Cov), as
observed at the end of Section 10.5. Moreover, it can be verified that uniform
traversability entails the comprehension axioms employed in the arguments
from uniform adjunction and partial rigidification.
Next, the infinitary resources employed by the argument from uniform
traversability are very strong. To see this, it is useful to separate these
resources from themodal claim that they are used to express.We can do so by
considering what we may call traversability, which is (UniTrav) without the
initial necessity operator. In fact, even this non-modal version of traversabil-
ity has some strong consequences. As we explain in Appendix 10.A, this
principle legitimizes what Paul Bernays (1935) calls “quasi-combinatorial”
reasoning, that is, reasoning about infinite totalities as if they were finite.
10.10 Pluralities as extensionally definite
We have surveyed various formal and informal arguments for plural rigidity.
It may be useful to summarize the most important principle that we have
discussed and their inferential relations to one another.
























3⁴ By contrast, as observed in footnote 30, the previous two argument both relied on two
assumptions—(Cov) and a comprehension principle—each one of which is compatible with
the failure of plural rigidity.
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Solid arrows represent one-way implications. Dotted arrows represent
non-deductive support, but can be transformed into implications by
adding suitable comprehension axioms, as discussed in Sections 10.7 and
10.8. Formal theses are in parentheses, as usual. Rigidity abbreviates
the conjunction of the rigidity claims (Rgd+) and (Rgd−), and, in a
contingentist setting, also the dependence claim (Dep).
A contingentist can use the same diagram, with two exceptions. First,
(UniTrav)must be replacedwith (UniTrav-c), whose left diagonal implica-
tion then only yields the two rigidity claims, not (Dep).3⁵ Second, Rigidity
entails only a restricted version of (Cov) (see p. 235).
Where does this leave us? We raised the question of whether plural
rigidity, just like the rigidity of identity, can be established from purely
logical premises. We have given at least a conditional answer. If (Indisc) and
the “suitable comprehension axioms” identified in Sections 10.7 and 10.8
count as purely logical, then so does plurality rigidity. But is the antecedent
true? As it stands, we find the notion of pure logic insufficiently clear to give
a definitive answer.
We find it more productive to recall the basic thought that has animated
much of our discussion in this chapter, namely that a plurality is nothing over
and above some circumscribed lot of objects. Every plurality thus exhibits
extensionality in its purest form. All we have are some objects, properly cir-
cumscribed. Pluralities are, as we will put it, extensionally definite. This basic
thought motivates some of our central principles, especially (Indisc) and
(UniTrav), which explicate different aspects of the extensional definiteness
of pluralities. The picture that emerges is thus that plural rigidity figures at
the heart of a tightly interwoven network of principles that all have to do
with the extensional definiteness of pluralities. These principles mutually
support each other. In particular, it would be difficult and unmotivated to
excise plural rigidity from this network. Plural rigidity is an integral part of
our analysis of pluralities as extensionally definite.
It is particularly interesting to examine the “second floor” of the above
diagram. For the principles that figure on this floor provide a factorization
of all the aspects of the extensional definiteness of pluralities that are repre-
sented in the diagram. To explain what we mean, let us begin by observing
that each principle on this floor represents a simple and natural idea.
3⁵ If desired, one can tweak (UniTrav-c) so as to ensure that (Dep) too follows, namely by
adding the following as a third (and perfectly sensible) conjunct: (Eaa ↔⋀a≺aa E ̄a).
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(a) The properties of any plurality supervene on its modal membership
profile, as expressed by (Sup).
(b) A plurality has a rigid membership profile: it has the very same
members at any possible world at which it exists.
(c) A plurality is traversable, thus ensuring the permissibility of quasi-
combinatorial reasoning applied to the plurality.
Next, we observe that the three factors entail each of the aspects of the
extensional definiteness of pluralities. It suffices to verify that the items on
the top floor of the diagram are entailed by those on the second. As observed
on p. 218, (Indisc) can be factorized into (Sup) and (Cov). And it can be
verified that (UniTrav) (or its contingentist cousin) factorizes into Rigidity
and Traversability.
What remains is to verify that the three factors are logically independent of
one another. To see that property supervenience, (Sup), does not follow from
the other two aspects of extensional definiteness, consider again the case of
committees. Imagine an oligarchic departmentwhere three senior academics
a, b, and c havewritten into the department statutes that they, and they alone,
are to be on theHiringCommittee and theGraduateAdmissionsCommittee.
Both committees have a rigidmembership profile and are clearly traversable.
Yet the two committees are not subject to property supervenience as different
powers of decision are vested in them.
Next, to show that a rigid membership profile does not follow from the
other two aspects, consider the case of properties, understood as objects that
are individuated by the necessary coextensionality of their defining concept
or condition, and tracked across possible worlds in terms of this concept or
condition. Thus understood, properties exemplify the second aspect of
extensional definiteness: all the characteristics of any given property are
shared by any necessarily coextensive property. However, a property can be
subject to contingent membership (or, perhaps better, contingent applica-
tion), including when its instances are traversable. And as we have seen, the
traversability of a domain ensures the traversability of any property on this
domain.
Finally, we observe that traversability is not a formal consequence of the
other two aspects of extensional definiteness. The principles that explicate
these other two aspects do not ensure the availability of the infinitary
resources needed for traversability. As Bernays observed, traversability
is based on an extrapolation from the finite into the infinite. How far
are we willing to extrapolate? The first two aspects of the extensional
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definiteness of pluralities do not, by themselves, provide any answer to
this question.
10.11 The status of plural comprehension
We wish to end the chapter with some remarks about the status of the plural
comprehension axioms. Many philosophers regard such axioms as utterly
trivial and insubstantial.3⁶ Provided that a condition is well defined and has
at least one instance, of course the condition can be used to define a plurality
of all and only its instances.
This view seems to us misguided. Indeed, we suspect the view is the
result of an excessive focus on ontology at the expense of other important
concerns. Because plural logic is thought to incur no ontological commit-
ments over and above those already incurred by the singular quantifiers,
the plural comprehension axioms are assumed to be ontologically innocent.
And because of the intense focus on ontology, one therefore concludes that
these axioms are trivial and insubstantial. One of the main upshots of this
chapter is that, irrespective of the question of ontological commitment,
plurals are governed by strong extensionality principles whose satisfaction
is a non-trivial matter. Since the plural comprehension axioms make claims
about possible assignments to the plural variables, which would accordingly
be governed by the non-trivial extensionality principles, these axioms too
should be regarded as non-trivial (see also Williamson 2016).
To elaborate, let us consider the three factors of the extensional definite-
ness of pluralities. First, it is not hard to see that traversability is a non-trivial
assumption. To say that plural comprehension is permissible on a condition
φ is to say that we may reason quasi-combinatorially about all the φs. A
number of disputes in the foundations of mathematics testify to the non-
triviality of this assumption.3⁷
Second, property supervenience too is a non-trivial matter. Consider the
following:
(10.9) TheHiringCommitteemet yesterday.They decided tomake an offer
to Sophia.
3⁶ In Section 2.5, we mentioned the claims that plural comprehension axioms as “genuine
logical truths” found in Boolos 1985b (342) and Hossack 2000 (422).
3⁷ See Feferman 2005 for a survey of debates concerning the legitimacy of impredicative
reasoning in mathematics.
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Is it permissible to apply the rule of plural existential generalization to ‘they’?
The answer must be ‘no’. Generalizing in this way would ascribe the property
of making a job offer to the members of the committee considered as a mere
plurality, where in reality the property can only be ascribed to the committee
as such. It is only the committee, not the plurality of its members, that has
the power to make job offers. Indeed, the property ascribed in the second
sentence of (10.9) fails to supervene on the modal membership profile.
As our earlier examples show, two committees can share the same modal
membership profile while differing in the powers that are vested in them.3⁸
The final factor of the extensionality of pluralities is their rigid mem-
bership profile. This rules out, for example, the existence of a plurality
of all actual and merely possible objects, that is, a plurality aa such that
2∀x(x ≺ aa ↔ x = x). For such a plurality would vary in membership
from world to world. (See Linnebo 2010.)
Summing up, we have argued that pluralities are rigid and that this is
in fact just one of several extensionality principles that govern pluralities.
These principles explicate our basic thought that pluralities are extensionally
definite. Although the principles can be split into three independent factors
(of which plural rigidity is one), they go naturally together as a package. Since
the extensionality principles are non-trivial, so are the plural comprehension
axioms, which assert the existence of pluralities governed by these principles.
This non-triviality plays an essential role in our development of a critical
plural logic in Chapter 12, which restricts the plural comprehension scheme.
3⁸ Our example from p. 218 of the Hiring Committee and the Graduate Admissions Com-
mittee will do.
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Appendices
10.A Traversability and quasi-combinatorial reasoning
We claimed in Section 10.9 that the non-modal traversability principle
(UniTrav) licences what Bernays (1935) calls “quasi-combinatorial” reason-
ing, that is, reasoning with infinite totalities as if they were finite. Let us now
spell out and defend this claim.
First, we claim that (UniTrav) ensures the permissibility of impredicative
plural separation axioms of the following form:
(10.10) ∃x(φ(x) ∧ x ≺ xx) → ∃yy∀u(u ≺ yy ↔ φ(u) ∧ u ≺ xx)
That is, given any xx that include a φ, there are some objects that are all of
the φs among xx. We show this as follows. We begin by finding a bunch
of names ̄a that provide a traversal of xx. We would like another bunch of
names ̄b that provide a traversal of just those members of xx that satisfy φ.
This is easily achieved by going through the former bunch, deleting every
item that names a non-φ. The resulting sub-traversal yields a quantifier
free—and thus fully predicative—definition of the desired sub-plurality of
xx.The upshot is that traversability functions like an axiom of reducibility, in
Russell and Whitehead’s famous sense, that is, as an axiom stating that every
higher-order entity has a predicative definition. The reducibility afforded by
(UniTrav) becomes particularly far-reaching if there is an all-encompassing
or universal plurality, as is standardly assumed. We would then obtain a
justification for the full impredicative comprehension scheme.
Second, when we work in the context of an intuitionistic theory,
traversability ensures that quantification restricted to any plurality behaves
classically. Assume that a formula ψ(x)—which may have further free
variables—is decidable on any given argument:
∀x(ψ(x) ∨ ¬ψ(x))
In effect, this means that the property defined by ψ(x) behaves classically
on any given argument. Then tranversability ensures that quantification
restricted to xx behaves classically as well, in the precise sense that we have
the following decidability property:
(∀x ≺ xx)ψ(x) ∨ (∃x ≺ xx)¬ψ(x)
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To see this, observe that by traversability this restricted quantification
reduces to a conjunction of its instances, each of which has been assumed to
behave classically.
10.B Proofs
We now provide proof sketches of various arguments referred to in
Chapter 10. We work within modal extensions of first-order logic (FOL) and
of PFO. Sentential and quantificational reasoning will apply to expressions
in the extended language. When dealing with arguments in a contingentist
setting, we rely on a standard negative free logic.Thismeans that the rules for
singular and plural quantifiers are restricted so as to ensure that quantifiers
range over existing objects or pluralities. For instance, from ∀xφ(x) we can
infer Ey → φ(y). Similarly, we can infer ∃xφ(x) from Ey∧φ(y), but not from
φ(y) alone. Moreover, there are rules guaranteeing that atomic predications
are false if at least one of the terms involved is empty.
Thenecessity of identity and distinctness. Both arguments rely on Lebniz’s
law. We develop them in a necessitist setting.
(1) x = x FOL
(2) 2(x = x) 1, Necessitation
(3) 2∀x2(x = x) 2, FOL, Necessitation
(4) 2∀x∀y(x = y → (2(x = x) ↔ 2(x = y))) Leibniz
(5) 2∀x∀y(x = y → 2(x = y)) 3, 4, K, FOL
The argument for the necessity of distinctness appeals to the Brouwerian
axiom:
φ → 23φ
The argument goes as follows:
(0) 2∀x∀y(x = y → 2(x = y)) as shown in the previous proof
(1) x = y → 2(x = y) 0, T, FOL
(2) ¬2(x = y) → x ≠ y 1, FOL
(3) 2(¬2(x = y) → x ≠ y) 2, Necessitation
(4) 2¬2(x = y) → 2(x ≠ y) 3, K
(5) 23(x ≠ y) → 2(x ≠ y) 4, Definition of 3
(6) x ≠ y → 2(x ≠ y) 5, B
(7) 2∀x∀y(x ≠ y → 2(x ≠ y)) 6, FOL, Necessitation
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The proofs of the necessity of identity and distinctness in the contingentist
setting are simple adaptations of the proofs just given. ⊣
Necessary set covariation. We observed in Section 10.4 that the set-
theoretic principle of extensionality (Set-Ext) implies that two coextensive
sets are necessarily coextensive:
(Set-Cov) ∀x∀y(∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ y) → 2∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ y))
The proof is similar to that of the necessity of identity:
(1) ∀x∀y(∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ y) ↔ x = y) (Set-Ext)
(2) ∀x∀y(x = y → (2∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ x) ↔
2∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ y)))
Leibniz
(3) ∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ x) FOL
(4) 2∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ x) 3, Necessitation
(5) ∀x∀y(∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ y) → 2∀u(u ∈ x ↔ u ∈ y)) 1, 2, 4, FOL
Note that this reasoning is available to necessitists and contingentists alike.
The necessitation of (Set-Cov) can be easily obtained from the necessitation
of (Set-Ext). ⊣
The remaining proofs concern modal properties of pluralities. Thus we
work in a modal extension of PFO. Because of the complexity of the rea-
soning involved, a fully formal presentation of some arguments will not be
particularly illuminating. In those cases, we prefer to reason informally about
the system rather than formally within the system. All the argumentative
strategies employed are meant to be essentially available, mutatis mutandis,
to both necessitists and contingentists.
Necessary plural covariation. First, we show that (Indisc) entails that two
coextensive pluralities are necessarily coextensive:
(Cov) 2∀xx∀yy(xx ≈ yy → 2(xx ≈ yy))
(1) 2∀xx∀yy(xx ≈ yy → (2(xx ≈ xx) ↔
2(xx ≈ yy))
(Indisc)
(2) xx ≈ xx PFO
(3) 2(xx ≈ xx) 2, Necessitation
(4) 2∀xx2(xx ≈ xx) 3, PFO, Necessitation
(5) 2∀xx∀yy(xx ≈ yy → 2(xx ≈ yy)) 1, 3, PFO
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There is a perfect analogy with the case of identity. In the presence of axiom
B, (Indisc) also entails that two distinct pluralities are necessarily distinct:
(Cov−) 2∀xx∀yy(xx ≉ yy → 2(xx ≉ yy))
⊣
The Barcan formula for bounded quantifiers. In the context of S5, a
restricted version of the Barcan formula is derivable:
(BFR) ∀xx(∀x(x ≺ xx → 2φ(x)) → 2∀x(x ≺ xx → φ(x))
Here is the contingentist argument for it (the necessitist argument can
be easily read off from it). Let xx be an existing plurality. Assume
∀x(x≺ xx→2φ(x)). We conjoin Exx and apply B to the resulting
conjunction to obtain a claim that will be used shortly:
(∗) 23(Exx ∧ ∀x(x ≺ xx → 2φ(x)))
Assume for reductio that the consequent of (BFR) is false, that is,
3∃x(x≺ xx∧¬φ(x)). By the necessitation of (Rgd+) and S4, we can add a
conjunct to this formula so as to obtain:
3∃x(x ≺ xx ∧ ¬φ(x) ∧2(Exx → x ≺ xx))
We now use (∗) to add a conjunct, namely the result of removing the
outermost 2 from (∗). This yields:
3∃x(x ≺ xx ∧ ¬φ(x) ∧2(Exx → x ≺ xx) ∧3(Exx ∧ ∀x(x ≺ xx → 2φ(x)))
A bit of modal logic on the last two conjuncts of this formula yields:
3∃x(x ≺ xx ∧ ¬φ(x) ∧32φ(x))
Reasoning in S5, we can derive the possible existence of some xwhich is both
φ and ¬φ. We turn this possible contradiction into an actual contradiction.
So we deny that there could be something among xx that is ¬φ and conclude
2∀x(x ≺ xx → φ(x)), which completes our proof. Since the proof relies on
no extra-logical assumption, (BFR) may be necessitated. ⊣
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Plural rigidity entails a restricted version of (Cov). The proof appeals
to (BFR). Let xx and yy be two pluralities and suppose that rigidity holds.
Assume xx ≈ yy. We want to show2(xx ≈ yy). By the assumption, if x ≺ xx,
then x ≺ yy. It follows from (Rgd+) that 2(Eyy → x ≺ yy); in the case of
necessitism, the antecedent can be dropped. Thus, in the case of necessitism,
we have:
∀x(x ≺ xx → 2(x ≺ yy))
By (BFR), we obtain:
2∀x(x ≺ xx → x ≺ yy)
By symmetrical reasoning, we obtain:
2∀x(x ≺ yy → x ≺ xx)
The last two displayed formulas entail our target claim: 2(xx ≈ yy). In
the case of contingentism, parallel reasoning can be carried out, though
contingent on the continued existence of the pluralities in question, thus
yielding a restricted version of the target claim:2(Exx ∧ Eyy → xx ≈ yy). ⊣
(Rgd−) from (Rgd+). In the presence of axiom B, a necessitated version of
(Rgd+) entails (Rgd−). Assume
(2Rgd+) 22∀x∀yy(x ≺ yy → 2(x ≺ yy))
Suppose for reductio that (Rgd−) is false, that is:
3∃x∃yy(x ⊀ yy ∧ 3(x ≺ yy))
The two displayed formulas entail:
3∃x∃yy(x ⊀ yy ∧ 3(x ≺ yy ∧ 2(x ≺ yy)))
By B, we can add a third conjunct:
3∃x∃yy(x ⊀ yy ∧ 3(x ≺ yy ∧ 2(x ≺ yy)) ∧ 23(x ⊀ yy))
A bit of modal reasoning yields:
3∃x∃yy33(x ≺ yy ∧ x ⊀ yy)
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That is,
¬2∀x∀yy22¬(x ≺ yy ∧ x ⊀ yy)
But this is inconsistent in K. From this reductio, we conclude that (Rgd−)
holds. Note that, since axiom 4 enables us to necessitate (Rgd+), we have
also shown that (Rgd−) follows from (Rgd+) in S5. ⊣
A central concern in Chapter 10 was to provide formal arguments in
support of plural rigidity. We focused on three principles that can yield
such arguments: uniform adjunction, partial rigidification, and uniform
traversability.
2∀xx∀z∃yy2∀u(u ≺ yy ↔ u ≺ xx ∨ u = z)(UniAdj∗)
2∀xx∃yy(xx ≈ yy ∧ ∀x(x ≺ yy → 2x ≺ yy))(PartRig)
2∀x(x ≺ xx ↔ ⋁
a≺xx
x = ̄a)(UniTrav)
We now prove the various claims made in the main text.
(UniAdj∗) entails (Rgd). The proof relies on axiom B. We first derive
(Rgd+). Assume that z ≺ xx. It follows from (UniAdj∗) and axiom T that
are yy such that:
∀u(u ≺ yy ↔ u ≺ xx ∨ u = z) ∧ 2∀u(u ≺ yy ↔ u ≺ xx ∨ u = z)
An obvious consequence of this fact is that 2(z ≺ yy). Since z ≺ xx, so we
also have that xx ≈ yy. By (Cov),2(xx ≈ yy). But2(z ≺ yy) and2(xx ≈ yy)
entail that 2(z ≺ xx). Thus:
z ≺ xx → 2(z ≺ xx)
The variables are arbitrary and the reasoning relies only on a necessary non-
logical premise, so we conclude:
2∀z∀xx(z ≺ xx → 2(z ≺ xx))
The other component of the rigidity claim, (Rgd−), can be proved similarly
by appealing to (Cov−), which was proved to follow from (Indisc) and B.
Alternatively, we can obtain (Rgd−) from (Rgd+) in S5, as shown above. ⊣
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(PartRig) entails (Rgd). The axioms of S5 are used. Assume that z ≺ xx.
By (PartRig) and T, there are yy such that:
xx ≈ yy ∧ ∀x(x ≺ yy → 2x ≺ yy)
So 2(z ≺ yy). By (Cov), 2(xx ≈ yy). Therefore, 2(z ≺ xx). So we have
shown that:
∀z∀xx(z ≺ xx → 2(z ≺ xx))
The modal status of (PartRig) guarantees that this holds of necessity. We
can then derive (Rgd−) from (Rgd+) in S5. ⊣
So far we have two arguments for plural rigidity. The first relies on
(UniAdj∗) and makes use of axiom B. The second relies on (PartRig) and
can be carried out in S5. We claimed that, against the background of (Cov)
and S5, the following three statements are equivalent: (UniAdj∗), (PartRig),
and (Rgd). An analogous claim holds in the contingentist setting. We have
already proved that each of the former statements entails the third. So it
suffices to establish the two converse entailments.
(Rgd) entails (UniAdj∗). Let xx and z be arbitrary. By plural comprehen-
sion, there are yy such that:
(†) ∀u(u ≺ yy ↔ u ≺ xx ∨ u = z)
Wewant to show that this generalization holds by necessity. Let us first prove
that the left-to-right direction of (†) holds by necessity. Suppose that u ≺ yy.
Then either u ≺ xx or u = z. If u ≺ xx, then (Rgd) implies 2(u ≺ xx) and
thus2(u ≺ xx∨u = z). If u = z, then2(u = z) and thus2(u ≺ xx∨u = z).
So, in either case,2(u ≺ xx∨u = z). Since u is arbitrary, we have established
that:
∀u(u ≺ yy → 2(u ≺ xx ∨ u = z))
By (BFR), we obtain:
(∗) 2∀u(u ≺ yy → u ≺ xx ∨ u = z)
Now we prove the necessity of the other direction. We proceed by reductio
and suppose the opposite, which can be written as:
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3∃u((u ≺ xx ∨ u = z) ∧ u ⊀ yy)
A bit of logical manipulation yields the following disjunction:
3∃u(u ≺ xx ∧ u ⊀ yy) ∨ 3∃u(u = z ∧ u ⊀ yy)
But each disjunct leads to contradiction. Consider the first disjunct. By the
converse of (BFR), that is:
3∃u(u ≺ xx ∧ φ(u)) → ∃u(u ≺ xx ∧3φ(u))
we obtain:
∃u(u ≺ xx ∧ 3(u ⊀ yy))
But given how yy were introduced, if u ≺ xx, then u ≺ yy. By (Rgd),
2(u ≺ yy), which contradicts3(u ⊀ yy). Now consider the second disjunct.
It entails that3(z ⊀ yy). But this contradicts2(z ≺ yy), which follows from
z ≺ yy by (Rgd). We conclude from the reductio that:
(∗∗) 2∀u(u ≺ xx ∨ u = z → u ≺ yy)
Our target claim, (UniAdj∗), is an immediate consequence of the conjunc-
tion of (∗) and (∗∗). ⊣
(Rgd) entails (PartRig). This is straightforward and requires no special
modal assumption.
(1) 2∀xx∀x(x ≺ xx → 2(x ≺ xx)) (Rgd)
(2) 2∀xx(xx ≈ xx ∧ ∀x(x ≺ xx → 2(x ≺ xx))) 1, PFO, K
(3) 2∀xx∃yy(xx ≈ yy ∧ ∀x(x ≺ yy → 2(x ≺ yy))) 2, PFO, K ⊣
The last formal argument for plural rigidity considered inChapter 10 relies
on the principle of uniform traversability:
2∀x(x ≺ xx ↔ ⋁
a≺xx
x = ̄a)(UniTrav)
The formulation of this principle (and of the resulting argument) requires an
infinitary extension of PFO.
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(UniTrav) entails each instance of (Rgd). Let xx be any plurality. By
(UniTrav), we can find a traversal:
(∗) 2∀x(x ≺ xx ↔ ⋁
a≺xx
x = ̄a)
By T and Universal Instantiation, we obtain z ≺ xx ↔ ⋁a≺xx z = ̄a. Now,
the necessity of identity entails ⋁a≺xx z = ̄a → ⋁a≺xx 2(z = ̄a). And basic
modal logic ensures ⋁a≺xx 2(z = ̄a) → 2⋁a≺xx z = ̄a. Combining the
three preceding formulas, we obtain:
z ≺ xx → 2⋁
a≺xx
z = ̄a
From this and (∗) we derive:
z ≺ xx → 2(z ≺ xx)
Since z is arbitrary, we can universally generalize to establish our desired
conclusion:3⁹
∀x(x ≺ xx → 2(x ≺ xx))
The modal profile of (∗) ensures that this conclusion holds of necessity. ⊣
3⁹ Can we proceed to universally generalize on ‘xx’ as well? In fact, this move is unavailable
because (UniTrav) is a axiom scheme, which for each xx states that there is a traversal, but which
provides no uniform way of specifying such a traversal.
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Absolute Generality and Singularization
11.1 Absolute generality
Is it possible to assert something of absolutely everything there is? It certainly
seems so; consider for instance the following assertions:
(11.1) Everything is physical.
(11.2) The empty set has no elements.
The truth of these assertions, it seems, rules out the existence of absolutely
any ghost or element of the empty set. Any ghost or element of the empty
set, no matter how remote or unfamiliar, is incompatible with what has been
asserted. Let absolute generality be the view that it is possible to quantify over
absolutely everything there is.
Plausible though it appears, absolute generality faces some challenges. We
begin by laying out what we take to be the most interesting and powerful
one. We do this in some detail, as it will be important to understand exactly
which options we have for responding.We then argue, followingWilliamson
(2003), that the rejection of absolute generality faces serious expressibility
problems. Next, we examine Williamson’s defense of absolute generality,
which gives up the thesis that there are universal devices of singulariza-
tion. We show how this proposal leads to an ascent to languages of ever
higher orders and argue that the resulting outlook suffers from expressibility
problems that are very similar to those that Williamson sought to avoid.1
Motivated by this, we explore an alternative approach to the challenge, which
allows a form of absolute generality but denies that the associated domain
is extensionally definite (that is, properly circumscribed), and on this basis
denies that the domain is an all-encompassing plurality of objects.
Absolute generality has emerged as one of the central themes in the
book, figuring as an essential premise in several arguments in the preceding
1 Here we draw on arguments from Linnebo 2006 and Linnebo and Rayo 2012.
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo,
Oxford University Press. © Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo 2021.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198791522.003.0011
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chapters. For instance, absolute generality was crucial to themore promising
attempts to refute regimentation singularism. Moreover, it was invoked
in the comparisons between alternative ways to talk about the many; for
example, it emerged as an obstacle to the elimination of pluralities in favor
of sets and to the mereological analysis of plurals. Furthermore, absolute
generality was proposed as a constraint in the choice of a model theory
for plural logic, a constraint that would rule out any form of semantic
singularism cashed out in first-order terms. In order to reach a verdict on
all these arguments, we need to resolve the question of absolute generality.
11.2 A challenge to absolute generality
Let us now formulate a challenge to absolute generality. The challenge
is based on the plural version of Cantor’s theorem that we presented in
Section 3.5.
Plural Cantor
For any plurality xx with two or more members, the subpluralities of xx
are strictly more numerous than the members of xx.
In particular, consider the universal plurality, that is, the plurality of every
object there is. On the uncontroversial assumption that there are two ormore
objects, the corresponding instance of Plural Cantor can be formulated as
follows:
Plural Profusion
There are more pluralities than objects.
This means that there can be no injective mapping of pluralities into objects.
The problem is that this technical result clashes with a wide range of
views in metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, and semantics. To get
the problem in focus, consider first all the stars in the universe, ss. There
appear to be many examples of injective mappings from subpluralities of
ss into objects. Consider the operator ‘the set of ’. According to its typical
usage, this operator defines an injective mapping from subpluralities of ss
to objects. If xx and yy are distinct, so are their object-level correlates, that is,
the set of xx and the set of yy. (For a detailed discussion see Linnebo 2010.)
Metaphysics provides other important examples. An interesting case is that
of propositions or facts (see McGee and Rayo 2000). It is widely assumed
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that if xx and yy are distinct, then the propositions or facts expressed by ‘xx
exist’ and ‘yy exist’ are also distinct. Thus, the functional expressions ‘the
proposition that . . . exist’ and ‘the fact that . . . exist’ define injectivemappings
from subpluralities of ss to objects. However, if these functional expressions
were applicable not just to subpluralities of ss but to all pluralities, we would
run into trouble. Suppose that, for any things xx whatsoever, there is the set
of xx (or the proposition that xx exist, or the corresponding fact). Then we
would have an injective mapping from pluralities to objects—in violation of
Plural Profusion.
Let a singularization be an injective mapping from the subpluralities
of some objects xx into objects.2 The plural version of Cantor’s theorem
constrains what singularizations are possible. For the theorem says that,
provided that xx have two or more members, there can be no injective
mapping of the subpluralities of xx into these very objects. That is, if there is a
singularization of all the subpluralities of xx, then the values of the subplural-
ities under this singularization cannot all be among xx but must “overflow”
this plurality. Of course, in some of the examples mentioned above, this is
precisely what one would expect. No one expected a set of stars to be itself
a star, and likewise for facts, properties, and propositions concerned with
stars. The problem arises when this overflowing is impossible, as in the case
of the universal plurality. This implies that there can be no singularization
of its subpluralities. Any such singularization would have to overflow the
universal plurality, which by its assumed universality is impossible.
This is a puzzling result. In our first example, it seemed completely
incidental that we considered the subpluralities of all the stars, as opposed
to the subpluralities of some other lot of objects. It is not as if stars are
more amenable to figuring as elements of sets than any other objects, or, for
that matter, to be involved in propositions, facts, or properties. One might
therefore have thought that these are universal singularizations, in the sense
that they are available for any plurality whatsoever.3 Plural Profusion seems
to show, in one fell swoop, that none of the mentioned singularizations, nor
any other, can be universal: there simply aren’t enough objects to enable a
singularization of absolutely all pluralities.
2 As before, this talk of mappings can either be taken as primitive or be understood as
shorthand for claims that officially talk merely about pluralities of ordered pairs (see Appendix
3.A). For ease of communication, we will mostly indulge in talk about mappings, which could
always be translated into talk about pluralities of pairs.
3 This is also a consequence of the liberal view of definitions canvassed in Section 4.4 and
developed in more detail below.
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A common reaction in the literature has been to take this result at face
value as a surprising limit on what singularizations there can be.⁴ This
reaction is not without problems, however. Singularization seems to play
an important role in natural language and in a wide range of theoretical
contexts, from mathematics to semantics. What are we to say about all these
apparent singularizations? Since it is not an option to reject singularizations
altogether, the most promising response is to find a way to restrict their
availability. We can allow these singularizations to be undefined on certain
pluralities or lift the requirement that the associated mappings always be
injective. However, this “compromising” response faces a threat of arbitrari-
ness. Restricting the scope of a device of singularization raises the question
of whether the restriction is adequately motivated.
We have ended up in an awkward position. Plural Cantor seems to show
that there can be no universal singularization, and as we have just seen,
this threatens to introduce some arbitrary and unmotivated restriction on
what singularizations there can be. Let us therefore reexamine the argument.
Might there be some way to reconcile Plural Cantor with the availability of
universal singularization? Given Plural Cantor, we know that any singular-
ization of the subpluralities of some things would have to overflow these
things. So a reconciliation would have to find a way to permit this kind of
overflow without exception. There have been two attempts to permit this.
The better known strategy is generality relativism, which denies that abso-
lute generality is possible.This view entails that no plurality is universal in an
absolute sense. The most we can ever have is a relative kind of universality,
which can always be surpassed. Although a plurality xx may be univer-
sal with respect to our current interpretation of the quantifiers—that is,
∀x(x ≺ xx)—it is possible to find an extended interpretation with respect
to which xx is no longer universal—that is, ∃+x¬(x ≺ xx) (where the ∃+
indicates that the quantifier is taken in this extended sense). This yields an
operation that extends any given interpretation I to a strictly more inclusive
interpretation I+. On the resulting view, any plurality—including one that is
universal with respect to our current interpretation of the quantifiers—can
be surpassed once we adopt a more inclusive interpretation of the quanti-
fiers. Clearly, this view makes the world safe for singularization. Since no
⁴ See, e.g.,McGee andRayo 2000, Rayo 2002, andUzquiano 2015a.Note also that this attitude
towards singularization is implicit in much of the philosophical literature on plural logic. An
analogous point is true with respect to the parallel case of nominalization and higher-order
logic.
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plurality is universal in an absolute sense, there is no obstacle to unrestricted
singularization. Provided that singularization leads to an expansion of the
interpretation of the quantifiers, we can safely accept its effect of always
surpassing any plurality with which we begin.
11.3 A trilemma
There is another strategy for blocking the argument against universal singu-
larizations, namely to restrict the axiom scheme of plural comprehension.
This strategy has no truck with generality relativism and accepts that an
absolute interpretation of the quantifiers is possible. Nor does the strategy
have any quarrel with Plural Cantor: it is perfectly true, for any plurality xx
with two or more members, that the subpluralities of xx are strictly more
numerous than the members of xx. Rather, unlike the generality relativist,
who seeks to retain traditional plural logic, the strategy in question chal-
lenges our naive assumptions concerning what pluralities there are. After all,
in the argument above, trouble arose only when we assumed that there is a
universal plurality, which enabled us to derive the problematic instance of
Plural Cantor, namely Plural Profusion. (Of course, we would get the same
effect from any other plurality that is too large to allow of singularization,
as its correspondingly small complement cannot accommodate the overflow
that would result.)
Needless to say, the big challenge for this strategy is to explain why there
are no pluralities that are so large that they cannot be singularized. The
existence of such pluralities is underwritten by the unrestricted plural com-
prehension scheme of traditional plural logic. Any rejection of the currently
accepted version of plural logic will of course have to be well motivated.
Attempts to provide such a motivation have in fact been made, targeting
the unrestricted plural comprehension scheme in particular. A promising
idea derives from the thought that domains of quantifications might be
extensionally indefinite, or not properly circumscribed, while every plurality
is extensionally definite. The idea is nicely summarized in the following
passage by Stephen Yablo:
The condition ϕ(u) that (I say) fails to define a plurality can be a perfectly
determinate one; for any object x, it is a determinate question whether x
satisfiesϕ(u) or not.How then can it fail to be a determinatematterwhat are
all the things that satisfy ϕ(u)? I see only one answer to this. Determinacy
of the ϕ’s follows from
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(i) determinacy of ϕ(u) in connection with particular candidates,
(ii) determinacy of the pool of candidates.
If the difficulty is not with (i), it must be with (ii). (Yablo 2006: 151–2; some
notation and terminology has been modified)
Perhaps the price of absolute generality is that the range of our quantifiers
becomes extensionally indefinite (or “indeterminate”, as Yablo might put it).
Since pluralities are extensionally definite, however, this would give us a
reason to restrict plural comprehension so as to reject the universal plurality.
Of course, the main challenge for this approach will be to articulate the
notion of extensional definiteness and show that it has the right properties.
This task was begun in the previous chapter and will be completed in next.
Let us take stock. Assume that absolute generality is possible and there
is a plurality that is universal in this absolute sense. Then Plural Profusion
entails that there cannot be a universal singularization. For if therewere, such
a singularization would yield an injective mapping from subpluralities of
the universal plurality to objects, contradicting Plural Profusion. Moreover,
since this argument can be given with the quantifiers interpreted absolutely,
which is assumed to be possible, it is not an option to object that the
argument equivocates by expanding the interpretation of the quantifiers
somewhere along the way. So we have a trilemma. We must accept one of
the following three horns.
First horn
Universal singularizations are impossible.
Second horn
It is impossible to quantify over absolutely everything.
Third horn
There is no plurality that is universal or all-encompassing.
The trilemma confronts us with a difficult theoretical choice.⁵ As we have
seen, there are several examples of devices of singularization in natural
⁵ Might a fourth option be possible, namely to challenge Plural Cantor? Since this is a
mathematical theorem, it can be no more controversial than the assumptions on which it rests.
The only point of attack seems to be the impredicative plural comprehension axiom that is
involved in some versions of the theorem. We don’t find this challenge at all promising, for
two reasons. First, some versions of the theorem require only predicative comprehension, as we
saw in Appendix 3.A. Second, even for the versions that require impredicative comprehension
the requisite impredicative plural comprehension was defended in Appendix 10.A.
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language and some of them appear to be fully general. Next, there is a
wealth of examples of assertions that seem to be about absolutely everything.
Finally, the existence of a universal plurality is underpinned by the principle
of plural comprehension enshrined in the traditional version of plural logic
and thus appears to stand on solid ground. How should the trilemma be
resolved? In what follows, we shall assess each of its three horns.
11.4 Relativism and inexpressibility
It turns out that the rejection of absolute generality is fraughtwith difficulties.
Let us mention three problems. One is simply that absolute generality very
much appears to be possible, for instance whenwe truly assert that the empty
set has absolutely no elements. It would take a very good reason to go against
such a robust appearance. A second problem is that absolute generality is
needed in order to express various general views that we find interesting,
such as the physicalist claim that absolutely everything is physical. To dis-
allow the expression of these views would be to disallow a lot of potentially
fruitful theorizing. As Williamson remarks, “[i]f the unexamined life is not
worth living, the credentials of a life without absolutely general thought are
shaky” (2003, 452). We take this to be a very serious complaint.
The most intriguing argument against generality relativism, however, is
that the view cannot coherently be expressed. David Lewis states the point
with characteristic verve:
Maybe the singularist replies that some mystical censor stops us from
quantifying over absolutely everything without restriction. Lo, he violates
his own stricture in the very act of proclaiming it! (Lewis 1991, 68)
Someunpackingmayhelp. Consider the claim thatmy current language does
not quantify over absolutely everything. This entails that there is something
over which my quantifiers do not range. But this is incoherent, as I am now
using a quantifier to assert the existence of something not in the range of my
quantifiers.
A relativist might attempt to do better by expressing her view as a claim
about interpretations, namely that for every interpretation of our quantifiers,
there is a more expansive interpretation. We use subscripts to indicate the
interpretation given to the quantifiers. Let I ⊂ J abbreviate ∃Jx∀Iy(x ≠ y).
One may then attempt to express relativism as follows:
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(11.3) ∀I∃J(I ⊂ J)
Promising though it may be, the attempt fails, as shown by the following
dilemma. Assume first that the quantifiers ‘∀I’ and ‘∃J’ in (11.3) range over
absolutely all interpretations. Then (11.3) expresses what it is meant to
express. But in so expressing it, one is violating the view expressed. For just as
there are arguments that it is impossible to quantify over all ordinal numbers
or all sets (see Florio 2014b, Section 3.1), there are analogous arguments
concerning quantification over interpretations. Alternatively, assume that
the quantifiers in (11.3) do not range over absolutely all interpretations.⁶
Thus understood, (11.3) is compatible with the view it is meant to express.
The problem is now that (11.3) fails to express the view properly. All that is
expressed is that every interpretation in some limited range of interpretations
can be extended. But this is compatible with there being a maximal interpre-
tation outside of this limited range.
The standard response by generality relativists, advocated for instance in
Glanzberg 2004 and Parsons 2006, is to invoke schematic generality.This idea
traces back to Russell’s use of free variables to achieve a form of generality
that goes beyond that afforded by the quantifiers.i
For our purposes [the distinction between ‘all’ and ‘any’] has a different
utility, which is very great. In the case of such variables as propositions or
properties, ‘any value’ is legitimate, though ‘all values’ is not. Thus we may
say: ‘p is true or false, where p is any proposition’, though we can not say ‘all
propositions are true or false’. (Russell 1908, 229–30)
In effect, we use free variables to achieve a version of absolutely general
universal quantification. Consider an operation which, when applied to
any interpretation I yields an extended interpretation I+; an example is the
operation described in Section 11.2. Using free variables, relativism can now
be expressed schematically as follows:
(11.4) I ⊂ I+
The use of schematic generality is severely limited, however. Schematic
statements cannot be negated and cannot be freely combined in other
truth-functional ways. Consider for instance the negation of (11.4) and
⁶ See, for instance, the relativist argument developed (as a foil) in Williamson 2003,
Section IV.
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read this schematically. The formula would express a universally generalized
negation, not the desired negated universal generalization. More generally,
schematic generality enables us to express absolutely general Π1-sentences,
but not Σ1-sentences or beyond.⁷ We find this expressive limitation hard to
accept. Anything that can be expressed can also be denied.
Can we do better by exploiting alternative expressive resources? An inter-
esting option is to formalize reasoning about expansions of quantifier inter-
pretations by means of modalities.⁸ So (11.3) receives a modal reading:
(11.5) Necessarily, for any interpretation I, there could be an extended
one J
or in symbols:
(11.6) 2∀I 3∃J (I ⊂ J)
How should the modal operators be interpreted? The ordinary metaphysical
interpretation is problematic. For the existence of the relevant objects, such
as pure sets, is often assumed to bemetaphysically necessary, which rules out
any variation of the domain of such objects across metaphysical possibilities.
Some writers favor an interpretational understanding of the modality, where
the modal operators enable us to theorize about the result of certain changes
to the interpretation of the language.⁹
Suppose this understanding of themodality can bemade out.What would
have been achieved? A desire for greater expressive adequacy led to the
adoption of resources that allow us to retrieve, or at least to simulate, full
absolute generality. For the strings ‘2∀’ and ‘3∃’ can now be used as devices
of generalization: not just over everything in the range of the quantifiers
as currently interpreted, but over everything in their range on any possible
interpretation. Indeed, the “mirroring theorem” of Linnebo 2010 shows that,
under plausible assumptions, the “modalized quantifiers” ‘2∀’ and ‘3∃’
behave precisely like ordinary quantifiers as far as logic is concerned. So these
can be seen as ways to recover a form of absolute generality from within a
theoretical standpoint that shares many of the motivations of relativism.
Where does this leave us? We set out to develop a form of relativism. We
ended up defending a form of absolute generality—albeit with an uncon-
⁷ We can, however, use operators or function symbols to make some existence claims even in
the scope of schematic generalization. An example is (11.4) where ‘+’ represents an operation
we can apply to any given interpretation I so as to form an extended interpretation I+.
⁸ See Fine 2006, Linnebo 2010, and Studd 2013.
⁹ See Fine 2006; Linnebo 2018, Sections 3.5–3.6; Studd 2019, Sections 4.4 and 6.1.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 10/6/2021, SPi
11.5 traditional absolutism and ascent 249
ventional understanding of absolute generality. This unconventional feature
emerges particularly clearly in connection with the following modalized
analogue of the ordinary plural comprehension scheme:
3∃xx2∀y(y ≺ xx ↔ φ(y))
Recall from Chapter 10 that every plurality is rigid: it has the same members
at every world at which it exists.This entails that the above scheme is invalid.
For example, letφ(y) be the condition ‘y = y’. Since the domain can vary from
possible world to possible world, so can the extension of this condition. By
contrast, a plurality cannot vary in membership. It is therefore impossible
for there to be a plurality that is necessarily coextensive with this condition.
The upshot is that, when the strings ‘2∀’ and ‘3∃’ are used to recover
absolute generality, the plural comprehension scheme, couched in terms of
this form of generality, needs to be restricted. In short, an attempt to defend
the first horn of our trilemma has morphed into a view that is more usefully
regarded as a defense of the third horn. Specifically, we have used pluralities,
which are tracked rigidly across possible worlds, to explicate the notion of
an extensionally definite collection, or Yablo’s corresponding notion of a
“determinate pool of objects”.
For the purposes of this book, we prefer a more direct approach. Instead
of adding modal operators to shore up a version of the first horn, we would
like to develop the third horn directly—which we do in the next chapter.
11.5 Traditional absolutism and ascent
In the remainder of this chapter, we will explore the second horn of our
trilemma. This horn concedes that there cannot be any universal singular-
izations, while retaining absolute generality over an extensionally definite
domain, represented by a universal plurality. Throughout this discussion,
traditional plural logic will therefore be assumed. We call the resulting view
traditional generality absolutism.
One of the main challenges confronting this view is to develop a model
theory for a language whose quantifiers are interpreted absolutely. The usual
set-based model theory is obviously unavailable, since the domain now con-
sists of absolutely everything there is and there is no universal set according
to standard set theory (see Section 7.7). How, then, should advocates of
absolute generality represent the domain of their absolute quantifiers and
the semantic values of the predicates defined on this all-inclusive domain?
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An answer that has recently gained a lot of support is that the model
theory for a first-order language with absolute generality can and must be
given in a plural or higher-order metalanguage.1⁰ In this metalanguage,
we let domains be pluralities or concepts. The domain of a language with
absolute generality will then correspond to the universal plurality or a
universal concept. This way to talk and reason about domains requires
no singularization whatsoever. Although we talk informally about “the
domain”, using a singular definite description, we officially have in mind the
many objects, or the many instances of a concept, over which the quantifiers
range. A similar strategy allows us to ascribe semantic values to predicates.
Although we informally talk about “the semantic value” of a predicate,
officially there are many objects or a concept representing the predicate’s
semantic contribution. In short, in order to develop the model theory for a
first-order language with absolute generality, we must ascend to a language
with plural or second-order resources.
Our discussion in Section 7.5 showed another instance of this phe-
nomenon. A model theory for PFO+ with absolutely unrestricted quantifi-
cation can only be given in a language with another layer of quantification,
such as superplural quantification or quantification over plural concepts.
In fact, this ascent phenomenon can be shown to continue further, as we
will now explain in detail. We will focus on the plural hierarchy, although
it is not difficult to adapt our discussion to the corresponding conceptual
hierarchy. For the two hierarchies have a common type-theoretic structure.
So to emphasize the parallel between them, we will often speak of a type-
theoretic hierarchy. Recall our terminology when the types receive a plural
interpretation: a language of order 1 is just a regular first-order language,
while order 2 adds plural quantification, order 3 adds superplural quantifi-
cation, and so on. Thus, a language of order n + 1 quantifies over what we
call pluralities of level n.
A more detailed argument for the ascent can now be set out as follows.
Premise 1
Traditional plural logic is valid.
Premise 2
Absolute generality is possible at every order of the hierarchy; that is,
for every order, it is possible to quantify over absolutely all entities at
that order.
1⁰ See, e.g., Rayo and Uzquiano 1999, Rayo and Williamson 2003, and Williamson 2003.
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To formulate the third and final premise, let a generalized semantics be a
theory of all possible interpretations that a language might take, without any
artificial restrictions on the domains, interpretations, and variable assign-
ments. A generalized semantics is thus an instance of model theory, in our
liberal sense of that term. The premise can now be stated as follows.
Premise 3 (semantic optimism)
Given any legitimate language, it should be possible to develop a gen-
eralized semantics for that language.
Finally, we have the following theorem.
Ascent theorem (basic form)
Assume traditional plural logic and the possibility of absolute general-
ity. Then a generalized semantics for a first-order language cannot be
given in another first-order language but can be given in a language
with plural quantification.
The result of the three premises and the theorem is that we are pushed from
a first-order to a plural language.
The question now arises: what about the semantics of a language with
absolutely general plural quantification? It turns out that the considerations
that require the initial ascent from a language of order 1 to a language of
order 2 require further ascents as well. For we have the following:
Ascent theorem (arbitrary finite form)
Assume traditional plural logic and the possibility of absolute generality
at every finite order n ≥ 1. Then a generalized semantics for a language
of order n cannot be given in another language of order n but can be
given in a language of order n + 1.
So at every finite order, the desire for a generalized semantics pushes us one
step up. This results in an ascent up through all the finite orders.11
11 More fine-grained results are possible as well. The Ascent Theorem applies to languages
that are sometimes called full (or plenary) in the sense that they contain predicates whose
arguments can be variables of order n, where n is the order of the language. If a language of
order n is not full, the formulation of a generalized semantics for it requires only that we ascend
to a full language of order n. This is why, for example, the plurality-based model theory for PFO
was carried out in PFO+. For a summary of these results and references to the literature, see
Florio 2014b, Section 4.1.
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In fact, as shown by Linnebo and Rayo (2012), an additional principle,
broadly in the spirit of those behind the theorems, extends the hierarchy of
higher-order languages into the transfinite. The additional principle states,
roughly, that for any collection of languages in the hiearchy, we can form
a “union” language that encompasses all the languages in the collection.12
Linnebo and Rayo (2012) prove a generalization of the ascent theorem into
the transfinite.
Ascent theorem (transfinite form)
Assume traditional plural logic and the possibility of absolute generality
at every order. Then we cannot develop a generalized semantics for
a language of order α in another language of order α. But for every
successor ordinal α, we can develop a generalized semantics for a
language of order α in a language of order α + 1.13
In fact, there is reason to think that Tarski knew all of this (and more):
[T]he setting up of a correct definition of truth for languages of infinite
order would in principle be possible provided we had at our disposal in the
metalanguage expressions of higher order than all variables of the language
investigated. (Tarski 1935, 72)
The end result is that defenders of the new orthodoxy, seeking to secure the
possibility of absolute generality while holding on to semantic optimism, are
pushed by the ascent theorems higher and higher up through the orders of
the hierarchy.
The only way to stop this ascent would be to give up on semantic opti-
mism, which insists on a generalized semantics. Why insist on this? As
remarked, a generalized semantics is just a higher-order version of ordinary
set-based model theory. It is therefore natural to think that a generalized
semantics is required in order to give an appropriate definition of logical
12 To avoid inconsistency, we must restrict the collections to which the principle applies.
If languages are indexed by ordinals, a plausible restriction is to any bounded collection of
languages: for a limit ordinal λ, if one is prepared to countenance languages of order β for every
β < λ, then one should also countenance a language of order λ. Without this restriction, we
would be able to prove an inconsistency. See Florio and Shapiro 2014 and Linnebo and Rayo
2014 for further discussion.
13 What about a language whose order is an infinite limit ordinal λ? Since this language is
contained in the language of order λ+1, the theorem ensures that its generalized semantics can
be developed in a language of order λ+ 2.
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consequence, just like Tarski’s notion of logical consequence requires model
theory.
One might try to resist this natural thought by recalling an observation
made in Section 7.4. By appealing to an appropriate set-theoretic reflection
principle, we can ensure that the standard definition of logical consequence
as truth preservation in every set-based model is extensionally equivalent to
the definition of logical consequence as truth preservation in every plurality-
based model. Does this show that a generalized semantics isn’t required after
all? We don’t think so. As indicated in Section 7.9, one response is that we
would like a theory of logical consequence that is not only extensionally
but also intensionally correct. For instance, by the downwards Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem, we know that it would be extensionally correct to define
logical consequence by quantifying solely over finite and countably infinite
models. Although extensionally correct, this definition of logical conse-
quence would be inferior to Tarski’s, because it badly fails to capture the
intended intension. An analogous argument can be made for considering
not only set-basedmodels but allmodels, as is done in generalized semantics.
Moreover, the ability to capture the intended intension, which here requires
quantification over all models, is essential when we lack independent means
of determining the correct extension. In that case, it is only against the
backdrop of an intensionally correct theory that we can check whether any
other theory is in fact extensionally adequate.
Another, more direct response is that generalized semantics is legitimate
and interesting in its own right, irrespective of its contribution to theorizing
about logical consequence. Our language has one interpretation. But there
are myriad other interpretations that it might have had. It is a legitimate
undertaking to study all these interpretations and how the truth of sentences
is affected by the choice of interpretation.
11.6 Ascent and inexpressibility
Let us therefore accept that traditional generality absolutism pushes us
up through the orders of the hierarchy and proceed to inquire about the
significance of this ascent phenomenon. It turns out that the ascent gives
rise to three complaints that mirror those we leveled against relativism in
Section 11.4.
First, type-unrestricted generality appears possible. For example, it
appears meaningful to ask whether the law of extensionality holds at every
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order of the type-theoretic hierarchy. It would take a very good reason to
go against such a robust appearance. Yet no such generalization is available
on the type-theoretic view. While quantification of any specific order is
available, there is no such thing as quantification across all orders at once.
Second, type-unrestricted generality is needed to engage in many inter-
esting and potentially valuable forms of theorizing. We already mentioned
the question of extensionality, which figures in some theoretically important
claims, for example, that extensionality holds at every order of the plural
hierarchy but not of the conceptual hierarchy. Likewise, it is an important
insight, which deserves to be properly expressed, that a version of Cantor’s
theorem holds at every order of the type-theoretic hierarchy. Coupled with
widely held assumptions about plural comprehension, this means that there
are more pluralities than objects, more superpluralities than pluralities, and
so on up through all the possible levels. For a final example, consider the
claim that the principle of compositionality holds at every order, that is, that
at every order, the semantic value of a complex expression is determined as
a function of the semantic values of the expression’s simpler constituents.1⁴
None of these questions can be properly expressed and discussed in the type-
theoretic setting.We thus seem to be confronted with examples of expressive
limitations that curtail certain forms of systematic and valuable theorizing.
In fact, the view that type theory suffers from expressive limitations has a
long history. Wittgenstein alludes to it in the Tractatus (Proposition 4.1241)
and formulates it explicitly in his pre-Tractarian period:
Types can never be distinguished form each other by saying (as is often
done) that one has these but the other has those properties, for this
presupposes that there is a meaning in asserting all these properties of both
types. (Wittgenstein 1979, 106)
For essentially these reasons, he concludes twopages later that “aTHEORYof
types is impossible”. Very similar considerations are echoed by Gödel twenty
years later:
The theory of simple types [. . .] has the consequence that the objects
are divided into mutually exclusive ranges of significance, [. . .] and that
therefore each concept is significant only for arguments belonging to one
of these ranges, i.e., for an infinitely small portion of all objects.Whatmakes
1⁴ See Linnebo 2006 for some further examples.
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the above principle particularly suspect, however, is that its very assump-
tion makes its formulation as a meaningful proposition impossible [. . .].
Another consequence is that the fact that an object x is (or is not) of a given
type also cannot be expressed by a meaningful proposition. (1944, 466)
It might be objected that our examples of expressive limitations are
biased.1⁵ From our point of view, there are indeed important generalizations
that the type theorist cannot express. But from the type theorist’s point of
view, the alleged examples of inexpressible insights can be dismissed as
ungrammatical gibberish. This is a perceptive and interesting complaint,
which leaves us in a difficult dialectical situation. From one point of view,
there is evidence against the opposing view. From the opposing point of view,
this alleged evidence isn’t even meaningful!
How can we get beyond this apparent impasse? It is true that the type
theorists can stubbornly reject the attempted examples of expressive limi-
tations without any fear of thereby contradicting themselves. But we claim
it would be bad methodology to do so. Greater expressive power appears
possible; there are consistent ways to develop this greater expressibility; and
the greater expressibility promises to be theoretically useful.1⁶ In such cases,
we contend, it is good methodology to press ahead, despite the protestations
of the coherent naysayers—though obviously with the epistemic caution that
behooves every exploration of an unconventional hypothesis.
Third, an objection to the semantic ascent through the type-theoretic
hierarchy is that we are precluded from properly stating the type theorists’
view that there is a hierarchy strictly divided into levels and without a
top level. This is analogous to the case of relativism. Recall the relativist’s
predicament: to state that every quantifier interpretation can be extended,
we need to avail ourselves of absolute quantification over interpretations.
Likewise, to state that quantification of every order can be extended by
quantification of some even higher order, we need to generalize across all
the orders simultaneously. The hierarchy has no maximal level, yet we are
precluded from properly expressing that.
Might the expressive limitations be overcome by appealing to schematic
generality, as discussed in Section 11.4? In this case, the schematic generality
would reside in the type indices. Where τ is a type, a claim φ(xτ) would be
1⁵ A version of this objection is discussed in Krämer 2014.
1⁶ For the second point, see Section 11.7.
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understood as conveying that the claim holds for any type τ.1⁷ However, as
noted in our discussion of generality relativism, the logical complexity of
the generalizations that can be captured by schematic generality is extremely
limited.
In sum, generality relativism and traditional generality absolutism have
far more in common than has been acknowledged in the existing literature:
both suffer from expressibility problems. We have discussed three such
problems: the apparent meaningfulness of certain absolute generalizations,
their potential theoretical utility, and the inability to properly express one’s
own view without access to such absolute generalizations. Our discussion
motivates taking a closer look at the third alternative, namely absolute
generality over a domain that is extensionally indefinite, or not properly
circumscribed. This is the task of the next and final chapter.
Before turning to this task, however, we would like examine a strategy
that might allow the traditional absolutist to restore full expressibility. We
will find that, while promising, this strategy ends up transforming traditional
absolutism into a view that has much in common with the third alternative.
11.7 Lifting the veil of type distinctions
As we have seen, semantic considerations push the traditional absolutist
higher and higher up through the type-theoretic hierarchy. But this ascent
phenomenon leads to expressibility problems. We now explore another
perspective on the debate. Consider the entire plural hierarchy to which
the traditional absolutist ends up committed. At the bottom, there is an
extensionally definite domain of individuals, which make up level 0. Then
there is level 1, which adds pluralities; level 2, which adds superpluralities;
and so on. Let the traditional absolutist make her choice about how high to
go. Our only assumption is that there is no maximal level of the hierarchy.
That is, for every level α in the plural hierarchy, there is also level α+1.These
levels are reflected in the type distinctions of our language: variables of each
type take their values exclusively from the corresponding level.
What happens if we abandon these type distinctions and bring all the
different sorts together? Doing so would be a radical change in perspective.
We would, as it were, lift the veil of type distinctions and thus gain a
new perspective on reality. We will now defend the coherence of this new
1⁷ Russell famously exploits this kind of “typical ambiguity”; see Russell 1908, 251.
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perspective. We will also show that, from the new perspective, traditional
plural logic is no longer valid.1⁸
As a warm-up case, imagine a community of extreme Cartesian dualists
whose language involves a strict type distinction between mental and physi-
cal vocabulary.Members of this community regard the application ofmental
predicates to physical terms as meaningless rather than false. Likewise, they
regard the application of physical predicates to mental terms as meaningless
rather than false. This prevents them from being able to generalize at once
over both the mental and the physical domain. For example, these dualists
cannot express claims such as:
(11.7) Everything is either mental or physical.
(11.8) Nothing is both mental and physical.
The situation is analogous to the one described in the previous section.
Like the type theorist we encountered there, the dualists can dismiss these
alleged examples of inexpressible claims as ungrammatical gibberish. How
can we convince them to abandon their type distinction and adopt a per-
spective that permits the expression of the above claims? From our point
of view, the dualists’ type distinction is dogmatic and parochial. But this
charge is supported by evidence which, from their point of view, isn’t
even meaningful! We face an impasse, which again can only be overcome
by showing to the dualists the methodological flaws of their dogmatism.
Greater expressive power appears possible, there are consistent ways to
develop this greater expressibility, and the greater expressibility promises to
be theoretically useful. As before, we contend that it is good methodology in
such cases to explore the expressively richer perspective. So let us describe a
suitable language in which that can be done.
The language of the community of extreme Cartesian dualists, we recall,
has distinct sorts for mental and physical vocabulary. We translate this
language into a one-sorted language in which all syntactic restrictions based
on the two sorts have been removed. We add two new predicates ‘M’ and
‘P’ for being mental and being physical, respectively. Using these predi-
cates together with the “all-purpose” variables of the one-sorted language,
1⁸ Simons (2016) and Oliver and Smiley (2016, Chapter 15) share our aim of developing a
logic of higher-level pluralities in an untyped language and discusses some axioms that might
be appropriate for this logic. Unlike them, however, we pursue this aim indirectly by first
formulating a typed logic of higher plurals and then translating it into an untyped system.
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we can track the dualists’ sortal distinction and interpret it as a form of
quantificational restriction.When they assert, relative to themental sort, that
everything is F, we interpret them as asserting that every M is F. Likewise,
when they assert, relative to the physical sort, that something is G, we
interpret them as asserting that some P is G. By means of this translation,
we regain full expressibility. For example, we can now state the claims that
the dualists were unable to express:
(11.9) ∀x(Mx ∨ Px)
(11.10) ¬∃x(Mx ∧ Px)
Let us return to the typed language that is our real concern, namely the
language of the plural hierarchy—call it ℒ1. Proceeding as in our warm-up
case, let us bring its many sorts together by translating this language into a
standard one-sorted languageℒ2. We want to capture the sortal distinctions
of ℒ1 in the one-sorted setting of ℒ2. To this end, we let ℒ2 contain a
new two-place predicate ‘L’ for the level of a plurality. Intuitively, ‘L(x, 0)’
means that x is an individual; ‘L(x, 1)’, that x is a plurality; ‘L(x, 2)’, that x is a
superplurality; and so on. (We are assuming the language can quantify over
enough ordinal numbers to index all the levels of the plural hierarchy.)
Let us describe a translation τ from ℒ1 to ℒ2. Every atomic formula
containing no plural vocabulary is translated as itself. An atomic formula
containing plural vocabulary is translated by replacing each plural expres-
sion with a singular counterpart. We avoid clashes of terminology by ensur-
ing that the translation of singular and plural vocabulary does not overlap.
Moreover, we reserve the special symbol ‘η’ for a membership relation that








τ⟼ yj η xi
The translation commutes with the logical connectives:
¬φ τ⟼ ¬τ(φ)
φ ∧ ψ τ⟼ τ(φ) ∧ τ(ψ)
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Finally, we come to the action of τ on the quantifiers. Singular quantifiers
retain their sort, since this is the only sort available in ℒ2, but we restrict
them by means of the formula ‘L(x, 0)’. Plural quantifiers are translated as
singular quantifiers restricted by means of the formula ‘L(x, 1)’; superplural
quantifiers, by means of ‘L(x, 2)’; and so on. So we have:
∀yj φ
τ⟼ ∀yj(L(yj, 0) → τ(φ))
∀xxi φ
τ⟼ ∀xi(L(xi, 1) → τ(φ))
∀xxxi φ
τ⟼ ∀xi(L(xi, 2) → τ(φ))
In a nutshell, a speaker of ℒ1 is interpreted as a speaker of an untyped
language whose sortal distinction is merely the syntactic expression of a
quantificational restriction.
The kind of translation we are proposing is not entirely unprecedented.
(See also Quine 1956.) Suppose ℒ1 is the language of PFO+, which has
only two types: singular and plural. Then ℒ2 is essentially the kind of one-
sorted version of plural logic that we discussed in Section 5.3.1⁹ Returning
to the general case, we may think ofℒ2 as a generalization of this one-sorted
plural language. The single sort of variables of ℒ2 permits different forms of
reference: singular, plural, superplurals, and so on. That is, we have a single
sort of “all-purpose” variables whose possible assignments include those of
all the different types of variable that are available in ℒ1.
Is this one-sorted languageℒ2, and the translation into it, permissible? Let
us begin by examining whether we run a risk of inconsistency by translating
in this way.We need to examine how theories formulated inℒ1 relate to their
translations. LetT be anℒ1-theory and letT∗ be anℒ2-theory whose axioms
are the translations of the axioms ofT.Then, we have the following key fact.2⁰
Fact 11.1 T is consistent if and only if T∗ is consistent.
Thus, formal consistency is not a concern when we lift the veil of type
distinctions.
We therefore turn to more philosophical issues concerning the language
ℒ2. Should its single sort of terms be taken to refer to sets? If so, the
traditional absolutist might protest that the translation involves a change of
1⁹ The only difference is the unimportant one that ℒ2 has a predicate ‘η’ for membership,
whereas the other language has a predicate ‘≼’ for being among. As we have seen, however,
these two predicates are interdefinable.
2⁰ See Enderton 2001, 300, Theorem 44A.
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subject. The plural variables of ℒ1 are used to refer plurally, not to effect
singular reference to sets; so to be adequate, a translation needs to respect
that fact. But in fact, it is neither obligatory nor particularly natural to take
the single sort of terms of ℒ2 to effect singular reference to sets. Many
theorists take sets to lack spatiotemporal location, and almost all take them
to lack causal powers. But pluralities of every level can have location, time,
and causal powers; for example, some children may be located in the garden,
break a window, and so on.
If not to sets, to what do the variables of ℒ2 refer? As mentioned, our
proposal is that each of these variables is capable of a variety of different
forms of reference: singular, plural, superplural, and so on. The assignment
to each such variable will be made in some metalanguage by means of
another variable with the same capabilities concerning its forms of reference.
This view isn’t objectionable to traditional absolutists in the way it would be
objectionable to interpret the terms of ℒ2 as referring to sets. True, ℒ2 lifts
the veil of the syntactic type distinctions found in ℒ1. But after lifting the
veil, each term retains precisely the form of reference it had before.21
So far, we have acquitted ℒ2 of the charges of risking inconsistency and
of changing the subject by translating terms that refer plurally as terms
that refer to sets. What positive reason might we have to accept ℒ2? Our
answer is that in ℒ2 we can express everything we wanted to, but couldn’t,
express in ℒ1. Here are some examples. First, we can raise the question of
cumulativity: can a plurality of level n + 1 have members only of level n or
also of any level lower than n + 1? For example, does ‘my children, your
children, and Bob’ refer to such a mixed-level plurality? Second, what is
the relation between a singleton plurality and its single member? Should
these be identified or not? For example, do ‘the objects identical to Bob’ and
‘Bob’ co-refer? Third, do extensionality principles hold at every level of the
plural hierarchy? For example, should we accept an indiscernibility principle
(Sections 2.4 and 10.5) governing each level? Based on these considerations,
we contend that traditional absolutists have good reason to accept the
translation of their plural logic, generalized to pluralities of all levels, into
the one-sorted language of higher pluralities, ℒ2.
We now face a crucial question: can the all-purpose variables of the
one-sorted language ℒ2 be “pluralized”? In other words, can we introduce
21 The view that all-purpose variables can effect generalized forms of plural references is
embraced by some theorists who develop higher-level plural logic directly rather than indirectly
by lifting the veil. See footnote 18.
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variables that relate to the all-purpose variables the way ordinary plural vari-
ables relate to ordinary singular variables? Consider the question from the
point of view of our opponent, the traditional absolutist. We are supposing,
recall, that her plural languageℒ1 contains all the forms of pluralization that
are available. Moreover, pluralization is a relationship that holds between
an expression of order α + 1 and expressions of order α (or, in the case of
cumulativity, orders ≤ α). Every form of pluralization corresponds to some
level of the plural hierarchy associatedwithℒ1. Transposed to the one-sorted
setting ofℒ2, this means that every pluralization of its single sort of variable
would have to have values at some level α (or, in the case of cumulativity,
at levels ≤ α). If we are to pluralize the all-purpose variables of the language
ℒ2, it follows that each of the resulting pluralities would be bounded by some
level.22 In particular, there can be no universal plurality with respect to the
single sort of variable of ℒ2—precisely as in the alternative version of plural
logic that we will defend in the next chapter.
In short, we have shown how full expressibility can be restored to the
traditional absolutist’s language while retaining plural reference, superplural
reference, and so on.Moreover, we have argued that the traditional absolutist
should accept this move. Full expressibility is restored by means of a one-
sorted language ℒ2 that lifts the veil of type distinctions. Crucially, we
have found that traditional plural logic is not valid in this new one-sorted
setting. When we attempt to pluralize the all-purpose variables of ℒ2, the
interpretation must be confined to some level, and hence some instance of
plural comprehension fails—this is the case, for example, for any instance
yielding the universal plurality. So, even by her own lights, the traditional
absolutist has a reason to countenance an alternative plural logic where plu-
ral quantification is bounded by some level. The most plausible development
of traditional absolutism thus ends up transforming it into a view that has
much in common with our third alternative of developing a critical version
of plural logic. In the final chapter, we take a more direct approach to this
third alternative.
22 Oliver and Smiley (2016, Chapter 15) reach the same conclusion via somewhat different
reasoning. For us, the boundedness requirement has its root in the typed system and is revealed
when the veil is lifted; for them, it is proposed as a natural response to a version of Russell’s
paradox that would afflict the untyped plural logic if (axioms equivalent to) unrestricted plural
comprehension were accepted.
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Appendix
11.A The Ascent Theorem
Recall that traditional plural logic assumes unrestricted plural compre-
hension at every order of the type-theoretic hierarchy. (This gives us, in
particular, a universal plurality.) Then, as we saw above, we have the follow-
ing theorem.
Ascent theorem (arbitrary finite form)
Assume traditional plural logic and the possibility of absolute generality
at every finite order n ≥ 1. Then a generalized semantics for a language
of order n cannot be given in another language of order n but can be
given in a language of order n + 1.
Let us begin by reminding ourselves of the proof of the basic form of the
theorem, which states that a generalized semantics for a first-order language
cannot be given in another first-order language but can be given in a language
with plural quantification, such as ℒPFO+. First, there is the positive part of
the theorem: this was shown in Section 7.3, where we provided a generalized
semantics for PFO, and hence for its first-order fragment, in PFO+.
Then, there is the negative part of the theorem. This result relies heavily
on the following thesis:
Plural Profusion
There are more pluralities than objects.
As we saw in Section 11.2, this thesis follows from Plural Cantor together
with the assumption that there is a universal plurality and two or more
objects. The negative part of the Ascent Theorem now has a straightforward
proof.
Proof. Under the assumption of absolute generality, an ordinary singular
predicate can be interpreted by means of any plurality. But by Plural Profu-
sion, there are more pluralities than objects. It follows that interpretations of
a first-order language cannot be objects but must be represented by means
of higher-order resources. ⊣
We now turn to the proof of the Ascent Theorem in its arbitrary finite
form. This proof is somewhat involved but can be broken down into three
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components. First, we need a way of coding ordered pairs of pluralities of
arbitrary finite level. Second, we extend the plurality-based model theory to
higher level. This is a version of the recursive characterization of truth in a
model familiar from Tarski (1935). Finally, taking a cue from Frege (1879)
and Dedekind (1888), we show how we can convert a recursive definition to
an explicit one by ascending one level in the hierarchy.
Coding of n-tuples of higher-level pluralities
We have shown in Section 7.5 that interpretations and variable assignments
can be taken to consist of pluralities of ordered pairs carrying the appropriate
semantic information. For instance, an interpretation includes a domain,
which is represented by a plurality of pairs of the form ⟨∃, x⟩.
Having defined interpretations and variable assignments, we can talk
about the semantic value of an expression E according to an interpretation ii
or a variable assignment ss, indicated by [[E]]ii,ss. So, for a plural constant tt,
we have:
∀x(x ≺ [[tt]]ii,ss ↔ ⟨tt, x⟩ ≺ ii)
Now we want to generalize these definitions to higher orders. We need
some notation for expressions of each finite order. For convenience, we use
single lowercase variables for terms and upper case variables for predicates.
As usual, the superscript indicates the order of a term. The hierarchy has
a plural interpretation but could also be given a conceptual interpretation.
We count objects as pluralities of level 0. The following examples illustrate
the relation between this notation and the one we have used throughout the
book:
x0 ≺ x1 ↦ x ≺ xx
P (x2) ↦ P (xxx)
We leave the predicates’ arity unmarked. We also suppress the superscript
of the symbol ‘≺’ for membership between any two successive levels of the
hierarchy. So we write ‘x0 ≺ x1’, ‘x1 ≺ x2’, and so on.
It is essential to have a device for handling higher-level analogues of n-
tuples, that is, n-tuples of pluralities of arbitrary (and possibly different)
orders. If this can be done, the characterization of an interpretation for a
higher-order language will be routine. Thankfully, we have the following
theorem:
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 10/6/2021, SPi
264 absolute generality and singularization
Theorem (n-tuples) Assume that for any two objects there is another object
that serves as their ordered pair. Given any pluralities xk11 , . . . , x
kn
n whose
levels are indicated by the superscripts, we can then code for the ordered
n-tuple of these pluralities by means of a single plurality xk, where k is the
maximum level among the ki.
We will designate this plurality xk as ⟨xk11 , . . . , x
kn
n ⟩.
As an initial exercise, consider the case of superplurals. Assume we want
to pair an object a with xxx to form ⟨a, xxx⟩. As we have seen, xxx is usefully












Now, to code the desired ordered pair, all we need to do is add a as a first










•⟨a, xx⟩ • ⟨a, yy⟩
•
⟨a, xxx⟩
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This idea, which we have illustrated visually, can now be developed formally
and with appropriate generality.
Proof idea.23 The key step is to define the ordered pair of x0 and an n-th
level plurality xn. We proceed by induction on n. Assume we have defined
⟨x0, xn⟩. Then we let ⟨x0, xn+1⟩ be the unique plurality yn+1 described by the
following equivalence:
(11.11) ∀un(un ≺ yn+1 ↔ ∃xn(un = ⟨x0, xn⟩ ∧ xn ≺ xn+1))
This key step enables us to attach a “tag” x0 to any higher plurality xn. And
this tagging, in turn, enables us to represent the n-tuple ⟨xk11 , . . ., x
kn
n ⟩, which
can be seen as follows. First, we attach the unique tag i to each xkii . Then, we
wish to form the union of all of the tagged higher pluralities. Assume for the
moment that ki = k for each i. Then the desired union can be defined as the
higher plurality yk whose members are any zk−1 that figures as a member of
one of the tagged higher pluralities xkii .
We claim that this union yk represents the desired n-tuple. To establish
this claim, we must show how each entry can be retrieved from the union.
Suppose we want to retrieve the i-th entry. First, we delete each object at
the base level of the union whose tag is distinct from i, while retaining
the articulation of the remaining base-level objects. Second, we delete all
occurrences of the tag i, again retaining the articulation. This yields xkii .
Let us now lift the simplifying assumption that ki = k for each i and let one
of the ki be less than k. We wish to handle this by raising the level of x
ki
i up
to k. We achieve this raising by considering the singleton plurality of xkii , and
its singleton plurality in turn, and so on until we obtain a higher plurality of
level k. We record the number of singleton operations applied by means of a
supplementary tag. We now proceed as before but use the resulting plurality
instead of xkii . When the time comes for retrieving the i-th entry from the
union of all the k-th level pluralities, we apply the two steps described in
the preceding paragraph and then finish by undoing the j topmost singleton
operations, where j is the number recorded by means of the supplementary
tag. This yields xkii . ⊣
23 See Linnebo and Rayo 2012, Appendix B, for a detailed proof of their closely related
Theorem 1.
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Tarski on satisfaction and model theory
We now want to characterize the notion of truth in an interpretation (satis-
faction) for a language of order n. As done in Chapter 7, we proceed by first
defining the notion of interpretation (as a combination of a domain and an
interpretation function) and the notion of variable assignment (and a variant
thereof).Thenwe obtain the definition of truth in an interpretation from the
more general relation of truth in an interpretation with respect to a variable
assignment, which we characterize recursively. Thus we have generalized the
model theory encountered above (Sections 7.3 and 7.5).
Definition (truth in an interpretation) Assume that we have defined an
interpretation in+1 =⟨dn+1, f n+1⟩ and a variable assignment sn. Then we
define truth in in+1 with respect to sn by means of the following clauses.
1. If φ is a formula of the form P(t1, . . . , tm) where P is an m-place
predicate and the ti are of appropriate order (that is, are of order at
most n), then:
in+1 ⊨φ [sn] if and only if ⟨[[t1]]in+1,sn , . . . , [[tm]]in+1,sn⟩ ≺ [[P]]in+1,sn
2. If φ is a formula of the form t0 = u0, then:
in+1 ⊨ φ [sn] if and only if [[t0]]in+1,sn = [[u0]]in+1,sn
3. If φ is a formula of the form t1 ≺ t2, where t1 and t2 are of the
appropriate order (that is, the order of t1 is strictly below that of t2),
then:
in+1 ⊨ φ [sn] if and only if [[t1]]in+1,sn ≺ [[t2]]in+1,sn
4. If φ is a formula of the form ¬ψ, then:
in+1 ⊨ φ [sn] if and only if it is not the case that in+1 ⊨ ψ [sn]
5. If φ is a formula of the form ψ1 ∧ ψ2, then:
in+1 ⊨ φ [sn] if and only if in+1 ⊨ ψ1 [sn] and in+1 ⊨ ψ2 [sn]
6. If φ is a formula of the form ∃vm ψ, where m ≤ n, then:
in+1 ⊨φ[sn] if and only if there is xm in dm+1 such that in+1 ⊨
ψ[sn(vm/xm)]
where dm+1 is the domain of pluralities of levelm encoded in dn+1 and
sn(vm/xm) is a variant of sn, namely an assignment just like sn, with the
possible exception that sn(vm/xm) assigns xm to vm.
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Frege and Dedekind on recursive definitions
Frege (1879) and Dedekind (1888) discovered that recursive definitions
can be turned into explicit ones by generalization over “collections” of the
entities related by the recursive definition. Consider the case of addition in
arithmetic. Using the prime symbol for the successor operation, Add(x, y, z)
(“z is a sum of x and y”) can be defined recursively as follows:
(i) Add(x, 0, x)
(ii) Add(x, y, z) → Add(x, y + 1, z + 1)
Then Add(x, y, z) can be defined explicitly as follows:
Add(x, y, z) ↔def ∀R(∀uR(u, 0, u) ∧ ∀u, v,w(R(u, v,w)
→ R(u, v′,w′)) → R(x, y, z))
Tarski (1935) realized that his own recursive definition of satisfaction
could be turned into an explicit one in this way. The same obviously goes
for his later definition of truth in a model. (See Appendix B.1 of Linnebo
and Rayo 2012 for details.) This completes our proof sketch for the positive
part of the Ascent Theorem.
As for the negative part, we already described how to prove this in the
basic case, utilizing Plural Profusion.Assumingunrestricted comprehension
for higher pluralities as well, it is easy to establish higher-level analogues of
Plural Profusion, namely that there are more pluralities of level n + 1 than
pluralities of level n. Equipped with this result, the observation we used to
prove the basic case is easily extended to prove the arbitrary finite case.




An inconsistent triad figured centrally in the previous chapter. We cannot
simultaneously accept universal singularizations, unrestricted plural com-
prehension, and absolute generality. So at least one of these prima facie
attractive assumptions has to be abandoned. Which one?
We began by rejecting generality relativism, which abandons abso-
lute generality. This left us with a choice between rejecting universal
singularizations and rejecting unrestricted plural comprehension. We
proceeded to take a closer look at the former option, which has received
far more attention than the latter. Our discussion revealed some serious
problems with this popular option. One problem is that there remains
pressure to accept universal singularizations, in particular when we examine
howplural logic can be used to illuminate set theory. Another problem is that
this version of absolute generality faces difficulties akin to those of generality
relativism. Overall, the previous chapter thus motivates taking a closer look
at the last remaining option, namely to restrict the plural comprehension
scheme.
At the outset, this option seems unpromising. How could there not be
some things that are all and only the φs? Provided there is at least one φ, the
mentioned claim seems obviously true, as observed for example by Boolos
and Hossack (see Section 2.5). Clearly, an explanation would be needed of
why the plural comprehension scheme must be restricted. Our proposed
explanation is simple, at least in essence. True, all we need to do to define
a plurality is circumscribe the objects in question; in particular, there is no
postulation of a set or any other “plural entity” over and above these objects.
But the objects in question do need to be circumscribed.And as we shall see, on
some metaphysical views, reality as a whole resists proper circumscription.
If a view of this sort is right, there can be no universal plurality, as this
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo,
Oxford University Press. © Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo 2021.
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would require circumscribing something uncircumscribable. It follows that
the plural comprehension scheme must be restricted.1
The aim of this chapter is to explore and develop these considerations.
This leads to a third way, we argue, between generality relativism and the
traditional form of generality absolutism.
12.2 The extendability argument
Let us reconsider the kind of extendability argument that is typically used to
motivate generality relativism. In a nutshell, the argument takes the following
form.2
Assume that we quantify over absolutely everything. For every condi-
tion φ(x), we can define a set {x ∶ φ(x)} of all objects satisfying the
condition:
(∗) ∀x(x ∈ {x ∶ φ(x)} ↔ φ(x))
Consider the condition ‘x ∉ x’ and the resulting set R= {x ∶ x ∉ x}. If
R is in the range of the quantifier ‘∀x’ in the associated instance of (∗),
a contradiction follows by familiar Russellian reasoning. Therefore, R
is outside the range of this quantifier, and we weren’t quantifying over
absolutely everything after all.
Clearly, the crux of the argument is the use of an arbitrary condition to define
a set subject to the requirement (∗).
Arguments of this form can be frustrating, however. Why is it permissible
to define the mentioned sets? Generality relativists take an extremely liberal
view of what constitutes a permissible mathematical definition. They claim
that this liberalism supports thementioned crux and thus also their relativist
conclusion. From the point of view of a generality absolutist, however, this
extreme liberalism is unacceptable—indeed provably so, as can be seen by
considering the following simple truth of first-order logic:
1 Some alternative strategies for defending this thesis can be found in Spencer 2012 and
Hossack 2014. Essentially the same view is also defended in Linnebo 2010, although the
quantifiers used here correspond to his “modalized quantifiers” ‘2∀’ and ‘3∃’.
2 See Dummett 1991 (especially Chapter 24), Parsons 1974b, Glanzberg 2004, and Fine 2006.
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¬∃y∀x(Rxy ↔ ¬Rxx)
Our inability to define the offending Russellian set is just an instance of this
logical truth, obtained by replacing ‘R’ with the relativists’ desired notion of
membership in a set.
Thus, in its standard form, the extendability argument fails to resolve the
debate about the possibility of absolute generality. The argument turns on
the permissibility of certain definitions, which absolutists have good reason
to reject. We believe progress can be made by means of a more nuanced
formulation of the argument. To explain what we have in mind, it is useful
to start with an analogy.
Suppose you detest web pages that link to themselves.3 So you wish to
create a web page that links to all web pages that are innocent of this bad
habit. In other words, you wish to create a web page that links to all and only
the web pages that do not link to themselves. Can your wish be fulfilled?
The answer depends on how your wish is analyzed. Should the scope of the
crucial plural description—‘the web pages that do not link to themselves’—
be narrow or wide? Depending on the scope of the description, your wish
can be analyzed in either of the following two ways:
(N) You wish to design a web page y such that, for every web page x, y
links to x if and only if x does not link to itself.
(W) There are some web pages xx such that, for every web page x, x is one
of xx just in case x does not link to itself, and you wish to design a
web page y that links to all and only xx.
On the narrow scope reading (N), your wish is flatly incoherent. The desired
web page would have to link to itself just in case it does not link to itself. On
this reading, your wish is no better than the wish to bring about the existence
of a Russellian barber:
(B) You wish there to be a barber y such that, for all x, y shaves x if and
only if x does not shave himself.
On the wide scope reading (W), by contrast, there is no conceptual or
mathematical obstacle to the fulfillment of your wish. First, you identify all
3 See Linnebo 2016, Section 7, and Linnebo 2018, Section 3.3. This example has been
independently used by Brian Rabern in teaching and on social media.
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the web pages xx that refrain from the bad habit of self-linking. Then, you
create a new web page that links to all and only xx.
What explains this stark difference between the two readings? The heart
of the matter is how one specifies the target collection, that is, the web
pages of which you wish to create a comprehensive inventory. (As before,
we use the word ‘collection’ in an informal way for anything that has a
membership structure, such as a set, class, plurality, or indeed even a Fregean
concept—where the relation between instance and concept is regarded as
a membership structure.) On (N), the target is specified intensionally by
means of the condition ‘xdoes not link to itself ’.This intensional specification
means that the target shifts with the circumstances. First, you find that there
is no web page of the sort you wish for. So you attempt to fulfill your wish
by changing the circumstances, that is, by creating a web page of the desired
sort. But since the target is specified intensionally, this new web page must
itself be taken into account when assessing whether your wish has been
satisfied—which of course it has not, as logic alone informs us.
By contrast, on the wide scope reading (W), the target is specified exten-
sionally by means of the plurality xx. This extensional specification ensures
that the target stays fixed when you change the circumstances. (Here we
invoke the modal rigidity of pluralities, which was defended in Chapter 10.)
You can thus fulfill your wish by creating a new web page that links to all
and only xx. Although xx are described, in the original circumstances, by
means of a condition that is prone to paradox, there is no requirement that
xx should remain so described in alternative circumstances. Like any other
plurality, xx are tracked rigidly across alternative circumstances, not in terms
of any description that these objects happen to satisfy.
With this analogy in mind, let us return to the question of what is a
reasonable liberalism about mathematical definitions. Suppose you care
about sets, not web pages. You wish to define a set by specifying its elements.
As our web page analogy reveals, it is essential to distinguish between two
different ways in which the elements of the would-be set might be specified.
You might specify the elements intensionally, by means of a condition φ(x):
(I) You wish to define a set y such that, for every object x, x is an element
of y if and only if φ(x).
Alternatively, you might specify the elements of the would-be set
extensionally, by means of a plurality xx:
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(E) You wish to define a set y such that the elements of y are precisely xx.
Can either wish be fulfilled?
This is a question about what it takes for a mathematical definition to be
permissible.We claim that the proposed definition is often problematicwhen
the target is specified intensionally, but always permissible when the target is
specified extensionally. Our defense of these claims will be informed by our
web page analogy.
Let us begin with the negative claim that (I) is often problematic. The rea-
son is simple. We can hardly be more liberal about mathematical definitions
than we are about objects that we literally (and easily) construct, such as web
pages. This means we need to be extremely cautious about which definitions
of sets we deem permissible when the target is specified intensionally. To
illustrate how such definitions can be problematic, observe that one instance
of the intensionally specified wish (I) is an analogue of the problematic
narrow-scope wish (N) concerning web pages:
(N′) You wish to define a set y such that, for every object x, x is an element
of y if and only if x is not an element of itself.
Just as (N) is flatly incoherent, so, we contend, is (N′). This takes care of the
negative claim, showing also that the standard extendability argument is too
quick. In the next section, we defend the positive claim that (E) is always
permissible.
12.3 Our liberal view of definitions
Suppose that the target set is specified extensionally by means of a plurality
xx. Then this specification ensures that the target won’t shift with the cir-
cumstances. We therefore have no difficulty making sense of circumstances
in which xx define a set, much as we have no difficulty making sense of
circumstances in which some given web pages yy are precisely the ones to
which some new web page links.
We can be far more specific, though. Consider a dispute between a
proponent and an opponent of the proposed definition. Suppose both parties
accept a domain dd. The proponent now wishes to define one or more sets of
the form {xx}, where xx are drawn from dd. She does not insist that the sets
to be defined be among dd; in this sense, the sets may be “new”. To shore up
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the proposed definition, she provides the following account of what it takes
for a “new” set to be identical with another set or have a certain element:⁴
(i) {xx} = {yy} if and only if xx ≈ yy
(ii) y ∈ {xx} if and only if y ≺ xx
These clauses achieve something remarkable. They provide answers to all
atomic questions about the “new” sets of the form {xx} in terms that are con-
cerned solely with the “old” objects in dd, objects that were available before
the definition. That is, all atomic questions about the “new” objects receive
answers in terms of the “old” objects that both parties to the dispute accept.
In fact, this ismerely an instance of themore general liberal view of defini-
tions encountered in Sections 4.4 and 5.8. According to this view, it suffices
for a mathematical object to exist that an adequate definition of it can be
provided, where the adequacy is understood as follows. Consider a domain
dd of objects standing in certain relations. We would like to define one or
more additional objects. Suppose our definition provides truth conditions
for every atomic predication concerned with the desired “new” objects in the
form of some statement concerned solely with the “old” objects with which
we began. Thus, every atomic question about the “new” objects receives an
answer in terms that are solely about the “old” objects. Then, according to
our liberal view, the definition is permissible. This idea can be applied not
only to sets but also tomereological sums (as we saw in Section 5.8), cardinal
numbers, and so on. For example, the cardinal numbers of two pluralities are
identical if and only if the pluralities are equinumerous.⁵
Our liberal view of definitions is an explication of a theme that one often
encounters in mathematicians’ own reflections on their practice. A striking
example is the following passage by Cantor.
Mathematics is in its development entirely free and only bound in the
self-evident respect that its concepts must both be consistent with each
other and also stand in exact relationships, ordered by definitions, to those
concepts which have previously been introduced and are already at hand
and established. […] [T]he essence of mathematics lies precisely in its
freedom. (Cantor 1883, 896)
⁴ In fact, the right-to-left direction of (i) follows from the plural indiscernibility principle
(Indisc) introduced in Section 2.4.
⁵ See discussion in Linnebo 2018, Section 3.3.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/6/2021, SPi
274 critical plural logic
A similar sentiment is expressed by other mathematicians, such as David
Hilbert and Henri Poincaré. Hilbert writes:
As long as I have been thinking, writing and lecturing on these things, I
have been saying [...]: if the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict each
other with all their consequences, then they are true and the things defined
by them exist. This is for me the criterion of truth and existence.
(Letter to Frege of 29 December 1899, in Frege 1980, 39–40)
According to Poincaré, “[m]athematics is independent of the existence of
material objects; in mathematics the word ‘exist’ can have only one meaning;
it means free from contradiction” (1905, 1026).
Let us apply our liberal view of definitions to the case of sets. It is
instructive to compare with the situation where the desired set is specified
intensionally, by means of a membership condition. Again, we start with
some objects dd accepted by both parties. A more extreme proponent of
liberal definitions may wish to define sets of the form {x ∶φ(x)}, where any
parameters in themembership condition φ(x) are drawn from dd. As before,
she does not insist that these sets be among dd; they may be “new”. The
opponent will rightly challenge her to provide an account of what it takes for
“new” sets to be identical or to have certain elements. Given the intensional
specification of the desired sets, her answers will be as follows:
(i′) {x ∶ φ(x)} = {x ∶ ψ(x)} if and only if ∀x(φ(x) ↔ ψ(x))
(ii′) y ∈ {x ∶ φ(x)} if and only if φ(y)
These answers are potentially problematic in a way that their extensional
analogues, (i) and (ii), are not. An interesting example is the attempt to define
a set a = {x ∶ x ∈ x}. If this definition is to succeed, there must be an answer
to the question of whether a is an element of itself. But the only answer we
receive from clause (ii′) is that a ∈ a if and only if a ∈ a. Of course, this
is useless.⁶ More tellingly, the answer is not stated in terms of the objects
accepted by both parties to the dispute. An atomic question about the “new”
object a receives an answer that essentially involves this very object; there is
no reduction to the “old” objects among dd.
⁶ It could be worse. When we ask whether the Russell set b = {x ∶ x ∉ x} is an element of
itself, we receive an inconsistent answer.
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Notice that it is of no avail for the extreme liberal to allow a to lie outside
of dd, that is, in our parlance, to be “new”. The set a is specified intensionally,
by means of the membership condition ‘x ∈ x’, and we cannot “outrun” this
specification. Even in a domain that strictly extends dd, a is, by definition, the
set of all and only the objects that satisfy the condition ‘x ∈ x’. By contrast,
when a set is specified extensionally by means of a plurality xx, it does help
to consider a domain that strictly extends dd. Even if xx are, say, all the
sets among dd that are not elements of themselves, xx need not satisfy this
plural description in an extended domain. For xx are tracked rigidly into the
extended domain, not bymeans of the description.Thismakes the world safe
for the desired set {xx}, provided that the set is located outside of dd. Notice
also the striking parallelism with the case of web page design. Suppose you
want aweb page to link to all and only themembers of some collection ofweb
pages, for example, the collection of web pages that do not link to themselves.
If the target collection is specified intensionally, it is of no avail to create a new
web page: you cannot “outrun” this problematic specification. By contrast,
if the collection is specified extensionally, there is no obstacle to the creation
of the desired web page.
The picture that emerges is that there is a fundamental difference between
the proposed definitions of sets depending on whether the target is specified
extensionally or intensionally. In the former case, every atomic question
about the “new” objects receives an answer expressed solely in terms of
the “old” objects, whereas in the latter case, this kind of reduction is often
unavailable.The proposed definitions are therefore often unacceptable when
the target is specified intensionally. In the case of an extensional specifi-
cation, on the other hand, a proponent of liberal definitions is in a much
stronger position. She has laid out certain definitions, which are mathe-
matically fruitful and have the desirable property that all atomic questions
about the “new” objects receive answers in terms that are acceptable to her
opponent. Granted, she cannot force her opponent to accept the proposed
definitions: he does not contradict himself when he rejects them. But she can
justifiably accuse her opponent of dogmatism that stifles scientific progress.
He dogmatically clings to certain beliefs that stand in the way of fruitful
mathematics. By insisting that dd are all-encompassing—and thus that there
can be no “new” objects outside of dd—he privileges certain metaphysical or
logical dogmas over good mathematics.
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12.4 Why plural comprehension has to be restricted
In the previous chapter, we defended the permissibility of absolute gen-
erality. And we have just argued that any given objects can be used to
define a set. Thus, we have defended two of the three assumptions that we
know to form an inconsistent triad. We therefore have no alternative but
to reject the third assumption, that is, to restrict the plural comprehension
scheme.
Here is an intuitive and more direct version of our argument for that
conclusion. To define a plurality, we need to circumscribe some objects. But
when we circumscribe some objects, we can use these objects to define yet
another object, namely their set, in a way that would not be possible were
the objects in question not circumscribed. And since yet another object can
be defined, it follows that the circumscribed objects cannot have included
all objects. Thus, reality as a whole cannot be circumscribed: there is no
universal plurality. Consequently, the plural comprehension scheme needs
to be restricted.
It might be objected that traditional plural logic is so compelling that
the correct response to our findings is not to reject it but to reconsider
our defenses of absolute generality and the view that every plurality can
be used to define a set. This response deserves a hearing. So let us explain
why we believe it is appropriate to reject traditional plural logic. First, we
have, as already mentioned, offered positive arguments for the two other
assumptions that make up the inconsistent triad.
Second, we have identified major difficulties with each of the two other
responses to the inconsistent triad. Both relativism and traditional abso-
lutism suffer from a serious expressibility deficit—the former because of its
relativism, the latter because it is pushed up through the type-theoretic hier-
archy. Our alternative solution avoids these expressibility problems.Without
a universal plurality, Plural Cantor no longer entails Plural Profusion. And
without Plural Profusion,we canno longer prove theAscentTheorem,which
appeared to show that the need for a generalized semantics forces us higher
and higher up in the type-theoretic hierarchy. In fact, even if one accepts
a type-theoretic hierarchy despite not being forced up it, there is a way to
restore full expressibility, as we explained in Section 11.7.
Ultimately, though, we believe the debate must be decided by theoretical
considerations. Which of the three horns of the trilemma is theoretically
most satisfying? We hope this book as a whole will show that the widely
ignored third horn hasmajor theoretical attractions, which very likely exceed
those of its two rivals.
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Let us compare our third alternative—critical (generality) absolutism, as
we shall call it—with its two rivals. We begin by reminding ourselves of how
the three types of view respond to the inconsistent triad.
universal absolute unrestricted
type of view singularization generality plural
comprehension
traditional absolutism 7 3 3
relativism 3 7 3
critical absolutism 3 3 7
Just like the traditional absolutist, our view accepts that our quantifiers
can achieve a form of absolute generality. We differ from the traditional
absolutist only in our insistence that absolute generality is generality over
an extensionally indefinite domain, which consequently does not sustain
unrestricted plural comprehension.
More nuanced comparisons are possible as well. Although we deny that
reality as a whole can be circumscribed, there are also restricted domains
of quantification that are extensionally definite and can thus be specified
as a plurality. Let dd be one such domain. Consider a condition φ(x) that
has an instance among dd. We can then use a plural separation principle to
define some objects xx that are all and only the objects among dd that satisfy
φ(x).⁷This shows that the unrestricted plural comprehension scheme is valid
whenever the domain of quantification is extensionally definite. Instead, an
extensionally definite domain does not permit a universal singularization
within this domain. For recall that our argument for the permissibility of
singularizing pluralities as sets forces us out of any given extensionally
definite domain. So universal singularization fails when all our quantifiers
are relativized to such a domain. The following table provides a summary of
these observations:
type of domain universal unrestricted
singularization plural comprehension
extensionally definite 7 3
extensionally indefinite 3 7
⁷ See Appendix 10.A for a justification.
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This table enables some illuminating comparisons of our view with its
two main rivals. First, when a domain is extensionally definite, the correct
view on plural comprehension and universal singularization is precisely that
of traditional absolutism. This traditional view is entirely correct—when
relativized to any given extensionally definite domain. Its only error is the
assumption that reality as a whole can be circumscribed, that is, that there is
a universal plurality. Modulo this single—though important—error, we are
in agreement with the traditional absolutist.
Second, consider relativism. Of course, we disagree with the relativists
on the important question of the possibility of absolute generality. But
there is something more interesting to be said. There are, as noted, many
extensionally definite domains, namely those that can be specified as a
plurality. Suppose we restrict our attention to generality over such domains.
Thus restricted, the relativist’s claim is right: given any extensionally definite
domain, there is indeed an even larger such domain. But the relativists fail to
appreciate the important distinction between domains that are extensionally
definite and those that are not. They appear tacitly to assume that all
domains are extensionally definite. It is only restricted to such domains
that their extendability claim has force, as argued in Sections 12.2 and 12.3.
Moreover, by ignoring the possibility of extensionally indefinite domains,
they inflict upon themselves a gratuitous expressibility deficit, which we
avoid by accepting generality over an extensionally indefinite domain of
absolutely everything.⁸
12.5 The principles of critical plural logic
By advocating a restriction of the plural comprehension scheme, we depart
from the traditional formulation of plural logic. To emphasize this departure,
let us call our approach critical plural logic.⁹
How, exactly, does our critical plural logic differ from the traditional
version? We accept standard classical first-order logic. Furthermore, we
allow the plural quantifiers to be governed by axioms and rules analogous to
⁸ To be fair, many relativists achieve a form of absolute generality through schematic
generality, as discussed in Section 11.4. But this form of generality is either subject to its own
expressibility deficit (by permitting only Π1-generalizations) or will be transformed into a
version of our preferred form of absolute, but extensionally indefinite, generality.
⁹ This label is inspired by Charles Parsons’s ‘Infinity and a Critical View of Logic’ (2015).
Some examples of this approach to logic are discussed in a forthcoming special issue of Inquiry
edited by Mirja Hartimo, Frode Kjosavik, and Øystein Linnebo.
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those governing the first-order quantifiers.1⁰We also retain the axiom stating
that pluralities are non-empty and the axiom scheme stating that coextensive
pluralities are indiscernible (see Section 2.4). Our quarrel with traditional
plural logic concerns only the question of what pluralities there are, or, in
other words, the question of which plural comprehension axioms to accept.
It is therefore incumbent on us to clarify what pluralities we take there to
be. It is insufficient merely to observe that the plural comprehension scheme
needs to be restricted in some way or other to avoid a universal plurality. We
need some “successor principles” to the unrestricted plural comprehension
scheme to tell us what pluralities there in fact are.
How should these successor principles be chosen and motivated? When
discussing this question, it is useful to recall the intuitive version of our argu-
ment for restricting the plural comprehension scheme. To define a plurality,
we need to circumscribe some objects. But when we circumscribe some
objects, we can use these objects to define yet another object, namely their
set. It follows that the circumscribed objects cannot have included all objects
and thus, in particular, that reality as a whole cannot be circumscribed.
Clearly, this argument hinges on the idea that every plurality is cir-
cumscribed, or, as we also put it, extensionally definite. Can this notion of
extensional definiteness guide our search for successor principles and help
us justify, or at least motivate, the resulting principles? Here we face a fork in
the road, depending on whether or not we attempt to provide an analysis of
extensional definiteness inmore basic terms, and on this basis, try to provide
the requisite guidance and justification.
There have been several attempts to provide such an analysis. Linnebo
2013 proposes a modal analysis inspired by Cantor’s famous distinction
between “consistent” and “inconsistent” multiplicities. Here is how Cantor
explains the distinction in a famous letter to Dedekind of 1899:
[I]t is necessary . . . to distinguish two kinds of multiplicities (by this I
always mean definite multiplicities). For a multiplicity can be such that the
assumption that all of its elements ‘are together’ leads to a contradiction,
so that it is impossible to conceive of the multiplicity as a unity, as ‘one
finished thing’. Such multiplicities I call absolutely infinite or inconsistent
multiplicities . . . If on the other hand the totality of the elements of a
multiplicity can be thought of without contradiction as ‘being together’,
so that they can be gathered together into ‘one thing’, I call it a consistent
multiplicity or a ‘set’. (In Ewald 1996, 931–2)
1⁰ But, of course, we should insist that the formulation of logical rules be neutral with respect
to which comprehension axioms are validated.
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Using the resources of modal logic, it is relatively straightforward to
formalize Cantor’s notion of a multiplicity being “one finished thing”,
namely, that all possible members of the multiplicity can exist or “be
together”. Or, changing the idiom slightly, there is no possibility of the
multiplicity gaining yet more members at more populous possible worlds.11
Based on this analysis, Linnebo 2013 proves various principles of extensional
definiteness, which in the present context amount to principles concerning
the existence of pluralities.
Another analysis of extensional definiteness is inspired by Michael
Dummett’s suggestion that a domain is definite just in case quantification
over this domain obeys the laws of classical logic, not just intuitionistic.12
Intriguingly, it turns out that a fairly natural development of this
Dummettian suggestion validates almost the same principles of extensional
definiteness as the modal analysis.13 Yet other analyses may be possible as
well. We invite the readers to explore.
Here we wish to pursue the other fork in the road, namely to leave
the notion of extensional definiteness unanalyzed and instead to use our
intuitive conception of the notion, coupled with abductive considerations,
to motivate principles of extensional definiteness. This strategy has both
advantages and disadvantages: it is more general, as it avoids specific the-
oretical commitments; but it also provides less leverage and thus less of an
independent check on the proposed principles of definiteness. In any case,
we believe this is an option worth exploring. We thus ask what it is for a
collection to be circumscribed or extensionally definite.
First, since every single object can be circumscribed, there are singleton
pluralities:
∀x∃yy∀z(z ≺ yy ↔ z = x)
Second, because the result of adding one object to a circumscribed plurality
is also circumscribed,we accept a principle of adjunction.Given any plurality
xx and any object y, we can adjoin y to xx to form the plurality xx+y defined
by:
∀u(u ≺ xx + y ↔ u ≺ xx ∨ u = y)
11 See pp. 248–9 for an explication of this idea in a modal language.
12 A closely related idea is found in Solomon Feferman’s widely circulated and discussed
manuscript, “The Continuum Hypothesis is neither a definite mathematical problem nor a
definite logical problem” (Feferman unpublished).
13 See Linnebo 2018.
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Moreover, we already argued that a plural separation principle is well
motivated (see Appendix 10.A). Suppose you have circumscribed a
collection and have formulated a sharp distinction between two ways that
members of the collection can be. Then the subcollection whose members
are all and only the objects that lie on one side of this distinction is in turn
circumscribed. More formally, given any plurality xx and any condition φ(x)
that has an instance among xx, there is a plurality yy of those members of xx
that satisfy the condition:
∃x(φ(x) ∧ x ≺ xx) → ∃yy∀u(u ≺ yy ↔ u ≺ xx ∧ φ(u))
Next, there are some plausible union principles. Let us begin with a simple
case. Since two circumscribed collections can be conjoined to make a single
such collection, a principle of pairwise union is plausible. Given any plurality
xx and any objects yy, there is a union plurality zz defined by:
∀xx∀yy∃zz∀u(u ≺ zz ↔ u ≺ xx ∨ u ≺ yy)
Ageneralized union principle can also bemotivated. Consider some circum-
scribed collections, each with its own unique tag. Suppose that the collection
of tags is also circumscribed. Then the “union collection” comprising all the
items that figure in at least one of the tagged collections is circumscribed.
This motivates a generalized union principle to the effect that the union of
an extensionally definite collection of extensionally definite collections is
itself extensionally definite. We can formulate this as the following schema.
Suppose there are xx such that:
∀x(x ≺ xx → ∃yy∀z(z ≺ yy ↔ ψ(x, z)))
Then there is zz such that:
∀y(y ≺ zz ↔ ∃x (x ≺ xx ∧ ψ(x, y)))
Although the generalized union principle does not, on its own, entail the
pairwise one, this entailment does go through in the presence of the singleton
and adjunction principles.1⁴ It therefore suffices to adopt the generalized
union principle.
1⁴ Proof sketch. Consider two pluralities xx and yy. Assume there are two distinct objects, say
a and b, to tag these pluralities. (If there is only a single object, the pairwise union of xx and yy is a
singleton plurality.) Now apply the generalized union principle to the formula ‘(x = a∧y ≺ xx)
∨ (x = b ∧ y ≺ yy)’, observing that a and b form a plurality. This yields the pairwise union of
xx and yy.
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The principles accepted so far do not entail the existence of any infinite
pluralities; indeed, they have a model where every plurality is finite. Is it
possible for an infinite collection to be circumscribed and thus to correspond
to a plurality? This question calls to mind the ancient debate about the
existence of completed infinities. Aristotle famously argued that only finite
collections can be circumscribed, and that a collection can be infinite only
in the potential sense that there is no finite bound on how many members
the collection might have. This remained the dominant view until Cantor
boldly defended the actual infinite and the existence of completed infinite
collections. The natural numbers provide an example. Aristotle denied,
whereas Cantor affirmed, the existence of a completed collection of all
natural numbers.
We are interested in an analogous question concerning pluralities. Let
‘P(x, y)’ mean that x immediately precedes y. Following first-order arith-
metic, we accept that every natural number immediately precedes another:1⁵
(12.1) ∀x∃y P(x, y)
We would like to know whether there is a circumscribed collection, or
plurality, of all natural numbers. More precisely, we would like to know
whether there are some objects xx containing 0 and closed under P, in the
following sense:
(12.2) ∃xx(0 ≺ xx ∧ ∀x∀y(x ≺ xx ∧ P(x, y) → y ≺ xx))
Although asserting the existence of such a plurality is a substantial step, it
has also been a tremendous theoretical success, as mathematics since Cantor
has clearly demonstrated. On abductive grounds, we therefore recommend
accepting (12.2), conditional on (12.1), as a plural analogue of the set-
theoretic axiom of Infinity.
It will be objected that this conditional principle is concerned specifically
with the natural numbers and thus lacks the topic neutrality of a logical
law. The objection is entirely reasonable and points to the need for a more
general principle that justifies transitions such as the one from (12.1) to
(12.2). There is nothing special about 0 and the functional relation P. So,
for any plurality xx and functional relation, there should be a plurality yy
1⁵ Aristotle would only accept a weaker, modal analogue of this principle, namely
2∀x3∃y P(x, y), where the modal operators represent metaphysical modalities.
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containing xx and closed under that function. We therefore claim that the
desired generalization is the schematic principle that every plurality can be
closed under function application:
∀x∃!y ψ(x, y) → ∀xx∃yy(xx ≼ yy ∧ ∀x∀y(x ≺ yy ∧ ψ(x, y)(12.3)
→ y ≺ yy))
We adopt this as the official plural principle of infinity. In practice, however,
it doesn’t much matter whether we accept this more general schematic
principle or merely (12.2), conditional on (12.1). For in the presence of
first-order arithmetic, ordered pairs, and the other principles concerning
pluralities, these two principles of infinity are provably equivalent.1⁶
A plural analogue of the axiom of Replacement is plausible as well.
Consider a plurality of objects. Now you may replace any member of this
plurality with any other object, or, if you prefer, leave the original object
unchanged. Then the resulting collection is also circumscribed and thus
defines a plurality of objects. We formalize this as follows.
∀xx[∀x(x ≺ xx → ∃!y ψ(x, y)) →
∃yy∀y(y ≺ yy ↔ ∃x(x ≺ xx ∧ ψ(x, y)))]
It is pleasing to observe that this plural version of Replacement follows from
the generalized union principle and the singleton principle. And, as in the
case of sets, the plural principle of replacement entails that of separation.1⁷
To sum up, we started with some core assumptions shared with tradi-
tional plural logic: first-order logic, axioms and rules governing the plural
quantifiers, and the principles (Non-empty) and (Indisc). Next, our intuitive
1⁶ Proof sketch. The only hard direction is to show that the specific conditional entails the
general one. Consider any xx, and assume that ψ is functional. For every member a ≺ xx, we
contend that there is a plurality zza containing a and closed under ψ. Given this contention,
the generalized union principle enables us to define the desired plurality yy as the union of
all the pluralities zza. To prove the contention, we observe that, using ordered pairs and plural
quantification, we can produce a formula θ(n, y)which expresses that n is a natural number and
that y is the nth successor of a in the series generated by ψ. We do this by letting θ(n, y) state that
⟨n, y⟩ is a member of every plurality containing ⟨0, a⟩ and closed under the operation ⟨m, u⟩ ↦
⟨m + 1, v⟩, where v is the unique object such that ψ(u, v). Now we apply the generalized
union principle to the plurality of all natural numbers and the formula θ to obtain the desired
plurality zza.
1⁷ Proof sketch. Consider xx and a condition φ(x). Assume φ(a) for some member a of xx.
Now apply the principle of replacement to the condition ψ(x, y) defined as (¬φ(x) ∧ y = a) ∨
(φ(x) ∧ y = x). This yields the subplurality of those members of xx that satisfy φ(x).
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An additional principle receives a more theoretical justification:
• infinity
These four principles, in addition to the core assumptions just mentioned,
constitute the system we call critical plural logic.





Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that each principle of critical plural
logic can be derived from traditional plural logic. In essence, each of the
pluralities we licence is a subplurality of the universal plurality licenced by
traditional plural logic. Critical plural logic is therefore strictly weaker than
the traditional system. This relative weakness is for a good cause, as will
emerge clearly in Section 12.7, where we explore the connection between
critical plural logic and set theory. This connection is far simpler and, we
believe, more natural than in the case of traditional plural logic.
12.6 Extensions of critical plural logic
When stronger expressive resources are accepted, various extensions of crit-
ical plural logic can be formulated and justified. The addition of superplural
resources provides an obvious example. This addition enables us to express
analogues of the principles of critical plural logic. Here we will focus on two
novel and more interesting principles.
First, we can formulate a principle of extensional definiteness that cor-
responds to the familiar set-theoretic axiom of Powerset. We can do this
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entirely without mention of sets by using superplurals. For any plurality xx,
there is a superplurality yyy of all subpluralities of xx:
∀xx∃yyy∀zz(zz ≺ yyy ↔ zz ≼ xx)
The justification for this “powerplurality” principle is less straightforward
than in the case of the earlier principles. It relies on what Bernays (1935)
calls “quasi-combinatorial” reasoning: a combinatorial principle that is com-
pelling for finite domains is extrapolated to infinite domains. The powerplu-
rality principle is certainly reasonable when the plurality xx is finite: we can
then list all of its subpluralities. The general principle is a big and admittedly
daring extrapolation of the finitary principle into the infinite. Its justification
is thus partially abductive: the big and daring extrapolation has proved to
be a theoretical success. Just like its set-theoretic analogue, the principle fits
into a coherent and fruitful body of theory, as will be explained shortly. The
principle also provides important information about which superpluralities
there are.
Second, superplurals make it possible to formulate plural choice
principles. For example, given a superplurality xxx of non-overlapping
pluralities, there is a “choice plurality” whose members include one member
of each plurality of xxx. That is, for each such xxx we have:
∃yy∀zz(zz ≺ xxx → ∃!y(y ≺ zz ∧ y ≺ yy))
As in the case of the powerplurality principle, plural choice principles are
extrapolations from the finite into the infinite, and their is justification is
partially abductive.1⁸
In sum, the addition of superplural resources enables us to formulate and
justify an extended critical plural logic. Two distinctive principles are:
• powerplurality
• choice
1⁸ See Pollard 1988 for a defense of the Axiom of Choice on the basis of a plural choice
principle. If ordered pairs are available, there is less of a need for superplurals to express choice
principles. For example, we can assert that for any relation coded by means of a plurality of
ordered pairs, there is a functional subrelation with the same domain, again coded by means of
a plurality of ordered pairs.
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Of course, yet stronger principles can be countenanced as ever greater
expressive resources are considered.
12.7 Critical plural logic and set theory
Thevarious plural principleswe have discussed provide valuable information
about sets. To see this, recall the correspondence we have advocated between
pluralities and sets:
(i) {xx} = {yy} if and only if xx ≈ yy
(ii) y ∈ {xx} if and only if y ≺ xx
Using this correspondence, the plural principles entail analogous set-
theoretic axioms.
However, there are two reasons to worry that the plural principles will not
lead to Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. First, since we do not ordinarily admit
an empty plurality, there is a threat of losing the empty set. Some ways to
address this threat were discussed in Section 4.4. One solution is to allow
an empty plurality. Another is to allow the “set of ” operation xx ↦ {xx} to
be what Oliver and Smiley (2016, 88) call a “co-partial” function, which can
thus take the value ∅ on an undefined argument. Either way, we can prove
the existence of an empty set.
Second, since plural logic is applied to all sorts of objects, the mentioned
correspondence introduces impure sets, that is, sets of non-sets. The rel-
evant comparison is therefore not ZFC, but ZFCU—the modified system
which accommodates urelements (see Section 4.7). Recall that this system
is obtained by making explicit the quantification over sets in the axioms of
ZFC.Whenever a quantifier of an axiomof ZFC is intended to range over sets
even when urelements are introduced, we explicitly restrict this quantifier to
sets by means of a predicate ‘S’ intended to be true of all and only sets.
Our aim, then, is to use critical plural logic and the correspondence
principles (i) and (ii) to justify axioms of ZFCU. We define ‘S(x)’ as
‘∃xx(x = {xx})’. This enables us, it turns out, to derive the axioms of Empty
Set, Pairing, Separation, Union, Infinity, and Replacement. (The proofs are
relatively straightforward.) Moreover, the axiom of Extensionality follows
immediately from the correspondence between pluralities and sets, and
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Foundation can be seen as explicating how sets are successively formed
from pluralities of elements, and as justified on that basis.1⁹
To derive the axioms of Powerset and Choice, we need to go beyond
critical plural logic. Choice follows naturally from the superplural choice
principle discussed in the previous section. Deriving Powerset is less
straightforward. Given any set a, we want to prove the existence of its pow-
erset. To do so, we need to show that there is a plurality comprising all of a’s
subsets. How might this be done? One option, inspired by the iterative con-
ception of set, is to postulate the existence of such a plurality, on the grounds
that when a was formed, all its elements were available, thus giving us the
ability also to form all of a’s subsets. We prefer to utilize the powerplurality
principle of the previous section, reasoning as follows. Let aa be the elements
of a, and consider their superplurality bbb. For every subset x of a, if x = {xx}
for some xx, then xx ≺ bbb. That is, bbb circumscribe all the subpluralities
of aa. But if some pluralities are jointly circumscribed, so are the unique sets
formed from precisely these pluralities. This gives us the desired plurality of
subsets of a. (This reasoning assumes that the extended, superplural logic
contains a replacement principle that allows us to replace each plurality of a
superplurality with a unique object and thus arrive at a plurality.)
Our discussion shows that critical plural logic, and the plausible
superplural extensions thereof, have great explanatory power, especially
in connection with the correspondence principles (i) and (ii). Still, one
might worry that things are too good to be true. Do we even know that
our assumptions—the mentioned plural logics and the correspondence
principles—are jointly consistent? This worry can be put to rest by proving
that these assumptions are consistent relative to ZFC. For critical plural
logic and the correspondence principles, we do this by translating plural
quantifiers as first-order quantifiers restricted to non-empty sets. An
analogous relative consistency result can be given for the described extension
of critical plural logic. In that case, superplural quantifiers are translated as
first-order quantifiers restricted to non-empty sets of non-empty sets.
1⁹ Relative to the other axioms of ZFC, Foundation is equivalent to the following induction
scheme:
Suppose that every urelement is φ and that, for every xx each of which is φ, {xx} too is φ.
Then everything is φ.
This induction scheme explicates the idea that every set is generated by means of the “set of ”
operation.
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Let us end with some more general observations. First, on the view we
have defended, plural logic lacks one of the features commonly ascribed
to pure logic, namely epistemic primacy vis-à-vis all other sciences (see
Section 2.5). To see this, we need only recall the extent to which our defense
of critical plural logic relies on abductive considerations, in particular, on
considerations about what constitutes a permissible mathematical defini-
tion. Moreover, some of the principles of critical plural logic—infinity,
powerplurality, and choice—specifically received an abductive justification.
Second, our view forges a close connection between the principles of
critical plural logic and the axioms of set theory, which suggests that critical
plural logic and its extensions have non-trivial mathematical content. Let
us explain. We have provided a factorization of set theory into two com-
ponents: the correspondence principles, which link pluralities and their
corresponding sets, and critical plural logic, which provide information
about what pluralities there are and how these behave. Clearly, the strong
mathematical content of set theory derives from these two components.
It is the correspondence principles that introduce sets as mathematical
objects by characterizing what Gödel called the the “set of ” operation (see
Section 4.6). What sets there are, however, will depend on what pluralities
are “fed into” this operation and is determined in large part by the plural
logic that is brought to bear. We can study this dependence by keeping the
correspondence principles fixed, while varying the plural logic to which
they are applied. As just observed, our extended critical plural gives rise
to full Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. If we remove the plural principle of
infinity, the result is a comparatively weak theory of hereditarily finite set.
Alternatively, suppose we retain that plural principle of infinity but impose
a predicativity requirement on the generalized union principle (and thus also
plural replacement and separation).2⁰ Then a broadly predicative set theory
ensues. In short, when we keep the correspondence principles fixed but vary
the plural logic, we obtain set theories with wildly different mathematical
content. This observation strongly suggests that some of the mathematical
content of the resulting set theory derives from the plural logic to which
the correspondence principles are applied, not solely from these principles.
If this is correct, it follows that a theory can have substantial mathematical
content without any commitment to mathematical objects.
2⁰ Specifically, we require that the formula ψ(x, y) be predicative, in the sense that it contain
no bound plural variables.
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To come to terms with the possibility of mathematical content even in
the absence of mathematical objects, it is useful to recall Bernays’s notion
of quasi-combinatorial reasoning, whereby principles that are compelling in
finite domains are extrapolated to infinite ones. Bernays and others regard
such reasoning as distinctively mathematical and a major watershed in
the foundations of mathematics, marking the onset of serious infinitary
reasoning. Since critical plural logic and its extensions embody, and are
motivated by, such reasoning, Bernays would regard both the notion of a
plurality and the principles of critical plural logic as distinctively mathe-
matical in character. This is particularly clear for the plural principles of
infinity, powerplurality, and choice, whose justification explicitly relied on
quasi-combinatorial reasoning.
Is the mathematical content of plural logic compatible with our view that
pluralities can be used to explain sets? We believe it is. The explanation
in question is a broadly metaphysical one: we make sense of a set {xx} as
“formed” from its elements xx. There is no conflict between this explanation
and the view that plural logic has non-trivial mathematical content. Indeed,
on this view, the indisputable mathematical content of set theory is in part
inherited from that of plural logic.21
Finally, the view that logic can have mathematical content has important
consequences concerning how we choose a “correct” logic. Some starkly
different views are found in the literature. At one extreme we find Frege, who
claims that logic codifies “the basic laws” of all rational thought, and the laws
of logic must therefore be presupposed by all other sciences. He writes:
I take it to be a sure sign of error should logic have to rely on meta-
physics and psychology, sciences which themselves require logical prin-
ciples. (Frege 1893/1903, xix)
This “logic first” view has been very influential. Following Frege, logic is
often regarded as epistemologically and methodologically fundamental. All
disciplines, including mathematics, are answerable to logic rather than vice
versa.
At the opposite extreme we find Quine, whose radical holism leads him
to assimilate logic and mathematics to the theoretical parts of empirical
science. Logic and mathematics, he claims, are not essentially different
21 Thanks to Hans Robin Solberg for raising this concern.
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from theoretical physics: although they go beyond what can be observed by
means of our unaided senses, they are justified by their contribution to the
prediction and explanation of states of affairs that can be observed.
These extremes are not the only views, however. In particular, one need
not be a radical holist to reject the Fregean logic-first view. What are some-
times called “critical views of logic” represent a less dramatic departure from
Frege.22 These views hold that the logical principles governing some subject
matter may depend on features of this subject matter or of our discourse
about it. The views thus stop short of Quine’s radical holism and emphasize
instead a more local entanglement of logic with some particular discipline,
such as mathematics, semantics, or some part of metaphysics. As a result of
this entanglement, logic is answerable to one’s views in this other discipline.
The revision of plural logic that we have defended provides a good
example of such a critical view of logic. Avoiding any commitment to
Quinean holism, we have argued that the principles of plural logic are
entangled with our theory of correct mathematical definitions. Specifically,
we have defended a liberal theory of mathematical definitions, and on the
basis of this theory, we have argued that plural comprehension needs to be
restricted more than has traditionally been assumed.
12.8 Generalized semantics without a universal plurality?
We wish to address an open question that, despite not being directly about
plurals, is nevertheless relevant to the view we have defended in this chapter
and the previous one.
The question concerns how semantics should be done if we adopt critical
plural logic. When a language quantifies over an extensionally definite
domain, the answer is straightforward: we may as well employ the usual set-
based model theory, since all of the relevant constructions, relative to this
domain, can be done in set theory. But what about languages that quantify
over an extensionally indefinite domain, such as the important domain of
absolutely everything? For such languages, plural logic is no better off than
set theory for the purposes of developing a generalized semantics; after all,
we have argued that there is no plurality corresponding to the domain of
absolutely everything. What to do?
22 See footnote 9 on p. 278.
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Our recommendation is to use Fregean concepts to do the job previously
done by pluralities. Instead of giving a plurality-based semantics, we should
give a second-order semantics based on Fregean concepts, as explained in
Section 7.5. Of course, this means that we must accept enough Fregean
concepts to serve the needs of semantics; in particular, we need a universal
concept to serve as our absolutely unrestricted domain of quantification.
While promising, this strategy raises some hard follow-up questions,
two of which are particularly pressing. First, we argued that every plurality
defines a set, which forced us to restrict plural comprehension (see Sec-
tions 12.3 and 12.4). Can an analogous argument be given that every Fregean
concept defines some sort of object, thus forcing us to restrict second-order
comprehension? If so, this might imperil our strategy of using higher-order
logic to develop a generalized semantics. Second, we argued that traditional
plural logic, when combined with absolute generality and a desire for a
generalized semantics, forces us to ascent to higher and higher levels of the
plural hierarchy (see Section 11.5). This gives rise to an expressibility deficit
akin to that which afflicts generality relativism.Does our use of second-order
logic, combined with the same assumptions, force an analogous ascent in the
conceptual hierarchy, resulting in an analogous expressibility deficit?
Let us take the questions in order. Concerning the first, recall that our
argument that every plurality defines a set relies essentially on the exten-
sional definiteness of pluralities. Without the assumption of extensional
definiteness, our liberal view of definitions would not licence the relevant
definitions. Suppose we wish to use some sort of collection to define a set
whose elements are precisely the members of this collection. We showed
that when the collection is extensionally definite—as any plurality is—the
assumptions of our liberal view are satisfied and the attempted definition
succeeds. But when the collection fails to be extensionally definite—as is
often the case with Fregean concepts—the assumptions are not satisfied and
the definition can be dismissed as illegitimate. Thus, our argument does not
extend from pluralities to Fregean concepts. As far as the views defended
in this book are concerned, it is wide open which Fregean concepts, if any,
define corresponding objects and what the resulting restriction on second-
order comprehension, if any, would have to be.
The second question, concerning an ascent into the conceptual hierarchy
and a resulting expressibility deficit, is harder. As discussed, wewish to retain
absolute generality and to develop a generalized semantics. Suppose that we
also accepted traditional second-order logic, with its unrestricted second-
order comprehension scheme. Then all the assumptions of the argument
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developed in Section 11.5 would be satisfied, and we would thus be forced
to ascend higher and higher in the conceptual hierarchy. Wouldn’t this be
unacceptable? Let us consider three increasingly ambitious responses.
The least ambitious response is to bite the bullet and admit the forced
ascent into the conceptual hierarchy as well as the ensuing expressibility
deficit. The resulting view would be on a par with generality relativism,
which suffers from an analogous expressibility deficit. But the resulting view
would at least have one advantage vis-à-vis traditional generality absolutism,
namely that it retains full expressibility with respect to the plural hierarchy,
accommodating the universal singularization provided by the transition
from some things to their set. Even so, we do not find this option very appeal-
ing: it is much too close to the generality relativism that we sought to avoid.
A more ambitious response, if forced to ascend into the conceptual
hierarchy, is to lift the veil of type distinctions along the lines explained
in Section 11.7, so as to return to an untyped language that ensures full
expressibility. We regard this strategy as promising but are mindful of the
fact that it will be significantly harder to implement it in the case of the
conceptual hierarchy than in the case of the plural one. The intuitive barrier
to lifting the veil appears greater for the conceptual hierarchy than for the
plural one. Perhaps this is because we are familiar with cumulativity in the
latter case but not the former.
Moreover, in the conceptual case, we face the question of how to handle
predication in the one-sorted language used to lift the veil. When the veil is
lifted, all the predicates of the original typed language are subsumed under a
single category. (Of course, predicates would still be distinguished according
to their adicity.) But the one-sorted language will include predicates of its
own, such as a generalized identity predicate and the application predicate
‘η’, both of which figured crucially in the translation into the one-sorted
language described in Section 11.7. Presumably, these predicates too must
have semantic values. But if so, we face a treacherous dilemma. Can these
semantic values figure as values of the single sort of variables? If they can,
then paradox will threaten, for example, by considering the interpretation
of ‘x does not apply to itself ’. If they cannot, we will have failed to restore full
expressibility.23
The most ambitious response is to reject traditional second-order logic in
favor of a more critical one that restricts the second-order comprehension
scheme. This would mean that the assumptions on which the ascent phe-
23 See Hale and Linnebo forthcoming for discussion of whether, and if so how, this dilemma
can be resolved.
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nomenon relies are no longer granted, with the result that the pressure to
ascend ceases. What kind of restriction might be appropriate? The desired
critical higher-order logic would have to balance two potentially opposing
needs. It would have to be weak enough to block the ascent, while simul-
taneously being strong enough to serve the needs of generalized semantics.
Although much remains to be investigated, there are indications that this
balancing act might be doable.2⁴
12.9 What we have learnt
This book has centered around the three overarching questions outlined in
Chapter 1. We would like to end our discussion by revisiting those questions
and recapitulating the answers we have developed throughout the book.
First there was:
The legitimacy of primitive plurals
Should the plural resources of English and other natural languages be
taken at face value or be eliminated in favor of the singular?
As emphasized already inChapter 1, different considerations pull in different
directions. On the one hand, the success of set theory suggests that we may
be able to dispense with the many: the “ones” provided by set theory suffice
for our theoretical needs. On the other hand, considerations from natural
language and the paradoxes appear to show that it is impossible consistently
to eliminate every “many” in favor of corresponding “ones”.
While natural language does indeed provide some evidence in favor of
primitive plurals, we have argued that this evidence is not entirely conclusive
(Chapter 2). We have even stronger reservations about the arguments from
paradox (Chapter 3). The stronger of these arguments depend on both
absolute generality and traditional plural logic. While we accept absolute
generality, we have argued that this form of generality makes traditional
plural logic problematic. However, this does not mean that we give up on
primitive plurals. There is a significant though underappreciated reason in
their favor: plural resources are of great value for the explanation of sets
(Chapter 4). In short, while some of the well-known arguments for primitive
2⁴ Promising approaches are developed in Fine 2005a, Linnebo 2006, Schindler 2019, and
work in progress by Sam Roberts.
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plurals are less compelling than many philosophers think, a less well-known
argument is quite powerful.
Once primitive plurals have been recognized, our second overarching
question arises, namely:
How primitive plurals relate to the singular
What is the relation between the plural and the singular? We have
been particularly interested in the circumstances under which many
objects correspond to a single, complex “one” and whether any such
correspondence can shed light on the complex “ones”.
Attempts to answer these questions are constrained by a key fact:
Plural Cantor
For any plurality xx with two or more members, the subpluralities of xx
are strictly more numerous than the members of xx.
Plural Cantor leads to a tricky trilemma (Chapter 11): we cannot
simultaneously accept the possibility of absolute generality, the existence of
universal singularizations, and traditional plural logic. Part IV explored the
theoretical consequences of choosing among its three horns, which amounts
to accepting one of the following three “package deals”:
(i) generality relativism;
(ii) generality absolutism with traditional plural logic but no universal
singularizations;
(iii) generality absolutism with critical plural logic and universal singu-
larizations.
We have defended the third package based on three sets of considerations.
To begin with, the first two options are afflicted with expressibility deficits.
Moreover, if we restore full expressibility by lifting the veil of type dis-
tinctions, there is a compelling argument for abandoning traditional plural
logic, as is done by the third option. Finally, this option is also supported
by a plausible account of permissible definitions, according to which a
mathematical object exists whenever an adequate definition of it can be
provided.
Our third and final overarching question addresses the significance of
plural logic as a tool:
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The significance of primitive plurals
What are the philosophical and (more broadly) scientific consequences
of taking plurals at face value?
The fact that primitive plural resources are available in thought and language
is itself highly significant. Philosophers often make strong further claims on
behalf of primitive plurals, in particular, that they:
(i) help us eschew problematic ontological commitments, thus greatly
aiding metaphysics and the philosophy of mathematics;
(ii) ensure the determinacy of higher-order quantification;
(iii) require us to redo semantics in a way that uses primitive plurals not
only in the object language but also in the metalanguage.
We have argued that these three claims are severely exaggerated. Plural
quantification is not ontological innocent, at least not in themost interesting
sense of this expression (Chapter 8). While it may not carry ontological
commitments to objects, it does carry substantive commitments that can be
precisely measured by means of a Henkin semantics. The same semantics
reveals that plural logic, even on its plurality-based model theory, is not
immune from non-standard interpretations and fails to secure a gain in
expressive power.
Finally, employing primitive plurals in the semantics is not always
required. When the domain is extensionally definite—which domains of
natural language typically are—the domain can be represented either as a
plurality or as its corresponding set. So wherever we can use plurals, we can
also use sets (or, for that matter, individual sums). Linguists can therefore
largely be acquitted of the charge of error. The only exception concerns
certain uses of language of particular interest to philosophers, namely those
where the domain is all-encompassing and thus, on our view, extensionally
indefinite. In such cases, we must look beyond the extensional resources of
plural logic, set theory, and individual mereology.
Let us finally return to the question of whether plural logic is really “pure
logic”. Three alleged features of pure logicality were identified in Section 2.5:
topic-neutrality, formality, and epistemic primacy. We have no quarrel with
the idea that plural logic is topic neutral, that is, that it is applicable to
reasoning about any domain. However, we have argued that some domains
are extensionally indefinite and for that reason require critical rather than
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traditional plural logic. We focused on two components of formality. We
grant that plural logic does not discriminate between objects, but we deny
that it is ontologically innocent, at least in the most interesting sense of that
term. Finally, does plural logic permit a special kind of epistemic primacy?
A negative answer was defended in Section 12.5, where we argued that both
the concepts of plural logic and the justification of its principles are entangled
with set theory.
All in all, we hope to have shown that plural logical is a tool of great value
and theoretical interest, both in its own right and for the hard questions it
raises concerning the relation between the many and the one—in semantics,
metaphysics, and the philosophy of mathematics. The value of this tool does
not require that it qualify as “pure logic” in any robust sense.
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